ORDER Anand Byrareddy, J. : Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. The facts briefly stated are as follows: The petitioners are the plaintiffs before the Trial Court and they have filed a suit for declaration of ownership of the suit property and injunction. The suit is contested by the defendants. The defendants 1 and 2 have filed their written statement. Defendants 3 to 6 however, have filed a petition under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, along with the plaintiffs. The said petition is pending consideration. The suit having been proceeded with against defendant No.2, who is the contesting party, a memorandum of partition dated 25.05.1988 was sought to be marked in evidence by the plaintiffs-petitioners herein. Objections were raised for marking the said document and the Trial Court has refused permission to, mark the document in evidence. The plaintiffs thereafter filed an application in I.A. No. VII seeking permission to mark the document, on be the ground that even an unregistered document can be marked in evidence for a collateral purpose. That application was contested. The Trial Court by the impugned order has dismissed the application. It is that which is challenged in the present writ petition. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contends, while reiterating the above sequence of events, that by the impugned order substantial injustice has been caused. The Trial Court has overlooked the circumstance that even an unregistered memorandum of parition was admissible in evidence for collateral purposes. On an interpretation of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Registration Act', for brevity). The finding of the Trial Court that the document in question was not a memorandum of partition, is improper and that, on an overall reading of the document, it is possible to construe the document as a memorandum of partition. It is to support these contentions that reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the following judgments: 1. Kuberappa and Ors. Vs. T.C. Gopal and Ors. reported in AIR 2009(5) Kar R 510. 2. S. Kaladevi Vs. V.R. Somasundaram & Ors., Reported in AIR 2010(2) Kar R 758. 3. Nani Bai Vs. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge reported in AIR 1958 (SC) 706 . 4. Padma Vithoba Chakkayya Vs. Molid Multani reported in AIR 1963 (SC) 70 . Kuberappa and Ors. Vs. T.C. Gopal and Ors. reported in AIR 2009(5) Kar R 510. 2. S. Kaladevi Vs. V.R. Somasundaram & Ors., Reported in AIR 2010(2) Kar R 758. 3. Nani Bai Vs. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge reported in AIR 1958 (SC) 706 . 4. Padma Vithoba Chakkayya Vs. Molid Multani reported in AIR 1963 (SC) 70 . 5. Mattapalli Chelamayya Vs. Mattapalli Venkataratnam reported in AIR 1972 (SC) 1121 . 6. Darshan Singh Vs. Samsher Singh reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 7. Mahadeva Vs. Commissioner, Mysore City Corporation reported in AIR 2003 Kar 217 . 8. K.G. Shivalingappa Vs. G.S. Eswarappa reported in 2004 CLT 98 -485 9. K.B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Development Consultant Ltd. reported in 2008 TLPRE-797. 4. While on the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent would seek to justify the impugned order and place reliance on the decision in Hallera Dyamappaand Others Vs. Tarihalli Karibasappa, 2010 (4) Kar.L.J. 124 . 5. It is seen that the Trial Court has rejected the application primarily on the ground that there was already an order passed earlier, refusing permission to mark the said document. Whereby on a close perusal of the document in question, the Court had already concluded that the parties have effected partition under the document and have allotted their respective shares under the very document and therefore, the same could not be construed as a memorandum of partition. Therefore, has concluded that the document was compulsorily registrable in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act and therefore, was not admissable in evidence. Hence has concluded that entertaining the application would tantamount to sitting in appeal over its own decision, rendered earlier. 6. In any event, the question for consideration by this Court is whether the Trial Court was justified in refusing permission to mark the document in question in evidence for want of registration. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has sought to place reliance on the several decisions in support of the petition. 8. In Nani Bai's case supra, which was a defendants appeal from the High Court of Bombay, one of the questions that arose for consideration was whether certain documents which were exhibited would operate, or create a right or interest in immovable property within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. 8. In Nani Bai's case supra, which was a defendants appeal from the High Court of Bombay, one of the questions that arose for consideration was whether certain documents which were exhibited would operate, or create a right or interest in immovable property within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. On a close interpretation of the documents, the Supreme Court has observed that partition in the Mithakshara sense may be severance of the joint status ofthe members of a co-parcenery, that is to say, what was once a joint title has become a divided title, though there has been no division of any properties by metes and bounds. Parition may also means, what is ordinarily understood by partition among co-parceners, who may not be members of a Hindu Coparcenery. For partition in the former sense, it is not necessary that all the members of the joint family should agree because, it is a matter of individual volition. If a co-parcener expresses his individual intention in unequivocal language to separate himself from the rest of the family that effects partition, so far as he is concerned from the rest of the family. By this process, what was ajoint tenancy has been converted into a tenancyin-common. For partition in the latter sense, of allotting specific properties or parcels to individuals co-parceners agreement amongst all the coparceners is absolutely necessary. Such a partiton may be effected orally. But if the parties reduce the transaction through a formal document which is intended to be the evidence of parition, it has the effect of declaring the exclusive title of the co-parcener to whom a particular property is allotted by partition and is