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2010 DIGILAW 959 (KER)

Ajayan v. State of Kerala

2010-12-07

J.CHELAMESWAR, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON, THOMAS P.JOSEPH

body2010
JUDGMENT : Thomas P. Joseph, J. "Is authorship of concealment sine qua non to make information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (for short, "the Act") ? Will such information which is otherwise admissible become inadmissible solely for the reason that such information does not reveal authorship of concealment?" This is the question referred to us for a decision in view of the conflicting decisions of the Division Benches of this Court. 2. The question arose in two criminal appeals arising from conviction of appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence to undergo imprisonment for life and payment of fine. The case is that on 3.4.2002 at or by about 9.15 p.m. appellants along with another (who was acquitted by the trial court) in furtherance of their common intention caused death of one Rajan. Prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence to bring home guilt of the appellants. One of the circumstances was the alleged recovery 9f weapons said to be used by the appellants for commission of the crime and the blood stained clothes of one of the appellants on the information given by hem. Information given by the appellants to the Investigating Officer is said to have led him to the place wherefrom the incriminating objects were allegedly recovered. T Investigating Officer prepared mahazars for recovery of the said objects and in the course of evidence deposed the fact discovered and the information given by the appellants. Information given by the appellants which led to he discovery of fact as deposed to by the Investigating Officer did not contain authorship of concealment of the objects. Learned counsel for appellants contended 1 before the Division Bench that evidence of the Investigating Officer regarding recovery of incriminating objects cannot be admitted in evidence under Section 27 of the Act since authorship of concealment of the incriminating object is not deposed to. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that authorship of concealment is not sine qua non for admissibility of the evidence regarding recovery under Section 27 of the Act. 3. Both sides relied on various decisions on the point. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that authorship of concealment is not sine qua non for admissibility of the evidence regarding recovery under Section 27 of the Act. 3. Both sides relied on various decisions on the point. The Division Bench though, was of the opinion that authorship of concealment is not sine qua non for admissibility of evidence under Section 27 of the Act found apparent conflict between decisions of this Court on the question and felt that the question has to be decided by a larger bench. Accordingly the Division Bench by order dated March 30, 2010 has referred the question for a decision. 4. Learned counsel for appellants contended that authorship of concealment is sine qua non to bring the information given by the accused within the mischief of Section 27 of the Act. Learned counsel relied on the decisions in Jaffer Husain Dastagir v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1934 , Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1949 , Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 911 , State of U.P. v. Jageshwar & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 349 , Fr. George Cherian & Ors. v. State of Kerala, ILR 1989 (2) Ker. 95, George v. State, 2005 (4) KLT SN 62 (C.No. 85) : 2005 (3) KLJ 593, Sankara Narayanan v. State of Kerala, 2006 (3) KLT 429 , Radhakrishnan v. Circle Inspector of Police, 2009 (1) KLD 690, and Rijo v. State of Kerala, 2010 (1) KLT SN 9 (C.No.9) : ILR 2009 (4) Ker. 730. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand argued that authorship of concealment is not an absolute necessity to bring the information given by the accused I within the scope of Section 27 of the Act. He cited the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000)1 SCC 471 , State of Karnataka v David Rozario, 2002 SCC(Cri.) 1852, Amitsingh Bhikarnsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 310 , and V. Venugopal v. State of Kerala, 2007 (2) KHC 649. 6. In Fr. George Cherian and others v. State of Kerala, ILR 1989 (2) Ker. 95, the accused had stated to the Investigating Officer that "the gold and the gold rings might be in the possession of either Krishnankutty or Kunju Kunju". The Division Bench held that statement of the accused was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Act. 6. In Fr. George Cherian and others v. State of Kerala, ILR 1989 (2) Ker. 95, the accused had stated to the Investigating Officer that "the gold and the gold rings might be in the possession of either Krishnankutty or Kunju Kunju". The Division Bench held that statement of the accused was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Act. However the learned Judges observed: "............It is clear that what is admissible under Section 27 is not merely the knowledge of the accused regarding the place of concealment of the material object, but his knowledge of the same emerging from the admission that he himself has concealed it there with the exclusion of the knowledge of others......" Learned Judges placed reliance on the decisions in Mahabir Mandal v. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCR 639, Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash, 1972 CrLJ 606 , Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, 1976 SCC(Cri.) 199 : AIR 1976 SC 483 , Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and State of U.P. v. Jageshwar & Ors. (supra). In Abdul Salain v. State of Kerala, 1994 (1) KLT SN 13 (C.No. 11), a Division Bench of this Court held that in the absence of authorship of concealment information given by the accused is not admissible under Section 27 of the Act and that authorship of concealment cannot be inferred by implication. In George v. State, 2005 (3) KLJ 593, another Division Bench of this Court noted that one of the primary requisites to make a recovery in pursuance of confession made by the accused admissible under Section 27 of the Act is that authorship of concealment of the articles must be proved. The Division Bench expressed inability to follow the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 , and State of Karnataka v. David Rozario, 2002 SCC(Cri.) 1852, as those decisions were rendered by Benches of two Judges, while according to the Division Bench, Jaffer Husain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, and Mahabir Biswas v. State of W .B. decided by larger benches took the view that authorship of concealment is an essential requirement of Section 27 of the Act. Further again, in Sankara Narayanan v. State of Kerala, Radhakrishnan v. Circle Inspector of Police, and Rijo v. State of Kerala, other Division Benches also took the same view. 7. Further again, in Sankara Narayanan v. State of Kerala, Radhakrishnan v. Circle Inspector of Police, and Rijo v. State of Kerala, other Division Benches also took the same view. 7. But, another Division Bench of this Court in V. Venugopal v. State of Kerala, held, relying on the decision in Amitsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 310 , that fact discovered for the purpose of Section 27 of the Act is not restricted to the physical object and that knowledge of the accused in relation to the place of concealment of weapon is a relevant fact and is an incriminating circumstance against the accused. 8. When the Act was enacted in the year 1872, the Legislature had no doubt that a confession made by an accused to a Police Officer or made by an accused to anyone whilst in custody of the Police shall not be admitted in evidence. The only departure for that rigour is when such confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. However, the Legislature thought it fit to make one more departure from the rigour of the above ban that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence while in the custody of a Police Officer, so much of the information whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved against the accused. Accordingly they enacted Section 27 in the form of a proviso to S s-25 and 26 of the Act. Section 27 of the Act reads: "27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.- Provided that, when any Fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." Various interpretations were given from time to time to the said provision and as to the extent of its admissibility in evidence. Initially it was thought that though the expression "fact" as defined by Section 3 of the Act included not only the physical fact which can be perceived by the senses, but also the psychological fact or mental condition of which any person is conscious, it is in the former sense that the expression "fact" is used in Section 27 of the Act and that the phrase "fact discovered" used in Section 27 referred to a material and not a mental fact. (See the opinion expressed by Shadi Lal, C.J. in Sukhan v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah. 344). Learned Chief Justice opined that the fact discovered may be stolen property, the instrument of crime, the corps of the person murdered or any material thing; or, it may be a material thing in relation of the place or locality where it was found. 9. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya & Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 , held : "...... it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife, knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence the fact discovered is very relevant......". 10. The expression "fact" is defined in Section 3 of the Act as under : "Fact" means and includes - (1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. 10. The expression "fact" is defined in Section 3 of the Act as under : "Fact" means and includes - (1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. In Pulukuri Kottaya their Lordships were of the view that 'fact' discovered embraces (not only the object discovered but also) the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to that (i.e. the fact of concealment) but the information given (by the accused) must relate distinctly to that fact. Their Lordships illustrated the situation in the following words: "Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife, knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, fact discovered is relevant." The expression that 'knives were discovered many years ago' was used not in the sense that in the reported case knives involved in the incident were discovered earlier. Their Lordships were pointing out that discovery of knives was not in consequence to the information given by the accused that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house', because, even before the accused gave that information, knives had been discovered and were in vogue. What was discovered by the information given by the accused was that a knife was concealed in the roof of house of the informant to his knowledge. If the knife was proved to have been used in the commission of the crime the fact discovered was very relevant. In otherwords, the fact discovered was not merely the object but also the place where it was kept concealed and the knowledge of the accused as to such concealment. If the knife was proved to have been used in the commission of the crime the fact discovered was very relevant. In otherwords, the fact discovered was not merely the object but also the place where it was kept concealed and the knowledge of the accused as to such concealment. Their Lordships held that the condition necessary to bring the Section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to by the Police Officer and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused whether it amounted to a confession or not. The decision in Pulukuri Kottaya was accepted with approval by the Apex Court in various decisions and that decision has now become locus classicus. 11. In Ramkishan Mithartlal Sharma & Ors. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 104 , the Supreme Court held that on a reading of Section 27 of the Act it appeared that what is allowed to be proved is the information or such part thereof as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. It was held:- "The evidence of the Police Officer would no doubt go to show that accused knew of existence of the fact discovered in consequence of information given by him. But that would not necessarily show his direct connection with the offence. It would merely be a link in the chain of evidence which taken along with other pieces of evidence might go to establish his connection therewith. This circumstance would therefore be quite innocuous and evidence could certainly be given of that circumstance without attracting the operation of Section 27." These observations do not support the contention that in the absence of authorship of concealment information given by the accused as deposed to by the Investigating Officer is inadmissible in evidence. 12. In Jaffer Husain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held (vide paragraph 4) thus: "In order that the Section may apply the prosecution must establish that the information given by the appellant led to the discovery of some fact deposed to by him. 12. In Jaffer Husain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held (vide paragraph 4) thus: "In order that the Section may apply the prosecution must establish that the information given by the appellant led to the discovery of some fact deposed to by him. It is evident that the discovery must be of some fact which the Police had not previously learnt from other sources and that the knowledge of the fact was first derived from information given by accused". It was also held that the essential ingredient of the Section is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. In that case, it so happened that information given by the accused contained authorship of concealment also. Learned Judges further observed: " ..............If an accused charged with a theft of articles or receiving stolen articles, within the meaning of Section 411 Indian Penal Code states to the police, "I will show you the articles at the place where I have Kept them" and the articles are actually found there, there can be no doubt that the information given by him led to the discover n d at the place mentioned. accused discovery of the fact that the articles ere kept by the discovery of the articles but the Y 11 at a particular place." The said observation was made with reference to the special facts of that case where information given by the accused contained authorship of concealment also and hence the discovery exended to the fact that it was the accused who had kept the articles at the particular place. Nowhere did the learned Judges in that decision observer e that This authorship of concealment is sine qua non for d above. r admissibility o clear from the observations in para.4, quoted above. 13. Mahabir Biswas & Anr. v. State of W.B., is also no authority to say that authorship of concealment is necessary. In that case the admissible part of statement of the accused pursuant to which the ring was recovered only proved that he knew that the ring was concealed in a particular place. 13. Mahabir Biswas & Anr. v. State of W.B., is also no authority to say that authorship of concealment is necessary. In that case the admissible part of statement of the accused pursuant to which the ring was recovered only proved that he knew that the ring was concealed in a particular place. It was held that from such knowledge, in the Absence Of Other Evidence And More Particularly as the recovery was made almost six months after the incident, no inference of theft of the ring or involvement in the murder could be drawn. The decision indicates that even when authorship of concealment is not disclosed by the accused, information given by him and leading to the discovery of fact is admissible in evidence. 14. In Mahabir Mandal v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court only referred to inapplicability of the bar under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal l Procedure to the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. In Himachal Pradesh A ( 1972 CrLJ 606 ) the Supreme Court observed, referring to Pulukuri Kottaya: "......The concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is what is discovered by the information and lends assurance that the information was true ............... from hi the information leading to the discovery from him which the police did snot know until the thing sold to him or hidden or kept with him which the police did not Know until the information was furnished to them by the accused." The said observation was made on the facts of the case where the admissible part of information given by the accused led the police to a witness (PW 11) from whom the case where the information given by the accused led the pol incriminating object was recovered. Those observations were highlighting the legal position that the fact discovered in that case was that the object was either sold to the witness (PW 11) or hidden or kept with him. Nowhere in that decision the Supreme Court said that to make the information given by the accused admissible under Section 27 of authorship of concealment. 15. It is true that in Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra, the admissible portion of the information given by the accused did not contain authorship of concealment. Nowhere in that decision the Supreme Court said that to make the information given by the accused admissible under Section 27 of authorship of concealment. 