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2010 DIGILAW 926 (MAD)

A. Kumar & Others v. The District Collector, Kancheepuram & Others

2010-03-02

ELIPE DHARMA RAO, N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, VASANTHAKUMAR

body2010
Judgment : ELIPE DHARMARAO, J. Since all these matters are inextricably interconnected with each other, they were heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners are the successful bidders for quarrying rough stone for a period of five years in Survey No.234/2 of Thiruneermalai village, Kancheepuram District, from the date of execution of lease deeds. The details of quarry number, extent, lease period etc. in respect of the writ petitioners are tabulated hereunder for better understanding Sl.No. Name of the lessee Quarry No. Extent Lease Period One time lease amount for first five years 1 A.Kumar (Petitioner in W.P.No.4227/2008) 3B 30. 0 hect. 20.2.2003 to 12. 2008 Rs.15 lakhs 2 R.Gurunathan (Petitioner in W.P.No.4638/2008) 2 82. 0 hect. 22. 2003 to 22. 2008 Rs.72 lakhs 3 G.Krishna Mohan Rao (Petitioner in W.P.No.13724 of 2008) 1 12. 0 hect. 2. 2003 to 31. 2008 Rs.75,60,000 4 P.Mariadoss (Petitioner in W.P.No.21852 of 2008) 3A 1. 30.0 hect. 19. 2003 to 19. 2008 Rs.31 lakhs 3. The case of the petitioners, in one voice, is that though the lease deeds were executed during February, 2003 (and in respect of W.P.No.21852of 2008 it during September, 2003), since they have to do preliminary works like cleaning the quarry and effect other such incidental developmental activities in the quarry, they could not commence the quarrying operations and in the process substantial time has elapsed. The petitioners further case is that their quarries have been carved out from and out of the major extent of old quarry or earlier quarry and thus only a smaller portions, that is bits of portions of virgin quarry forming part of the larger extent of area in favour of the petitioners and the said area is fully a virgin area, having not been subjected to quarrying till the date of grant of lease to the petitioners; that the subject matter of the quarry has been sub-divided only in the year 2003 i.e. prior to the conduct of the public auction held on 1. 2003 mainly for the purpose of granting more number of leases in the same survey number, by dividing number of quarries so as to get more revenue to the Government. 4. The petitioners would further contend that pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.391, dated 111. 2000, an amendment was brought into Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. 2003 mainly for the purpose of granting more number of leases in the same survey number, by dividing number of quarries so as to get more revenue to the Government. 4. The petitioners would further contend that pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.391, dated 111. 2000, an amendment was brought into Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. For the sake of convenience and better appreciation, we shall now extract the said Rule, which reads as under: "The period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of the virgin areas, which have not been subjected to quarrying so far, shall be ten years. The period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of other areas shall be five years. The period of lease for quarrying sand and other minor minerals,other than the minerals covered under Rules 8-A and 8-C of the said Rules, shall not exceed three years and shall not be less than one year and shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:- .(i) The date of commencement of the period of lease granted under this Rule shall be the date on which the lease deed is executed .(ii) The lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed and in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made." 5. Placing heavy reliance on the above said Rule, the petitioners have sought for extension of the lease period for five more years in conformity with the above said Rule by submitting representations to the District Collector, Kancheepuram and in W.P.No.13724 of 2008, the said request of the petitioner therein was rejected by the District Collector, which is being impugned in that writ petition and in the other writ petitions, alleging that no orders have been passed by the District Collector on their representations, the petitioners have come forward to file the writ petitions. 6. 6. Heard Mr.R.Thiyagarajan, learned senior counsel for Mr.P.Arivudainambi for the petitioner in W.P.No.4227 of 2008; Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned senior counsel for Mr.K.Ramakrishna Reddy for the petitioner in W.P.No.4638 of 2008; Mr.N.R.Chandran, learned senior counsel for Mr.B.K.Singh for the petitioner in W.P.No.13724 of 2008; Mr.N.Jothi for Mr.V.Karthikeyan in W.P.No.21852 of 2008 and M/s.T.Mohan and S.Devika for the petitioners in the impleadment petition in M.P.No.1 of 2010 in W.P.No.4638 of 2008 and Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General assisted by Mr.Thirugnanam, Special Government Pleader and Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fazil, Government Advocate for the respondent/State in all the writ petitions. .7. While onthe part of the writ petitioners, it has been strenuously argued that the lands over which the quarry rights have been leased out to them are virgin lands and therefore they are very well entitled to wreak the benefits under Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), on the part of the respondent/Government it has been submitted that the stone quarry lease was previously granted for a total extent of 77 acres in S.No.234/2 at Thiruneermalai to various persons and therefore the said quarry is an existing quarry, and there is no justification on the part of the petitioners in praying to grant extension of lease as virgin quarry. It has further been submitted on the part of the Government that the Government in their G.O.Ms.No.88, Industries, dated 110. 2002 have amended the Rule 36(1A) of the Rules, restricting the grant of lease within 300 meters from the residential area instead of the rule prohibiting the distance of 500 meters which were in existence earlier and in pursuance of the above said amendment, restricting the radial distance to 300 meters from the residential inhabitation site and also to get more revenue to Government for the benefit of the Panchayat, the admissible total area was divided into four parts as Quarry No.1 (12. 0 hect.); Quarry No.2 (82. 0 hect.); Quarry No.3A (1.30 hect.) and Quarry No.3B (1.30 hect.) and brought under tender-cum-public auction on 1. 