thus, withiri the mischief of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. But partition in the former sense of defining the shares only, without specific allotment of the property has no reference to immovable property. Such a transaction only affects the status of the member or the members who have separated themselves from the rest of the co-parcenery. The change of status from a joint member of a co-parcenery to a separated member having a definite share in the ancestral property, may be effected orally or it may be brought about by a document. If the document does not evidence any partition in the latter sense, it does not come within the purview of Section 17(1)(b). The change of status from a joint member of a co-parcenery to a separated member having a definite share in the ancestral property, may be effected orally or it may be brought about by a document. If the document does not evidence any partition in the latter sense, it does not come within the purview of Section 17(1)(b). Because, so long there has been a partition, in that sense, the interest of the separated member continues to extend over the whole joint property as before. Such a transaction does not purport or operate to do any of the things referred to in that Section and the Supreme Court concluded, that insofar as the documents, referred to in that case, was evidence of parition only in the former sense and therefore, were not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 and shall not come within the mischief of Section 49, which prohibits the reception into evidence of any document effecting immovable property and it was held that the documents were rightly received in evidence for a limited purpose. 9. In Mattapalli Chelamayya's case supra, the question that arose for consideration was as regards the terms of an award by arbitrators, under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellants before the Apex Court were made liable to pay certain amounts personally, to the respondents, along with interest and that amount was made a charge on the immovable properties in the possession of the appellants. The Apex Court was dealing with the effect of non-registration of the said award. The Apex Court held that insofar as the direction to pay a sum of money by one party to another is concerned, it was held that there was no difficulty, because it creates a personal liability and an award containing such a direction did not require to be registered. But the contention that was raised was that since the award creates a charge also, for the payment of that amount, on immovable properties, the whole transaction was to be regarded as one arid unseverable and since a charge requires to be registered, the instrument could not be received in evidence, for want of registration. The High Court had rejected such a contention. The High Court had rejected such a contention. The Supreme Court held that it was rightly rejected; And while interpreting the scope of Section 49 of the Act, the Supreme Court held that since the award was not registered, it would be correct to hold that the document would not affect immovable properties of the appellants. It cannot also be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the said property as evidence of the charge. But the Apex Court observed that the Section does not indicate that the document cannot be received in evidence at all and if under the Evidence Act, the document was receivable in evidence for a collateral purpose, Section 49 was no bar and this legal position has been duly recognized by the amending Act 21 of 1929, which has added a proviso to the Section. The Apex Court concluded that the direction to pay a sum of money which had been held due and payable by the appellants to the respondents did not create a liability for the first time, but merely worked out the liability, but the same cannot be said about the charge which was created for the first time. The Court concluded that the case involved two distinct matters, one being a personal liability to pay a certain amount and the second, an additional. relief to recover that amount from the immovable property of the appellants and that the two did not form one transaction, but two severable transactions. That the test would be, whether the transaction evidenced by the particular instrument is single and indivisible or whether it really evidences two transactions which can be severable from each other. One as creating an independent personal obligation and the other, as merely strengthening it by adding a right to proceed against immovable property. But it was also observed that it is not enough if there was an obligation to pay a sum of money, but it was also necessary that the obligation should have an independent existence and be in no way contingent or conditional on the breach of some obligations relating to immovable property created by some instrument for the contingency or the condition and the obligation would then be a part of one indivisible transaction. 10. 10. In Darshan Singh's case supra, the case involved four brothers, who were the plaintiffs, who along with the defendants, were the descendants of a common ancestor. The two branches of the family had joint ancestral properties. The agricultural lands were partitioned and which was followed by a further partition of residential properties. This fact was embodied in a memorandum of partition. It was claimed that the parties had remained in separate exclusive possession of their respective properties. However, a dispute having arisen in respect of the plaintiffs intention to construct over a portion of one item of property, the parties were before the Court. A learned Single Judge as well as a Division Bench of the High Court, construed the document, which came in for interpretation, as a memorandum of family arrangement and not as an instrument of partition requiring registration and therefore, was held admissible in evidence under the proviso to Section 49 of the Act. The Apex Court on a close interpretation of the content of the document, held that, while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or serving ownership and causing a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to such a document, would require registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. But a writing which merely recites that, there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter would be whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction and it was well settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration and has held that Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should by its own force operate, or purport to operate, to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place, cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place, cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow: (1) A partition may be effected orally, but it if is subsequently reduced into a form of document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of a bargain it will be necessary to register it. If it is not registered, Section 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondly, the evidence of factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists, which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered to prove the fact of partition. 