Judgment :- The de facto complainant in a calendar case pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Thrissur is the revision petitioner, who is a lady. 2. In this revision petition, she challenges the order dated 19.8.2010 in Crl.M.P.No.3038 of 2010 in C.C.No.279 of 2008 of the said court by which her petition under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) for further investigation was dismissed by the learned Magistrate. 3. When the matter was taken up for hearing on admission, Sri. K. Ramakumar, the learned Senior Counsel entered appearance for and on behalf of the first respondent and had raised the preliminary objection and contention regarding the maintainability of the above revision petition. As the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel is against the very jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the revision petition against the order impugned, I am of the view that legally and procedurally, it is just and proper to decide the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue. 4. The short facts, which led to the filing of the present revision petition, are absolutely necessary to consider the question of maintainability of this revision, which are as follows: 5. C.C.No.279 of 2008 is a case instituted in the trial court on taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 470, 471 and 474 I.P.C., on the basis of the report filed after investigation in Crime No.12 of 2007 of the Nedupuzha Police Station. The said crime was registered on the allegation that the first respondent herein, who is the sole accused, fabricated a false promissory note from his house at Chiyyaram in Kerala and he had filed a suit before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ananthpur Sahib, Punjab as Suit No.307/18.9.2006 against the revision petitioner claiming a total sum of Rs.50,000/-. The further allegation is that the suit was filed by the accused by showing his name as one P.A. Sebastian, Sethi Nivas, 1333 Shivalik Avenue, Phase II, Naya Nangal, Punjab. The further allegation is that the suit was filed by the accused by showing his name as one P.A. Sebastian, Sethi Nivas, 1333 Shivalik Avenue, Phase II, Naya Nangal, Punjab. According to the petitioner, on getting summons from the trial court, she had realized from the records that the Police has not conducted a proper investigation in the case and no evidence is collected to show that the plaintiff in the above referred suit and the accused herein are one and the same person and the averment continues that the investigating officer has not taken any earnest steps to get the original documents filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Ananthapur Sahib, Punjab and it is also the averment of the petitioner that the investigating officer has not taken any effective steps to get the original of the forged documents which were taken by the accused from the Civil Court as per the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. It is also alleged that the lawyer of the accused, who appeared in the above civil court for the plaintiff, is not even questioned or cited as a witness and therefore, according to the revision petitioner, a further investigation in the above case is absolutely necessary under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. 6. The learned Magistrate dismissed the above petition with certain observations. According to the learned Magistrate, the accused has virtually admitted his identity in the counter statement as well as in the other documents. It was also observed that if the prosecution was of the view that the identity could be proved by comparing the signature or other materials in the original records produced before the civil court, it could file an application before the court below to summon the original records from the civil court and get it compared with the admitted signatures or specimen signature of the accused or another documents or evidence. According to the learned Magistrate, as the civil court had already rejected the application filed by the investigating officer for getting the original records, no purpose would be served by ordering a further investigation and in case the prosecution felt it necessary to file an application for summoning the original records from the civil court, further steps could be taken at appropriate time. It is the above order now under challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition. 7. It is the above order now under challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition. 7. In view of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., the learned Senior Counsel Sri. K. Ramakumar advanced two-fold arguments among which the most important argument is that the revision petition is not maintainable since the impugned order is an interlocutory order. The second point raised by the learned counsel is that the revision petitioner, who is a de facto complainant, has no authority or right to seek an order for further investigation as contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. since such power is well within the domine of the investigating officer or the court concerned. 8. Supplement to the main point raised, the learned Senior Counsel has strenuously submitted that the order of dismissing the petition, rejecting the prayer for further investigation is not a final order and therefore, it is essentially an interlocutory order and therefore, the bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is attracted. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that in spite of the dismissal of the said petition of the de facto complainant, it is a fact that the trial is not terminated, but the same can be proceeded further. So, the dismissal of the petition under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. in no way can be termed as a final order and therefore, it is only an interlocutory order. It is also the contention of the Senior Counsel that by the dismissal of the petition under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., the rights of the parties to the proceedings are affected no way and that is also a ground to hold that the order impugned is an interlocutory order and therefore, the bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is attracted. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel that even though the petitioner’s prayer for further investigation is rejected, she is not left with any remedy and she can very well agitate the issue after the trial or in appeal against the final verdict of the trial court. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel that even though the petitioner’s prayer for further investigation is rejected, she is not left with any remedy and she can very well agitate the issue after the trial or in appeal against the final verdict of the trial court. In order to buttress the argument of the learned counsel, the learned counsel heavily relied upon the decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (AIR 1980 SC 962) whereby the Apex Court has held thus:- “…… in order to construe the term ‘interlocutory’, it has to be construed in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. ……” and according to the Apex Court, “……. In other words, the words ‘not a final order’ must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. …..” Accordingly, the Apex Court has held thus:- “….. Thus, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term ‘final order’. ……” Besides the above decision, the learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the following decisions, viz., State represented by Inspector of Police & Others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate [(2004) 5 SCC 729], Rocky V.A. v. V.I. Vakkachan and Ors. [2009 (4) KHC 422], Yadav Agencies Pvt. Ltd. Philomina [1985 KLT 560] and Vasu v. Unnikrishnan [1983 KLT 310], to substantiate his challenge against the maintainability of the revision petition on the basis of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. 9. Another point raised by the learned counsel is that the petition for further investigation under Section 173(8) is not maintainable at the instance of a private individual or a complainant and for that reason also, the present revision petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. In order to substantiate the above contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Others [(2009) 9 SCC 129], particularly paragraphs 25 and 26. In order to substantiate the above contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Others [(2009) 9 SCC 129], particularly paragraphs 25 and 26. On the basis of the observation and findings of the Apex Court contained in the above passages of the Reeta Nag’s case (supra), the learned counsel submitted that no further investigation can be ordered on the basis of a petition filed by the de facto complainant under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. or on the basis of a protest complaint. 10. Stoutly resisting the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Philip. T. Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the preliminary objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel is liable to be rejected as the bar contemplated under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is not applicable in the present case since the order impugned in this revision petition is not an interlocutory order, but only an intermediate order. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that the order upon a petition filed under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., dismissing or allowing the same, is likely to affect the rights of the parties, especially with respect to the issue pending before the trial court for its consideration and therefore, the order, though not final in nature, is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel submitted that the correct position of law has been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47). In the above decision, the Apex Court has observed that ordinarily and generally, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term “final order”. But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. In the above decision, the Apex Court has observed that ordinarily and generally, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term “final order”. But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. It has also been held that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words “final order” and the Apex Court has classified the impugned order therein as an intermediate order, though the same is not final in nature, but surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel also relied the following decisions viz., Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others (AIR 1977 SC 2185), Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [(1999) 3 SCC 134], and Dharmarajan v. State (2002 (2) KLT 666), in support of his contention against the challenge of the revision petitioner on the ground of maintainability. 11. On the strength of a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Shaji v. State of Kerala (2003 (2) KLT 929), in reply to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the petition for further investigation is not maintainable at the instance of the private party, the counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the court can act upon such a petition and if the court is satisfied with the ground of further investigation, such an order can be passed irrespective of the fact whether the petition was moved by the investigating agency or a private complainant. Learned counsel also submitted that the first respondent/accused has no say while dealing with a petition for investigation or further investigation and to substantiate the above point, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in Ummer v. State of Kerala (2010 (1) KLT 963). 12. Sri. Tek Chand, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that a revision petition, challenging an order issued under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C., is maintainable and the bar under Section 397 (2) is not applicable to such an order. 12. Sri. Tek Chand, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that a revision petition, challenging an order issued under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C., is maintainable and the bar under Section 397 (2) is not applicable to such an order. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Madhu Limaye’s case, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the order impugned in this revision petition can be categorized as an intermediate order and hence the bar under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. is not applicable. In support of the above submission, besides the decision in Madhu Limaye’s case, the learned Public Prosecutor has also relied upon a decision of this Court reported in Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala [2009 (2) KLT SN 34 (C.No.40)]. 13. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by Mr. K. Ramakumar, Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent, the arguments of Sri. Philip T. Varghese, counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor. I have carefully gone through the decisions cited by both the counsel and the learned Public Prosecutor and also the impugned order. 