JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.6.1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No. 46/1992. 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that the predecessor-in-interest of the present Appellant-Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'Plaintiff for convenience sake) claimed in the suit that the land was purchased by the Plaintiff through registered sale deeds dated 26.4.1976, 4.1.1978 and 30.1.1978 for the construction of the temple Badri Parshad Banian Attarian, which is still under construction and the temple is a private temple of the Plaintiff, which is not institution envisaged by the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Religious Institution and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity sake). Plaintiff's temple does not figure in the appended Schedule of the Act, as it has never been used for the benefit of the community. Temple is situated on private property purchased and as such the temple is small and funds for the purchase of land and construction of temple were raised by utilizing compensation payable to deity Thakur Badri Parshad Temple, at Bathu which has submerged in Pong Dam Lake and the compensation was payable through Parshotam Chand Mohtami of deity Thakur Badri Parshad, Bathu. Respondents-Defendants (hereinafter referred to as 'Defendants' for convenience sake) were interfering with the management of the temple on assertion that it vests with them and sought injunction prohibiting Defendants from taking action in pursuance of notice issued by Defendant No. 2 vide letters dated 19.1.1989 and 23.1.1989. Defendants contested the suit on objections of jurisdiction and cause of action. It was claimed on merit that the temple was built, land was purchased out of the compensation awarded to Mandir Bathu and the temple is complete, which is fully covered within the provisions of the Act. The temple is frequently visited by public at large since many years and order dated 2.4.1986 is legal and valid. Plaintiff in the replication has stated that preliminary objections taken are wrong and it has been submitted that the land for construction of temple has been purchased from the compensation received in the Bathu Mandir, which was submerged in the Pong Dam. On the pleading of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial Court on 11.2.1991: 1. Plaintiff in the replication has stated that preliminary objections taken are wrong and it has been submitted that the land for construction of temple has been purchased from the compensation received in the Bathu Mandir, which was submerged in the Pong Dam. On the pleading of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial Court on 11.2.1991: 1. Whether the Plaintiff Mandir is under construction and the provision of H.P. Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act are not applicable as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the temple in question is private temple if so whether the provision of the Act are not applicable to such type of Mandir as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the Defendants/State is competent to manage the affairs of the Mandir as alleged? OPD 4. Whether this Court has got no jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 5. Relief. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. He dismissed the same on 9.6.1994, Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. The same was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. "What is the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 inasmuch as the notification has not been laid before the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to date? 2. Whether there were any circumstances justifying the issuance of impugned letter thereby including the Plaintiff Temple in the Schedule attached with the Act? 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted before the Court on 22.5.2004 that the person through whom the temple had sued the appeal, had died, therefore, appropriate steps for representation of the Appellant were required to be taken for which four weeks' time was allowed. However, steps for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased sole Appellant were not taken and vide order dated 8.9.2004, appeal stood abated for want of bringing on record the legal representatives and the same was dismissed accordingly. However, order dated 8.9.2004 was recalled by this Court vide order dated 20.7.2010 and the appeal was directed to be heard today. 5. Mr. Ramakant Sharma has strenuously argued that the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are contrary to principles of law. However, order dated 8.9.2004 was recalled by this Court vide order dated 20.7.2010 and the appeal was directed to be heard today. 5. Mr. Ramakant Sharma has strenuously argued that the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are contrary to principles of law. According to him, Defendants have not complied with the mandatory provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act inasmuch as the notification has not been laid before the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. He then contended that the temple in question is a private temple and the same could not be included in Schedule-1 of the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowment Act, 1984. 6. Mr. Vikas Ratbore, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, appearing for the Respondents have strenuously argued that the temple in question, i.e. Shri Badri Parshad Temple Banian Attarian, has been included in the 1st Schedule vide notification dated 29.12.1988 published in the Gazette dated 24.4.1989. They further contended that this temple is a public temple and not private. They lastly contended that since the temple has been included in Schedule-I, the notices have been legally issued to the Plaintiff by Defendant No. 2 on 19.1.1989 and 23.1.1989. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 8. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, therefore, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussion of evidence. 9. Plaintiff has relied on various documents, including jamabandis Ex.A-1 to A-6 from 1868 to 1972-73. It is borne out from Ex.A-1, i.e. copy of Khewat Tarmim Bandobast 1868 that the temple Thakurdawara Bathu, Raja had been performing Pooja through Brahmans. He invited Mahant Ram Dass Mauz to perform Pooja. The land was gifted to Mandir Thakurdawara Bathu. Ex.A-2 jamabandi for the year 1981-82 reveals that Graha and Gelu are in possession of the property owned by Mandir Badri Vishal. In jamabandi Ex.A-3 for the year 1911-12 entries have been made whereby Thakur Badri Parshad has been shown in possession of the property. Similar are the entries in Ex.A-4, jamabandi for the year 1942-43, Ex.A-5 jamabandi for the year 1967-68 and Ex. A-6 jamabandi for the year 1972-73. Raja Sahib gifted certain land to Thakurdwara Bathu. The land was specifically gifted to temple and not to Ram Dass Mahant. Similar are the entries in Ex.A-4, jamabandi for the year 1942-43, Ex.A-5 jamabandi for the year 1967-68 and Ex. A-6 jamabandi for the year 1972-73. Raja Sahib gifted certain land to Thakurdwara Bathu. The land was specifically gifted to temple and not to Ram Dass Mahant. The temple got submerged in Pong Dam. The compensation was awarded in the name of temple. The committee was also constituted as per Ex. PD for the purpose of reconstruction of the temple and for purchasing the land. The land for the temple was purchased vide sale deeds Ex.P-2 dated 30.3.1978, Ex.P-3 dated 30.3.1978 and Ex.P-4 dated 4.1.1978, respectively. 