JUDGMENT Honble A.P. Sahi, J.—The petitioner, a Head Constable of the U.P. Police and a government servant, has been dismissed from service on the charge of contracting a second marriage, even though the first spouse was living without permission of the competent authority. This case is not unique because of the point of law involved, but because of its peculiar facts where the petitioner has been assessed by the respondents to be the perpetrator of his own misfortunes. Interestingly enough, the petitioner basking in the glory of his cultural belief, set upon to have a second wife during the life time of the first one, only to realise after quarter of a century that he was guilty of misconduct as a government servant for having entered into this bigamous relationship. 2. This began with, as usual, by a complaint made by one Mr. Matamber Tiwari, who is a resident of the same village as the petitioner. The petitioner alleges that Mr. Matamber Tiwari was annoyed on account of a land transaction, which involved the two wives of the petitioner, and this long enmity manifested itself in the complaint made by Mr. Matamber Tiwari to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Allahabad. By this time, when the complaint was made in the year 2007, the petitioner had almost completed his service tenure and was about to retire after a year. The complaint which was made in 2007 contained a recital that the petitioner had entered into a second marriage without requisite permission and he was, therefore, continuing in service in violation of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. Rule 29 is quoted below for ready reference : “29. Bigamous marriages.—(1) No Government servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government, notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him. (2) No female Government servant shall marry any person who has a wife living without fist obtaining the permission of the Government.” The petitioner is a Hindu by religion, which fact is undisputed. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes bigamy punishable under Sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is quoted below : “17. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes bigamy punishable under Sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is quoted below : “17. Punishment of bigamy-Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of this Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of Sections 498 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), shall apply accordingly.” 3. The complaint which was the outcome of a evil neighbours design, saw its way to an inquiry, which in the preliminary round was conducted by the Circle Officer, Shri A.K. Shukla, who submitted a report on 25th March, 2008. The petitioner was issued a notice informing him that the report in relation to his alleged bigamous relationship has been received and one Mr. Shiv Baran Singh another Circle Officer was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct a regular inquiry under the U.P. Subordinate Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. The Enquiry Officer served the petitioner with a charge sheet dated 5th April, 2008 and after conducting the inquiry submitted a report on 28th May, 2008. The petitioner was found to have contracted a second marriage without permission of the State Government which amounted to a misconduct. A show cause notice, after the inquiry, was issued to the petitioner on 1st June, 2008 whereafter the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the Enquiry Officer’s report and the evidence on record was taken into account and the petitioner was punished by dismissal from service on 21st June, 2008. The petitioner preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed on 20th August, 2008 and a revision filed before the Inspector General of Police against the order of the Appellate Authority was also dismissed on 18.11.2008. The petitioner has justified his actions and questioned the legality and correctness of the aforesaid orders impugned in the present writ petition and has prayed for quashing of the same with a direction to the respondents to treat him as a regular employee and award him all such benefits even after his retirement. It is undisputed that the petitioner has also attained his age of superannuation which he would have attained even otherwise during the course of these proceedings. 4. It is undisputed that the petitioner has also attained his age of superannuation which he would have attained even otherwise during the course of these proceedings. 4. The petitioner having been deprived of his livelihood and his future pension contends that while he was in service in the prime of his life, he was blessed with four daughters from his first wife Parvati. One of the daughters died and three, who survived were married by the petitioner respectively. However, his first wife was allegedly suffering from cancer of the uterus and, therefore, with her consent the petitioner contracted the second marriage with Dewrati in the year 1982 only for the sole purpose of having a son, whose birth would guarantee his salvation and emancipation from this world as per accepted Hindu religious belief. The petitioner contends that this second marriage was under the aforesaid compulsory circumstances, which emanated out of this old traditional and orthodox belief that had a moral and religious sanction behind it. The petitioner consummated the second marriage for the said purpose, which has been admitted by himself throughout the inquiry proceedings and is also corroborated by the statement of the first wife Parvati, who was produced as a witness during the inquiry proceedings. The petitioner had also taken a defence that he had duly intimated the then Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad, Mr. G.P. Sharma about his intention to do so, and a plea was also set up before the authorities that permission had been granted by the then Superintendent of Police. The petitioner, however, failed to produce any documentary evidence to demonstrate the same on this score. The Enquiry Officer found the petitioner to have misconducted himself, which finding was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and the services of the petitioner were dispensed with accordingly. 