2003. It is the specific contention of the Government that the stone quarry lease in S.No.234 over an extent of 78.78 acres comprising the entire area in Thiruneermalai was granted to one K.Arunachalam s/o.Kannan, Thiruneermalai for a period of three years for the period ending 30.6.1987 in Collectors proceedings Rc.1752/84 Q dated 8. 2003. It is the specific contention of the Government that the stone quarry lease in S.No.234 over an extent of 78.78 acres comprising the entire area in Thiruneermalai was granted to one K.Arunachalam s/o.Kannan, Thiruneermalai for a period of three years for the period ending 30.6.1987 in Collectors proceedings Rc.1752/84 Q dated 8. 1984 and subsequently the lease was granted to one Arumugam for the period ending 30.6.1994 and therefore, the quarries are not virgin as has been submitted on the part of the petitioners but are old ones, existing in the same location and the minerals were exploited for more than ten years prior to the occupation of the petitioners. 8. While these writ petitions are pending on the file of this Court, another Writ Petition in W.P.No.26985 of 2009 has been filed before this Court as a probono publico by the General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Vivasayigal Sangam, Chennai, praying to issue a Writ of Declaration to declare that the leases granted to respondents 7 to 10 therein [A.Kumar (the petitioner in W.P.No.4227/2008) as R.7; R.Gurunathan (the petitioner in W.P.No.4638/2008) as R.8 and Mariadoss (the petitioner in W.P.No.21852/2008) as R.9] in Quarry Nos.1,2,3, 3A and 4 in S.No.234/2 in Thiruneermalai village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District as illegal and consequently to direct the official respondents from in any manner permitting the respondents 7 to 10 therein from continuing to quarry in the said areas with appropriate directions for remediation of the site and compensation to restore the temple and the buildings and the health of the people of the said village. In this writ petition an impleadment petition was filed by one E.Sekar and S.Mohan, praying to implead them as respondents 11 and 12 and the said petition having been allowed by us, they were brought on record as respondents 11 and 12 therein. In this writ petition an impleadment petition was filed by one E.Sekar and S.Mohan, praying to implead them as respondents 11 and 12 and the said petition having been allowed by us, they were brought on record as respondents 11 and 12 therein. Though, at the first instance, the said writ petition No.26985 of 2009 was also tagged with the present writ petitions, as the issue involved appears to be similar for the reason that the quarry operations in the same survey number is in dispute, since the questions of law that are to be dealt with are quite different and different yardsticks and parameters are required to be adopted, the said writ petition No.26985 of 2009 was ordered to be de-linked from this batch of writ petitions and to post the same after the disposal of the present writ petitions. .9. In the present W.P.No.4638 of 2008 also, the above said E.Sekar and K.S.Mohan have filed a petition to implead them as respondents 2 and 3. Their case is that the quarry operations are being carried out without following any safety measures and at times during blasting operation, huge stones get thrown up into the village and hurt people and several persons have been injured due to this, further developing cracks in the ancient temple in the area and causing air and noise pollution and that necessary permission under Rule 36 of the Rules has not been obtained from the Railways or the Highways Department. The points urged by these persons are the points to be considered in the probono publico W.P.No.26985 of 2009 pending on the file of this Court, wherein these persons were already brought on record as party respondents. As has already been observed supra, the said writ petition was ordered to be posted after the disposal of the present writ petitions, since the legal points that need to be considered are different in both these sets of writ petitions. Therefore, in our considered opinion, no purpose will be served by impleading these persons as party respondents to the present W.P.No.4638 of 2008. Hence, this petition is dismissed. However, the petitioners in M.P.No.1 of 2010 in W.P.No.4638 of 2008, can very well rake up all their pleas in W.P.No.26985 of 2009, wherein they have already been impleaded as party respondents. 10. Hence, this petition is dismissed. However, the petitioners in M.P.No.1 of 2010 in W.P.No.4638 of 2008, can very well rake up all their pleas in W.P.No.26985 of 2009, wherein they have already been impleaded as party respondents. 10. Mr.V.T.Gopalan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.4638 of 2008 would argue that since the lands are virgin lands, the Court can very well order extension of lease, by acceding to the request of the petitioners in these writ petitions and since the rights of the parties are as per the contract entered into, the State cannot claim any immunity and further since substantial period of time has elapsed in bringing the land fit for quarry operations, since being a virgin land, that period should also be taken into consideration. The learned counsel appearing for other writ petitioners also would argue on the same lines.11. On behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the following judgments are relied on: 1. BABUBHAI MULJIBHAI PATEL vs. NANDLAL KHODIDAS BAROT AND OTHERS [ (1974) 2 SCC 706 ] 2. HAR SHANKAR AND OTHERS vs. THE DY.EXCISE AND TAXATION COMMR. AND OTHERS [ (1975) 1 SCC 737 ]; 3. NEW HORIZONS LIMITED AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ (1995) 1 SCC 478 ]; 4. TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ANOTHER vs. N.RAJU REDDIAR AND ANOTHER [ (1996) 4 SCC 551 ] 5. UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH, ADMN. AND OTHERS vs. MANAGING SOCIETY, GOSWAMI, GDSDC [ (1996) 7 SCC 665 ; 6. DWARIKESH SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. PREM HEAVY ENGINEERING WORKS (P) LTD. AND ANOTHER [ (1997) 6 SCC 450 ] 7. V.KARNAL DURAI vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TUTICORIN AND ANOTHER [ (1999) 1 SCC 475 ]; 8. STYLE (DRESS LAND) vs. UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH AND ANOTHER [ (1999) 7 SCC 89 ; 9. TVL SUNDARAM GRANITES vs. IMPERIAL GRANITES LTD. AND OTHERS [ (1999) 8 SCC 150 ]; 10. S.GANESAN vs. DIST.COLLECTOR, TIRUCHIRAPALLI [JT 2002 (3) SC 90]; 11. BEG RAJ SINGH vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [ (2003) 1 SCC 726 ]; 12. SALIGRAM KHIRWAL vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ (2003) 7 SCC 689 ]; 113. JAYASWALS NECO LIMITED vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NAGPUR [ (2007) 13 SCC 807 ] 114. A.SRINIVASAN AND 25 OTHERS vs. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KANCHEEPURAM AND 9 OTHERS [ 2008 (3) CTC 800 ]; 12. SALIGRAM KHIRWAL vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ (2003) 7 SCC 689 ]; 113. JAYASWALS NECO LIMITED vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NAGPUR [ (2007) 13 SCC 807 ] 114. A.SRINIVASAN AND 25 OTHERS vs. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KANCHEEPURAM AND 9 OTHERS [ 2008 (3) CTC 800 ]; 12. In the first judgment cited above, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 706 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: "The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769 = AIR 1970 SC 802 ). If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect." 13. Inthe second judgment cited above, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 737 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: "The terms and conditions of auctions were announced before the auctions were held and the bidders participated in the auctions without a demur and with full knowledge of the commitments which the bids involved. The announcement of conditions governing the auctions were in the nature of an invitation to an offer to those who were interested in the sale of country liquor. The bids given in the auctions were offers made by prospective vendors to the Government. The Government’s acceptance of those bids was the acceptance of willing offers made to it. On such acceptance, the contract between the bidders and the Government became concluded and a binding agreement came into existence between them. The successful bidders were then granted licences evidencing the terms of contract between them and the Government, under which they became entitled to sell liquor. The licensees exploited the respective licences for a portion of the period of their currency, presumably in expectation of a profit. Commercial considerations may have revealed an error of judgment in the initial assessment of profitability of the adventure but that is a normal incident of all trading transactions. Those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits. The powers of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences by auction and to collect licence fees through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions be questioned by those who, had their venture succeeded, would have relied upon those very powers to found a legal claim. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever have a binding force." 14. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever have a binding force." 14. In the third judgment cited above reported in (1995) 1 SCC 478 , the Honourable Apex Court has held that: "The State, in exercise of its various functions, is governed by the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution which excludes arbitrariness in State action and requires the State to act fairly and reasonably. The action of the State in the matter of award of a contract has to satisfy this criterion. Moreover a contract would either involve expenditure from the State exchequer or augmentation of public revenue and consequently the discretion in the matter of selection of the person for award of the contract has to be exercised keeping in view the public interest involved in such selection. The decisions of this Court, therefore, insist that while dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with the standards or norms which are not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. It is, however, recognised that certain measure of “free play in the joints” is necessary for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere." 15. In the fourth judgment cited above, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 551 ,the Honourable Apex Court has held: "At the outset it must be borne in mind that the agreement between the parties was a written agreement and therefore the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement. Once a contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is not open to any of the parties to seek to prove the terms of the contract with reference to some oral or other documentary evidence to find out the intention of the parties. Once a contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is not open to any of the parties to seek to prove the terms of the contract with reference to some oral or other documentary evidence to find out the intention of the parties. Under Section 92 of the Evidence Act where the written instrument appears to contain the whole terms of the contract then parties to the contract are not entitled to lead any oral evidence to ascertain the terms of the contract. It is only when the written contract does not contain the whole of the agreement between the parties and there is any ambiguity then oral evidence is permissible to prove the other conditions which also must not be inconsistent with the written contract." .16. In the fifth judgment cited above, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 665 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: ."A contract in violation of the mandatory provisions of law can only be read and enforced in terms of the law and in no other way. The question of equitable estoppel does not arise in this case because there can be no estoppel against a statute." .17. Inthe sixth judgment cited above, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 450 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: ."When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops." .18. In the seventh judgment cited above, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 475 , an advertisement was issued inviting tenders for quarrying sand for three years from 1. 1995 to 33. 1998 and the appellant therein stood as a highest offer, which was rejected by the Collector on 23. It is time that this tendency stops." .18. In the seventh judgment cited above, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 475 , an advertisement was issued inviting tenders for quarrying sand for three years from 1. 1995 to 33. 1998 and the appellant therein stood as a highest offer, which was rejected by the Collector on 23. 1995 in exercise of powers under Rule 8(6)(b)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and the appeal filed by the allottee was allowed by the Director on 4. 1997, by which time, part of the lease period from 4. 1995 to 4. 1997 was already expired, therefore, lease was granted by the Director only for the remaining period of 4. 1997 to 33. 1998. In the meantime, Rule 8(8)(a)(i) was amended w.e.f.112. 