Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 902 (GAU)

Lalla Ryntathiang v. Josimuddin Ahmed

2010-11-30

B.K.SHARMA

body2010
B.K. Sharma, J. - This is an application under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. for quashing the proceeding of the criminal case being C.R. No. 2Q4(S)/2010 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong. 2. The petitioner is the Manger in the establishment of M/s OPTIONS Show room at Star Plaza Shopping Complex, G.S. Road, Police Bazar, Shillong. On the other hand, the respondent who is the complainant in the aforesaid C.R. Case, is a businessman. He alongwith one Shri Rahmat Ali Dhanani, Managing Director of M/s Dhanani Shoes Co. Ltd. is running the Star Plaza Shpping Complex and has let out the shops to different tenants on monthly rental basis. 3. In paragraph-3 of the petition, it has been stated that the respondent was appointed as Supervisor cum Manager of M/s OPTIONS and LEVIS prior to appointment of the petitioner. In paragraph-4 of the petition, it has been stated that the appointment of the respondent as such was dispensed with w.e.f. 11.08.09 and in his place the petitioner was appointed as Manager. 4. In paragraph-5 of the revision petition, it has been stated that due to the differences between the respondent and the other joint owner Shri Rehmat Ali Dhanani, they arrived at a compromise by executing a deed of compromise on 09.09.09. However, in spite of such deed of compromise, the respondent always nurtured a grievance for dispensation of his service as Manager from the two show rooms, i.e. M/s OPTIONS and LEVIS. As a consequence, he kept on interfering and disturbing with the affairs of the two show rooms and threatened the staff of the company. 5. The respondent alongwith some other persons entered into the show room, i.e. M/s OPTIONS, on 08.12.09 and assaulted the staff including the lady employees. In addition, they also looted an amount of Rs. 1,42,000/-. An FIR was lodged on 08.12.09 by the petitioner with Shillong Sadar Police Station which was registered as Sadar PS. Case No. 211(12)/09 under Section 379/323/354/34 IPC. Be it stated here that the respondent had obtained anticipatory bail on 11.12.09 in connection with this case. 6. Apart from the aforesaid FIR, another FIR was also lodged on 01.09.09 by Shri Rehmat Ali Dhanani against the respondent for creating obstruction in running the affairs of the shop by putting lock and key. Be it stated here that the respondent had obtained anticipatory bail on 11.12.09 in connection with this case. 6. Apart from the aforesaid FIR, another FIR was also lodged on 01.09.09 by Shri Rehmat Ali Dhanani against the respondent for creating obstruction in running the affairs of the shop by putting lock and key. According to the petitioner, as a sequel to the aforesaid affairs and the desire of the respondent to have his say in the affairs of the shop, he falsely lodged a complaint against the petitioner with the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong which has been registered as C.R. No. 204(S)/2010 under Section 500 of the IPC. The learned Court below having taken cognizance of the complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. issued process against the petitioner by order dated 07.05.2010. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of the said proceeding. 7. I have heard Ms. PDB Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. MF Quereshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner has-submitted that the complaint as has been filed by the respondent having not disclosed any offence against the petitioner, the learned Court below ought not have taken cognizance of the same so as to issue the process against her. She further submits that having regard to the earlier FIR lodged by the petitioner against the respondent, as a sequel of the same, the respondent tiled the complaint case against her as an act of retaliation, a fact which the learned Court below ought to have taken note of before issuance of the process in a mechanical manner. She has placed reliance on the flowing decisions: 1) 2009(1)GLT 609 :Ravijhunjhunwala & Anr. Vs. Paw an Kumar Mishra & Anr. 2) (2008) 5 SCC 668 : Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 3) (2002) 1 SCC 241 : S. W. Palanitkar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 4) AIR 1936 Allahabad 780: Raghunath Singh Parmar Vs. Mukandi lal. 5) 1985 Crl. L.J. 1121: Krishna Sadan Ghosh Vs. Govind Prasad Saraf. 8. Countering the above argument, Mr. Quereshi, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Court will be reluctant to quash the proceeding initiated by the learned Court below. He submits that no reason is required to be recorded towards issuance of the process. Mukandi lal. 5) 1985 Crl. L.J. 1121: Krishna Sadan Ghosh Vs. Govind Prasad Saraf. 8. Countering the above argument, Mr. Quereshi, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Court will be reluctant to quash the proceeding initiated by the learned Court below. He submits that no reason is required to be recorded towards issuance of the process. He further submits that since the petitioner would get ample opportunity to defend her case in the proceeding before trial Court, this Court exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will not sit on appeal over the decision of the learned Trial Court to take cognizance of the matter and issuance of the process against the petitioner. 