5. In appeal, the petitioner raised several grounds including the ground of dis-proportionality of the punishment and all other grounds which had been raised before the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority, in addition to the reasons given by the punishing authority, further held that even otherwise the Superintendent of Police had no authority to extend any such permission and it was to be given by the State Government or an Officer authorized in this behalf. In the absence of any such document to substantiate the said plea, the conduct of the petitioner was in breach of Rule 29 aforesaid. In the absence of any such document to substantiate the said plea, the conduct of the petitioner was in breach of Rule 29 aforesaid. The Appellate Authority further recorded that such a permission can only be granted where the first wife is dead, or she is mentally unsound or there is a divorce established under law. The Appellate Authority held that none of these contingencies did exist and even if, the subsequent marriage was permissible under the personal law of the petitioner, he was not entitled to any such permission. Thus, the conclusion of the Appellate Authority was that firstly, there was a complete lack of evidence of permission and secondly, no such permission could have been granted to the petitioner. On the question of proportionality, the Appellate Authority did not find any valid reason to interfere with the same and accordingly rejected the appeal. 6. The petitioner in his revision raised all the aforesaid issues and further questioned the correctness of proportionality on the ground of sub Rule 3 of Rule 29 that a different punishment ought to have been awarded. He further raised the issue that if the second marriage was not permissible in law then it was void and a void marriage cannot be made the basis for invoking the provision of Rule 29, which contemplates a subsisting and valid bigamous relationship. The petitioner further submitted that no evidence was led by the department to dislodge the stand of the petitioner that he had sought permission and since no evidence was led in the negative, therefore, the procedure adopted by the respondents is defective and no inference of not having sought valid permission could have been drawn. The issue of proportionality was again repeated but the revisional authority negatived all these contentions by recording clear findings. It was found by the revising authority that sub-rule (3) of Rule 29 had already been deleted through a notification dated 20.10.1976 and, therefore, a lesser punishment could not have been awarded. The question of marriage being void was also turned down on the ground that the conduct of the petitioner of having the company of another woman and begetting a child out of the said relationship under any circumstance cannot be accepted as a circumstance to avoid punishment of misconduct, inasmuch as, the petitioner had according to his own admission contracted the second marriage. Taking an over all view of the situation, the Inspector General of Police did not find the punishment to be disproportionate and upheld the orders under challenge. 7. Shri K.M. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced his submissions to the best of his abilities and he submits that apart from the correctness of the orders that have been assailed, the petitioner has been punished disproportionately which shocks the conscience in the given background of the case and, therefore, the orders impugned are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel has relied on several decisions to substantiate his arguments. The judgments relied on are that of (1) Writ Petition No. 27963 of 2007 (Smt. Raj Bala Sharma v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 23.07.2009, (2) Writ Petition No. 7080 of 1995 (Awadhesh Chandra Sharma v. U.P.P. Service Tribunal Lucknow and others, (3) Amal Kumar Baruah v. State of Assam and others, 2006 (3) GLR 106, (4) Syed Azad v. Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Scr and another, 2006 (2) ALT 112 and (5) Narendra Kumar Jain v. Food Corporation of India and others, 2002 (1) LBESR 1046. 8. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged that the petitioner having admitted the second marriage, it is not open to him to question the factual basis of the same to gain any advantage by raising a legal argument. It is submitted on behalf of the State that the action of the petitioner was a clear case of misconduct and the same having been discovered after more than 25 years, does not in any way dilute the misconduct committed by the petitioner. There is no dilution of the impact of Rule 29 merely because of passage of time and the consequences have to be accepted in law. Learned Standing Counsel relied on two decisions namely that of Ramesh Pal Singh v. Union of India and others, 2008 (1) ESC 350 and Veerpal Singh v. Senior Superintendent of Police and others, 2006 (5) ADJ 318 to contend that the guilt having been established, the petitioner has been clearly found to have committed a misconduct and, therefore, the punishment is not dis-proportionate. It is submitted that the petitioner has voluntarily entered into the second marriage and there was no such legal compulsion or any other justification available to petitioner in law so as to justify his conduct of second marriage and, therefore, a mere convenience which has been given the shape of a moral sanction, disentitled the petitioner from any compassion. The impugned orders therefore deserve to be affirmed. 9. I have heard Shri K.M. Tripathi and Shri P.K. Giri, for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents and perused the affidavits that have been exchanged between the parties. 