1996 providing that lease period of three years should be from the date of execution of the lease deed. In such circumstances, the Honourable Apex Court has held that the amended rule is applicable and Rule as it stood at the time of disposal of the application for grant of lease will be applicable and though at that time the unamended rule was operative but since appeal is continuance of the proceedings, the amended rule having come into force during pendency of the appeal the same will be applicable and hence the period of three years for a sand quarry lease must necessarily run from the date of execution of the lease deed. Though the advertisement for lease was for a specific period but the same having been issued in order to implement these very Rules, terms of the advertisement must be read in conjunction with the Rules. Since proviso to R.8(8)(a)(i) that the lease amounts for the second and subsequent financial years shall be fixed by way of an annual increase of 20% was deleted w.e.f. 112. 1996 and appellants tender having been rejected on 23. 1995, the old provision for periodic increases was operative till 112. 1996 only so far as rate was concerned and enhancement would be roughly for two years and in the circumstances the lease amount will stand increased to start with, by 40% of the offer and appellant shall have to pay the seigniorage also as per the amended Rules in addition to the lease amount." .19. 1996 only so far as rate was concerned and enhancement would be roughly for two years and in the circumstances the lease amount will stand increased to start with, by 40% of the offer and appellant shall have to pay the seigniorage also as per the amended Rules in addition to the lease amount." .19. In the eighth judgment cited above, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 89 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: ."The Government cannot act like a private individual in imposing the conditions solely with the object of extracting profits from its lessees. Governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorised" .20. In the ninth judgment cited above, reported in (1999) 8 SCC 150 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: ."... while grant of largesse is at the discretion of the State Government, its action should be open, fair, honest and completely above board." .21. In the tenth judgment cited above, reported in JT 2002 (3) SC 90, the Honourable Apex Court has held in Para No.6 as follows: ."In somewhat identical circumstances when a peculiar situation arose, this Court in V.Karnal Durai vs. District Collector, Tuticorin and Anr. [JT 1998 (8) SC 301] taking note of the fact that for no fault of the appellant the lease period having expired, the lease could not be granted in his favour and, therefore, directed grant of lease of the land in question on appropriate terms. In this matter, land is still available for being leased as per letter of the deputy director (G&M), Tiruchirapalli to which we have adverted to earlier. In the circumstances arising in this case, we think the order made by the High Court in the writ petition and in the writ appeal should be set aside and the writ be allowed as was done in V.Karnal Durais case but subject to the condition that the appellant shall make further payment in respect of the lease amount per year by enhancing the same by 50% of the earlier bid. This amount is fixed by us taking note of the fact that the money paid by the appellant has been with the respondent for more than a period of 5 years. All other terms shall be governed by the new rules. This amount is fixed by us taking note of the fact that the money paid by the appellant has been with the respondent for more than a period of 5 years. All other terms shall be governed by the new rules. The department shall now give reasonable time to the appellant to deposit the amount of lease for the entire period of 3 years which shall not be less than four weeks from today." 22. In the eleventh judgment cited above, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 726 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: "6. The only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant has been given a very rough deal by the State Government and the injustice done to the appellant the High Court has failed to redeem. He had identified and explored the new mining area and made huge expenditure in making the mining area approachable and therefore it was the legitimate expectation of the appellant that he would be entitled to operate the mine for a minimum period of three years as per the declared policy of the State Government. The State Government should not have interfered with the order of the Collector and that too at the instance of a third party — Respondent 3, when no auction was held and no right was created in favour of Respondent 3. Matter as to the grant or renewal of the lease for a total period of three years was in accordance with the policy of the State Government and was a matter between the State and the appellant. It was submitted at the end that the appellant has been agitating his right diligently throughout and the time lost in prosecuting legal proceedings up to the High Court wherein the plea raised by the appellant laying challenge to the order of the State Government was found to be meritorious and the order of the State Government held liable to be set aside, the appellant should not have been denied relief and should have been allowed to operate the mine for that period by which the mining operation by the appellant fell short of three years’ time. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third-party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in-between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the appellant. No auction has taken place. No third-party interest has been created. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it has incurred in accordance with its own policy decision." 23. In the twelfth judgment cited above, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 689 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: "Where the applicant for mining lease was merely canvassing and claiming consideration afresh of his/her application for grant of mining lease and no order for grant of lease passed in his/her favour, no vested right had accrued to him/her for the grant, so that on death of such applicant R.25-A would not apply." "Rule 25-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (as introduced on 4. 1991) not merely clarificatory in nature and it cannot be read as if declaring the law as it prevailed even in absence of the Rules and moreover, 1991 amendment not retrospective in operation." 