JUDGMENT G.M. AKBAR ALI, J. The appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 13.8.2004 made in A.S. No. 200 of 2003 on the file of the Principal District Court, Tirunelveii, confirming the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 618 of 1996 dated 5.8.2003 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Nanguneri. The plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The suit in O.S. No. 618 of 1996 was filed for a declaration and injunction. 3. The brief facts of the case is as follows: The suit property belonged to the plaintiff’s mother one Sankara Rathina Manickam Ammal which was gifted by her mother by a gift deed dated 20.8.1934 and she was in possession and enjoyment of the property. The land was leased out to one Kalyana Sundaram Pillai, Subbulakshmi Ammal and Pechi Muthu Pillai and thereby she was enjoying the property. After the death of the plaintiff’s mother, the property was inherited by the plaintiff and he was enjoying the same by cutting trees and collecting rents. The defendants were trying to interfere with the possession of the property, claiming tenancy under the Temple. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration and injunction. 4. The defendants resisted the suit stating that the suit property belong to the Temple viz., Arul Migu Sathya Vaakeswarar Gomathiyammal Koil and the 2nd defendant is the tenant and the plaintiff has no right or title over the property. 5. On the above averments, the learned District Munsif, Nanguneri, analysed the oral and documentary evidences and framed triable issues and found that the plaintiff has not proved his title and found that in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 the plaintiffs mother’s title was not proved by the plaintiff and thereby dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by which, the plaintiff has preferred the appeal in A.S. No. 200 of 2003 and also filed an application to receive additional documents under Order 41 Rule 27 and 28 of C.P.C. The learned District Judge, Tirunelveli found that the plaintiff has neither proved his title or his predecessor’s title and therefore, dismissed the appeal and also the application to receive the additional documents. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the lower appelicte Court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. Pending the appeal, the appellant died and the legal representatives are brought on record. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the lower appelicte Court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. Pending the appeal, the appellant died and the legal representatives are brought on record. The main ground taken in the second appeal is that if the documents filed by the plaintiff in the appellate Court received in evidence, it will clearly show that the suit property was in possession of the plaintiff’s sister’s husband. 6. On admission, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: “1. Is the learned District Judge right for dismissing the suit when the plaintiff has proved his possession by filing his title deed Exhibit A-1 and A-2 and when no document has been filed by the defendant to show their title to the suit property? 2. Is the learned District Judge right in rejecting the Exhibit A-1 since it is a registered copy and not original when the document is more than 30 years old and to be admitted as per Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act? 3. When the document filed by the defendant does not relate to the suit property, is the learned District Judge right for dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff?” 7. Ms. N. Krishnaveni the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the First Appellate Court ought to have received the additional evidence filed by the plaintiff which would show that the property belonged to the plaintiff and his-predecessor in title. The learned counsel also pointed out that the learned First Appellate Court has erred in rejecting Exhibit A-1 which is an old document dated 20.8.1934 and as the original cannot be filed the First Appellate Court has rejected the certified copy. The learned counsel pointed out that under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act the proof is net required for 30 years old document. The learned counsel pointed out that for a declaration of title, the plaintiff has discharged the initial burden and the onus is upon the defendants to prove their claim and they have miserably failed. 8. The learned counsel pointed out that under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act the proof is net required for 30 years old document. The learned counsel pointed out that for a declaration of title, the plaintiff has discharged the initial burden and the onus is upon the defendants to prove their claim and they have miserably failed. 8. The learned counsel relied on (2010) 1 MLJ 1019 : 2009 (4) CTC 440 wherein this Court has held that the provisions for recording reasons mentioned in Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. is only directory and not mandatory and the ultimate goal of the Court is to render justice and the Court can admit important and necessary peace of evidence even in the appellate stage. 