10. The petitioner’s effort is to justify his second marriage on the principles of certain moral and religious sanctions which he believes to be necessary for his benefit and the benefit which he is likely to receive upon his departure from this world. His belief is that his soul and that of his ancestors will rest in peace if he dies leaving behind a son to discharge his pious obligations. It is not only the petitioner but his first wife Parvati as well who has clearly stated in her statement before the Enquiry Officer that husband and wife both profess honestly to believe that if the husband contracts a second marriage for the purpose of having a son, this will help to bring about salvation of the parents. The son born out of the second wedlock would in their belief would be the only competent person who would be entitled to perform the rites and duties for such obligations, and as fate would have it, the petitioner and his second wife has been blessed with three sons and one daughter. The petitioner, in my opinion, has a right to have believed in his moral convictions and for that it was open to him to conduct himself in a manner so as to furnish faith to his belief. But it was not open to the petitioner to do this without the permission of the State Government. It is for this reason that the limitations have been prescribed in Rule 29. Rule 29 is permissive in nature and not prohibitory to the extent of absolute exclusion of a second marriage. The limitations are, however, in the absence of the first spouse or her mental unsoundness or a situation where the husband is a divorcee. It is for this reason that the limitations have been prescribed in Rule 29. Rule 29 is permissive in nature and not prohibitory to the extent of absolute exclusion of a second marriage. The limitations are, however, in the absence of the first spouse or her mental unsoundness or a situation where the husband is a divorcee. These are the limitations prescribed by law to define the limits of a decent conduct of a government servant. Bigamy would not be a misconduct to the aforesaid extent. The permission to be granted by the State Government takes care of the basic need of human life and in my opinion, is a measure of social improvement. The petitioner may be thinking rightly and for him it was Courteous to have obtained the consent of the first wife, but in my opinion, the personal morals of the petitioner was confined to his own necessity of satisfying his religious belief. This personal need of the petitioner to make it convenient for him to fortify his religious belief may have a moral sanction but it does not have a sanction in law. The law as indicated above declares bigamy as an offence after 1955. Such an act under the 1956 Rules is a misconduct if the second marriage is contracted without permission. The words used in Rule 29 is clearly notwithstanding anything contained in the personal law of the government servant that may make such a subsequent marriage permissible. Thus, the rigour of Rule 29 makes it obligatory for a permission to be granted by the State Government. The petitioner did attempt to establish this permission but has failed. He did not produce any oral or documentary proof to establish any attempt having been made to seek permission and obtain it from the appropriate authority. His mere statement, therefore, was rightly disbelieved by the authorities and in the absence of any material proof this finding on a question of fact cannot be a subject matter of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, thus, clear that having failed to establish anything with regard to the grant of permission by the State Government, the petitioner has himself invited the invoking of the aforesaid Rule which may have been at the instance of a unruly neighbour. 11. It is, thus, clear that having failed to establish anything with regard to the grant of permission by the State Government, the petitioner has himself invited the invoking of the aforesaid Rule which may have been at the instance of a unruly neighbour. 11. The law recognizes the act of the petitioner as a misconduct and the supporting statement of his first wife, in my opinion, cannot improve the situation. The attempt of the petitioner, according to his own statement, was to fill the void of a son in the family. The second marriage brought about three sons later on. This was his personal choice but was a legal lapse, little realising that the petitioner may have to face the consequences of such a folly. 12. I have considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case and it is difficult to even push a needle into the findings of the authorities that link each other perfectly. There is no legally permissible way to drive a wedge and create a space for faulting the findings recorded by the authorities below. The petitioner, therefore, could not dislodge the findings of misconduct in law on the basis of the facts that have emerged. 13. The only issue which now tinkers with the conscience is the fact that this dismissal has come after a lapse of more than a quarter century of the services of the petitioner, who was at the fag end of his career and had a little more than one year to superannuate. The complaint itself emanated in the year 2007 and the complainant Mr. Matamber Tiwari in his statement during inquiry while being cross-examined stated that he came to now about the misconduct Rules only in the year 2007 even though he had knowledge of the bigamous relationship from before and, therefore, the complaint was made in the year 2007. It is quite possible that the bitterness of his personal enmity with the petitioner may have been also one of the causes of complaint, but the fact remains that the complaint was made after 25 years of the marriage, which took place in 1982. 14. The petitioner has three sons and a daughter from the second marriage. It is quite possible that the bitterness of his personal enmity with the petitioner may have been also one of the causes of complaint, but the fact remains that the complaint was made after 25 years of the marriage, which took place in 1982. 