14. On a careful perusal of the impugned order, it can be seen that the learned Magistrate himself is of the opinion that the prosecution materials or evidence collected so far are not complete, and the said fact is discernible from the following observation in the order impugned. “9. The further contention is that the investigating officer has not questioned the lawyer who appeared for the plaintiff in the civil suit and the investigating officer has not taken steps to prove that the accused herein and the person who filed the civil suit are one and the same person. The identity is virtually admitted by the accused in the counter statement as well as in the other documents. However, if the prosecution is of the view that the identity can be proved by comparing the signature or other materials in the original records produced before the civil court, it can file an application before this Court to summon the original records from the civil court and get it compared with the admitted signatures or specimen signature of the accused or another documents or evidence. As stated above, the civil court has already rejected the application of the investigating officer for getting the original records. As stated above, the civil court has already rejected the application of the investigating officer for getting the original records. So, no purpose will be served by ordering a further investigation. The prosecution feels it necessary to file an application for summoning the original records from the civil court, further steps can be taken.” Hence, according to me, the said observation of the learned Magistrate would show that there is some defect or dearth of materials or evidence. The crux of the prosecution allegation against the first respondent/accused is that he had fabricated and forged a document for the filing of a civil suit, and the suit itself was filed in a different name by the accused. Therefore, the question, whether a further investigation is necessary or not, can be answered only after further enquiry into the matter. 15. In the light of the above factual premises and in view of the rival contentions taken by the contesting parties and the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties, the question, to be decided, is whether an order, issued by a competent court dismissing a petition for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C, is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. and is there any legal bar in entertaining such revision petition in view of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., especially an order under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. based upon a petition filed by the de facto complainant or a private person? In order to consider the above question, a reading of Section 397 is inevitable, which runs as follows:- “397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation, --All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” 16. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. K. Ramakumar strenuously argued that the order impugned in this revision petition is an interlocutory order and therefore, by virtue of the prohibition contained under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., the revision petition is not maintainable. In order to substantiate the above point, the learned counsel mainly relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in V.C. Shukla’s case (supra). The learned Senior Counsel took me through paragraphs 4 and 5 in the above decision which reads as follows:- “4. A perusal of the Objects and Reasons clearly shows that the Parliament wanted to implement the recommendation of the Law Commission as far as possible. In the instant case, we are mainly concerned with two important changes which have been made in the Code. In the first place, as para 5 of the Objects and Reasons shows the preliminary inquiry which preceded the trial by a court of session known as committal proceedings has been abolished and the Magistrate before whom the charge-sheet is submitted has merely to find out whether the offence is exclusively triable by a sessions court and, if so, to send the case to the sessions court. This was obviously done to cut down considerable delay and duplication in the trial of serious criminal offences. We have laid special stress on this part of the amendment because a serious argument was built up by the learned counsel for the appellant on the question as to when the trial in a warrant case starts. We shall deal with this aspect of the matter a little later. We have laid special stress on this part of the amendment because a serious argument was built up by the learned counsel for the appellant on the question as to when the trial in a warrant case starts. We shall deal with this aspect of the matter a little later. Secondly, para 5(d) of the Objects and Reasons emphasizes the fact that powers of revision against interlocutory orders have been taken away as they were found to be the main contributing factor in the delay of the disposal of criminal cases. It may be mentioned here that in the Codes of Criminal Procedure, prior to the Code of 1973, the word ‘interlocutory order’ was not used at all and, therefore, it has to be interpreted for the first time only after the Code came into force. Section 397(2) of the Code which contains the powers of revision against interlocutory orders runs thus -- (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. 5. It will be important to note that the words ‘interlocutory order’ used in this sub-section relates to various stages of the trial, namely, appeal, inquiry, trial or any other proceeding. The object seems to be to cutdown the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction. So far as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is concerned, it has got a wide and diverse area of jurisdiction inasmuch as it regulates the procedure of trial not only of the large number of offences contained in the Indian Penal Code but also in other Acts and statutes which apply the Code of criminal Procedure or which are statutes in pari materia the Code. Having regard, therefore, to the very large ambit and range of the Code, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ would have to be given a broad meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act without disturbing or interfering with the fairness of the trial. Fortunately, however, there are a few decisions which have interpreted the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as appearing in S.397(2) of the Code………” The Apex Court, after considering several decisions including the decisions in Madhu Limaye’s case and Amar Nath’s case, in paragraph 23 observed as follows:- “23. Fortunately, however, there are a few decisions which have interpreted the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as appearing in S.397(2) of the Code………” The Apex Court, after considering several decisions including the decisions in Madhu Limaye’s case and Amar Nath’s case, in paragraph 23 observed as follows:- “23. Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. …. …..” Thus, it was finally held as evidenced from paragraphs 46 and 47 as follows:-“46. Thus, summing up the entire position the inescapable conclusion that we reach is that giving the expression ‘the interlocutory order’ its natural meaning according to the tests laid down, as discussed above, particularly in Kuppuswami’s case and applying the non obstante clause, we are satisfied that so far as the expression ‘interlocutory order’ appearing in S.11(1) of the Act is concerned, it has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Code in S.397(2). The view taken by us appears to be in complete consonance with the avowed object to the Act to provide for a most expeditious trial and quick dispatch of the case tried by the Special Court, which appears to be the paramount intention in passing the Act. 47. In these circumstances, therefore, we hold that the order passed by the Special Judge was an interlocutory order and the appeal filed against that order in this Court is clearly not maintainable. We therefore, uphold he preliminary objection taken by the Solicitor General and dismiss the appeal as being not maintainable.” Thus, according to the Honourable Apex Court, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term ‘final order’ and an intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. 17. But, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in V.C. Shukla’s case (supra) is not relevant and applicable in the present case since their Lordships laid down the guideline considering mainly the scope of Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 (Act 22 of 1979) (for short ‘the Act’). But, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in V.C. Shukla’s case (supra) is not relevant and applicable in the present case since their Lordships laid down the guideline considering mainly the scope of Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 (Act 22 of 1979) (for short ‘the Act’). Thus, on a consideration of the facts involved in the above case, it can be seen that the above decision was rendered by the Apex Court on appeal preferred under Section 11 (1) of the Act and especially, when a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal was taken. The preliminary objection therein was mainly on the ground that the order impugned before the Apex Court, being purely an interlocutory order, which is coming within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the Act, no appeal will lie to the Apex Court. It is on the basis of the above preliminary issue, the appellate court rendered the above decision. Thus, while considering the above section of that particular Act, the Apex Court has also considered the scope of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. In this juncture, it is pertinent to note that, while rendering the above decision, the Apex Court has though considered the Madhu Limaye’s case (AIR 1978 SC 47), which was a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court, the dictum laid down therein has not been overruled, in the decision in V.C. Shukla’s case which is rendered by a larger Bench consisting of four Judges of the Apex Court, rather the principles laid down in Madhu Limaye’s case have been approved by the Bench. Thus, according to the decision in V.C. Shukla’s case, the Apex Court is of the opinion that the natural and legible meaning of an interlocutory order is that an order, which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceedings, suit or trial, but which does not however conclude the trial at all. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceedings, suit or trial, but which does not however conclude the trial at all. The Apex Court had further observed that the above interpretation is given without taking resort to the Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute and it is made clear that such interpretation is with respect to the term ‘interlocutory order’ when used in Section 11(1) of the Act. In this juncture, it is also beneficial to refer to a passage contained in paragraph 95 of the above decision. Justice D.A. Desai, while concurring the final order proposed by Justice Fazal Ali, His Lordship Justice D.A. Desai has observed in paragraph 95 as follows:- “95. Ordinarily speaking, the expression “interlocutory” in legal parlance is understood in contradistinction to what is styled as final. In the course of a judicial proceeding before a court, for judicially determining the main dispute brought to the Court for its resolution, a number of situations arise, where that court goes on disposing of ancillary disputes raised by parties to the proceeding by making orders and unless the order finally disposes of a proceeding in a court, all such orders during the course of a trial would be broadly designated ‘interlocutory’ orders. Such interlocutory orders are steps, taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding ……” So, according to me, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is correct in his contention that the decision reported in V.C. Shukla’s case is not an authority to consider the question involved in the present case. According to me, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the legal position is well settled in the decision reported in Madhu Limaye’s case, in which the appeal before the Apex Court arose out of by a Special Leave Petition from the order of the Bombay High Court dismissing the revision petition filed by the appellant under Section 397(1) of the Cr.P.C. on the ground that the revision was not maintainable in view of the embargo contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. The Bombay High Court dismissed the revision petition without going into the merits of the case. For the correct understanding of the proposition laid down in the above decision, some more facts are necessary which is discernible from paragraph 2 of the said decision, according to which, in a press conference, the appellant is said to have made certain statements and handed over a ‘press hand-out’ containing allegedly some defamatory statements with respect to Sri. A.R. Antulay, the then Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra and the said statements were published in various newspapers and hence, the Maharashtra State Government decided to prosecutor the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 500 of the I.P.C. and for filing the complaint, sanction was also purported to have been accorded under Section 199(4)(a) of the