9. On the contrary, Mr. P. Senthurpandian the learned counsel for the first respondent would state that the suit property belonged to the Temple and the property list of the temple would show that the property was dedicated to the Temple and the Temple is in possession and enjoyment through the tenant. 10. Mr. Meenakshisundaram the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would support the contention of the first respondent and would state that the 2nd respondent is a tenant under the first respondent and the plaintiff has failed to prcve the possession of the property. 11. I have carefully considered the contentions on either side both in the appeal as well as in the miscellaneous petition which is filed under Order 47 Rule 27 for receiving of additional evidence and perused the materials on record. 12. The suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 was filed by one Bagavathi Manickkathammal daughter of one Gomathi Manickathammal. One Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal was the daughter of Bagavathi Manickkathammal and the plaintiff is the son of the said Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal. If it is accepted, the present suit property is the same property which belonged to the plaintiff and his predecessor in title and the tracing of the history of the property would reveal that how a woman from a dancing community had been denied the possession and enjoyment of the property though she had valid title. 13. One Gomathi Manickathammal, who was the original owner of the suit property, was the member of the dancing girl community. She had inherited the property as early as 1879 by some means. 13. One Gomathi Manickathammal, who was the original owner of the suit property, was the member of the dancing girl community. She had inherited the property as early as 1879 by some means. She had a son namely Kandasamia Pillai and a daughter Gomathi Manickathammal, who is also a dancing girl. After the death of Gomathi Manickathammal, her daughter Bhavathi Manickathammal inherited the property as per the peculiar custom in the community of the dancing woman. This is apparent from the observations by His Lordship DEVADASS, J. in 1949 MLJ 684 which reads as follows: “Dancing women have their peculiar customs. Their status is recognized in Hindu society. Their customs have received the sanction of judicial decisions and the adoption of girls by them is recognized by law. The daughter of dancing woman inherit in preference to their son.” 14. On inheritance by Bhagavathi Manickathammal she gifted the property to one Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal under a gift deed dated 20.8.1934. However, she could not enjoy the property as one Kandasamia Pillai and Supputhaiammal were in possession of the property. Therefore, she filed a suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 for possession on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram. The learned District Munsif had delivered a judgment discussing the rights of the parties and upheld the gift deed dated 20.8.1934 as valid and ordered for recovery of possession. The decree was passed as early as on 10.12.1954. The present plaintiff who claims to be the son of Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal has now come forward with the present suit claiming title and also for recovery of possession from the present defendants. 15. The first defendant is the Temple represented by its Executive Officer and the 2nd defendant is the tenant under the first defendant. The trial Court found that the plaintiff has not produced the original gift deed dated 20.8.1934 and has also not produced any document that his mother took possession in pursuant to the decree passed in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 and also disbelieved the possession of the plaintiff and therefore dismissed the suit. 16. When the appeal was pending before the first appellate Court, in I.A. Nos. 16. When the appeal was pending before the first appellate Court, in I.A. Nos. 687 and 688 of 2003 were filed for reception of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. I.A. No. 687 of 2003 was filed permitting the plaintiff to file reply statement and I.A. No. 688 of 2003 was filed to accept the sale deed dated 11.8.1971 to prove the possession of the plaintiff one Ulaganathan Pillai who was the sister’s husband of the plaintiff. However, the First Appellate Court dismissed the applications. 17. While considering the title of the plaintiff, the both the Courts found that the plaintiff has relied on the certified copy of the gift deed and as well as the certified copy of the suit register in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 which would not go to prove the title and have dismissed the suit. 18. Before this Court, miscellaneous petition has been filed for admission of two documents namely, the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Ambasamuthiram and the decree thereon. 19. As stated earlier, if it is accepted that the present suit property is the same property mentioned in the gift deed dated 20.8.1934 and in the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 both these documents would go to prove that the plaintiff and his predecessor in title alone are entitled to the suit property. Though the Temple has claimed title to the property, they have filed only the xerox copy of the property list which shows the entry of the suit property. How this property was dedicated to the Temple has not been either stated or proved. The identification of the suit property is not in question. However, it is well settled that the burden is heavily upon the plaintiff to prove the title to the suit property. The suit was filed in the year 1995 for declaration and possession and the defendants have not admitted the title of the plaintiff and therefore, there is no question of limitation. 