11. In that case before the Apex Court, it held there was a partition by metes and bounds of agricultural lands effected in the year 1955 and the shares allotted to the two branches were separately mutated in the revenue records. There was thus the destruction of a joint status. All that remained was a partition of the ancestral house and a smaller house and that the document in question did not effect partition, but merely recorded the nature of arrangement arrived at as regards the division of the remaining property. A mere agreement to divide does not require registration, but if the writing itself effected a division, it would require registration. 12. Strong reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kuberappa Vs. T.C. Gopal's supra. The facts in that case were, the suit was filed for partition and separate possession. The defendants, inter-alia, contended that a partition had already taken place and the question of a further partition did not arise. At the stage of evidence, the defendants sought to produce a partition deed. This was opposed on the ground that it was not duly stamped and registered. The objection was upheld by the Trial Court and therefore, the parties were before this Court. 13. At the stage of evidence, the defendants sought to produce a partition deed. This was opposed on the ground that it was not duly stamped and registered. The objection was upheld by the Trial Court and therefore, the parties were before this Court. 13. This Court while referring to Section 34 of The Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, opined that an unregistered document which requires compulsorily to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act can be received in evidence to prove a collateral transaction. This Court has held that the meaning to be attributed to the words "collateral transaction" as employed in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act to mean and include a transaction between the parties in a deed which did not require registration. This Court has held as follows: "All and every transactions between two parties do not require registration. In such of the transactions specified under Section 17 of the Act are compulsory registrable. There may be transactions between the parties in a particular deed which requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Act and there may also be transactions which do not require registration. Therefore an unregistered document requiring compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Act can be received in evidence to prove collateral transactions which do not require registration. Say for example, status of a party, the relationship between the parties, the nature of properties, severance of status among members of the family are all transactions between which do not require registration." While holding as above, this Court has relied on the following passage from Darshan Singh's case supra namely, "It is well settled that the document though unregistered can however be looked into for the limited purpose of establishing a severance in status, though that severance would ultimately affect the nature of the possession held by the members of the separated family as co-tenants. The document Ex.P-12 can be used for the limited purpose and a collateral purpose of showing that subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide." And has also placed reliance on a passage from the decision in Umakant Rao Vs. The document Ex.P-12 can be used for the limited purpose and a collateral purpose of showing that subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide." And has also placed reliance on a passage from the decision in Umakant Rao Vs. Lalitabai, 1988 (2) KLJ 155 to the following effect: "a document contains matters relating to the relationship between the parties, the nature of properties, the severance of status of members of joint family are all collateral in nature do not require registration." 14. In the light of the ratio in Nani Bai's case supra, wherein the Apex Court has discussed the difference between a document merely recording a severance of joint status of the members of a co-parcenery and a document evidencing a parition, whereby there is allotment of specific properties or parcels to individual co-parceners and its opinion as to whether the one or the other would require registration or not; And as to how transactions evidenced under the same document, if are capable of severance and one of the transactions requiring registration and the other not so required to be registered, as discussed in Mattapalli Chelamayya's case and finally having regard to the discussion in Darshan Singh's case, the fact that the document in question was a mere agreement to divide which did not by itself effect division. The appellant seeking to place reliance on the above decision of this Court in Kuberappa's case, could not advance the case of the petitioners. For in the present case on hand, the transactions that are sought to be urged as being severable namely, the severance of joint status of the parties and the actual division and allotment of shares to the respective co-parceners, is one indivisible transaction and is not capable of serverance as sought to be contended. When the transactions so evidenced by the document are not divisible, or are not capable of severance, the question of the document being admissible in evidence is not tenable. Therefore, in the instant case, the document was compulsorily registerable and the Trial Court was right in its view. Hence the petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.