Judgment : The above appeal has been filed by the additional 5th defendant in O.S.No.395/87 on the file of the Munsiff’s Court, Attingal. That suit was one for declaration and partition filed by the 3rd respondent as plaintiff. That suit was tried along with another suit, O.S.No.146/91 filed by the present appellant as plaintiff in which a decree of injunction was claimed. Though the appellant herein was not made a party in O.S.No.395/87, she got herself impleaded as additional 5th defendant and resisted the suit claim for declaration and partition. In the two suits identical issues arose for adjudication and a joint trial of the cases was proceeded with. Suffice to state, after trail, on the materials placed by both sides, a decree was granted in O.S.No.395/87 declaring one half right of the plaintiff (3rd respondent in the present appeal) over the plaint property, allowing him to have separate possession of his share moving an application for passing a final decree. Suit filed by the appellant as plaintiff (O.S.No.146/91) for a decree of injunction, was dismissed under the common judgment rendered by the trail court, disposing the two suits. As against the dismissal of her suit O.S.No.146/91, the present appellant preferred an appeal as A.S.No.37/94 before the Sub Court, Attingal. She did not challenge the decree granted in favour of the 3rd respondent in the appeal, plaintiff in O.S.No.395/87. However, two other defendants in the above suit filed an appeal impeaching the decree granted in O.S.No.395/87, as A.S.No.1/94 before the Sub Court, Attingal. In that appeal (A.S.No.1/94) the present appellant was the 3rd respondent. Receiving notice in such appeal, 3rd respondent in A.S.No.1/94 (the present appellant) preferred cross objections impeaching the decree granted to the plaintiff, who was a corespondent in such appeal with her. Cross objections so filed in A.S.No.1/94, was numbered as I.A.No.664/94 in the above appeal. The appeals, A.S.No.1/94 arising from the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87 and A.S.No.37/94 from O.S.No.146/91, both of them, after being heard together, were disposed by the lower appellate court dismissing both the appeals, by which the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87 in favour of the plaintiff in that suit was confirmed and the dismissal of O.S.No.146/91, the suit filed by the appellant as plaintiff was upheld. As against the concurrent decision rendered by both the courts below negativing the claim of the present appellant in her suit O.S.No.146/91 declining her the relief of decree of injunction applied for, she has filed the second appeal-R.S.A.No.477/03, which after being admitted awaits disposal. As against the dismissal of A.S.No.1/94 confirming the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87, the above appellant, who was the 5th defendant in the suit and the 3rd respondent in that appeal before the lower appellate court has filed the appeal, S.A.No.354/03. 2. This appeal, which was preferred with a petition for condonation of delay had been previously dismissed for default, but, later resorted to file. Thereafter delay in filing the appeal, with notice to respondents, having been condoned, the appeal has come up for consideration. 3. The entertainability of the appeal was canvassed with reference to R.S.A.No.477/03 preferred by the same appellant against the decision rendered by the lower appellate court confirming the decree passed in O.S.No.146/91, which had already been admitted to file. The present appellant/additional 5th defendant in O.S.No.395/87, admittedly, had not challenged the decree passed in that suit preferring an appeal before the lower appellate court. A second appeal at her instance over the dismissal of an appeal preferred by some other defendants by which the decree granted to the plaintiff was confirmed, is prima facie not entertainable. However, the learned counsel for the appellant submitting that cross objections preferred by her in A.S.No.1/94 arising from the decree in O.S.No.395/87, after being numbered and received on file, were not considered by the lower appellate court while rendering the common judgment in A.S.No.1/94 and A.S.No.37/94 contended that the appellant has a valid legal right to impeach the correctness of the judgments of the courts below, and the present appeal, after being admitted, therefore, deserve to be disposed of on merits along with R.S.A.No.477/03 already admitted. 4. The cross objections filed by the appellant in the appeal A.S.No.1/94 preferred by some co-defendants against the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87, though numbered and received on file, evidently were not considered on merits. There is also no advertence nor even reference to such cross objections in the common judgment rendered by the lower appellate court while disposing the two appeals A.S.Nos.1/94 and 37/94 under a common judgment. There is also no advertence nor even reference to such cross objections in the common judgment rendered by the lower appellate court while disposing the two appeals A.S.Nos.1/94 and 37/94 under a common judgment. Be that as it may, the non-consideration of the cross objections by the lower appellate court can have significance only if it is shown that such cross objections were maintainable at the instance of the appellant in the appeal, A.S.No.1/94 preferred by two other co-defendants against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.395/87. The fact that the appellant had filed cross objections in such appeal, A.S.No.1/94 by itself and it was numbered on the file of the court, but not considered, would not give a larger right to the appellant to impeach the correctness of the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87 