14. The petitioner has three sons and a daughter from the second marriage. This aspect of the matter that the complaint has come up at the fag end of the career of the petitioner, can be a circumstances for going into the question of proportionality of punishment. However, such examination can be made only if the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. The circumstances are that the petitioner had four daughters from his first marriage out of whom one died and the other three were married by him to the satisfaction of his first wife. From his second marriage, the petitioner has three sons and one daughter. It is, therefore, now a very large family which has to be looked after by the petitioner and the petitioner himself has to sustain his own family with two wives. All three persons namely the petitioner and his two wives, must now be in their advance age and incapable of any further resources to sustain their livelihood apart from what has already been acquired by them. Not only this, the social obligations of such a family have to be undertaken. These circumstances also add to the misery of the petitioner, who has been dismissed from service. The petitioner has admittedly superannuated during these proceedings and, therefore, he also looses the right to receive pensionary benefits. The petitioner’s misconduct was an adventure undertaken by him, which ultimately turned out to be his own disaster. The desire to have salvation in future life has ruined his present prospects. The approach of the petitioner was therefore not only unpragmatic but was an invitation founded on his own follies. The consequences that have visited the petitioner does not involve him alone but his entire family. It is this aspect of the matter which tends to bring about a pause in the process of reasoning for the purpose of considering the proportionality of the punishment. 15. Before entering into this a word about the decisions which have been cited at the bar on both sides. It is this aspect of the matter which tends to bring about a pause in the process of reasoning for the purpose of considering the proportionality of the punishment. 15. Before entering into this a word about the decisions which have been cited at the bar on both sides. The case of Awadhesh Chandra Sharma (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was with regard to a charge against an employee, who allowed a truck to enter within the municipal limits without payment of octroi duty. The case was disposed of with a finding of disproportionate punishment by relying on the Division Bench judgment of Narendra Kumar Jain (supra). In the decision of Narendra Kumar Jain a finding was recorded that the government servant may have been negligent in the performance of his duty but the same would not constitute misconduct. In my opinion, both these judgments do not apply on the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in those cases there was a negligence of duty and the lapse had resulted into some loss to the State Government. These cases are not in relation to a misconduct founded on bigamy or violation of Rule 29 of the 1956 Rules. 16. The other two decisions are of the Guwahati High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Andhra Pradesh High Court came to the conclusion that the punishment of compulsory retirement on the ground of bigamy was disproportionate and was substituted by stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. It was a case of a marriage by a Muslim couple and it was held that the fact of the marriage receded into the background and, therefore, on the peculiar facts of the said case it was held that they being Muslims a second marriage could have been contracted. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the marriage was without permission as required under the Rules the punishment was reduced. 17. In the decision of the Guwahati High Court referred to herein above the second marriage was admitted but it was held that the second marriage had got nothing to do with the official position or the discharge of official duties of a person. 17. In the decision of the Guwahati High Court referred to herein above the second marriage was admitted but it was held that the second marriage had got nothing to do with the official position or the discharge of official duties of a person. The Court further came to the conclusion that the findings of bigamy as defined under Sections 494 and 495, I.P.C. has been made a compoundable offence invoking Section 320, Cr.P.C. In such circumstances where the criminal law treats different offences on different footing making such an offence compoundable, the Court came to the conclusion that it would be too harsh to dismiss a person from service. The award of dismissal was set aside with a direction to award some lesser punishment leaving it to the authority to consider the proportionality thereof. 18. On the other hand, the decisions which have been relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel, it is to be seen that in the case of Ramesh Pal Singh (supra), the delinquent employee had taken shelter of a false statement about the knowledge of the second marriage to the first wife. It was found as a measure of fact that the employee had not informed the first wife and she was totally ignorant of the same. On the contrary, he had misguided his first wife and had consummated the second marriage. In such circumstances, it was found that the circumstances did not shock the conscience of the Court and rather an appropriate punishment had been rightly awarded. The facts of the said case, therefore, are entirely different from the facts of the present case because, here the petitioner and his first wife, both have joined together in defence of the consummation of the second marriage. 19. The decision in the case of Veerpal Singh (supra) as relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel has also proceeded to hold that the punishment was founded on the basis of the misconduct of the petitioner and the scope of interference being limited, there was no occasion to reduce the punishment. The Court held in the penultimate paragraph that where bigamy is a criminal offence, a government servant having committed a misconduct on this score cannot ask for award of minor or lesser punishment. 20. The Court held in the penultimate paragraph that where bigamy is a criminal offence, a government servant having committed a misconduct on this score cannot ask for award of minor or lesser punishment. 