Judgment : The questions urged for a decision in this petition are: (i) Whether an Additional District Judge has jurisdiction to decide an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Arbitration Act”)? (ii) Whether such a proceeding could be instituted before an Additional District Judge empowered to receive proceedings under Sec. 7(2) of The Kerala Civil Courts and Small Cause Courts Act, 1957 (for short, “the Act”)?. 2. Short facts necessary for decision of the said questions are: There was a work contract between petitioner and respondent. In the course of the work, dispute arose between them which was referred to the Arbitrator who passed award on 01-07-2009. Arbitrator passed award in favour of petitioner with an interest holiday of three months if the amount awarded was paid within three months from the date of award. Respondent filed O.P(Arb.). No. 43 of 2009 in the court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara under Sec.34 of the Arbitration Act praying to set aside the award on various grounds set forth in that petition. Petitioner raised a preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction of learned Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara to entertain and decide the said application and filed I.A.No.1124 of 2009 (Ext.P2) for the said purpose. That application was resisted by the respondent contending that the said court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application. Learned Additional District Judge vide Ext.P3, order dated October 19, 2010 rejected contention of petitioner, found that the said court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application and dismissed I.A.No.1124 of 2009 with cost to the respondent. That order is under challenge. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner contended that in view of the definition of “court” given in Sec.2(e) of the Arbitration Act, application under Sec.34 of the Arbitration Act could have been filed only in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which is the court of the Principal District Judge, Alappuzha and hence the Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara could not entertain or decide the application. It is also contended that at any rate court below was not justified in imposing cost on petitioner for raising a legal question regarding jurisdiction. It is also contended that at any rate court below was not justified in imposing cost on petitioner for raising a legal question regarding jurisdiction. Learned counsel for respondent contended that court of Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara having being invested with power to receive proceedings under Sec.7(2) of the Act, it was within the power and jurisdiction of that court to receive the application on file and decide the same. 3. Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act enables “the Court” to set aside an arbitral award on any of the grounds mentioned therein. In view of use of article “the” before the expression “Court” “the court” referred to in Sec. 34 must be the ‘court’ as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act. “Court” is defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act as under: “‘Court’ means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” (Emphasis supplied) 4. Argument advanced by learned Senior Advocate is that “court” as defined in Sec. 2(e) is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can be court of Principal District Judge and hence question of application under Sec. 34 being filed before the Additional District Court notwithstanding Sec. 7(2) of the Act does not arise. Learned Senior Advocate has referred to me the decision in Sulekha Clay Mines Vs. Union of India (2000 (1) KLT 691) where, a learned Judge of this court held that in view of the definition in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, Rule 2(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Court) Rules, 1997 (Kerala) conferring power in the court of subordinate Judge is invalid. Reliance is also placed on the decisions in M/s. I.T.I Ltd, Allahabad Vs. District Judge, Allahabad (AIR 1998 Allahabad 313) and Managing Director, Sundaram Finance Ltd, Madras V. G.S. Nandakumar (2001 ALT (4) 383) where it was held that the District Judge could not make over an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act to the Additional District Judge and that the latter has not jurisdiction to decide the matter. District Judge, Allahabad (AIR 1998 Allahabad 313) and Managing Director, Sundaram Finance Ltd, Madras V. G.S. Nandakumar (2001 ALT (4) 383) where it was held that the District Judge could not make over an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act to the Additional District Judge and that the latter has not jurisdiction to decide the matter. Learned Senior Advocate has also placed reliance on the decision in Panady and Co. Builders (p) Ltd Vs. State of Bihar and Another (2007 (1) SCC 467). 5. To appreciate that argument it is necessary to make reference to the provision of the Act as well. Sec. 3 of the Act reads as under: “Establishment of District Court: (1) For the purposes of this Act, the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, divide the state into civil districts (to be called as districts) and alter the limits or the number of such districts. (2) The Government shall establish a District Court for each district and a Judge (hereinafter called the District Judge) shall be appointed to such court”. There can be no doubt that the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district is the district court established under Sec. 3 of the Act. Sec. 4 of the Act deals appointment of additional Judges. The said provision reads as under: “(1) When the state of business pending before a District Judge so requires one or more Additional District Judges may be appointed to that court for such period as is deemed necessary. (2) An Additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under this Act in respect of all matters which the District Judge may assign to him, or which under the provisions of Sec. 7 may be instituted before him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge”. 6. It is relevant to note that while under Sec. 3 of the Act the Government establishes the “District Court” for each (Civil) district and appoints a Judge called District Judge to such Court, under Sec. 4 of the Act the Government is not establishing Additional District Courts in the (Civil) district, but only appoints more District Judges additionally to the District Court (Established under Sec. 3) for such period as is deemed necessary depending on the business pending before the District Court. Such District Judges are appointed to the District Court in addition to the Judge already appointed to that District Court (Called the District Judge). Of course, the District Judges appointed additionally to the District Court can only discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge in respect of matters which the District Judge may assign to them or which under Sec. 7 of the Act may be instituted before them. Such Additional District Judges, in the discharge of those functions exercises the same powers, as of the District Judge. 