10. PW-2 Mahant Gobind Dass has testified that the temple is private and Bathu temple which is submerged in Pong Dam was also a private temple. He has obtained this information from Parshotam Maharaj, but Parshotam Maharaj was not examined. PW-5 Onkar Nath claimed the temple to be private but at the same time says that Langar is arranged in the temple for saints. He also admitted that after the installation of idol of Badri Parshad in the temple, people started visiting it. DW-2 Bhagwan Singh deposed that it is a public temple frequented by the public at large without obstruction. 11. It will be apt at this stage to go through the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowment Act, 1984. The purpose of enactment is to provide better administration of Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such institutions and endowments. Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act defines "Charitable Endowments". Expression "Hindu Public Religious Institution" is defined under Sub-section (f) of Section 2. Chapter-II of the Act provides for preparation and maintenance of registers by religious institutions. The Act applies to all the Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments mentioned in the Schedule- 1, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 1. The Government has the power under Section 29 of the Act, if it is of opinion that it is expedient or necessary in the public interest so to do, by notification in the official Gazette, add to, omit from the Schedule-1 any Hindu Public Religious Institution and Charitable Endowment and on any such notification being issued, the Schedule-1 shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 provides that every such notification shall, as soon as possible after it is issued, be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State. Section 29 reads thus: 29. Power to amend Schedule-1.--(1) The Government may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient or necessary in the public interest so to do, by notification in the Official Gazette, add to, omit from, the Schedule-1 any Hindu Public Religious Institution and Charitable Endowment and on any such notification being issued, the Schedule-1 shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. (2) Every such notification shall, as soon as possible after it is issued, be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State. 12. It is not in dispute that notification under Section 29 (1) of the Act has been issued whereby Shri Badri Parshad Temple Bhai Attarian has been included in Schedule-I. Vide mutation No. 51 (Ex.D-3), Temple Officer, Damtal was appointed by the Commissioner as Mohtmim of the temple. Ex. DX is the copy of Rapat No. 41 dated 30.4.1989 of the Patwari showing that management of the temple was taken by the Temple Officer. The revenue entries have been supported by DW-1 Om Parkash, Temple Officer and DW-2 Bhagwan Singh. Defendant No. 2 has also the necessary power under the Act to issue notices dated 19.1.1989 and 23.1.1989. 13. Now, the Court will advert to submission of Mr. Ramakant Sharma that provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Act have not been complied with. The Court is of the considered view that the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Act are directory. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atlas Cycle Industries Limited and Ors. v. The State of Haryana (1979) 2 SCC 196 have held that there are two considerations for regarding a provision as directory or mandatory: (i) absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed, and (ii) serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act of the Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for non-compliance with the particular provision. 15. 15. Their Lordships have further held that policy and object underlying the provisions relating to laying the delegated legislation made by the subordinate law making authorities or orders passed by subordinate executive instrumentalities before both Houses of Parliament being to keep supervision and control over the aforesaid authorities and instrumentalities, the "laying clauses" assume different forms depending on the degree of control which the Legislature may like to exercise. The questions whether the direction to lay the rules before Parliament is mandatory or merely directory and whether laying is a condition precedent to their operation or may be neglected without prejudice to the effect of the rules, will depend upon circumstances of each case or wordings of the statute under which the orders or the rules are made. Their Lordships while interpreting Section 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 have held that the requirement as to laying can be said to be a "simple laying" and is directory and not mandatory. Their Lordships have further held that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by Section 3 (6) of the Act should render the order void. Their Lordships have held as under: 19. Though Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act provides that every order made by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made, the important point to be considered in the absence of analoguous statutes like the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 and the Laying of Documents Before Parliament (Interpretation) Act, 1948 prescribing the conditions, the period and the legal effect of the laying of order before the Parliament is whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is well to remember at the outset that the use of the word 'shall' is not conclusive and decisive of the matter and the Court has to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature which is the determining factor, and that must be done by looking carefully to the whole scope, nature and design of the statute. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1958 SCR 533 : AIR 1957 SC 912). Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1958 SCR 533 : AIR 1957 SC 912). Reference in this behalf may also be made with advantage to another decision of this Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR 679: AIR 1961 SC 751) where Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) after quoting with approval the passage occurring at page 516 in Crawford "On the Construction of Statutes" as well as the passage occurring at page 242 in 'Craies on Statute Law', 5th Edition, observed as follows: The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstances namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered. 20. Thus two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are: (1) absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed and (2) serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act of the Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for non-compliance with the particular provision. 