20. The gift deed dated 20.8.1934 is marked as Exhibit A-1 and the suit register is marked as Exhibit A-2. There is a specific finding given by the Trial Court that the plaintiff has failed to prove the title and based on the suit register the Court cannot come to the conclusion. 20. The gift deed dated 20.8.1934 is marked as Exhibit A-1 and the suit register is marked as Exhibit A-2. There is a specific finding given by the Trial Court that the plaintiff has failed to prove the title and based on the suit register the Court cannot come to the conclusion. During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff had tried to prove possession and the identity of the suit property by production of third party sale deed in which one of the boundary was shown as the suit property under the occupation of his brother-in-law namely one Ulaganathan Pillai. The schedule of property would show the present boundaries and the schedule of the property in Exhibit A-1 as well as in the suit register and in the decree would naturally show the boundaries as then existed. By a efflux of time, boundaries might have changed. But the point is, what the plaintiff is claiming under Exhibit A-1 is the same property for which the defendant is also making an independent claim under the property list. Though the plaintiff tried to produce a document before the First Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 27, unfortunately, the First Appellate Court did not appreciate the evidence and rejected the application. Now the plaintiff has produced the judgment and the decree. 21. Whether the plaintiff can produce additional evidence at the second appellate stage is a mute question to be answered. Order 41 Rule 27 reads as follows: “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if - (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise or due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 22. In a case on AIR 1976 SC 1053 : (1976) 3 SCC 28 the Supreme Court has held as follows: “10. So far as the application of the appellants for additional evidence is concerned, it cannot be allowed in view of the well settled principles of law that the discretion given to the appellate Court to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will nave to be ignored. The true to be applied in dealing with applications for additional evidence is whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced (see Arjun Singh alias Puran V. Kartar Singh). ...” 23. In a case in AIR 1977 SC 1217 : (1977) 2 SCC 656 , the Supreme Court has held as when the High Court allowed the parties to produce some documentary evidence in appeal. “... The matter would have been different if the High Court, in the interest of justice, had called for additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 28 Code of Civil Procedure, so that the parties would have proper and adequate opportunity to establish their respective versions including the procedure of the particular Court regarding acceptance of deposit in a given situation. It is true that the High Court could itself permit documentary evidence to be produced before it under Order 41, Rule 27, but, as we have seen, this course has resulted in great prejudice to the defendant. ...” 24. In a case in 1997 (3) CTC 445 his Lordship S.S. SUBRAMANI, J. has held as follows at p. 613 of MLJ: “26. ... C.M.P. No. 9369 of 1994. The above petition was filed by the appellants to receive the deposition of P.W.1 given by him in another case, namely, O.S. No. 364 of 1990. ...” 24. In a case in 1997 (3) CTC 445 his Lordship S.S. SUBRAMANI, J. has held as follows at p. 613 of MLJ: “26. ... C.M.P. No. 9369 of 1994. The above petition was filed by the appellants to receive the deposition of P.W.1 given by him in another case, namely, O.S. No. 364 of 1990. The purpose of production of the same is to prove that Exhibit B-1 is genuine. 28. I do not think I will be justified in receiving this document, a deposition of a living person. It could be used only for the purpose of contradiction. That apart, I do not find any ground to receive the same as additional evidence in second appeal. Whether the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. applies to second appeal itself is doubtful. In second appeal, the Court is concerned only with the question of law, and sufficiency of evidence. That apart, the document produced is inadmissible and irrelevant for the purpose of this case. No grounds also have been made out under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. even if the same is made applicable. The C.M.P. is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.” 25. It is well settled that in the second appeat, the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts of Courts below unless the finding is perverse, the factual finding was based on no evidence and non consideration of relevant evidence. 