7. Going back to the definition of ‘Court’ in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, I must bear in mind that there, reference is not to the “District Judge” meaning thereby Judge of the District Court (established under Sec. 3 of the Act) but to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which is the ‘District Court’ (established under Sec. 3 of the Act). In M/s. I.T.I Ltd, Allahabad Vs District Judge, Allahabad and Managing Director, Sundaram Finance Ltd, Madras Vs. G.S. Nandakumar (supra) the view taken commending upon the expression “means” “includes” and “principal civil court” occurring in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act is that it admits of no doubt that the definition in Sec. 2(e) is restrictive and takes in only the District Judge not an Additional District Judge. Learned Judges held that the District Judge could not therefore make over an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act to the Additional District Judge for disposal and that the latter has no jurisdiction over the matter. With great respect, I am unable to agree with that view in the light of Secs. 3 and 4 of the Act so far as the situation in the State of Kerala is concerned. It is pertinent to note that Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act also contains an exclusion clause, ie; the “Court” defined thereunder, “does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any court of small causes”. The courts thus excluded from the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, for the purpose of the Arbitration Act are civil courts of a grade inferior to such principal civil court or any court of small causes. The courts thus excluded from the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, for the purpose of the Arbitration Act are civil courts of a grade inferior to such principal civil court or any court of small causes. No doubt, the inclusive definition in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act does not take in ‘an Additional District Court’ but, in my view that is of no consequence since from Secs. 3 and 4 of the Act I stated, that it is not that Additional District Courts are being established but only that more District Judge are appointed to the District Court when the business of such court so requires. It is relevant to note that the court of Additional District Judge is not “inferior” to the District Court. Whenever the law wanted to state for any specific purpose that the court of Additional District Judge is ‘subordinate’ to the District Court, it has specifically stated so. For instance, Sec. 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers on the District Court the general power of transfer and withdrawal of cases and subsec. 3(a) of the said provision states that, “For the purpose of this section, courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court.” That subordination of the court of Additional District Judge is for the limited purpose of general power of the District Court for transfer and withdrawal of Additional District Judge. The decision in M/s/ I.T.I Ltd, Allahabad and Managing Director, Sundaram Finance Ltd, Madras Vs. G.S. Nandakumar (supra) have not considered the effect of the exclusionary clause in Sec. 2 (e) of the Arbitration Act. The decision in Panady and Co. Builders (P) Ltd Vs. State of Bihar and Another (supra) has not application to the facts of the case. What was decided there, was that the Patna High Court was not exercising original civil jurisdiction and hence did not come within the purview of “court” as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act. The court of Additional District Judge to which an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act is made over by the District Judge has got jurisdiction to decide such application as the Additional District Judge exercises the same functions and powers of the District Judge in relation to matters made over to him. The court of Additional District Judge to which an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act is made over by the District Judge has got jurisdiction to decide such application as the Additional District Judge exercises the same functions and powers of the District Judge in relation to matters made over to him. A learned Judge of this court in Metro Silks and Sarees Vs. Darpan Traders (2009 (3) KLT 916) has also taken the view that ‘Court’ defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Arbitration Act takes in the Additional District Court. 8. In the present case, the application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act was instituted in the court of Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara. Question is whether, proceeding could have been instituted in that court. The Additional District Judge is to exercise functions and powers of the District Judge in respect of matters assigned to him by the District Judge or which, under Sec. 7 of the Act may be instituted before him. Sec. 7 of the Act reads: “Court’s Location - (1) The place or places which any court referred to in Sec. 2 shall be held, may be fixed, and may from time to time be altered by the Government in consultation with the High Court. (2) The High Court may, with the approval of the Government, direct by notification in the gazette that all or any class of proceedings arising in a specified local area in a district which would ordinarily be instituted in the District Court, may be instituted before an Additional District Judge of that court sitting in a place other than the place where the District Judge sits”. Thus, the High Court (of Kerala) is given the power though with the approval of the Government, to direct by notification that all or any of the class of proceedings arising in a specified local area in a district which ordinarily is to be instituted before an Additional District Judge of that court (ie. District Court) sitting in a place other than the place the District Judge sits. 9. District Court) sitting in a place other than the place the District Judge sits. 9. The High Court of Kerala, in exercise of that power and with the approval of the Government of Kerala has issued notification No.C1-373/57 dated March 11, 1957 (published in the Kerala Gazette, Vol II, Part III, (Judicial Department) dated March 19, 1957 which is to the following effect: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 7(2) of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 (president 5 Act 1 of 1957), the High Court of Kerala with the approval of the Government of Kerala hereby directs that all classes of proceedings of a civil nature arising in the area comprised within the local limits of the Munsiff’s Courts of Mavelikkara, Chengannur, Pathanamthitta, Thiruvalla, Krishnapuram and Haripad which would ordinarily be instituted in the District Court of Quilon be instituted before the Additional District Judge of the Court sitting at Mavelikkara.” It is not disputed before me that the present case arises from the above notified area. If that be so, respondent was justified legally in instituting the application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act before learned Additional District Judge-I Mavelikkara who is invested with power as per the said notification issued under Sec. 7(2) of the Act receive proceedings arising from the notified areas. In view of the matter I hold that Additional District Judge-I, Mavelikkara was competent to receive the application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act. 10. What remained is whether petitioner should have been saddled with the liability to pay cost. Learned counsel for respondent has given me a copy of the cost memo which states that the cost payable is Rs. 4025/-. No doubt, awarding of cost is a matter within the ‘discretion’ of the Court concerned. ‘Discretion’ is the power to administer justice regulated according to the known rules of law (See N.S.S Medical Mission Hospital Vs. Soulbeth Beevi (2009 (2) KLT 779). In the present case maintainability of the proceeding was challenged raising a legal question which required consideration. There is nothing to think that in raising that objection petitioner has proceeded against respondent in an obstinate or inequitable manner so that it was necessary to award cost. As such, I am inclined to hold that the discretion to award cost has not been exercised in the proper manner. It therefore calls for interference. There is nothing to think that in raising that objection petitioner has proceeded against respondent in an obstinate or inequitable manner so that it was necessary to award cost. As such, I am inclined to hold that the discretion to award cost has not been exercised in the proper manner. It therefore calls for interference. Resultantly this petition is allowed to the extent that cost awarded by the learned Additional District Judge to the respondent is set aside. In other respects the order of learned Additional District Judge would stand.