21. Now the policy and object underlying the provisions relating to laying the delegated legislation made by the subordinate law making authorities or orders passed by subordinate executive instrumentalities before both Houses of Parliament being to keep supervision and control over the aforesaid authorities and instrumentalities, the "laying clauses" assume different forms depending on the degree of control which the Legislature may like to exercise. As evident from the observations made at pages 305 to 307 of the 7th Edition of Craies on Statute Law and noticed with approval in Hukam Chand v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCR 896: AIR 1972 SC 2427) there are three kinds of laying which are generally used by the legislature. These three kinds of laying are described and dealt with in Craies on Statute Law (supra) as under: (i) Laying without further procedure, (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution, (iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. (i) Simple laying. The most obvious example is in Section 10(2) of the 1946 Act. In earlier days, before the idea of laying in draft had been introduced, there was provision for laying rules etc., for a period during which time they were not in operation and could be thrown out without ever having come into operation (compare Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, Section 417; Inebriates Act 1898, Section 21) but this is not used now. (ii) Negative resolution. Instruments so laid have immediate operative effect but are subject to annulment within forty days without prejudice to a new instrument being made. The phraseology generally used is "subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament." This is by far the commonest form of laying. It acts mostly as a deterrent and sometimes forces a Minister (in Sir Cecil Carr's phrase) to "buy off opposition" by proposing some modification. (iii) Affirmative resolution. The phraseology here is normally "no order shall be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. Normally, no time limit is fixed for obtaining approval - none is necessary because the Government will naturally take the earliest opportunity of bringing it up for approval - but Section 16 (3) of the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 did impose a limit of forty days. An old form (not much used nowadays) provided for an order to be made but not to become operative until a resolution of both Houses of Parliament had been obtained. This form was used in Section 10 (4) of the Road Traffic Act. 1930 (of. Road Traffic Act 1960, Section 19 (3).) ... The affirmative resolution procedure necessitates a debate in every case. This means that one object of delegation of legislation (viz. This form was used in Section 10 (4) of the Road Traffic Act. 1930 (of. Road Traffic Act 1960, Section 19 (3).) ... The affirmative resolution procedure necessitates a debate in every case. This means that one object of delegation of legislation (viz. saving the time of Parliament) is to some extent defeated. The procedure therefore is sparingly used and is more or less reserved to cases where the order almost amounts to an Act, by effecting changes which approximate to true legislation (e.g. where the order is the meat of the matter, the enabling Act merely outlining the general purpose) or where the order replaces local Acts or provisional orders and, most important of all, where the spending, etc. of public money is affected. Sometimes where speedy or secret action is required (e.g. the imposition of import duties), the order is laid with immediate operation but has to be confirmed within a certain period (of. Import Duties Act 1958, Section 13 (4)). This process of acting first and getting approved after has also been adopted in the Emergency Powers Act 1920 under which a state of emergency can be proclaimed and regulations made. The proclamation must be immediately communicated to Parliament and does not have effect for longer than a month; but it can be replaced by another proclamation. Any regulations made under the proclamation are to be laid before Parliament immediately and do not continue in force after the expiration of seven days from the time when they are so laid unless a resolution is passed by both Houses providing for their continuance." 22. Now at page 317 of the aforesaid Edition of Craies on Statute Law, the questions whether the direction to lay the rules before Parliament is mandatory or merely directory and whether laying is a condition precedent to their operation or may be neglected without prejudice to the effect of the rules are answered by saying that "each case must depend on its own circumstances or the wording of the statute under which the rules are made." In the instant case, it would be noticed that Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act merely provides that every order made under Section 3 by the Central Govt. or by any officer or authority of the Central Govt, shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. or by any officer or authority of the Central Govt, shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. It does not provide that it shall be subject to the negative or the affirmative resolution by either House of Parliament. It also does not provide that it shall be open to the Parliament to approve or disapprove the order made under Section 3 of the Act. It does not even say that it shall be subject to any modification which either House of Parliament may in its wisdom think it necessary to provide. It does not even specify the period for which the order is to be laid before both Houses of Parliament nor does it provide any penalty for non-observance of or noncompliance with the direction as to the laying of the order before both Houses of Parliament. It would also be noticed that the requirement as to the laying of the order before both Houses of Parliament is not a condition precedent but subsequent to the making of the order. In other words, there is no prohibition to the making of the orders without the approval of both Houses of Parliament. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the requirement as to laying contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act falls within the first category i.e. "simple laying" and is directory not mandatory-We are fortified in this view by a catena of decision, both English and Indian. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the requirement as to laying contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act falls within the first category i.e. "simple laying" and is directory not mandatory-We are fortified in this view by a catena of decision, both English and Indian. In Bailey v. Williamson, (1873) 8 QB 118) whereby Section 9 of the Parks Regulations Act, 1872 passed on June 27, 1872 "to protect the royal parks from injury, and to protect the public in the enjoyment of those royal parks and other royal possessions for the purpose of innocent recreation and exercise" it provided that any rules made in pursuance of the first schedule to the Act shall be forthwith laid before both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament be sitting, or if not, then within three weeks after the beginning of the then next ensuing session of Parliament; and if any such rules shall be disapproved by either House of Parliament within one month of the laying, such rules, or such parts thereof as shall be disapproved shall not be enforced and Rules for Hyde Park were made and published on September 30, 1872 when Parliament was not sitting and in November 18, 1872, the Appellant was convicted under Section 4 of the Act for that he did unlawfully act in contravention of Regulation 8 contained in the first Schedule annexed thereto by delivering a public address not in accordance with the rules of the said Park but contrary to the statute, and it was inter alia contended on his behalf that in the absence of distinct words in the statute stating that the rules would be operative in the interval from the time they were made to the time when Parliament should meet next or if Parliament was sitting then during the month during which Parliament had an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon them, no rule made as supplementing the schedule could be operative so as to render a person liable to be convicted for infraction thereof unless the same had been laid before the Parliament, it was held overruling the contention that the Rules became effective from the time they were made and it could not be the intention of the Legislature that the laying of the rules before Parliament should be made a condition precedent to their acquiring validity and that they should not take effect until they are laid before and approved by Parliament. If the Legislature had intended the same thing as in Section 4, that the rules should not take effect until they had the sanction of the Parliament, it would have expressly said so by employing negative language. 