20. There is yet another decision, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner namely that of Smt. Raj Bala Sharma (supra). The petitioner therein was a lady Officer, who married a constable in the U.P. Police Services. She was a widow, who after having lost her husband married the said constable. She, however, took a plea that she was not aware that the person, whom she married, was already married to someone else. Both of them lost their services. This Court found that the conduct of the lady Officer, who was the petitioner in the writ petition, was a natural course undertaken by a young widow to support her life. The relevant paragraph is quoted below : “Here is a case of a widow of a police personnel who was given compassionate appointment on the death of her husband in harness on 10.2.92. At the time of the death of her husband, the petitioner had two minor children to maintain. She was given compassionate appointment on 21.11.92 on the post of constable (m). It is evident from record that the petitioner was subsequently promoted on the higher post of Assistant Sub Inspector of Police (m). This shows that her work, conduct and performance in the services had remained satisfactory. It was natural for a young widow like the petitioner to get attracted to a colleague working in the same department. Both were in the ministerial establishment working in the same office. The love is blind. It also appears from the record that Sri Ajeet Singh was supporting his senior colleague Smt. Raj Bali Sharma and her children in the time of need. It is borne out from the record that Sri Ajeet Singh was providing mental and other support to the petitioner and her children to carry on in life at a small city, i.e.,Bulandshahr. In peculiar circumstance in which the widowpolice personnel was living, it was natural for her to be attracted to a supportive man. It is borne out from the record that Sri Ajeet Singh was providing mental and other support to the petitioner and her children to carry on in life at a small city, i.e.,Bulandshahr. In peculiar circumstance in which the widowpolice personnel was living, it was natural for her to be attracted to a supportive man. Like in garden a creeper (Lata, vallarre) needs a strong support to climb up and sustain itself, a woman also may need a support who could stand with her facing the life garden in hard times. Even a small stream needs support of its banks,strong hills rocks to proceed further in the process to transform itself into a big mighty river.” 21. The Court further went on to hold that since the petitioner had not been charged with having failed to obtain permission, therefore, Rule 29 could not have been invoked. The finding is as follows : “As far as petitioner’s statement is concerned, she has demonstrated that she had no knowledge about the first marriage of Sri Ajeet Singh. As far as the offence of remarriage (as per Section 494, IPC) is concerned, in the present case the petitioner Smt. Raj Bala Sharma had married after the death of her first husband. Section 494, I.P.C. deals with a person who had a husband or wife living. This charge cannot be fastened on Smt. Raj Bala Sharma, petitioner. There is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that according to Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act, no marriage between two Hindus could be solemnised if one of them has a husband or wife living. If such marriage is solemnised after the commencement of this Act it would be null and void. The provisions of Sections 494 and 495, IPC shall apply in such cases. Applying this law, the marriage of the petitioner with Sri Ajeet Singh was null and void under law and no punishment could be awarded against her under Section 29 of the U.P. Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. As per Section 11 read with Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the marriage may be held as void. The petitioner’s case cannot be dealt with under under Rule 29 of the U.P. Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. As per Section 11 read with Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the marriage may be held as void. The petitioner’s case cannot be dealt with under under Rule 29 of the U.P. Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. Sri Ajeet Singh had given in writing to the Enquiry Officer that he had not informed the petitioner regarding her earlier marriage. The petitioner appears to be innocent in the present case. In Rule 29 of the U.P. Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956, the main thrust has been given on the term “ without obtaining prior permission of the government”. In this case the petitioner has not been charged for this misconduct. She has been charged only for remarriage and not for charge of not obtaining the permission of the government. Neither there was such accusation against the petitioner nor it was found proved.” 22. In my opinion, I have certain reservations about the consummation of a second marriage on natural instincts rather than a legal necessity. Nonetheless, the facts of the said case are entirely different from the present case and, therefore, the said ratio would not apply herein. Secondly, the finding recorded is that there was no charge of not having taken permission under Rule 29. This aspect also makes the case distinguishable and in the instant case the specific charge is in relation to violation of Rule 29. The said decision, therefore, in my opinion would not come to the aid of the petitioner. On the aforesaid grounds accordingly the Court appears to have been emotionally driven to hold that the punishment was not commensurate with the gravity of the charges and accordingly interfered with the punishment. It has time and again been held that a case in an authority on what it actually decides and no two cases have identical set of facts. 23. In view of these principles, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner except the decision of the Guwahati High Court do not exactly fit in so as to invoke the doctrine pronounced in the said decisions to support the cause of the petitioner. 24. 23. In view of these principles, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner except the decision of the Guwahati High Court do not exactly fit in so as to invoke the doctrine pronounced in the said decisions to support the cause of the petitioner. 