Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 918 (ALL)

U. P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Kaleemullah

2010-03-18

DEVI PRASAD SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT Devi Prasad Singh, J.—Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the award passed by the Addl. Collector, Bahraich awarding compensation in pursuance to power conferred by the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, in short Act and the rules framed thereunder. The question involved is whether the competent authority lacks jurisdiction to award compensation more than the amount provided under the Schedule of the Act in pursuance to the provisions contained in Section 3 ? 2. In brief, on 28.5.2001, Shri Barkatullah and his wife Smt. Fatima Begum happens to be father and mother of the private respondent succumbed to electric shock by the electricity wire possessing 11000 volt of current when they were going to Kaiserganj on their scooter. The accident occurred near village Chakpihani on Gandara Kaiserganj road. Both Shri Barkatullah and Smt. Fatima succumbed to the electric shock at the spot. A first information report was lodged on 28.5.2001 at police station, Kaiserganj. After the death of parent, private respondents have filed an application under Section 6 of the Act for payment of compensation. A Case Nos. 11 and 12 of 2001 was registered and adjudicated by the opposite party No. 7. With regard to the death of father, compensation claimed was for Rs. 4,63,776 and with regard to death of mother (in Case No. 12), compensation claimed was Rs. 4,80,000. 3. Before the Addl. Collector, the plaintiff respondents had filed the income certificate of Shri Barkatullah showing his monthly income as retired postmaster to the tune of Rs. 2,706. Apart from income certificate through pension, the complainant has also filed the copy of the death certificate, copy of the kutumb register and copy of the list of family members, paper cuttings, letter sent to authorities with regard to accident in question. It was specifically pleaded before the Presiding Officer that the electricity wire fell down over the road because of negligence on the part of the petitioner and in consequence thereof, the deceased succumbed to the electric shock. It was also pleaded that the flow of electric current was not switched of automatically after falling down of the wire on the road ; rather only after the accident when the deceased died, after receipt of information, the departmental employees have switched of the electricity current. It was also pleaded that the flow of electric current was not switched of automatically after falling down of the wire on the road ; rather only after the accident when the deceased died, after receipt of information, the departmental employees have switched of the electricity current. It was further pleaded that the electricity is a hazardous substance under Section 2 (d) of the Act and the Collector is empowered under Section 7 to render an award for payment of compensation. At the time of death, the deceased were survived by two sons, two daughters, i.e., four minor children. The deceased Barkatullah was the only earning member serving the family. 4. In response to the application moved by the respondents under Section 6 of the Act, the petitioners pleaded that they are not responsible to pay compensation as falling of wire was accidental and inadvertent. It was also stated that the maximum compensation which may be awarded is Rs. 25,000 in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. The petitioners had disowned the liability before the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority had considered the evidence led by the parties and awarded Rs. 62,472 on account of death of Shri Barkatullah keeping in view his age of 60 years. Rs. 1,30,000 as compensation was awarded for the death of Smt. Fatima Begum including the needs of minor children. The total compensation of Rs. 1,92,472 was awarded by the Addl. Collector. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court under the writ jurisdiction. By an interim order dated 13.11.2006, the writ petition was admitted and recovery proceedings were stayed subject to deposit of Rs. 5,000 and furnishing of bank guarantee in favour of the Registrar of this Court within fifteen days. 5. Solitary argument advanced by Shri Abdul Rashid, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent No. 7 could not have awarded compensation more than Rs. 25,000 as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It has been submitted that under the Act, the compensation may be awarded only in terms of the Schedule provided in view of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act with regard to no fault liability. 6. 25,000 as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It has been submitted that under the Act, the compensation may be awarded only in terms of the Schedule provided in view of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act with regard to no fault liability. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the private respondents submitted that the application was filed under Section 6 of the Act and the respondent No. 7 was well within power to award the compensation keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. It has been submitted that the provisions with regard to limit of Rs. 25,000 relates to no-fault liability whereas the provisions contained in Section 6 read with Section 7 deals with different situation and the competent authority has got power to award just and fair compensation keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Section 2 (d) of the Act defines "hazardous substance" and provides that it shall be same as defined under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986. Section 2 (e) of the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 defines hazardous substance as follows : "Hazardous substance means any substance or preparation which, by reasons of its Chemical or physicochemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, microorganism, property or the environment". "14. Section 3 of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 states : "3. Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no-fault.—(1) Where death or injury to any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage. (2) In any claim for relief under sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to in this Act as claim for relief) the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person. Explanation. — For the purposes of this section— (i) 'workman' has the meaning asigned to it in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) ; (ii) 'injury' includes permanent total or permanent partial disability or sickness resulting out of an accident." 15. Explanation. — For the purposes of this section— (i) 'workman' has the meaning asigned to it in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) ; (ii) 'injury' includes permanent total or permanent partial disability or sickness resulting out of an accident." 15. A perusal of Section 3 (1) shows that the owner is liable to pay damages to any person (other than workmen) where death or injury has resulted from an accident. The word accident has been defined in Section 2A of 1991 Act as follows : "Accident" means an accident or incident occurring while handling any hazardous substance." 16. The word "handling" has been defined in Section 2 (c) of the 1991 Act as following : "(c) handling", in relation to any hazardous substance, means the manufacture, processing, treatment, package, storage transportation by vehicle, use, collection, destruction, conversion, offering for sale, transfer or the like of such hazardous. 17. Owner has been defined in Section 2 (g) of 1991 Act as follows : 'Owner' means a person who has control over handling any hazardous substance." 18. Section 3 (2) incorporates the principle of strict liability regarding accidents due to hazardous substances, and this will be discussed later in this judgment. 19. Under Section 4 of the Act, the owner has to take out one or more insurance policies providing for contracts of insurance whereby he is insured against liability to give relief under sub-section (1) of Section 3. 8. Now, electricity may be called a hazardous substance. Electricity is the flow of free electrons in a particular direction at the particular moment. The flow can be any wire or even an atmosphere like lightening or in body or in other body. The electron is very small and it has been discovered by the scientist that an electron is a pins about an excess and it has got organic field. The electron is thus a material article and electricity is the flow of all these small material particulars in a particular direction. The flow consequently is the flow of a matter having physico chemical properties like when passed through water, it separates the hyderogen from the oxygen atoms (electrolysis). Thus, the electricity is a substance having physico chemical process and also hazardous. The flow consequently is the flow of a matter having physico chemical properties like when passed through water, it separates the hyderogen from the oxygen atoms (electrolysis). Thus, the electricity is a substance having physico chemical process and also hazardous. Accordingly, it is a hazardous substance covered by definition under the Act vide U. P. Electricity Board and another v. District Magistrate, Dehradun and others, AIR 1998 All 1 . 9. Accordingly, the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the electricity is not a hazardous substance is not sustainable. 10. Section 3 of the Act provides that where death or injury to any person or damage of any property has resulted from an accident, the Court shall be liable to give such relief as specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage. The schedule provides that an amount of Rs. 25,000 shall be paid in addition to reimbursement of medical expenses to the maximum limit of Rs. 12,500. However, a plain reading of Section 3 read with Schedule shows that the provisions relate to no-fault liability and the power conferred to the prescribed authority under Sections 6 and 7 deal with different situation. For convenience, Sections 3, 6 and 7 are reproduced as under : 3. Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no-fault.—(1) Where death or injury to any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in Schedule for such death, injury or damage. (2) In any claim for relief under sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to in this Act as claim for relief), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section— (i) "workman" has the meaning assigned to it in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) ; (ii) "injury" includes permanent total or permanent partial disability or sickness resulting out of an accident. 6. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section— (i) "workman" has the meaning assigned to it in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) ; (ii) "injury" includes permanent total or permanent partial disability or sickness resulting out of an accident. 6. Application for claim for relief.—(1) An application for claim for relief may be made— (a) by the person who has sustained thc injury ; (b) by the owner of the property to which thc damage has been caused ; (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of thc deceased ; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such property or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : Provided that where all thc legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for relief, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector and shall be in such form, contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed. (3) No application for relief shall be entertained unless it is made within five years of the occurrence of the accident. 7. Award of relief.