by the trail court and confirmed by the lower appellate court by way of a second appeal. It goes without saying that, if the cross objections filed in A.S.No.1/94, after being numbered, were not considered by the lower appellate court while disposing of the appeals A.S.Nos.1/94 and 37/94 under its common judgment, it no way prevented the appellant to invite the attention of that court, at the time of hearing of the appeals or even later, the non-consideration of the cross objections on its merits, if it were entertainable under law. Cross objections preferred in an appeal, needless to point out, is akin to that of cross-appeal and as such even where the appeal in which such cross objections are preferred is dismissed, otherwise than on any ground as to its maintainability, a decision on the cross objections, and a decree being passed thereof is the mandate of the law. So much so, the mere fact that cross objections were filed in A.S.No.1/94 by the present appellant, a co-respondent in the above appeal and such objections were not considered while disposing of that appeal is not a sufficient ground assisting the appellant to show that her second appeal as against confirmation of the decree by the lower appellate court is assailable by way of a second appeal. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant, relying on some judicial pronouncements, has urged for entertaining this second appeal and for its consideration along with R.S.A.No.477/03 preferred from the adverse decision rendered against her suit, which was jointly tried with the suit covered by the decree impugned in this appeal. This court is fully empowered to render a decision on the merits of the decree passed in O.S.No.395/87 even if the present appellant has not preferred an appeal against the said decree before the lower appellate court in exercise of its powers conferred under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the submission of the counsel. In the nature of the disputes involved in the case, the entertainability and consideration of the above second appeal, along with R.S.A.No.477/03 already received on file, is warranted is the further submission of the counsel. 6. Before adverting to the merit of the submission made by the counsel, it is more appropriate to state in a nut shell the case presented by the rival parties in the two suits, O.S.No.395/87 and also O.S.No.146/91. The plaint property covered by the two suits, admittedly belonged to one Sekharan (late). Plaintiff in O.S.No.395/87 claimed one half right over suit the property on the basis of a gift deed executed by the 1st defendant, the wife of Sekharan. The above said Sekharan had got acquainted with another lady, the 2nd defendant, and the 3rd defendant is stated to be their daughter. Plaintiff in the above suit claimed declaration of his one half right in the suit property seeking partition and separate possession. The 1st defendant resisted the suit contending that the gift in favour of the plaintiff had been revoked by her and, further, it had not come into effect. She claimed enjoyment and possession of the suit property as its title holder. Defendants 2 and 3 disputing the status of the 1st defendant as the wife of Sekharan contended that the 2nd defendant was his legally wedded wife and 3rd defendant, the .daughter born out of their wedlock. Including the 3rd defendant, the 2nd defendant and Sekharan have seven children was also canvassed to contend that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Including the 3rd defendant, the 2nd defendant and Sekharan have seven children was also canvassed to contend that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Defendants 2 and 3 claimed title, possession, and enjoyment over the suit property, impeaching the gift executed in favour of the plaintiff as void and also challenging the right of the 1st defendant over the property. In the above suit, the present appellant and another, though not made defendants, voluntarily got impleaded as additional defendants. The present appellant got impleaded as the additional 5th defendant and the other as additional 4th defendant. The additional 4th defendant contended that the suit property belonged to the 1st defendant and he had purchased from her 1 Acre 10 cents out of the above property for valuable consideration. The 2nd defendant was not the wife and 3rd defendant not the daughter of Sekharan, was his further case. The remaining 10 cents the suit property, it was contended had been conveyed to the 5th defendant (present appellant) for valuable consideration by the 1st defendant. The appellant herein, the additional 5th defendant, raised similar contentions canvassed by the additional 4th defendant claiming title and possession over 10 cents of land under a sale deed executed by the first defendant. 7. The present appellant/additional 5th defendant, did not challenge the adverse decision rendered against her in O.S.No.395/87 preferring an appeal. As against the decision rendered in the above suit, only two other defendants (2nd and 3rd defendants) whose contentions to resist the suit were diametrically opposite to that of the present appellant/additional 5th defendant, had preferred an appeal. With the plaintiff in the suit, the present appellant was a co-respondent in that appeal. In such appeal, the appellant herein filed a cross objections as against the decision rendered in favour of the co-respondent (the plaintiff), but it was not considered when the appeal was disposed of, is the sheet anchor on which the second appeal is preferred challenging the decision rendered in the first appeal preferred by some other defendants in the suit. 8. The learned counsel has placed reliance on some judicial pronouncement to contend that, in the circumstances indicated above, this court is fully empowered to decide the challenges raised against the decision of the lower appellate court invoking its powers under Rules 33 of Order XLI of the Code, after entertaining the present appeal. 