24. Coming to the decisions of the Apex Court, the leading decision on the doctrine of proportionality which has held the field for about more than 25 years is the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 1983 (2) SCC 442 . The view was followed in the case of Ranjeet Thakur v. Union of India and others, 1987 (4) SCC 611 and later on in the case of Union of India v. Giriraj Sharma, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 775. This doctrine of proportionality was carried forward in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 1998 (9) SCC 416 . 25. I have gone through the later decisions and the other decisions in this regard up to the decision in the case of Bharat Forge Company Limited v. Uttar Manohar, 2005 (2) SCC 489 and the case of V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and others, 2005 (7) SCC 338 . 26. All these decisions have broadly indicated that in the matter relating to power of judicial review, this doctrine is rarely invoked where the quantum of punishment can be commented upon if it is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt found and is also shocking to the conscience of the Court. Circumstances have been found to interfere with an order of extreme punishment of dismissal if the misconduct was an out come of inevitable and unexpected circumstances with no intention to wilfully commit a misconduct. In the case of V. Ramana (supra) the Apex Court had the occasion to indicate that what is shocking to the conscience of the Court means what is in defiance of logic and moral standard. 27. The word “conscience” means, according to the ordinary dictionary meaning, a knowledge of right or wrong within oneself. The conscience develops according to the circumstances of the Society in which one lives. The standards of morality of a Society, which have been carried over for long attribute to the conscience. Any lapse of morality in breach of such standards is a deviation from the conscience. The conscience develops according to the circumstances of the Society in which one lives. The standards of morality of a Society, which have been carried over for long attribute to the conscience. Any lapse of morality in breach of such standards is a deviation from the conscience. It is the morality of an action which basically is the reason to invoke the conscience. 28. There is a distinction between the words “conscience” and “conscious”. This distinction has been very neatly and subtly explained in a recent article written by the Editor of the Complete Wellbeing Magazine Mr. Manoj Khatri (Vol. IV Issue 4 Feb. 2010). The writer explains the distinction in his words as follows : “Among the most common mistakes of English usages is the confusion between the words conscience and conscious. English experts say that although both are nouns and sound similar, their meanings are totally different. Different they are. But in my opinion, the confusion doesn’t stop at just their usage. In fact, people often allow their conscience to dictate their conduct, when all they need is their consciousness. Let me elaborate. Conscience is most often associated with morality-knowing “right” from “wrong”, and behaving accordingly. The dictionary defines conscience as: the complex of ethical and moral principles that controls or inhibits the actions or thoughts of an individual. Note the use of the words ethical, moral, and principles, which indicate that conscience is a social phenomenon. In other words, conscience is not natural-it’s acquired. It’s the result of long and deep social conditioning of out minds. But that is where the trouble begins. Because conscience is really a social phenomenon, there can never be any consensus on it. You see, what’s moral or ethical for one group of people need not be for another. Think about it and you will realise that our conscience depends on many external factors-our parents. Our family, our religion, our educational institutes, out city, our country and so on. At the most basic level, conscience is the result of a list of dos and don’ts handed down to us by the society and culture we belong to. Consciousness, on the other hand, is strictly personal. It’s is an awareness that comes from being alive. It’s our natural instinct that tells us what is right for us and what is not. Consciousness, on the other hand, is strictly personal. It’s is an awareness that comes from being alive. It’s our natural instinct that tells us what is right for us and what is not. With consciousness, there is no need for any consensus because you simply know. To me, conscience often blocks out our consciousness. That’s because, conscience is due to the presence of negative feelings such as fear and guilt, whereas consciousness is due to the presence of love. Let me explain with an example. When you see a hungry being on the street and you share your food with him because the religious scriptures say so, or because your parents instilled moral values in you, then it’s your conscience at work. But if you share the food because you know how it feels to be hungry, then you’re acting out of consciousness. So, conscience pricks you [makes you feel guilty] when you don’t do something you must or do something you ought not to; with consciousness, the though of moral/immoral simply doesn’t arise because you act out of a knowing. If you let go of your conscience and allow your consciousness to dictate your conduct, you may find a different kind of satisfaction-and it will be one that comes minus the pricks!” 29. What has been indicated by the Supreme Court is that, something which shocks the conscience of the Court, may be a ground to invoke the proportionality doctrine. The word “shock” means a violent upset, which is stern and creates a mental impression or physical recession that has an element of horror, disgust and indignation. 