32. From the foregoing discussion, it inevitably follows that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act should render the order void. Consequently non-laying of the aforesaid notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the commodity in question before both Houses of Parliament cannot result in nullification of the notification. Accordingly, we answer the aforesaid question in the negative. In view of this answer, it is not necessary to deal with the other contention raised by the Respondent to the effect that the aforesaid notification being of a subsidiary character, it was not necessary to lay it before both Houses of Parliament to make it valid. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards and Anr. v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P. and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 634 while interpreting Section 11 (2) of the A.P. Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963 have held that requirement of laying of Government order granting exemption before Legislative Assembly was an instance of simple laying and hence the requirement was not mandatory despite the use of word "shall". Their Lordships have held as under: 29. The next question is whether the requirement of laying' before the legislature is mandatory? Sections (2 of Section 11 of the Act requires that an order made under Section 11(1 shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly for the period prescribed therein and shall be subject to such modifications as may be made by the legislature. The legislature is also entitled to annul the said order. This is one form of legislative control over subordinate legislation. Shri Sorabjee cited the decision of this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana holding that the requirement of laying', couched in the language akin to Sections (2 of Section 11 - a case of "simple laying" in contradistinction to "laying subject to negative resolution" and "laying subject to affirmative resolution" - is not mandatory notwithstanding the use of the expression 'shall' in the relevant provision. The Court was dealing with Sections (6 of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which provides for laying the orders made under the Act before the appropriate legislature, an instance of "simple laying" or "laying without further procedure". The said decision appears to be consistent with the authorities on the subject, both in India and in United Kingdom, and is binding upon us. It is brought to our notice that as early as 1956, Subba Rao, CJ. had taken the same view in A.P. High Court vide D.K. Krishnan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority. Accordingly, we hold that the requirement of laying prescribed by Sections (2 of Section 11 is not mandatory and an order of exemption (Jeevan Reddy, J.) under Section 11 cannot be said to be ineffective or unenforceable for the reason of 'non-laying' as required by Section 11(2) of the Act. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. and Ors. v. Hukum Chand Mills Karamchari, (1996) 7 SCC 81 while interpreting Section 95 (3) of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 have held that laying of the Rules before the Legislature was not a condition precedent for bringing the rules into force and omission to lay on the table of the Legislative Assembly had not the effect of vitiating the said rule. Them Lordships have held as under: 3. It is urged on behalf of the State that the High Court had not kept in mind the distinction between the case where rules come into force only after approval by the Legislature as against the mere laying of the rule on the table of the Legislative Assembly for purpose of information. The position has been succinctly laid down by this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana. Unfortunately, this vital aspect had been overlooked 4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent in fairness, states that there can be no demur to the submission on law on behalf of the State. However, there are other points which require to be gone into in the writ petition. They were not decided by the High Court. Since the High Court chose to allow the writ petition on the short ground of the invalidity of the Rule, as it conceived. Besides the Schedule relating to levy of audit fees having been changed the matter is academic. 5. They were not decided by the High Court. Since the High Court chose to allow the writ petition on the short ground of the invalidity of the Rule, as it conceived. Besides the Schedule relating to levy of audit fees having been changed the matter is academic. 5. In order to determine the above controversy, we think it is worthwhile to quote Section 95(3) of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The said Section runs as under: 95(3). All rules made under this Act shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly In view of this it is clear the laying of the Rule 50-A before the Legislative Assembly was only for the purpose of information. When the State by virtue of the delegated powers under Section 95 makes Rules they would come into force only after they are laid before the Assembly and after its approval. That is not the case here. The purpose of such a procedure is that for the State to exercise control over delegated powers. The rule, is a subordinate legislation. The legislature which has plenary power of legislation retains the control over subordinate legislation. The distinction between the two kinds, has been clearly brought out by the decision of this Court cited on behalf of the State, namely Atlas Cycle industries Ltd. We do not find any necessity to multiply the case-law. 18. The "laying principle" has been succinctly explained by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Quarry owners' Association v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 655. Their Lordships have held as under: 45. It is true that the language of both Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 28 are different. They are reproduced below: 28. 18. The "laying principle" has been succinctly explained by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Quarry owners' Association v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 655. Their Lordships have held as under: 45. It is true that the language of both Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 28 are different. They are reproduced below: 28. Rules and notifications to be laid before Parliament and certain rules to be approved by Parliament.--(1) Every rule and every notification made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or notification or both Houses agree that the rule or notification should not be made, the rule or notification shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the rule or notification. xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) Every rule and every notification made by the State Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature where it consists of two Houses, or where such Legislature consists of one House, before that House. There is no difficulty for us to uphold their submissions that in view of difference in the language of Sub-section (3), the same meaning to it as that of Sub-section (1) cannot be given. This difference has been carved out for a purpose to give different projection to the said two provisions. In the case of major mineral which plays important role in the National growth and wealth and where the delegatee is the Central Government, Parliament retained its full control but for the minor mineral. This difference has been carved out for a purpose to give different projection to the said two provisions. In the case of major