—(1) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 6, the Collector shall after giving notice of the application to the owner and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, each of he claims, and may make an award determining the amount of relief which appears to him to be just and specifying thc person or persons to whom such amount of relief shall be paid. (2) The Collector shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of thc award. (2) The Collector shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of thc award. [(3) When an award is made under this section— (a) the insurer, who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award and to the extent specified in sub-section (2B) of Section 4, shall, within a period of thirty days of the date of announcement of the award, deposit that amount in such manner as the Collector may direct ; (b) the Collector shall arrange to pay from the Relief Fund, in terms of such award and in accordance with the scheme made under Section 7A, to the person or persons referred to in sub-section (1) such amount in such manner as may be specified in that scheme ; (c) the owner shall, within such period, deposit such amount in such manner as the Collector may direct.] (4) In holding any inquiry under sub-section (1), the Collector may, subject to any rules made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as he thinks fit. (5) The Collector shall have all the powers of civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed ; and the Collector shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) Where the insurer or the owner against whom the award is made under sub-section (1) fails to deposit the amount of such award within the period specified under sub-section (3), such amount shall be recoverable from the owner, or as the case may be, the insurer as arrears of land revenue or of public demand. (7) A claim for relief in respect of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of such claim within three months of the receipt of the application for relief under sub-section (1) of Section 6. (7) A claim for relief in respect of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of such claim within three months of the receipt of the application for relief under sub-section (1) of Section 6. [(8) Where an owner is likely to remove or dispose of his property with a view to evading payment by him of the amount of award, the Collector may, in accordance with the provisions contained in Rules I to 4 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908), grant a temporary injuction to restrain such act.] [7A. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, establish a fund to be known as the Environment Relief Fund. (2) The Relief Fund shall be utilised for paying, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the scheme, relief under the award made by the Collector under Section 7. (3) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make a scheme specifying the authority in which the relief fund shall vest, the manner in which the Fund shall be administered the form and the manner in which money shall be drawn from the Relief Fund and for all other matters connected with or incidental to thc administration of the Relief Fund and the payment of relief therefrom.] 11. A plain reading of Section 6 read with Section 7 shows that the dependent or heir of the person who sustained injury or suffered damages may move an application to the Collector under sub-section (1) of Section 6. The Collector shall hold an enquiry to make an award after determining the amount of relief which appears to him to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom such amount as relief shall be paid. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 empowers the Collector to make an award determining the amount of relief which appears to him to be just and proper. The Legislature to their wisdom has not provided any rider to the power of Collector with regard to quantum of compensation. The justness of compensation shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case in the event of death or injury. The Legislature to their wisdom has not provided any rider to the power of Collector with regard to quantum of compensation. The justness of compensation shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case in the event of death or injury. In case of death, the age, income, family status, number of dependents and other alike factors shall be relevant factors to adjudicate the quantum of compensation. 12. On the other hand, for benefit of Section 3, the age, income or other factors are immaterial for the purpose to award compensation. The provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 is mandatory for payment of specified compensation under the schedule. It shall not depend upon the age, income, number of dependants and other alike factor. The provisions contained in Sections 3 and 6 deal with different situation. 13. The provisions contained in Section 3 is analogous to Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The compensation paid in pursuance to power conferred by Section 3 is independent of provisions contained in Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act. Whether there is negligence or not on the part of the victim, he or his legal representative, as the case may be, shall be entitled to recover damages in pursuance to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It has been legislated to meet out the social demand in the manner as provided under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. Even if no application is moved by the dependents of the deceased or the victim it shall always be open to the Collector to award compensation under Section 3 read with Schedule of the Act on receipt of information with regard to death and injury caused because of hazardous substance. Whereas for higher compensation or compensation in terms of the injury caused, it shall always be obligatory for the injured or the dependent of the deceased to move appropriate application in terms of Section 6 of the Act. 15. It is necessary because the statement of object and reasons of the Act provide that because of growth of hazardous industries, process and operations, country is accompanied by growing risks by accident. Not only for the workmen employed in such undertaking but also innocent members of the public who may be in the vicinity. 