9. Mr. Quereshi has also placed reliance on the following decisions: 1) AIR 1992 SC 604 : State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan lal & Ors. 2) AIR 1983 SC 67 : Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors. 3) 2000 Crl. L.J. 1799 (SC) : U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs M/s Mohan Meakins Ltd. & Ors. 10. In Ravijhunjhunwala (supra), referring to the decision of the Apex Court, it was observed that primary test of the Court at the time of taking cognizance is to see as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding or not. In paragraph-17 of the judgment it was observed thus: 17. In the case before me, although the letters, allegedly written by the victim woman to the accused, photographs and other documents were submitted to establish the point that the marriage was registered voluntarily and without any fraudulent mind or method, the respondent has not filed any counter disputing the aforesaid facts and genuineness of the documents. It is true that the new sets of document are ordinarily not examined by the High Court. However, I am of the view that the High Courts, while examining an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and also being a supervisory authority of the subordinate Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 483 Cr.P.C. it has an onerous duty to see that justice is secured and injustice is prevented sans technical hindrances. To say if differently, High Courts cannot suo moto put its hands into shackles and close its eyes to allow perpetuation of apparent injustice and abuse of process of law. 11. To say if differently, High Courts cannot suo moto put its hands into shackles and close its eyes to allow perpetuation of apparent injustice and abuse of process of law. 11. In S.W. Palanitkar (supra), the Apex Court referring to its earlier decisions observed that the legal position regarding quashing of proceeding is to see as to whether uncontrovered allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. Referring to the particular complaint in question and the sworn statement of the complainant, it was held that there was nothing to pursue the trial Court to take cognizance of the offence alleged. 12. In Maksud Saiyed (supra), it was observed that where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition field in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.. the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. It was observed that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is serious matter and that criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It was further held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He is also required to examine the nature of the allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof. 13. In Krishna Sadan Ghosh (supra), the Patna High Court dealing with a same nature of case, held that when there is no material before the Magistrate on the basis of which he could issue process against the accused to stand his trial, it will be gross abuse of the process of the Court if the accused is made to stand to his trial. This case has been referred so as to argue that there is no mateiral to link the petitioner with the publication of the particular news item about which mention has been made below. 14. Raghunath Singh Parmar (supra) was a case of liability in tort. The Allahabad High Court held that there would bar to remedy against another where there are joint tort-feasors and a compromise with one of them would debar the plaintiff from seeking remedy against others. 15. 14. Raghunath Singh Parmar (supra) was a case of liability in tort. The Allahabad High Court held that there would bar to remedy against another where there are joint tort-feasors and a compromise with one of them would debar the plaintiff from seeking remedy against others. 15. In Bhajan lal (supra), the Apex Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. and the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court in a series of decisions relating to exercise of extra ordinary power under 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent power under Section 482 Cr. PC. enumerated certain circumstances in which the particular jurisdiction can be exercised which are as follows: 1) Whether the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2) Whether the allgations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in suport of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. 5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act. 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act. providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party, 7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly atended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously institued with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 16. In U.P. Pollution Control Board (supra), the Apex Court held that there is no hard and fast rule regarding recording of the reasons towards issuance of process for taking cognizance of the matter. In the said decision an earlier decision reported in (2000) 1 SCC 722 : Kanti Bhadra Shah Vs. State of West Bengal has also been referred to wherein it was held that in absence of any legal requirement, the trial Court need not write an order showing the reasons for issuance of the process and that mere non-mentioning of reasons may not be enough to quash the proceeding. 17. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), it was observed thus : 9. It is therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stage can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the present Code. 18. The above decisions are on the circumstances under which the Court can exercise the power and jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C/so as to quash the proceedings. The decisions have also been referred to so as to bring home the arguments that in the instant case there is no materials to connect the petitioner, even remotely, with the offence alleged. According to the petitioner she being only the Manager of the show room, she has unnecessarily been dragged to the instant proceeding, although the real dispute is between the owners of the shop premises. 