8. The learned counsel has placed reliance on some judicial pronouncement to contend that, in the circumstances indicated above, this court is fully empowered to decide the challenges raised against the decision of the lower appellate court invoking its powers under Rules 33 of Order XLI of the Code, after entertaining the present appeal. What is to be considered now is the entertainability of the second appeal preferred by the additional 5th defendant in the suit as against the decision rendered by the lower appellate court in an appeal preferred by some other defendants. She had filed cross objections in such appeal as against the co-respondent (the plaintiff in the suit) in no way assist her whether or not such cross objections were considered by the lower appellate court. She had no common case with the appellants in the first appeal to resist the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff. A decision on the cross objections canvassed by the appellant against the co-respondent/plaintiff was not relevant, and in fact not required to decide the challenge raised in the appeal preferred by some other defendants. Cross objections preferred by the appellant in such appeal was clearly not entertainable when the case canvassed by the additional 5th defendant to resist the claim of the co-respondent (plaintiff) was diametrically opposite to that of the other contesting defendants (defendants 2 and 3) who had preferred the appeal against the decree granted to the plaintiff by the trail court. When that be so, it follows that the present appellant had submitted to the adverse decision rendered against her in O.S.No.395/87 without challenging the same as provided by law by way of an appeal. She is, therefore, incompetent to prefer a second appeal over the decision rendered in the appeal confirming the decree of the trail court by the lower appellate court in an appeal preferred by some other defendants who and no common interest, but only conflicting interest with the present appellant. Another appeal preferred by her against the adverse decision rendered in her suit for injunction concurrently by both the courts which was tried and disposed of with O.S.No.395/87 has already been admitted by this court is no ground enabling the appellant to get the present appeal admitted where it is found to be not at all entertainable under law. 9. Another appeal preferred by her against the adverse decision rendered in her suit for injunction concurrently by both the courts which was tried and disposed of with O.S.No.395/87 has already been admitted by this court is no ground enabling the appellant to get the present appeal admitted where it is found to be not at all entertainable under law. 9. There is no merit in the plea canvassed by the counsel for the appellant for invoking the powers of the appellate court under Rule 33 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain this appeal relying on the cross objections filed in the appeal preferred by some other defendants before the lower appellate court against the decree of the trail court. The power under Rule 33 of the Order XLI of the Code can be invoked when a portion of the decree appealed against is inseparably connected with a portion not appealed against where the appellate court is satisfied that leaving it as such untouched would result in injustice or inconsistency in the decree rendered by the court. The Apex Court in Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal (AIR 2003 SC 1989) has cautioned that the exercise of such power is subject to atleast three limitations. The power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the Court, it cannot be invoked to revive a claim given up or lost, and lastly such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the disadvantage of such party. Viewed with reference to the limitations as above in exercising the power under Rule of Order XLI of the Code by the appellate court, it has to be stated that the entertainability of the appeal canvassed for under that suit by the counsel for the appellant is unworthy of any merit. 10. The question whether Rule 33 of Order XLI of the Code can be invoked by the appellate court to do justice between the parties even where an appeal has not been preferred by one or other party as against the adverse decision rendered by the lower appellate court is, in fact, beside the point in examining the entertainability and admissibility of the appeal. The power enjoined under such Rule cannot be invoked by the appellate court to admit an appeal, which is found not entertainable. Needless to point out, invoking the powers under Rule 33 of Order XLI of the Code for exercise of the extraordinary powers vested with the appellate court would come into play, if so satisfied by the facts presented, only at the stage of consideration of the appeal on merits, at the time of hearing, but not before, at any rate, not at the stage of considering or determining the entertainability and admissibility of an appeal. The appellate court is vested with such wide powers under Rule 33 of Order XLI of the Code in granting reliefs to a party in an appeal, even if the appeal is preferred only as against the part of a decree or no appeal is preferred in one of the decrees in cross suits or when two or more decrees are passed in such suits, does not enable any party to press for entertaining his appeal by the appellate court, where its admissibility is shown to be barred by law. The appeal is found to be not entertainable and it is dismissed.