24. In the thirteenth judgment cited above, reported in (2007) 13 SCC 807 , the Honourable Apex Court has held: "A Bench of coordinate jurisdiction must not disregard the decision of the same strength on its own on an identical question. The rationale of this rule is the need for consistency, certainty and predictability in the administration of justice. Classification of particular goods adopted in earlier decisions must not be lightly disregarded in subsequent decisions, lest such judicial inconsistency shake public confidence in the administration of justice. It is undoubtedly vital in the administration of justice that those exercising judicial power must have the necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings bring to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous decision in the earlier case. In such circumstances, it is reasonable and indeed efficacious to refer the case to a larger Bench." 25. In such circumstances, it is reasonable and indeed efficacious to refer the case to a larger Bench." 25. In the fourteenth judgment cited above, reported in (2008) 3 CTC 800 , a Division Bench of this Court, in para No.13, has held: "Only in the event the statute prohibits or imposes a restriction for giving effect to retrospective operation, the rule must be read in the same manner by giving effect to the real meaning and the Court cannot import something new into the said rule. But the said principle of law is not applicable to the given cases. A lease is known to be virgin by the fact whether it was virgin at the time when it was granted for quarrying. So long as the lease period is in force,the area would be only known to be virgin till such time the lease is over. The words "which have not been subjected to quarrying so far" in the amended Rule shall relate only to date on which the lease was granted and not subsequently. The intention of the legislature is clear in granting ten years for virgin quarries and only for five years in respect of other quarries. The decision to grant ten years is with reference to virgin quarries. We do not find any intention of the legislature to restrict the period to existing virgin quarries and in fact by that rule, there is no such restriction. This would be the correct interpretation as the Government had duly taken into consideration of the representations of the lessees who could not exploit the mineral for hte entire full period of five years. As the area being virgin, they had to develop the area before commencement of the quarrying operation and in that process,they would lose a substantial portion of the lease period. Keeping the above grievance of the lessees only, the Government had extended the period of lease to ten years in respect of virgin areas. Hence, the lessees are entitled to the lease for a period of ten years provided the areas that were leased to them were virgin and there were no prior leases granted and the said quarries were not put into operation earlier." 26. Hence, the lessees are entitled to the lease for a period of ten years provided the areas that were leased to them were virgin and there were no prior leases granted and the said quarries were not put into operation earlier." 26. With due attention to the above legal propositions laid down by the upper forums of law, now we shall proceed to decide the main legal question urged on either side that in case of virgin lands the lease shall be for a period of ten years. 27. There cannot be any doubt that Rule 8(8) of the Rules mandates that the period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of the virgin areas, which have not been subjected to quarrying so far, shall be ten years. Therefore, the condition precedent which needs to be satisfied under this Rule is that the land must be a virgin land, which has not been subjected to quarrying so far. .28. While on the part of the petitioners it has been contended that all the lands for which they are granted lease of quarrying are virgin lands, on the part of the Government it has been argued and maintained that they are all old quarries. Thus, there is a dispute regarding the very nature of the land wherein quarry rights are given to the writ petitioners. The writ courts, normally, will not enter into the fray of deciding the disputed questions of fact. But, in NATIONAL THERMAL POWER CORPORATION LIMITED vs. MAHESH DUTTA AND OTHERS [ (2009) 8 SCC 339 ], cited on the part of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.4638 of 2008, the Honourable Apex Court has held, in para No.39 of its judgment, that .".... There is no law denying or debarring High Court from entering into a disputed question of fact. The issue will have to be determined keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in each case. If a disputed question can be determined on the basis of the documents and/or affidavit, the High Court may not ordinarily refuse to do so. In a given case, it may also examine witnesses." 29. The issue will have to be determined keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in each case. If a disputed question can be determined on the basis of the documents and/or affidavit, the High Court may not ordinarily refuse to do so. In a given case, it may also examine witnesses." 29. Therefore, the Honourable Apex Court has made it clear that if the fact situation can be determined on the basis of the documents and/or affidavit, the High Court may not ordinarily refuse to do so, and since to deny the claim of the petitioners that it is a virgin land, on behalf of the Government they rely on the factual position that on earlier occasions, leases were granted in respect of the same lands and thus they are not virgin and are relying on the official communications issued by them in this regard, now, we have to see whether from the materials placed on record, this factual position could be assessed or not? .30. The Gazette Notification dated 112. 2002 issued by the respondent has been filed at Page Nos.1 to 7 of the additional typed set of papers No.II by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.4638 of 2008. This Gazette Notification is flanked with three annexures. While the first annexure named as A is in respect of the lands wherein the quarry rights are granted for five years, the second annexure named as B is in respect of the lands wherein the quarry rights are granted for a period of ten years and the third annexure named as C is in respect of the lands wherein quarry rights are granted only for one year. Rule 8(8) of the Rules, whereupon much emphasis has been placed on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the writ petitions, was introduced by way of G.O.Ms.No.391 Industries dated 111. 2000 and therefore, it follows that the Gazette Notification dated 112. 2002, has been issued by the Government only in due compliance of this Rule. It has been clearly mentioned in this Notification that annexure A is regarding old quarries and annexure B is regarding virgin lands and in respect of annexure C it has been mentioned as gravel quarry. 2000 and therefore, it follows that the Gazette Notification dated 112. 