26. Order 41 Rule 27 enables a party for production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. The Appellate Court includes the second Appellate Court and the said provision is applicable even in the second appeal stage. If the conditions provided under Rule 27 Order 41 is complied with, then there is no impediment for the High Court to accept the additional evidence. 27. In the present case, the specific finding of the Courts below is that mere production of the suit register in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 is not enough to prove the title of the plaintiff. Whereas the through reading of the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 is an eye opener to the custom and law relating to the dancing women and devolution of the title of the property. If the documents are accepted then the plaintiff has proved his case. Whereas the through reading of the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 is an eye opener to the custom and law relating to the dancing women and devolution of the title of the property. If the documents are accepted then the plaintiff has proved his case. The only question is whether the mode of taking additional evidence in the appellate Court as provided under Rule 28 Order 41 has to be pressed into service. 28. As held in Natha Singh and Others v. Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Others (supra) the test to be applied in dealing with the application for additional evidence is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration of the additional evidence sought to be adduced. 29. If this test is applied to the present case without taking to consideration of the additional evidence sought to be adduced, this Court will not be in a position to render justice. When the additional evidence is available and sought to be relied on in the appellate stage, the Court cannot ignore such additional evidence. 30. As held in 2004 (9) CTC 440 as stated supra relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant the ultimate goal of the Court is to render justice and the Court cannot dwell upon technicalities. 31. If the plaintiff is permitted to prove his title and if the additional evidence is allowed then the burden shifts upon the defendants to prove their title. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the plaintiff must be allowed to adduce additional evidence for the better appreciation of the case in hand and therefore, miscellaneous petition fiied for reception of additional evidence is to be allowed. However, as postulated under Rule 28 of Order 41 there shall be a direction directing the first appellate Court to take an evidence so that the parties can have adequate opportunity to establish their respective versions by adducing additional evidence both oral and documentary. 32. However, as postulated under Rule 28 of Order 41 there shall be a direction directing the first appellate Court to take an evidence so that the parties can have adequate opportunity to establish their respective versions by adducing additional evidence both oral and documentary. 32. In the result, C.M.P. No. 1 of 2006 is allowed and the documents namely, the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 are forwarded to the first appellate Court to take additional evidence by giving opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence in relation to this document or any other document produced by the parties and complete such enquiry within a period of 3 weeks on receipt of this order on urgent basis and forward the finding to this Court. Post the matter on 3.2.2010. The Registry is directed to forward all the documents filed in C.M.P. No. 1 of 2006 to the First Appellate Court. S.A. (MD) No. 465 of 2004 33. When the judgment was delivered on 7.1.2010, this Court considered an application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C and after serious considerations, allowed the application in C.M.P. No. 1 of 2006 and directed the first appellate Court to take additional evidence by giving opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence in relation to this document or any other documents produced by the parties and complete such enquiry within a period of three weeks on receipt of the order on urgent basis and forward the finding to this Court. 34. Now, the learned first appellate Court had examinee the parties and Exhibits A-6 to A-8 were marked and has forwarded the sae along with his findings. Both side counsels appeared and further arguments heard. The subject matter of the second appeal relates to a property, originally owned by one Gomathy Manickathammal, a woman from a dancing community, from whom her daughter Bhagavathy Manikathammal inherited. The said Bhagavathy Manikathammal executed a gift deed dated 20.8.1934 in favour of her daughter Sankara Rathina Manickathammal. The gift deed was opposed by his brother one Kalyana Sundaram Pillai. Therefore, Sankara Rathina Manickathammal filed a suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 before the District Munsif, Ambasamudram for possession on the basis of the title. The suit was contested. The said Bhagavathy Manikathammal executed a gift deed dated 20.8.1934 in favour of her daughter Sankara Rathina Manickathammal. The gift deed was opposed by his brother one Kalyana Sundaram Pillai. Therefore, Sankara Rathina Manickathammal filed a suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 before the District Munsif, Ambasamudram for possession on the basis of the title. The suit was contested. The learned District Munsif, elaborately considered the right of inheritance by the female heir through their mother in a dancing community, found that the succession to the property of Gomathi Manickathammal is governed by customary law applicable to the dancing girl community and that therefore, the property was inherited by her daughter Bhagavathy Manickathcmmal who gifted to Sankara Rathna Manickathammal, the plaintiff therein. The decree for rossession was granted. The decree was granted as early as 10.12.1945. The 1st appellant (since died) filed a suit in O.S. No. 618 of 1986, for a declaration and for possession, claiming that he is the only son of Sankara Rathina Manickathammal. Before the trial Court, he could produce only the certified copy of the suit register. He was not able to produce the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 310 of 1944. The trial Court found that he has not proved his title to his mother and therefore, dismissed the suit. On appeal, the 1st appellate Court also found that he has not proved title to his mother Sankara Rathna Manickathamal except producing Suit Register. The respondents all along contended that the property belong to Arulmigu Sathyavaageswarar Gomathiammal Temple which is represented by the Executive Officer. According the respondents, the 2nd respondent is a lessee under the 1st respondent. They have produced a xerox copy of the Property Register of the temple. The appellant produced a copy of the sale deed in respect of an adjacent property to prove his possession through one Ulaganathan Pillai, his uncle. That application was dismissed. The first appellate Court has also dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment of the trial Court. The first appellant preferred the second appeal. Pending appeal, the first appellant died and the legal heirs are brought on record and the 2nd appellant is the contestant. On admission, the substantial questions of law have been formulated. That application was dismissed. The first appellate Court has also dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment of the trial Court. The first appellant preferred the second appeal. Pending appeal, the first appellant died and the legal heirs are brought on record and the 2nd appellant is the contestant. On admission, the substantial questions of law have been formulated. Arguments were heard in the second appeal along with an application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure to admit the certified copies of the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 310 of 1934 And as stated earlier, C.M.P. No. 1 of 2006 was allowed. Now the matter has come before this Court for further consideration. While calling for the report, this Court observed as follows: “12. The suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1934 was . filed by one Bagavathi Manickkathammal, daughter of one Gomathi Manickathammal. One Sankara Rathina Manickathamal was the daughter of Bagavathi Manickkathammal and the plaintiff is the son of the said Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal. If it is accepted, the present suit property is the same property which belonged to the plaintiff and his predecessor in title and the tracing of the history of the property would reveal that how a woman from a dancing community had been denied the possession and enjoyment of the property though she had valid title. 13. One Gomathi Manickathammal, who was the original owner of the suit property, was the member of the dancing girl community. She had inherited the property as early as 1879 by some means. She had a son namely Kandasamia Pillai and a daughter Gomathi Manickathammal, who is also a dancing girl. After the death of Gomathi Manickathammal her daughter Bagavathi Manickathammal inherited the property as per the peculiar custom in the community of the dancing woman. This is apparent from the observations by His Lordship DEVADASS, J.,. In Viswanatha Mudali and Another v. Boariswami Mudali and Another (supra) which reads as follows: “Dancing women have their peculiar customs. Their status is recognized in Hindu Society. Their customs have received the sanction of judicial decisions and the adoption of girls by them is recognized by law. The daughter of dancing woman inherit in presence to their son.” 14. On inheritance by Bagavathi Manickathammal she gifted the property to one Sankara Rathina Manickathammal under a gift deed dated 20.8.1934. Their status is recognized in Hindu Society. Their customs have received the sanction of judicial decisions and the adoption of girls by them is recognized by law. The daughter of dancing woman inherit in presence to their son.” 14. On inheritance by Bagavathi Manickathammal she gifted the property to one Sankara Rathina Manickathammal under a gift deed dated 20.8.1934. However, she could not enjoy the property as one Kandasamia Pillai and Supputhaiammal were in possession of the property. Therefore, she filed a suit in O.S. No. 310 of 1994 for possession on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram. The learned District Munsif had delivered a judgment discussing the rights of the parties and upheld the gift deed dated 20.8.1934 as valid and ordered