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2010 DIGILAW 950 (JHR)

Central Gurudwara Prabandhank Committee v. State of Jharkhand

2010-09-29

BHAGWATI PRASAD, R.R.PRASAD

body2010
JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition has been filed by the Petitioner to seek the following reliefs : (i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction for quashing Notification issued vide Memo No. 626 dated 24.2.2009 (Annexure-7) whereby and whereunder Jharkhand State Minority Commission has been constituted u/s 4(2) of the Jharkhand State Minority Commission Act, 2001, in view of the fact that in the said reconstituted Commission, the minority community belonging to "Sikhs" has not been given adequate representation as no member of Sikh community has been made Vice Chairman of the said Jharkhand State Minority Commission. (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents to appoint one member of Sikh Community as Vice Chairman of the Jharkhand State Minority Commission, especially in view of the fact that from the very beginning itself one member of Sikh Community had always been given representation in the Jharkhand State Minority Commission on the post of Vice Chairman and also in view of the fact that the minority community of Sikhs in the State of Jharkhand constitutes an approximate population of 5 lakhs and above and due to their inadequate representation in the Jharkhand State Minority Commission, they are immensely suffering. (iii) For issuance of appropriate writ/order/direction, including the Writ of Certiorari, for quashing the appointment of Respondent No. 4 - Manzoor Ahmad Ansari, who has been appointed on the post of Vice Chairman of Jharkhand State Minority Commission, especially in view of the fact that the said appointment is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and no due procedure of law has been followed by the Respondents while appointing said Respondent No. 4. (iv) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction directing the Respondents not to illegally and arbitrarily discriminate one minority community of the State of Jharkhand with that of the other minority communities giving them more representation in the Jharkhand State Minority Commission than that of the minority community of Sikh. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner took pains to establish that there is an established practice to appoint Sikh Community Member as Vice Chairman of the Minority Commission constituted under the Minority Commission Act in the Jharkhand State. 3. From the facts, we find that the Minority Commission, as constituted in the year 2004 and 2008, no Sikh gentleman has been appointed as Vice Chairman. 3. From the facts, we find that the Minority Commission, as constituted in the year 2004 and 2008, no Sikh gentleman has been appointed as Vice Chairman. In view of that background, it cannot be a legitimate argument or contention that this is a practice in this State. In any case, a practice in a State, which is in existence only for ten years, cannot be said to be an established practice. It may further be noticed that when there is a statute governing the formation of a commission then the practice would be hardly of any consequence because the legislative mandate has to be looked into. 4. The other argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Sikh Community has a legitimate expectation to get appointed to see that any member of their community is appointed as Vice Chairman. The aforementioned legitimate expectation was sought to be invoked by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the line of the following decisions of the Supreme Court : i. Bal Patil and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 2005 SC 3172 ii. Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, AIR 1991 SC 101 iii. Sethi Auto Service Station and Another Vs. Delhi Development Authority and Others, AIR 2009 SC 904 iv. Ram Pravesh Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 381 5. Suffice it to say the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the legitimate expectation itself negates the claim of the Petitioner because the Petitioner is not the one who can fall within the four corner of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. In this regard, relevant paragraph of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pravesh Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 381 is quoted hereinbelow : 15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term "established practice" refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. The term "established practice" refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a "legitimate expectation" of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above "fairness in action" but far below "promissory estoppel". It may only entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid, or bona fide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the "legitimate expectation". The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognized legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly. 6. A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly. 6. In view of the aforesaid argument, as advanced, to get appointed a member of Sikh Community as Vice Chairman on the basis of the legitimate expectation is also a misconceived argument. Both the arguments of learned Counsel having not registered with us, we do not think that any relief can be granted to the Petitioner in the public interest litigation. This may also, however, be mentioned that this is not a bona fide public interest litigation. This is more in the nature of personal interest litigation. 7. In view of the above, we refuse to exercise our jurisdiction. 8. This petition is; accordingly, dismissed.