mineral which plays important role in the National growth and wealth and where the delegatee is the Central Government, Parliament retained its full control but for the minor mineral. Parliament felt for the minor minerals as the subject is of local use and State Government being well versed to deal with it in the historical background, mere placement of rules, notifications framed by it before the State Legislature would be a sufficient check on the exercise of its powers. Thus, this difference of language gives two different thrust as intended by the Parliament. Any Act of the Parliament, far less when it introduces any new provision through amendment, it could (not) be said for it to be in futility. The purpose has to be found. What could be the purpose for such an amendment? One of the reasons is that this was brought in, in view of the observation made by this Court in D.K. Trivedi's (AIR 1986 SC 1323) (supra). This Court records (at p. 1350 of AIR): ... It was, therefore, for Parliament to decide whether rules and notifications made by the State Governments under Section 15(1) should be laid before Parliament or the legislature of the State or not. It, however, thought it fit to do so with respect to minerals other than minor minerals since these minerals are of vital importance to the country" industry and economy, but did not think it fit to do so in the case of minor minerals because it did not consider them to be of equal importance.... The Parliament through its wisdom, apart from above brought this amendment also to keep a check on the exercise of power by the State Government's as delegatee. The question is whether mere laying rules and notification before the legislature, as in the present cases, can be construed as a check on the State Government power. Laying before House of Parliament are made in the three different ways. Laying of any rule may be subject to any negative resolution within specified period or may be subject to its confirmation. This is spoken as negative and positive resolution respectively. Third may be mere laying before the House. Laying before House of Parliament are made in the three different ways. Laying of any rule may be subject to any negative resolution within specified period or may be subject to its confirmation. This is spoken as negative and positive resolution respectively. Third may be mere laying before the House. In the present case, we are not concerned with either affirmative or negative procedure but consequence of mere laying before the legislature. 46. Administrative law by HWR Wade and Forsyth, 7th Edition, page 898 records with reference to mere laying: Laying before Parliament An Act of Parliament will normally require that rules or regulations made under the Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Parliament can then keep its eye upon them and provide opportunities for criticism. Rules or regulations laid before Parliament may be attacked on any ground. The object of the system is to keep them under general political control, so that criticism in Parliament is frequently on grounds of policy. The legislation concerning 'laying' has already been explained. Laying before Parliament is done in a number of different ways. The regulations may merely have to be laid; or they may be subject to negative resolution within forty days; or they may expire unless confirmed by affirmative resolution." 47. Constitutional and Administrative Law, Stanely De Smith and Rodney Brazier, 7th Edn., records: ... If the instrument has merely to be laid, or laid in draft, before Parliament, it will be delivered to the Votes and Proceedings Office of the House of Commons. No opportunity is provided by parliamentary procedure for the instrument to be discussed, but its existence will at least be brought to the notice of members and the Minister is more likely to be questioned about it than if it is not laid before Parliament at all. 48. In a democratic set up, every State Government is responsible to its State Legislature.-When any statute require mere laying of any notification or Rule before the Legislature its execution, viz., State Government comes under the scrutiny of the concerned Legislature. Every function and every exercise of power, by the State Government is under one or other Ministry who in turn is accountable to the legislative concerned. Where any document, rule or notification requires placement before any House or when placed, the said House inherently gets the jurisdiction over the same. Every function and every exercise of power, by the State Government is under one or other Ministry who in turn is accountable to the legislative concerned. Where any document, rule or notification requires placement before any House or when placed, the said House inherently gets the jurisdiction over the same. Each member of the House, subject to its procedure gets right to discuss the same, they may put questions to the concerned Ministry. Irrespective of the fact that such rules or notifications may not be under purview of its modification, such members may seek explanation from such Ministry of their inaction, arbitrariness, transgressing limits of their statutory orbit on any such other matter. Short of modification power, it has a right even to condemn the Ministry. No doubt in the case where House is entrusted with power to annul, modify or approve any rule, it plays positive role and have full control over it, but even where the matter is merely placed before any House, its positive control over the executive, makes even mere laying to play a very vital forceful role which keeps a check over the concerned State Government. Even if submission for the Appellants is accepted that mere placement before a House is only for the information, even then such information, inherently in it makes legislature to play an important role as aforesaid for keeping a check on the activity of the State Government. Such placement cannot be construed to be non est. No Act of Parliament should be construed to be of having no purpose. As we have said mere discussion and -questioning the concerned ministry or authority in the House in respect of such laying would keep such authority on guard to act with circumspection which is a check on such authority, specially when such authority is even otherwise answerable to such Legislature. Further examining the scheme of the Act, with its historical background, we find there is clear demarcation in dealing between the Major minerals and the Minor minerals. For minor minerals all its activity before this Act has been delegated to the State Government as it having all conceivable knowledge over it, as it being of local use and not being of much national importance. For this difference also stricter control is made for the Major minerals through Section 28(1) than for the minor minerals. For minor minerals all its activity before this Act has been delegated to the State Government as it having all conceivable knowledge over it, as it being of local use and not being of much national importance. For this difference also stricter control is made for the Major minerals through Section 28(1) than for the minor minerals. Thus, this mere check on the State Government, as aforesaid, may have been found to be sufficient by the Parliament, with reference to the minor minerals. Thus, the language of both Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) though different, this is only for two different purposes. Thus when Parliament introduced Sub-section (3) through amendment, it was to further strengthen the control over the State Government power. Any other submission, the one made by the Appellants, makes such an Act of the Parliament meaningless, which cannot be attributed to the Parliament. 