2002, has been issued by the Government only in due compliance of this Rule. It has been clearly mentioned in this Notification that annexure A is regarding old quarries and annexure B is regarding virgin lands and in respect of annexure C it has been mentioned as gravel quarry. All the quarries, regarding which these writ petitions are filed, situate in S.No.234/2 are grouped in Annexure A – under the caption old quarries. 31. The lease deeds in these cases were executed during February, 2003 (and in respect of W.P.No.21852 of 2008 it is during September, 2003). The lease periods, thus came to an end during the month of February 2008 and during September, 2008 in the case of W.P.No.21852 of 2008. The first writ petition of all these writ petitions viz. W.P.No.4227 of 2008 was filed on 12. 2008; W.P.No.4638 of 2008 was filed on 20.2.2008; W.P.No.13724 of 2008 was filed on 6. 2008 (after his request dated 24. 2008 for extension of lease was rejected by the District Collector on 20.5.2008) and W.P.No.21852 of 2008 was filed on 9. 2008. Therefore, it is very much clear that such requests or prayers have been made on the part of the writ petitioners at the fag end of the tenure of their lease periods and all these petitioners got interim orders of stay also from this Court. 32. On the part of the Government, by producing sufficient materials, it has been proved that the quarry lease was previously granted for a total extent of 77 acres in S.No.234/2 at Thiruneermalai for the fasli 1385 to 1388 in their order in Rc.No.20515/75, dated 7. 1975, D.Dis.10493/76, dated 6. 1976; D.Dis.88791/77, dated 112. 1977 and D.Dis.33203/78 dated 19. 1978 to one T.Munusami Naicker of Thiruneermalai village and also renewed the same for the fasli 1389 from 7. 1979 to 30.6.1980 in the Collectors proceedings No.80771/79, dated 210. 1979 and subsequently, the stone quarry lease was granted to one K.Arunachalm, son of Kannan of Thiruneermalai for a period of three years ending 30.6.1987 in Collectors Proceedings in Rc.No.1752 of 1984, dated 8. 1984 and subsequently the lease was granted to one Arumugam for the period ending 30.6.1994. No material has been produced on the part of the petitioners to deny the above official details furnished on the part of the Government. 1984 and subsequently the lease was granted to one Arumugam for the period ending 30.6.1994. No material has been produced on the part of the petitioners to deny the above official details furnished on the part of the Government. However, it seems, thereafter, no lease was granted in these lands for one reason or other, mostly due to legal battles pending before the Courts. 33. But, by virtue of the Gazette Notification dated 112. 2002, the lease hold rights were auctioned for these lands, by sub-dividing it, for an appreciable cause of augmenting revenue to the State. Probably because of the absence of any quarry operations after 30.6.1994 till the period the petitioners assumed quarrying operations, the petitioners are under the miserable misconception that these are virgin lands wherein no quarry operations have ever taken place. In fact, it is not so. When the quarry was a old one and the quarry operations are stopped for sometimes, for one reason or other, such an old quarry, will not gain the status of virgin quarry once again on being entrusted with other parties for quarrying purposes. Therefore, on a scrutiny of the entire materials placed on record, we hold that the lands are not virgin lands but old ones wherein quarry operations were already conducted for quite a long number of years and hence the petitioners cannot get any benefit under Rule 8(8) of the Rules. .34. As has already been pointed out supra, the amended Rule 8(8) came into effect from 111. 2000 and the Notification was issued much well after that, i.e. on 112. 2002 and it has been published in the Gazette on 112. 2002. Opening Para No.2 of the Gazette Notification specifically required the intended parties to the auction to inspect the quarry sites at their own expenditure, so as to have personal knowledge of the condition of the lands, before participating in the auction. It has also been specifically mentioned therein that in the event of grant of quarry lease, the successful bidders have to make their own arrangements like laying roads from the quarry and other such necessary amenities at their own cost and expenditure. 35. Therefore, it follows that the petitioners have participated in the auction only after duly visiting the quarry sites and assessing the conditions prevailing therein and having fully satisfied with the same. 35. Therefore, it follows that the petitioners have participated in the auction only after duly visiting the quarry sites and assessing the conditions prevailing therein and having fully satisfied with the same. Having personally visited the sites and got satisfied with the condition of the lands, knowing fully well that the lands are old quarries wherein already quarry operations took place and thus the lands are not virgin, the petitioners have participated in the auction and emerged as highest bidders. Thereafter, they have enjoyed the rights of quarrying for the full period and only at the fag end of the lease periods, the petitioners started quarrelling about the nature of the land that the lands are virgin lands and not already existing quarries and the respondent/State has wrongly notified the lands as old quarry lands and therefore, they are entitled for the lease rights for ten years, instead of five years granted by the respondent. This clearly establishes the mala fide intention of the petitioners. 36. At this juncture, on the part of the petitioner in W.P.No.4638 of 2008 it has been contended that immediately after executing the lease deed on 22. 2003, he has submitted a representation to the respondent on 23. 2003 pointing out the fact that the lands are virgin lands and therefore, he should be granted lease for a period of ten years and not five years. In support of his contentions, this petitioner has produced the copy of his representation dated 23. 2003 at page No.64 of his typed set of papers. This aspect of this petitioner submitting the above said representation dated 23. 2003 has been stoutly denied on the part of the respondent/Government. When it is the case of the petitioner that he has submitted the said representation to the respondent as early as on 23. 2003, the burden lies on him to prove the same by producing postal receipt, acknowledgement and such other documents as proof of service to prove that the respondent/State has received it under proper acknowledgment. But, no such material has been produced on the part of this petitioner to show that he has submitted his alleged representation dated 23. 