30. A sincere thought and an honest understanding leads me to believe that while judging a case a Judge has to keep in mind that the effect of law is always accepted as just. This however has to be understood as not doing away with justice altogether. In other words this has to be done not at the expense of justice. I am reminded of the words of our former Chief Justice A.N. Ray (2005-07) that “when we were young, we were told that Law is good but Justice is better.” There is also an age old principle that “Equity follows Law” and not the converse. In other words this has to be done not at the expense of justice. I am reminded of the words of our former Chief Justice A.N. Ray (2005-07) that “when we were young, we were told that Law is good but Justice is better.” There is also an age old principle that “Equity follows Law” and not the converse. It is here where the role of “Conscience” and the “Consciousness” of the Court presided over by a Judge, who is also a human being, comes into play. To my mind the duty of a Judge is to balance the call of conscience when it is shocked, with a conscious approach to the effect of law. This is necessary to do Justice, both to the cause, and to the Law of the land, for the protection whereof oath has been administered to a Judge. It is this approach which inspires confidence in the mind of the public for the institution of justice. One is obliged to uphold the rule of Law akin to the cause of humanity. The application of law, dry as it is, has to be made that advances the cause of humanity at the same time without violating the law. The Judge is duty bound to act and pronounce so as to bring about a fusion of law and justice without any element of indiscipline to law. 31. A perusal of the decisions of the Supreme Court, therefore indicate that it is the conscience of the Court, which has to be shocked and not the personal opinion which is formed on any happening. Such an abhorrence should be an out come of outrageous defiance of logic and rationality. In my opinion, it is within these parameters that the case of the petitioner has to be gauged. The facts as disclosed demonstrate that the act of second marriage was a voluntary act of the petitioner. The misconduct was committed 25 years ago and was discovered at the fag end of his career. In this regard there is an indication in the decision of Bharat Forge Company Limited (supra). The said case arose out of the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, where the domestic inquiry against the employee on the charges having been found fast asleep during duty hours, was taken to be a gross misconduct and the employee was dismissed from service. The said case arose out of the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, where the domestic inquiry against the employee on the charges having been found fast asleep during duty hours, was taken to be a gross misconduct and the employee was dismissed from service. The complaint of the employee was, that it was unfair labour practice, and the Labour Court on this complaint came to the conclusion that the inquiry was fair and proper and the findings of the inquiry officer was not perverse, but the Labour Court held that the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the employee was harsh and disproportionate. The employee aggrieved by the reduced punishment and the employer aggrieved by such reduction both filed revision applications before the Tribunal. The Tribunal reversed the order of the Labour Court and held that the order passed by the Labour Court was not justified. 32. On a writ petition filed before the Bombay High Court, a learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Labour Court had nowhere found that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate and upheld the order of the revising authority to that effect. The learned Single Judge further went on to hold that while considering the reduction in punishment the Labour Court could not have over emphasized the length of service, which in that case was 10 years of service of the employee, to the detriment of previous disciplinary action and observed that this would amount to discounting quality as against quantity. 33. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, which went on to investigate the gravity of the offence, set aside the order of dismissal as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge and substituted the same by ordering that instead of reinstatement the employer would pay a sum of Rs. 2, 50, 000/- (two lacs fifty thousand). The employer went up in appeal before the Apex Court and the judgment of the Division Bench was set aside and held that such an order could not have been passed on a compassionate ground. 34. The case of the petitioner is still more peculiar as against the decisions referred to by the Apex Court and referred to herein above. 35. This is a case of bigamy, which is a serious misconduct. 34. The case of the petitioner is still more peculiar as against the decisions referred to by the Apex Court and referred to herein above. 35. This is a case of bigamy, which is a serious misconduct. The punishment which has been meted out is a major penalty under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. The said Rule provides for major and minor penalties. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides for additional punishments to be inflicted. The heading of major penalties under which the petitioner was proceeded with mentions dismissal from service, removal from service and reduction in rank including reduction to a lower scale or to a lower stage in a time scale. Rule 8 of the 1991 Rule provides for the holding of an inquiry and sub-rule (4)(a) (b) provides for severe punishment in two cases namely allowing a person in police custody to escape and conviction in an offence involving moral turpitude. The same carves out of an exception that it can be a lesser punishment provided the Punishing Authority has to record reasons as to why it considers otherwise to award a lesser punishment. 36. The case of the petitioner is that he entered into bigamy and, therefore, the proceedings against him cannot be said to be in defiance of any logic. Had this misconduct been discovered promptly when it was committed in the year 1982, the question of proportionality may not have arisen at all. The judgement of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, which was upheld in the case of Bharat Forge Company Limited (supra) also held that the passage of time of the service of the employee of 10 years cannot minimise the misconduct by over emphasizing the length of services as the previous actions of misconduct of the employee also deserved to be taken into account. The employee had also misconducted himself on previous occasions. 