54. M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. (AIR 1979 SC 1149: 1979 Cri LJ 927) (supra). In this case also one of the contentions was that the notifications were not placed before the Parliament as required by Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodity Act, 1955 - The Sub-section (6) of Section 3 of this Act requires that every order made under this Section by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. This is similar to the provision which we are considering under Sub-section (3) of Section 28. The Court held such provision to be directory and hence for this default of not placing the Iron and Steel Control Order 1956 and notification under Clause 15(3) before the Parliament the order shall not become-invalid. 19. It is thus evident from the plain language of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 and the authoritative law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cited hereinabove, that the notification issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act whereby the temple in question has been included in the 1st Schedule is not vitiated for the simple reason that notification has not been laid before the Legislative Assembly. 20. There are no consequences to follow if the notification is not laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State. 20. There are no consequences to follow if the notification is not laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State. Moreover, no serious prejudice is caused to the general public if it is not laid before the Legislative Assembly. The laying of the notification before the Legislative Assembly, in the instant case, is only "simple laying. 21. Now, the Court will advert to whether the temple could be included in the Schedule attached with the Act, i.e. Schedule-1 or not. A bare perusal of the revenue entries, discussed hereinabove, read with statements of PW-2 Mahant Gobind Dass, PW-5 Onkar Nath and DW-2 Bhagwan Singh makes it abundantly clear that the temple in question is a public temple and not a private. The land has been gifted by Raja of Guler to the Temple and not to Mohtmim. The revenue entries have been incorporated in the name of temple. The land in question for the purpose of construction of temple has been purchased from the funds of the temple vide sale deeds Ex.P-2 dated 30.3.1978, Ex.P-3 dated 30.3.1978 and Ex.P-4 dated 4.1.1978, respectively. 22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee and Ors. v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 485 have explained the distinction between private and public temple as under: 9. Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar 1956 SCR 756: (AIR 1957 SC 133), is a leading judgment of this Court by a Bench of four Judges. In that case the facts found were that one Sheo Ghulam, a pious childless Hindu, constructed Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji in Balasia village of District Sitapur. He was in management of the temple till his death. He executed a 'Will' bequeathing all his properties to the temple and made provisions for its proper management. The question arose whether the temple was dedicated to the public and whether the temple was a public or private temple. This Court laid down that the issue whether the religious endowment as a public or a private is a mixed question of law and facts, the decision of which must be taken on the application of the legal concepts of public and private endowment to the facts found and it is open to consideration of this Court. This Court laid down that the issue whether the religious endowment as a public or a private is a mixed question of law and facts, the decision of which must be taken on the application of the legal concepts of public and private endowment to the facts found and it is open to consideration of this Court. The distinction between a private or a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. An idol is a juristic person capable of holding properties. The properties endowed for the temple vest in it, but the idol has no beneficial interest in the endowment. The true beneficiaries are its worshipers. On facts it-was found that the temple was a public temple. In Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, ( (1964) 1 SCR 561: AIR 1963 SC 1638) the Constitution Bench of this Court held, on construction of evidence, that Nathdwara temple of Udaipur is a public temple with management of the trustee of the property belonging to the temple. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayhak Gosavi, (1960) 1 SCR 773: AIR 1960 SC 100) a Bench of three Judges held that the long user by the public as of right and grant of land and cash by the rulers, taken along with other relevant facts were consistent only with the public nature of the endowment. It was held that Sri Balaji Venkatesh at Nasik and its Sansthan constituted charitable and religious trusts within the meaning of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920. In that context this Court also considered the question of burden of proof and held that it would mean of two things, namely, (1) that a party has to prove an allegation before it is entitled to a judgment in its favour; and (2) that the one or the other of the two contending parties has to introduce evidence on a contested issue. The question of onus is material only where the party on which it is placed would eventually lose if it failed to discharge the same. Where issues are, however, joined, evidence is led and such evidence Can be weighed in order to determine the issues, the question of burden becomes academic. 10. The question of onus is material only where the party on which it is placed would eventually lose if it failed to discharge the same. Where issues are, however, joined, evidence is led and such evidence Can be weighed in order to determine the issues, the question of burden becomes academic. 10. In Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi, Special Officer-in-Charge of the Hindu Religious Trusts, (1959) Supp (2) SCR 583: AIR 1959 SC 951), another Constitution Bench reiterated the distinction between the public and private trust. In the former the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it, answering a particular description. In the latter, the beneficiaries are definite and ascertained individuals or who within a time can be definitely ascertained. The facts that the uncertain and fluctuating body of persons is a Section of the public following a particular religious faith or is only a sect of persons of a certain religious persuasion would not make any difference on the matter and would not make the trust a private trust. It was held that Sri Thakur Laxmi Narainji was a public trust within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950. In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Ranchhoddas Kali das (1969) 2SCC 853: AIR 1970 SC 2025), relied on by the Appellant, this Court construing whether a public trust or a private trust laid down the following tests: (1) Is the temple built in such imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple? (2) Are the member of the public entitled to worship in that temple as of right? (3) Are the temple expenses met from the contributions made by the public? (4) Whether the Sevas and Utsvas conducted in the temple are those usually conducted in public temples? (5) Have the management as well as the devotees been treating that temple as a public temple? On the facts of that case, it was held that Haveli at Nadiad was a public temple. (4) Whether the Sevas and Utsvas conducted in the temple are those usually conducted in public temples? (5) Have the management as well as the devotees been treating that temple as a public temple? On the facts of that case, it was held that Haveli at Nadiad was a public temple. In that context this Court emphasized that the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of gifts received by it, rights exercised by the devotees in regards to worship, the consciousness of the Manager and the consciousness of the devotees themselves as to the public character of the temple are relevant factors which would go to establish that the temple is whether public or a private one. The true character of a particular temple is to be decided on the basis of diverse circumstances. 