2003 to the respondent. Even the copy of the alleged representation dated 23. But, no such material has been produced on the part of this petitioner to show that he has submitted his alleged representation dated 23. 2003 to the respondent. Even the copy of the alleged representation dated 23. 2003 made available at page No.64 of the typed set of papers, does not bear any seal of the office of the respondent, so as to say that the respondent was duly served with the alleged representation of the petitioner dated 23. 2003. Therefore, we hold that this petitioner has failed to prove that he has submitted the representation dated 23. 2003 to the respondent and hence no reliance could be placed on the copy of the alleged representation dated 23. 2003 made available at page No.64 of the typed set of papers. Had it been true that this petitioner has submitted his first representation on 23. 2003 and thereafter in the year 2008 before expiry of the lease period and that the respondent/State has not considered the same by passing any order, this petitioner should have approached this Court within a reasonable time instead of waiting till the fag end of the lease period. This also weighs much in rejecting the case of the petitioners. .37. From the materials available on record and from the conduct of the petitioners, it is clear that even by the date when the petitioners are participating in the auction, after inspecting the quarry lands since they have been permitted to visit the said lands under Opening Para No.2 of the Notification itself, they are very well aware of the Rule position and also the physical condition of the land. But, they have not challenged the said Gazette Notification -in it prescribing the lease period only as five years under the caption old quarries. Instead, by accepting the terms and conditions of the said Notification, they have participated in the auction and emerged as highest bidders. They have enjoyed the right of leasing fora period of five years and only when the granted period is about to expire, they started agitating for extension of lease rights, praying to treat the lands as virgin with a view to grab the advantage of the provision of law under Rule 8(8) of the Rules. This clearly shows the ill-motivated tactics adopted on the part of the petitioners. This clearly shows the ill-motivated tactics adopted on the part of the petitioners. The specific case of the respondent/State is that since it is not a virgin land, they have rightly granted the lease only for a period of five years and the petitioners have also participated in the auction knowing fully well that the period of lease was only for a period of five years and have also executed the lease deeds for a period of five years only and under Rule 8(8)(ii) of the Rules, no further extension of lease could be granted in favour of the petitioners and hence the petitioners are not entitled for further period of five years. 38. We are in total conformity with the meritorious arguments advanced on the part of the learned Advocate General on this aspect. When the petitioners have participated in the auction, after visiting the sites and having fully satisfied with the condition of the quarries that they are the old and existing quarries and not virgin quarries, as per the Annexure A to the Notification and emerged as highest bidders and enjoyed the rights for full five years, they cannot be permitted to agitate the nature of the land at the fag end of their lease period and in our considered view, this plea has been invented for the sole purpose of wreaking benefits under Rule 8(8) of the Rules, knowing fully well that the said provision of law is not at all applicable to their case. From this it is clear that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands but have initiated these proceedings with an ill-intention of protracting and prolonging the proceedings, so as to prevent the State from going on with the process of initiating fresh auction proceedings, which conduct exhibits their ulterior motive to enrich themselves at the cost of the State exchequer, which should not be permitted/encouraged. 39. Where a Statute occupies the field, the principles of equity and promissory estoppel have no role to play. In the cases on hand, the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 occupies the entire field and it is an exhaustive legislation insofar as the field is concerned. Therefore, the rights and liabilities of the parties emanate only from this Statute. Where a Statute occupies the field, the principles of equity and promissory estoppel have no role to play. In the cases on hand, the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 occupies the entire field and it is an exhaustive legislation insofar as the field is concerned. Therefore, the rights and liabilities of the parties emanate only from this Statute. Rule 8(8), clearly distinguishes the rights of the lease holders in respect of virgin lands and the old lands as five years and ten years. As per Rule 8(8)(ii), the lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed and in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made.When there is a specific bar created under law for such extension of the period of lease, which is exhaustive in nature, the prayers of the petitioners cannot be appreciated. .40. It is to bepointed out that much reliance has been placed on the part of the petitioners on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in A.Srinivasans case reported in 2008(3) CTC 800 . But, in the said writ petition, the Division Bench of this Court was not called upon to decide the nature of the land as to whether it was a virgin land or an existing quarry land, which is the prime question involved in all the cases on hand. In the above said Division Bench judgment of this Court, the lease was granted for a period of five years only and in the meantime, the amended Rule 8(8) came into existence, by G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 111. 2000. Since the said provision of law came into operation during the currency of the lease, which is admittedly for a virgin land, the Division Bench of this Court has held that so long as the lease granted in respect of the virgin areas for the first time is in force and the period of lease was not over on the date when the amendment came into force on 111. 