19. According to the petitioner she being only the Manager of the show room, she has unnecessarily been dragged to the instant proceeding, although the real dispute is between the owners of the shop premises. 19. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is too pre­mature to judge the matter on merit and that the Trial Court having taken cognizance of the matter should be allowed to bring the same to its logical end. 20. The whole basis of the complaint is the two newspaper reports in two different newspapers. Annexure-I is the newspaper report dated 11.12.2009, while Annexure-2 newspaper report is dated 12.12.2009. By the said two newspaper reports, the incident in respect of which the petitioner had lodged the FIR referred to above, has been narrated. While narrating the incident, the particular remark stated to have been made by the particular organization has been reported in the first news paper report. However, in the second newspaper report such narration has been attributed to the petitioner. In the first newspaper report, the particular statement is: "The people who were eyewitnesses to the incident said that the accused while assaulting the victim also stated that Police Bazar area is under the European Ward and so Khasi people do not have any right to do business and work in the area". On the other hand, in the second newspaper the particular statement is: "Jaisimuddin, according to Laila, warned that Police Bazar was not meant for Khasi to do business, "Police Bazar is excusively meant for non-tribal and their business." 21. Although the proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner, but interestingly the owner, publisher and the editor of both the newspapers are not the party of the proceeding. There is no allegation against the said parties. Unless some materials are brought connecting the petitioner towards publication of the said newspaper reports, mere publication of the said two news item cannot be said to be enough towards imitating the proceeding under Section 500IPC. There is no material to establish that the statements attributed to the petitioner in the second newspaper report was in fact, made by her. 22. By the impugned order dated 20.04.09, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong upon referring to the deposition of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C., fixed the matter for recording deposition of other witnesses on 07.05.2010. There is no material to establish that the statements attributed to the petitioner in the second newspaper report was in fact, made by her. 22. By the impugned order dated 20.04.09, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong upon referring to the deposition of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C., fixed the matter for recording deposition of other witnesses on 07.05.2010. On 07.05.2010 he examined the other witnesses and without discussing the materials on record took cognizance of the case under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. While doing so, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate did not record any reason deriving satisfaction from the materials, about which the Apex Court and this Court in the aforementioned decisions have emphasized. In Bhajan lal (supra), the Apex Court while enumerating the guidelines towards exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has dealt with this aspect of the matter. 23. Coupled with the above, the fact that the petitioner was instrumental in lodging the FIR against the respondent in respect of which the incident was referred to and narrated in the two newspapers, will go to show that there was some kind of tension between the petitioner and the respondent. It is in this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the particular complaint was lodged against the petitioner as a sequel to the FIR lodged by the petitioner against the respondent. That apart, the newspaper reports themselves are uncertain as to the involvement of the petitioner in making the particular statement. The learned Court below solely on the basis of the complaint lodged and the evidence adduced without disclosing the materials on record, could not have taken cognizance of the complaint lodged by the respondent, more particularly in the absence of any material whatsoever connecting the petitioner to the statements in question and/or attributing the said statements to her. 24. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the proceeding in C.R. No. 204(S)/2010 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shillong is not sustainable in law and the said proceeding is liable to be quashed which I accordingly do. 25. At this stage, Mr. Quereshi, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the quashing of the proceeding may not be a bar for the respondent to pursue legal remedy in civil law. No opinion is expressed in this regard. 25. At this stage, Mr. Quereshi, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the quashing of the proceeding may not be a bar for the respondent to pursue legal remedy in civil law. No opinion is expressed in this regard. It will be entirely upon the respondent to pursue such remedy, if available in law. 26. The criminal revision petition is allowed, without, however, any order as to costs.