Cr.P.C. by the State Government. On the basis of the said sanction order and as directed by the State Government, the Public Prosecutor has filed a complaint in the Court of Sessions, Bombay upon which cognizance was taken by the Sessions Court without being committed to it as mandated under sub-section (2) of Section 199 of the Cr.P.C. In the said complaint, the Chief Secretary to State of Maharashtra was examined to prove the sanction order and thereafter, Shri. Madhu Limaye, the appellant filed a petition to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In support of the above petition, various grounds were taken. Thus, the appellant took several contentions, including the main three grounds, before the Sessions Court to assail the validity and the legality of the trial in question. One of such grounds is that the Sessions Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint as the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance without the committal of the case. Secondly, the sanction given was bad since it was not given by the competent authority. Thirdly, while issuing sanction, the Chief Secretary has not applied his mind. But, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the petition filed by the appellant against which the appellant approached the High Court by filing a revision petition which was also dismissed upholding the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the revision application. It is, against the said order, the appellant approached the Honourable Supreme Court. But, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the petition filed by the appellant against which the appellant approached the High Court by filing a revision petition which was also dismissed upholding the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the revision application. It is, against the said order, the appellant approached the Honourable Supreme Court. While interpreting the term ‘interlocutory order’ and assigning meaning thereto, the Honourable Apex Court has held that though ordinarily and generally, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term “final order”, an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. According to the Apex Court, if such a meaning is given, it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1) of the Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in paragraph 13 of the above decision has held as follows:- “13. In S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, 1947 FCR 180: (AIR 1949 FC 1) Kania C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pages 185 and 186 (of FCR): (at p.3 of AIR). Lord Esher M.R. Said in Saleman v. Warner, (1891) 1 QB 734 “If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory”. To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgments of Fry L.J. and Lopes.L.J. Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court (at that time there was no bar like S.397(2)) was not a “final roder” within the meaning of S.205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final roder only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words “interlocutory order” occurring in S.397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final roder and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final roder must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by S.397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chap.XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide, for example, The River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson, (1876-77) 2 AC 743 and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, 1957 SCR 930: (AIR 1957 SC 628) that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words “final order”. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case (AIR 1949 FC 1) (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order – pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-s.(2) of S.397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Art.134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterize them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S.397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-sec.(2) of S.397. In our opinion, it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.” (underline supplied) 18. On examination of the facts and circumstances involved in the present case, which led to the impugned order, it can be seen that though the order passed by the learned Magistrate is not final in nature or determining the right of the parties, the outcome of the order is likely to affect the right of the parties at the stage of final adjudication. As observed by Justice Desai, in V.C. Shukla’s case, the present order arose out of a step taken by the de facto complainant towards the effective final adjudication of the matter pending before the trial court and for assisting the parties in the prosecution for their case in the pending proceedings. I am of the view that on a dismissal or allowing of petition filed under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C., either by the investigating agency or at the instance of private complainant, the same cannot be characterized neither as a final order nor as an interlocutory order, but the same has vital consequence, at the stage of final adjudication of the main proceedings pending before the court connected with the inquiry or trial commenced. So, according to me, the order impugned in this revision petition is an order passed during the course of proceedings, but not final in the sense, determining the right or liabilities of the parties and the same is not an interlocutory order, but the order can be categorized as the one falling in between the final order and interlocutory order and the outcome of such order is likely to affect the interest of the parties in the trial and therefore, such order is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is not attracted. No doubt, the proceedings which are the subject matter of the decisions reported in State represented by Inspector of Police & Others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate [(2004) 5 SCC 729], Rocky V.A. v. V.I. Vakkachan and Ors. [2009 (4) KHC 422], Yadav Agencies Pvt.Ltd. v. Philomina [1985 KLT 560] and Vasu v. Unnikrishnan [1983 KLT 310], are purely interlocutory in nature and hence, the bar contemplated under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is attracted and as such, the dictum laid down in those decisions is beyond any dispute and governs the field. In the light of the decisions reported in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [(1999) 3 SCC 134], Dharmarajan v. State (2002 (2) KLT 666) and Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala [2009 (2) KLT SN 34 (C.No.40), according to me, the order impugned is revisable, notwithstanding the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. because the test laid down in those decisions is squarely applicable in the present case also. 19. 