for recovery of possession. The decree was passed as early as on 10.12.1954. The present plaintiff who claims to be the son of Sankara Rathina Manickkathammal has now come forward with the present suit claiming title and also for recovery of possession from the present defendants”. It is further observed that, “19. As stated earlier if it is accepted that’ the present suit property is the same property mentioned in the gift deec dated 20.8.1934 and in the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 both these documents would go to prove that the plaintiff and his predecessor in title alone are entitled to the suit property. Though the Temple has claimed title to the property, they have filed only the xerox copy of the property list which shows the entry of the suit property. How this property was dedicated to the Temple has not been either stated or proved. The identification of the suit property is not in question. However, it is well settled that the burden is heavily upon the plaintiff to prove the title to the suit property.” After marking of these documents Exhibits A-6 to A-8 and on analysing the oral and documentary evidence, the first appellate Court in its finding dated 16.2.2010 has held that inspite of a decree of possession in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 the decree holder viz., Sankara Rathina Manickathammal has not taken possession of the property and there is no evidence to prove such possession and therefore, Exhibits 6 to 8 shall not prove the title and possession of the plaintiffs. Ms. Ms. N. Krishnaveni, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of the first appellate ccurt cannot be accepted. The learned counsel pointed out that by producing the decree and judgment In O.S. No. 310 of 1944, the appellants have proved the title to their predecessors. On the other hand, the respondents have not proved any better title. She further contended that the suit is for possession and therefore, there is no question of proving the appellant’s or their predecessor’s possession. This Court has already dealt with the title of the property in Paragraphs 13 to 15 of its judgment dated 7.1.2010 which is already extracted above. This Court has also observed that if it is accepted that the present suit property is the same property mentioned in the gift deed dated 20.8.1934 and in the judgment and in decree in O.S. No. 310 of 1944, both these documents would go to prove that the plaintiff and his predecessors in title alone are entitled to the suit property. At that time, the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 was not before this Court and the same documents have now been marked as Exhibits A-6 and A-7. The District Munsif one Sr. R.S.B. Mani in his judgment dated 10.12.1945 has extensively dealt with the title of Sankara Rathina Manickathammal, who is a member of dancing girl community. Her mother Bhagavathy Manickathammal was also a dancing girl and so was her grand mother Gomathy Manickathammal. It is very strange that neither Bhagavathy Manickathammal nor her daughter Sankara Rathina Manickathammal could enjoy the property. Sankara Rathina Manickathammal had gone to the Court in 1944 and had obtained a decree in 1945. Whether she has taken possession in pursuant of the decree or not is not an issue before the first appellate Court. The suit itself is for possession. In a suit for possession, the burden is heavily on the plaintiff to prove the title. The respondents have not claimed any adverse possession. They have claimed independent title. Once the plaintiff proves his or her title, the burden shifts on the defendant to prove a better title. Both the Courts below originally negatived the claim of the plaintiff on the basis that he has not proved his title except filing an extract of a suit register. They have claimed independent title. Once the plaintiff proves his or her title, the burden shifts on the defendant to prove a better title. Both the Courts below originally negatived the claim of the plaintiff on the basis that he has not proved his title except filing an extract of a suit register. Now the appellants were given a chance to produce these documents and the same has been admitted. Through this document, the appellants have proved the title of their predecessor. Therefore, they have discharged their burden. On the contrary, the respondents have not proved how the property was dedicated to the temple except producing a xerox copy of the property register. The finding of the first appellate Court is net acceptable as this Court has already held that the gift deed dated 20.8.1934 and the judgment in O.S. No. 310 of 1944 would go to prove that the appellant and their preoecessor in title alone are entitled to the suit property. Whether the decree holder has taken possession or not is immaterial. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the appellants have proved their title and they are entitled for possession of the suit property. The questions of law answered accordingly. In the result, the second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree in A.S. No. 200 of 2003 is set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for. Three months time is granted to the respondent to hand over vacant possession. The judgment dated 7.1.2010 to be attached with this judgment. No costs. Second appeal allowed.