15. It is necessary because the statement of object and reasons of the Act provide that because of growth of hazardous industries, process and operations, country is accompanied by growing risks by accident. Not only for the workmen employed in such undertaking but also innocent members of the public who may be in the vicinity. Keeping this broader principle, the Parliament to its wisdom has provided for mandatory public liability insurance for installation, handling hazardous substance to provide minimum relief to the victims. It shall be appropriate to reproduce the statement of objects and reasons of the Act : "Statement of Objects and Reasons.—The growth of hazardous industries, processes and operations in India has been accompanied by the growing risks from accidents, not only to the workmen employed in such undertakings, but also innocent members of the public who may be in the vicinity. Such accidents lead to death and injury to human beings and other living beings and damage to private and public properties. Very often, the majority of the people affected are from the economically weaker sections and suffer great hardships because of delayed relief and compensation. While workers and employees of hazardous installations are protected under separate laws, members of the public are not assured of any relief except through long legal processes. Industrial units seldom have the willingness to readily compensate the victims of accidents and the only remedy now available for the victims is to go through prolonged litigation in a Court of Law. Some units may not have the financial resources to provide even minimum relief. 2. It is felt essential, therefore, to provide for mandatory public liability insurance for installations handling hazardous substances to provide minimum relief to the victims. Such an insurance, apart from safeguarding the interests of the victims of accidents, would also provide cover and enable the industry to discharge its liability to settle large claims arising out of major accidents. If the objective of providing immediate relief is to be achieved, the mandatory public liability insurance should be on the principle of "no-fault" liability as it is limited to only relief on a limited scale. However, availability of immediate relief would not prevent the victims to go to Courts for claiming larger compensation." 16. If the objective of providing immediate relief is to be achieved, the mandatory public liability insurance should be on the principle of "no-fault" liability as it is limited to only relief on a limited scale. However, availability of immediate relief would not prevent the victims to go to Courts for claiming larger compensation." 16. In view of above, for the sake of repetition, it is held that the compensation under no-fault liability may be paid by the Collector after due investigation even if no application is moved by the victim who suffered injury or is the dependent of the deceased. In case the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 are interpreted otherwise with regard to award of compensation under no-fault liability, then it shall frustrate the very object of the Act with regard to persons who are downtrodden, illiterate or have got no skill, knowledge or capacity to approach the authority for payment of compensation under the Act. 17. In case argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then it shall amount to addition of words to the statute. Ordinarily the Courts should not add or delete words in a statute, vide Mohan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 2625 : 2007 (3) AWC 3021 (SC) and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and E.T.I.O. and others, AIR 2007 SC 1984 . The golden rule of construction of a statute is that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the Court must give effect to the words used in the statute, vide Promoters and Builders Association of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 2007 SC 1956 . 18. Moreover, the Act being beneficial legislation and for the maintenance of human rights the functional realism should be seen and not facial cosmetics as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. C. Mehta and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 1086 . While reiterating the principle involved in the case of Rammana Shett's case, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 17 as under : "17. While reiterating the principle involved in the case of Rammana Shett's case, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 17 as under : "17. The criteria evolved by this Court in Ramana Shett's case, AIR 1979 SC 1628 (supra) were applied by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 2 SCR 79 : AIR 1981 SC 487 at pages 492, 493, 494, where it was further emphasised that : Where constitutional fundamentals vital to the maintenance of human rights are at stake, functional realism and not facial cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool for constitutional law must seek the substance and not the form. Now it is obvious that the Government may act through the instrumentality or agency of natural persons or it may employ the instrumentality or agency of judicial persons to carry out its function......... It is really the Government which acts through the instrumentality or agency of the corporation and the juristic veil of corporate personality work for the purpose of convenience of management and administration cannot be allowed to obliterate the true nature of the reality behind which is the Government....... for it the Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional limitations it must follow a fortiori that the Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation should be equally subject to the same limitations. On the canon of construction to be adopted for interpreting constitutional guarantees the Court pointed out : .......Constitutional guarantees .........should not be allowed to be emasculated in their application by a narrow and constricted judicial interpretation. The Courts should be anxious to enlarge the scope and width of the fundamental rights by bringing within their sweep every authority which is an instrumentality or agency of the Government or through the corporate personality of which the Government is acting, so as to subject the Government in all its myriad activities, whether through natural persons or through corporate entities to the basic obligation of the fundamental rights." 