19. In the decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel, ie., State represented by Inspector of Police and Others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate [(2004) 5 SCC 729], the Honourable Apex Court has held that the order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings of the trial itself nor can it have any effect on the ultimate decision of the case and if an order of remand is found to be illegal, it cannot result an acquittal of the accused or in termination of proceedings. The Apex Court has further held that a remand order cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner. Thus, according to the Apex Court, applying the test laid down in Madhu Limaye’s case, it cannot be categorized even as “intermediate order”. But, it is pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C., a revision against the said order is not maintainable. On applying the same test in the present case, it can be seen that either dismissal or allowing the prayer for further investigation is likely to affect the progress or regress, as the case may be or it is likely to considerably affect the adjudication or final decision. 20. If the contention of the learned Senior Counsel is admitted as such, the aggrieved party will be left with no efficacious remedy to redress the grievance, irrespective of the fact, whether the affected party is the accused or the investigating agency or the de facto complainant. If it is held that the bar contemplated under Section 397(2) is applicable against entertaining the revision petition from an order like the present one, then the affected party cannot approach the High Court even by invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C., since the settled position of law would again stand in the way of such affected party in invoking the inherent power of High Court since Section 482 cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory ban as that of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. The contention of the learned counsel that the affected party can file an appeal after the trial, seems to be a sound one since the fresh materials or evidence have to be collected and presented before conclusion of the trial, otherwise the justice will be again delayed. In effect, as indicated earlier, the affected party would be put in irreparable injury and hardship which will ultimately adversely affect the administration of criminal justice. Now-a-days, due to the changes in the society, the number of economic offences and crime connected therewith and also crimes related to extremism are being increased and such offenders or wrong doers are equipped with modern devices including sophisticated weapons and electronic equipments and both of them are powerful and capable to sabotage any investigation by using their money power as well as muscle power and hence during the investigation, the necessary evidence or material need not necessarily come to the notice of the investigating agency. Under such circumstances, the contingency will arise under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. and it is only just and proper to have a further investigation and if such course is denied, then the only remedy available to the affected party is to avail the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and in such a situation, such remedy cannot be denied by classifying an order under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. as an interlocutory order because such an approach and interpretation will adversely affect administration of criminal justice and such approach is against the demand of time. 21. With respect to the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel that the application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. is not maintainable at the instance of private complainant, I am of the view that such a contention is not sustainable in the light of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Shaji’s case. In the above dictum, in point No.4 of the conclusions, this Court has held that by taking cognizance of the offence, adjudicatory process of the Court starts and normally investigation stage ends except under S.173(8). It was also held that therefore, ordinarily, after taking cognizance of the offence, Court shall not suo motu order further investigation unless circumstances warrant. In the above dictum, in point No.4 of the conclusions, this Court has held that by taking cognizance of the offence, adjudicatory process of the Court starts and normally investigation stage ends except under S.173(8). It was also held that therefore, ordinarily, after taking cognizance of the offence, Court shall not suo motu order further investigation unless circumstances warrant. Under point No.5 of the conclusions, the Division Bench has held that if the complainant files a petition saying that real culprits were not included in the final report or there is lacuna in the investigation which will cause failure of justice and if the Magistrate after considering the matter comes to the prima facie conclusion that proper investigation was not conducted, he is not helpless, the Magistrate will be free to order further investigation to avoid failure of justice. 22. In the light of the above facts and circumstances and the discussions and in view of the legal position explained, according to me, an order, dismissing a petition filed under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. for further investigation, is not an interlocutory order attracting the bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and hence, the challenge against such order, either at the instance of the investigating agency or at the instance of the de facto complainant or a private complainant as the case may be, by way of revision petition would lie to the High Court under Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C. and the order impugned is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the result, I am of the view that the objection raised by the first respondent against the maintainability of the revision petition is not legally and factually sustainable and the same is overruled and rejected. In the light of the above facts, circumstances and the legal position discussed above, the revision petitioner has established a prima facie case and requires further enquiry in the matter for which the revision petition has to be admitted. Admit. Issue notice to first respondent. Public Prosecutor takes notice for second respondent.