12. In T.D. Gopalan v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, (1973) 1 SCR 584: AIR 1972 SC 1716), relied on by the Appellants, the facts were that the Mandapam was constructed on their own land. The Garbha Griha in front of the mandapam, stone idols called Dwarabalakas on either side and implements necessary for offering puja in the mandapam existed. The Commissioner declared it to be a public temple but in the suit the trial Court declared it to be a private temple. On appeal, the High Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and held that the temple was a public temple on the ground that members of the public had been worshipping at the shrine without let or hindrance, and that the temple was being run by contributions and by benefactions obtained from members of the public. This Court considered the nature of the temple, place of worship attaching importance to the origin of the temple, the management thereof by the members of the family and absence of any endowed property etc., declared it to be private temple and confirmed the decree of the trial Court. This Court considered the nature of the temple, place of worship attaching importance to the origin of the temple, the management thereof by the members of the family and absence of any endowed property etc., declared it to be private temple and confirmed the decree of the trial Court. While considering those facts, this Court held that the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs were managed, the nature and extent of the gifts received by it, the rights exercised by devotees in regard to worship therein, the consciousness of the Manager or devotees themselves as to the public character of the temple are facts which go to establish whether a temple is public or private. In the absence of Dwajasthamba or Nagara bell or Hundial in the temple were considered to be factors to declare the temple to be a private temple. In Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa v. Charity Commissioner, (1976) 3 SCR 518: AIR 1976 SC 871), While reiterating the well-settled distinction between private trust or public trust, this Court emphasised the deity installed in the temple was intended by the founder to be continually worshiped by an indeterminate multitude of the Hindu public without any hindrance or restriction in the matter of worship by the public extending over a long period. Receipt of the Royal grant, gifts of the land by members of the public, absence of any evidence in the long history of the Sansthan to warrant that it had any appearance of, or that it was ever treated as, a private property are some of the features to lead to an inescapable conclusion that Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan was to be public trust within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. 19. A place in order to be a temple, must be a place for public religious worship used as such place and must be either dedicated to the Community at large or any Section thereof as a place of public religious worship. The distinction between a private temple and public temple is now well settled. In the case of former the beneficiaries are specific individuals; in the latter they are indeterminate or fluctuating general public or a class thereof. Burden of proof would mean that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. The distinction between a private temple and public temple is now well settled. In the case of former the beneficiaries are specific individuals; in the latter they are indeterminate or fluctuating general public or a class thereof. Burden of proof would mean that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. The one or the other of the contending parties has to introduce evidence on a contested issue. The question of onus is material only where the party on which it is placed would eventually lose if he failed to discharge the same. Where, however, parties joined the issue, led evidence, such evidence can be weighed in order to determine the issue. The question of burden becomes academic. 20. An idol is a juristic person capable of holding property. The property endowed to it vests in it but the idol has no beneficial interest in the endowment. The beneficiaries are the worshippers. Dedication may be made orally or can be inferred from the conduct or from a given set of facts and circumstances. There need not be a document to evidence dedication to the public. The consciousness of the manager of the temple or the devotees as to the public character of the temple; gift of properties by the public or grant by the ruler or Government; and long use by the public as of right to worship in the temple are relevant facts drawing a presumption strongly in favour of the view that the temple is a public temple. The true character of the temple may be decided by taking into consideration diverse circumstances Though the management of a temple by the members of the family for a long time, is a factor in favour of the view that the temple is a private temple it is not conclusive. It requires to be considered in the light of other facts or circumstances. Internal management of the temple is a mode of orderly discipline or the devotees are allowed to enter into the temple to worship at particular time or after some duration or after the head man leaves, the temple are not conclusive. The nature of the temple and its location are also relevant facts. The right of the public to worship in the temple is a matter of inference. 23. The nature of the temple and its location are also relevant facts. The right of the public to worship in the temple is a matter of inference. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Teki Venkata Ratnam and Ors. v. Deputy Commissioner, Endowments and Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 106 have held that a private temple can also in due course of time become a public temple. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. The second submission based on the decision of the District Court made in O.P. No. 1 of 1940 declaring the temple as private, as rightly held by the High Court, has no merit or force. It must be remembered that a private temple in course of time depending on various factors and developments may gradually acquire the nature of a public temple. The Division Bench of the High Court in this regard relied on the decision of this Court in Goswami Shri Mahalaximi v. Shah Ranchhoddas, (AIR 1970 SC 2025), para 15 of the said judgment reads: Though most of the present day Hindu public temples have been founded as public temples, there are instances of private temples becoming public temples in course of time. Some of the private temples have acquired great deal of religious reputation either because of the eminence of its founder or because of other circumstances. They have attracted large number of devotees. Gradually in course of time they have become public temples.... 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Pitchai Ganapathy and Ors. v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 460 have held that a party seeking declaration that the temple is a private one must rebut presumption that temple whose origins are unknown is a public temple. Their Lordships have held as under: 12. The trial Court, as noted earlier, held that suit temple is not a 'religious institution' as defined under Section 6(20) of the Act. The learned single Judge on appeal and the Division Bench of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal took a contrary view and concurrently held that the suit temple is a 'religious institution' as defined in Section 6(20) of the Act and it is not a 'private temple' as held by the trial Court on the facts adverted to by the learned Single Judge. 