15. It is true that in Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra, the admissible portion of the information given by the accused did not contain authorship of concealment. The Supreme Court held: "The recovery the instance a blood stained spear becomes because to connect the "The criminality tending element of the but the accused recovery at the instance of accused with the crime lies in the authorship of concealment, namely, that the appellant who gave information leading to its discovery was the person who concealed it ................... To make such a circumstance incriminating it must be shown that the appellant himself had concealed the blood stained spear which was the weapon of offence ................" The above observation only indicated that if authorship of concealment of the weapon which is proved to be involved in the crime is disclosed by the accused, that is an incriminating circumstance against him. It was also held in that case that where the information given by one of the accused leading to the discovery of murder weapon was capable of two interpretations, i.e., (1) he was the person who concealed the weapon, or (2) that he had the knowledge of the place where it was hidden, the accused could not be convicted for murder on the basis of such information. That was because the connecting link between the object recovered and the accused was not proved by the prosecution and when the information given by the accused was capable of two interpretations the one beneficial to the accused had to be adopted. Not only that the said decision is no authority for the proposition that authorship of concealment is sine qua non for admissibility of information given by the accused, it is authority that even when the information given by the accused did not contain authorship of concealment, information leading to the discovery of fact is admissible in evidence but in the absence of other evidence, such evidence may not be sufficient to convict the accused. 16. In State of U.P. v. Jageshwar & Ors. a gun was alleged to have been recovered in pursuance a of a statement made by the accused. The Supreme Court observed: "............. 16. In State of U.P. v. Jageshwar & Ors. a gun was alleged to have been recovered in pursuance a of a statement made by the accused. The Supreme Court observed: "............. Nor, indeed, did he make any statement that he had concealed it at a place which he would point out. The discoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act are not of guns and daggers used in a crime. Guns and daggers have an ancient origin and one does not have to hunt for an accused to discover them. The discovery, mostly and really, is as regards the authorship of concealment. Conduct and concealment are incriminating circumstances and their discovery becomes relevant and admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act ................". The observation that "discovery, mostly and really, is as regards the authorship of concealment" does not indicate that according to the Supreme Court in the absence of authorship of concealment evidence regarding discovery is inadmissible under Section 27 of the Act. The Supreme Court was pointing out that it is not the information given by the accused which led to the discovery of guns and daggers, for, guns and daggers had an ancient origin and were in vogue and that one need not to go after an accused to discover guns and daggers. The observation only meant that authorship of concealment (of the weapon of offence) is an incriminating circumstance as is clear from the further observation : "Conduct and concealment are incriminating circumstances and their discovery becomes relevant and admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act". Certainly authorship of concealment is also admissible under Section 27 of the Act but this decision is no authority for the proposition that authorship of concealment is sine qua non for the application of Section 27. 17. In Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 166 , the statement accompanying the discovery was woefully vague to identify the authorship of concealment with the result that pointing out the weapon was held, at the best to be sufficient to prove the knowledge of the appellant as to where the weapon was kept. That is not a case where for absence of evidence of authorship of concealment information given by the accused was held inadmissible under Section 27 of the Act. 18. That is not a case where for absence of evidence of authorship of concealment information given by the accused was held inadmissible under Section 27 of the Act. 18. In Varghese v. State of Kerala, 1998 (1) KLT 681 , rendered by the Supreme Court, evidence regarding recovery of the weapon (of offence) was held to be not sufficient for conviction, in the absence of statement indicating concealment (of the weapon) by the accused or other incriminating articles. That decision only referred to the insufficiency of evidence including absence of statement indicating authorship of concealment. 19. None of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above either deviated from Pulukuri Kottaya as to the mean of the expression "fact" discovered pursuant to the information given by the accused and admissible under Section 27 of the Act, or held that authorship of concealment is sine qua non for admissibility of disclosure statement under Section 27. On the other hand a close look at those decisions indicate that even in cases where authorship of concealment was wanting, evidence regarding information which led to the discovery was admitted under Section 27 of the Act. 20. In Udai Bhan v. The State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1116 , it was held: "a discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence". In Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483 , it was held that the expression 'fact discovered' includes not only the physical object produced but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to that. Learned Judges observed thus: ".......Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected. Thus processed, in the instant case, only the first part of the statement, viz., "I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums" was the immediate and direct cause of the fact discovered. Therefore, this portion only was admissible under Section 27.............." It is relevant to note that the statement attributed to the accused did not contain authorship of concealment. 21. Therefore, this portion only was admissible under Section 27.............." It is relevant to note that the statement attributed to the accused did not contain authorship of concealment. 21. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, information given by the accused as deposed by the Investigating Officer was: "her dead body is kept concealed in the field; I will take it out and produce the same; come with me." The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court did not rely on the above circumstances. Information given by the accused as deposed to by the Investigating Officer did not contain authorship of concealment of the dead body. The Supreme Court in that case held thus: "We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well - justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act." (emphasis supplied) The Apex Court held further that from the information given by the accused (sans authorship of concealment) and the conduct of the accused pointing out the place wherefrom the dead body was recovered it was open to the criminal court to presume that it was the accused who had concealed the dead body at the place wherefrom it was unearthed and that such an interferenceis consistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Act. This view is reiterated in Nagappa Yellappa Hosamani & Ors. This view is reiterated in Nagappa Yellappa Hosamani & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2009) 14 SCC 582 . In State of Karnataka v. David Rozario & Arir. (supra), also it was held hat the fact discovered is not discovery of the object alone and that the words "so much of such information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered are very important and the whole force of the Section is concentrated on them. Clearly the extent of information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. It i is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact envisaged in the Section. The "fact disovered" envisaged in the Section embraces the place from which the object was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. The Supreme Court in Pandurang Kalu Patil and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 490 , elaborately discussed the scope and application of Section 27 of the Act and that Section 27 was enacted as proviso to Sections 25 and 26 and that the object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a Police Officer admissible in evidence whether or not such statement is confessional or non-confessional. The Apex Court pointed out that a fact can be discovered by the Police (Investigating) Officer pursuant to an information elicited from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or more of a variety of causes. Recovery or even production of object by itself need not necessarily result in the discovery of a fact. It was held that the legal proposition adumbrated in Pulukuri Kottaya has been considered and tested by the Supreme Court time and again, and on all such occasions the Supreme Court has only reiterated the said principle with approval. 22. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 SCC 269 , Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657 , and Amitsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 310 , also the Supreme Court followed the decision in Pulukuri Kottaya. 23. Section 27 of the Act is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. 23. Section 27 of the Act is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. When the accused gives information to the Police Officer that a particular object is kept concealed at a particular place or given to a particular person and either points out that place wherefrom the said object is recovered by the Police or is produced by the accused or he points out the person who produces he object, recovery of the object confirms truth of the information given by the accused. For the application of Section 27, it makes no difference whether information given is that the article is concealed at a particular place or that it is given to a particular person Section 27 does o say that for admissibility of the information authorship of concealment is essential. The expression "distinctly" only means "directly", "indubitably", "strictly", unmistakably". That expression is used in Section 27 to limit and define the scope of information admissible in evidence. It refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The expression distinctly" is used to show 'exclusivity' of the information acquired by the Police Officer from the accused and leading to the discovery of the fact The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh, (1997) 10 SCC 675 , pointed out that the ratio in Pulukuri Kottaya "has become locus classicus and even the lapse of half a century after its pronouncement has not eroded its forensic worth". The Supreme Court quoted with approval the decision in State of Bombay v. Chhaganlal Gangaram Lavar ( AIR 1955 Bom 1 ), in Pandurang Kalu Patel v. State of Maharashtra which is thus: "So long as the Supreme Court does not take different view from the view taken by the Privy Council, the decisions of the Privy Council are still binding upon us, and when we say that the decisions of the Privy Council are binding upon us, what is binding is not merely the point actually decided but an opinion expressed by the Privy Council, which opinion is expressed after careful consideration of all the arguments and which is deliberately and advisedly given." 24. In view of what we have stated above, we hold that authorship of concealment is not sine qua non to make information received from a person accused of an offence while in the custody of the Police Officer admissible under Section 27 of the Act and that if the information as deposed to by the Investigating Officer is otherwise admissible in evidence it would not become inadmissible solely for the reason that the information deposed by the Police Officer does not reveal authorship of concealment. In other words, the view taken in the decisions of this Court that authorship of concealment is sine qua non for admissibility of the statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Act is not correct in law. The Registry shall place the Criminal Appeals before the Bench concerned for final disposal. Appeal disposed of.