37. The case of the petitioner is, therefore, distinguishable to this extent that there is no indication of any previous misconduct that may add to his detriment as in the case of the employee referred to in the decision of Bharat Forge Company Limited (supra). The petitioner has been made a victim on account of his erroneous belief, which he says was necessary for salvation. This cannot by itself shock the conscience of the Court. The petitioner has been made a victim on account of his erroneous belief, which he says was necessary for salvation. This cannot by itself shock the conscience of the Court. On the contrary this cannot be considered to be a genuine belief of the petitioner against law and social beliefs of the time. The Society as on today may not generally give any acceptance to such a belief. 38. The second wife or the first wife did not lodge any complaint on the petitioner. The action of the petitioner in entering into a second marriage cannot be said to be an act of morally depraved conduct. He contracted the second marriage with the consent of the first wife, who has supported his cause and has carried on with the petitioner for the past 28 years without demur or complaint. In fact, the first wife has herself compounded the element of bigamy. 39. In such a situation and in view of the fact that the petitioner was to retire within one year or slightly more from his service, can the said punishment of dismissal be said to be disproportionate. Coupled with this is the huge size of family of the petitioner and the old age of the petitioner and his two wives. It is here where one has to consider the aspect of proportionality as to why the other alternative punishments under the heading of major penalties indicated in Rule 4 could not be considered to be a suitable punishment. 40. To allow a man to peacefully continue to almost complete his journey as a public servant for 28 years and then make him stand at the edge of cliff and and push him over, resting the justification in law as misconduct, has to be observed, to my mind with a tittle diluted but human approach. The reason is his exceptionally long period of service. It is true that passage of time will not reduce the guilt, but the punishment can be proportioned with an approach towards the lesser punishments that are available in the rules itself. The mind has to be applied to find out a reason, in the peculiar facts of a case like the present one as to why the lesser punishments would not be appropriate when they have been provided under the same rules. The mind has to be applied to find out a reason, in the peculiar facts of a case like the present one as to why the lesser punishments would not be appropriate when they have been provided under the same rules. This takes one to the gravity of the misconduct which in this case became a discovery after 28 years. It is here where one’s sense of mature justice is brought to test. The proportionality of the punishment therefore requires a careful measurement on the scales of reason and justice combined. Merely because it is a serious misconduct, does not necessarily categorise it for the extreme penalty of dismissal. It has to be assessed on its own facts and the nature of the indiscipline. The petitioner has not runaway with somebody’s elses wife so as to bracket the action involving moral turpitude nor has he attempted to shield himself on any such count. His case has been consistent throughout supported by his first wife. These factors, which are the other side of the coin have not been assessed by the authorities appropriately which do require a consideration. The conscience of the Court on the above noted principles has been thoroughly disturbed which in my opinion calls upon my “conscious” approach to command the authorities to invoke the principle of proportionality. The petitioner has to live with a disrepute of misconduct but that can be done with a lesser punishment without putting the entire family of the petitioner to peril. That would be unjustly outrageous. 41. To my mind, the said aspect has to be considered in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts. The continuance of the petitioner at the fag end of his career was found detrimental to a disciplined force which may in given circumstances be correct, but in my opinion, the said aspect deserves an examination by the appropriate authority as it strikingly moves the conscience to the extent as to why a lesser major penalty would not serve the purpose. Even though the Rules do not indicate any other penalty like compulsory retirement but the same can be explored by the appropriate authority in the given set of circumstances provided it is permissible under rules. 42. Even though the Rules do not indicate any other penalty like compulsory retirement but the same can be explored by the appropriate authority in the given set of circumstances provided it is permissible under rules. 42. The conduct of the petitioner was an absolute personal affair of the petitioner in relation to the consummation of second marriage and the same had got nothing to do with the affairs of the State or the discharge of his public duty to that extent. The judgment in the case of Amal Kumar Baruah of the Guwahati High Court (supra) comes to the aid of the petitioner. 43. Accordingly, for the reasons given herein above and in the peculiar facts of the present case as discussed I would prefer to set aside the order of the revising authority dated 18th November, 2008 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Allahabad Zone, Allahabad to the aforesaid extent only. The Inspector General of Police may, therefore, consider the aforesaid limited aspect of proportionality as the other aspects need not be interfered with. To that extent, the order dated 18th November, 2008 is set aside with a direction to the respondent No. 2 to pass an order after assessing the aforesaid factors in accordance with law. 44. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is partly allowed. ————