13. 13. The fact that temple is situate on paramboke land cannot be seriously disputed; that the origin of the temple is not known; that its location is next to the famous Meenakshi Amman Temple; that the evidence adduced on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants was not enough to hold the temple and the properties owned by it belong to the Plaintiffs-Appellants. The documentary evidence made available to the Court with reference to the suit in O.S. No. 278/1866, O.S. No. 511/1884 and Ex. A-7 which is described as a deed of loan executed on 17-3-1888 by Muthaye alias Meenakshi Ayi. It is not clear from the judgments as to who deposed on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and who deposed on behalf of the Defendants-Respondents and even after careful perusal of the entire judgment no conclusion can be drawn as to in what capacity the ancestors of the Plaintiffs-Appellants claimed enjoyment of the suit land. There is a specific mention of the claim of the Plaintiffs-Appellants in the suit that the suit land belonged to the Plaintiffs-temple. The ownership of the lands is thus conceded to the temple and not claimed by the Plaintiffs and it was not made clear as to who the Plaintiffs were. In regard to O.S. No. 511/1884, a reference to the plaint would reveal that it was a suit filed by two Plaintiffs described as Priest/Priestess of the Padhinettampadi Karuppannasamy Temple and situate at Kizhathirai Street, Madurai and Veerasamy Pillaiyar Temple, Madurai,,the Division Bench clearly found that the claim made in the suit was with regard to possession and enjoyment and not title or ownership and the judgment was not made available in that particular case and the decree indicated the date of the judgment to be 11.4.1885 in favour of the Plaintiffs-Appellants restraining the Defendants-Respondents by entering into the suit property in order to disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the Plaintiffs-Appellants and also directing the Defendants-Respondents to pay Rs. 20/- to the Plaintiffs-Appellants for having demolished the wall unlawfully and also directing to pay the costs to the Plaintiffs-Appellants. Exhibit A-7, which is dated 17.3.1888, was executed by one of the ancestors of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and in order to construct a pucca building of the Sri Meenakshi. Sundereswarar Temple, the wife of the temple Priest took a loan of Rs. 500/- from one Chackarabani Chettiar. Exhibit A-7, which is dated 17.3.1888, was executed by one of the ancestors of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and in order to construct a pucca building of the Sri Meenakshi. Sundereswarar Temple, the wife of the temple Priest took a loan of Rs. 500/- from one Chackarabani Chettiar. Therefore, this document can hardly throw any light on the character of the suit temple. The judgment in O.S. No. 577 of 1888 is also useful as in that judgment there is only reference to certain description and nothing of any importance on the question whether the temple was a 'public' or 'private' temple. The deed of partition dated 27.5.1897 indicates that certain rights are available to the Plaintiffs-Appellants' family in the suit temple in offering pooja and the right to apportionment of the offerings and nothing more. 25. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kuldip Chand and Anr. v. Advocate General to Government of H.P. and Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 46 have laid down the guidelines to determine whether the endowment is a public or private in nature. Their Lordships have held as under: 40. Undoubtedly, bequests for construction of a Dharamsala will be for a charitable purpose. It is not necessary that the properties must be dedicated to any particular deity but what is essential is complete dedication for a charitable purpose. Such dedication may be made to an object both religious and of public utility, 26. Similarly, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of W.B. and Ors. v. Sri Sri Lakshmi Janardan Thakur and Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 490 have culled out the following factors to determine whether the trust is private or public: 15. In order to ascertain whether a trust is a private, following factors are relevant: (1) If the beneficiaries are ascertained individuals; (2) If the grantor has been made in favour of an individual and not in favour of a deity; (3) The temple is situated within the campus of the residence of the donor; (4) If the revenue records or entries suggest the land being in possession of an individual and not in the deity. On the other hand an inference can be drawn that the temple along with the properties attached to it is a public trust: (1) If the public visit the temple as of right. (2) If the endowment is the name of the deity. On the other hand an inference can be drawn that the temple along with the properties attached to it is a public trust: (1) If the public visit the temple as of right. (2) If the endowment is the name of the deity. (3) The beneficiaries are the public. (4) If the management is made through the agency of the public or the accounts of the temple are being scrutinized by the public. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board and Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 482 have held that the properties of deities, temples etc. are required to be protected and safeguarded by their trustees/archakas/shebaits/employees. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees/Archaks/Sebaits/ employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of 'fences eating the crops' should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of Courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation. 28. In the instant case, the land in question has been gifted by the Raja of Guler to the temple in question and not to the Mahant or Mohtmim. Public at large offers prayers at the temple without obstruction. The revenue entries suggest that ownership of the land is with Mandir (temple). The beneficiaries are public at large. The money has been raised for the purchase of land from the funds made available by way of award made under the Land Acquisition Act after the temple submerged in the Pong Dam. 29. Consequently, it is held that the temple in question is a 'public temple' and not a 'private temple' and has rightly been included in Schedule-1 of the Act. The notification issued under Section 29 (1) of the Act- is not vitiated only for the reason that it has not been laid before the Legislative Assembly. 29. Consequently, it is held that the temple in question is a 'public temple' and not a 'private temple' and has rightly been included in Schedule-1 of the Act. The notification issued under Section 29 (1) of the Act- is not vitiated only for the reason that it has not been laid before the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not assailed the validity and legality of the notification issued under Section 29 (2) of the Act. The suit for injunction is not maintainable as the Plaintiff is out of possession and the Defendants cannot be restrained from taking any action. Orders dated 19.1.1989 issued by Defendant No. 2 also supports that the management has already taken over as per the attestation of mutation. 30. Accordingly, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in the Regular Second Appeal and' the same is dismissed. No costs.