2000, those areas should be considered to be virgin not subjected to quarrying operation and therefore the benefit of the period of ten years shall be extended to those lessees as the virgin quarries are entitled to the grant of lease for a period of ten years as per the said amended rule. 2000, those areas should be considered to be virgin not subjected to quarrying operation and therefore the benefit of the period of ten years shall be extended to those lessees as the virgin quarries are entitled to the grant of lease for a period of ten years as per the said amended rule. Thus observing, the Division Bench of this Court has ordered retrospective operation of the said Rule to the cases before it. Relying on the above said Division Bench judgment of this Court, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would press into service a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Jayaswals Neco Limited case [ (2007) 13 SCC 807 ] for the proposition that A Bench of coordinate jurisdiction must not disregard the decision of the same strength on its own on an identical question. 41. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition of law declared by the Honourable Apex Court. But, in the cases on hand, the Notification was issued very well after the induction of the said amended Rule 8(8), in due compliance of the above provision of law, giving separate annexures for virgin lands and existing quarry lands and in the said case the Division Bench of this Court was not called upon to decide the nature of the lands, which are admittedly the virgin lands. But, in the cases on hand, the very nature of the lands has been questioned by the petitioners, having participated in the auction knowing very well about the nature of the lands notified in the Notification and started questioning the nature of the lands only at the fag end of the lease periods. Thus, the above said Division Bench judgment is factually distinguishable and we have no hesitation to hold that the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, there is no question of disregarding the decision of the coordinate Bench by us, so as to apply the principles laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in Jayaswals Neco Limited case reported in (2007) 13 SCC 807 . 42. Therefore, there is no question of disregarding the decision of the coordinate Bench by us, so as to apply the principles laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in Jayaswals Neco Limited case reported in (2007) 13 SCC 807 . 42. When we have posed a specific question to Mr.N.Jothi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.21852 of 2008 as to why they have not questioned the Gazette notification at the first instance, he has answered that they thought that first they accept the contract and thereafter agitate the nature of the quarry under Rule 8(8). This seems to be the intention/idea of the other petitioners also, which cannot be appreciated. Therefore, since the material on record clearly establishes the fact that the lands in question are not virgin but old ones wherein quarry operations were conducted for quite a long number of years prior to grant of the same to the petitioners, we have no hesitation to hold that this factual aspect can be assessed from the materials placed on record which, in effect, would lead to the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of Rule 8(8) of the Rules. .43. It has also been submitted on the part of the petitioners that if the Court allows their writ petitions, extending their lease periods, they are ready to offer more lease amounts. But, it is the specific stand of the respondent/State that if the lease rights are auctioned, it will fetch more revenue. We are in total conformity with the submissions made on the part of the State in this respect particularly in view of the bar created under Rule 8(8)(ii) of the Rules holding that the lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed and in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made and we do not think that the petitioners are barred from participating in the fresh auctions to be held for the lands in question, if they are really interested. 144. The petitioner in W.P.No.21852 of 2008 has submitted that there was inordinate delay of nine months in commencing the quarry operations, which is solely attributable to the slackness on the part of the respondent. 144. The petitioner in W.P.No.21852 of 2008 has submitted that there was inordinate delay of nine months in commencing the quarry operations, which is solely attributable to the slackness on the part of the respondent. But, on the part of the respondent/State it has been established that the possession of the quarry could not be delivered to this petitioner because of the stay order granted by the Court and immediately after the stay order was vacated, he was accorded with the possession of the land. Since the proceedings were pending before the Court and as a result of the stay order alone, the possession could not be delivered to the petitioner in W.P.No.21852 of 2008, the respondent cannot be blamed for the said delay. Regarding the point urged on behalf of the writ petitioners that due to various reasons, including the delay caused due to the orders of stay, they could not commence the quarrying and a substantial valuable time has elapsed which need to be compensated by the State in a proper way, we have no hesitation to hold that if it is so, the petitioners can very well make their representations to the respondent, who would consider their requests/representations on merits and in accordance with law. Nowhere, in the entire process, we see any arbitrariness or lack of transparency in the actions of the State in these matters, so as to press into service the propositions laid down by the upper forums of law in the above referred judgments. Therefore, in the above discussed factual matrix of the cases, we have no hesitation to hold that none of the cases cited on the part of the petitioners would augment their case, since every case has to be dealt with on its own merits. Likewise, as has already been held supra, the principles of promissory estoppel also have no application to the facts of the case, since the State is at no fault and it has not gone back on any of its promise and it is the petitioners who, under the miserable misconception of the nature of the lands and with the sole aim of protracting the proceedings, have resorted to filing these writ petitions, knowing fully well that they are fighting a losing battle. For all the above reasons and discussions, all these writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. For all the above reasons and discussions, all these writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. The writ petitioners are directed to vacate the premises, removing all their machinery and other equipments and hand over the vacant possession of the quarries to the respondent within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With regard to the amounts deposited as per the interim orders passed by this Court, the respondent is directed to refund the same, after deducting/adjusting any amounts due by the writ petitioners.