19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta and another (supra) observed that the law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast-changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. The law cannot afford to remain static. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta and another (supra) observed that the law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast-changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. The law cannot afford to remain static. The Indian law should be developed not only keeping in view the pace with time but also ground realities of the country. We should evolve our own jurisprudence while dealing with complicated question of law and fact. 20. An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry poses a potential threat to the health and safety. The enterprise or the public undertaking have got obligation to regulate their hazardous activities alongwith highest standard of safety and if any harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such activity, there shall be absolute liability to compensate all those who are affected by such hazardous substance/ accident. Their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) observed that such liability is not subject to any of the exception which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit even in public interest, there shall be presumption under law that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity as an appropriate items of its overheads. 21. In a recent judgment with regard to accident claimed from Railway under the Railways Act in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijai Kumar and others, 2008 (2) TAC 777 (SC) : 2008 (3) ACCD 1440 : 2008 (5) AWC 5181 (SC), their Lordships have reiterated the principle enunciated in M.C. Mehta's case and held that Rylands v. Fletcher is not applicable in strict sense to decide the compensation in Indian context. It has been melodied down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with intention to provide complete justice to the sufferer/victim. 22. The power of Court is not only injunctive in ambit but is also remedial in scope to preserve and protect fundamental right of life and liberty. Keeping in view this broader principle, the compensation should be determined under the Act. 23. 22. The power of Court is not only injunctive in ambit but is also remedial in scope to preserve and protect fundamental right of life and liberty. Keeping in view this broader principle, the compensation should be determined under the Act. 23. While considering the no-fault liability and strict liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, in a case in Yallwwa (Smt) and others v. National Insurance Co. Limited and another, (2007) 6 SCC 657 : 2007 (2) ACCD 970 : 2007 (3) AWC 2480 (SC), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while considering the compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Court has not to see whether the owner of the vehicle in question was at fault or not. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that for payment for compensation under sub-section (3) of Section 140, the claimants shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim was made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle. Whereas Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates filing of a composite application and the Tribunal has to make award deciding the compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act in a just and fair manner. For convenience, relevant portion from the judgment with regard to no-fault liability and strict liability from the case of Yallwwa (supra) is reproduced as under : 27. In Bapu Onkar Chaudhari (supra), the Bombay High Court appears to have placed strong reliance on Kaushnuma Begum and others v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2001 ACJ 428 : (2001) 2 SCC 9 . In Kaushnuma Begum (supra), this Court was concerned with the question as to whether the amount of compensation to be paid under Section 140 of the Act can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal and while doing so, opined : "20. "No-fault liability" envisaged in Section 140 of the M.V. Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former, the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. "No-fault liability" envisaged in Section 140 of the M.V. Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former, the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the M.V. Act permit that compensation paid under "no- fault liability" can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the M.V. Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them." 24. Adopting the aforesaid analogy from the Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of compensation under Section 6 of the Act, it shall be necessary for the claimant to move appropriate application before the Collector who shall award compensation under Section 7 of the Act. The compensation should be just and proper keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. The quantum of compensation may be higher than what a claimant is entitled in view of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act under no-fault liability. 25. The compensation so awarded under the Act is not final. The claimant will have a right to approach appropriate forum for compensation in addition to compensation awarded under the Act provided under other law for the time being in force. 26. In view of above, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the impugned award seems to be not sustainable. The impugned award does not seem to suffer from any impropriety or illegality. 27. The writ petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed.