ORDER Arali Nagaraj, J : These five Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by the same petitioner viz., the Deputy Commissioner and District Election Officer, Bellary, who is the informant in C.C.Nos. 586, 589, 591, 593 and 594 of 2008 pending on the file of the learned I Additional JMFC, Bellary (hereinafter referred to as "Trial Court" for short), challenging the legality and correctness of the Common Order dated 05.06.2010 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary (hereinafter referred to as "Revisional Court" for short) in Crl. R.P. Nos. 137 to 141 of2009 allowing the said revision petitions and thereby reversing the orders dated 29.08.2009 passed by the Trial Court in the said Criminal Cases. Common question of law is involved in all these petitions. Therefore, they are disposed of by this Common Order. 2. The Trial Court, by its order dated 29.08.2009 passed in the said respective Criminal Cases, allowed the memo dated 03.08.2009 filed by the petitioner informant seeking its permission to submit his arguments opposing the application that was filed by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor under Section 321 Cr.P.C. (hereinafter referred to as "APP" for short) in each of the said cases, seeking consent of the Trial Court for withdrawal of the said cases launched against the respective accused therein, holding that the petitioner-informant has 'locus standi' to oppose the said applications filed by the learned APP. 3. Aggrieved by the said orders of the Trial Court, the prosecution (respondent State herein) filed the said Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 137. to 141 of 2009 before the Revisional Court. By its Common Order dated 05.06.2010, the Revisional Court allowed all the said revision petitions and set aside the orders of the learned Trial Court impugned therein holding that the petitioner-informant has no 'locus standi' to oppose the said applications filed by the learned APP under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the said Common Order of the Revisional Court, the present petitions are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 4. The petitioner herein, who is the informant in the said cases, filed his complaint before the SHO, Cowl Bazaar P.S. in Bellary City against' the respective accused for the offences under Section 171E of IPC and under Section 3 of Karnataka Open Spaces (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981. The petitioner herein, who is the informant in the said cases, filed his complaint before the SHO, Cowl Bazaar P.S. in Bellary City against' the respective accused for the offences under Section 171E of IPC and under Section 3 of Karnataka Open Spaces (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed in the said Criminal Cases for the said offences against the respective accused therein. 5. Before the plea of the accused could be recorded in the said cases, the learned APP filed his application dated 17.07.2009 under Section 321 Cr.P.C. in each of the said cases seeking consent of the Trial Court for withdrawal of the said cases from prosecution. 6. Thereafter, on 03.08.2009, the petitioner, who is the informant in all the said cases, filed his memo in each case seeking permission of the Trial Court to submit his arguments and also to produce documents in support of his arguments opposing the said application of the prosecution. That memo was seriously opposed by the learned APP and also by the respective accused therein on the ground that the petitioner, though informant in the said cases, who set the criminal law in motion, has no 'locus standi' to oppose the said withdrawal applications. 7. Since the very locus of the petitioner-informant in opposing the withdrawal applications was seriously questioned, the Trial Court heard the arguments of both the sides on the question of locus of the petitioner informant and then, by its order dated 29.08.2009, passed in each of the said Criminal Cases, held that the petitioner-informant has 'locus standi' to oppose the said applications. The Revisional Court, in Criminal Revision Petitions that were filed by the prosecution, took contrary view, allowed the said revisions and thereby set aside the orders of the Trial Court impugned therein. , 8. I have heard the arguments of Shri. Krishna S. Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner-informant; Shriyuths K.M. Nataraj, the learned Additional Advocate General, (hereinafter referred to as "AAG" for short) Shri K.B. Adhyapak, the learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent - State and Shri Ravishankar, the learned Counsel for the respondents accused in all these petitions. Perused both the orders of the Trial Court and the Revisional Court. 9. Perused both the orders of the Trial Court and the Revisional Court. 9. Having heard both the sides, the only point that arises for my consideration in all these petitions is: Whether the informant in the said Criminal Cases (Petitioner " herein), who set the criminal law in motion by lodging first information against the accused therein, has 'locus standi' to oppose the application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor in each of the said Criminal Cases seeking consent of the Trial Court for withdrawal of the said Cases? . 10. In all the said revision petitions, the respondent therein (the petitioner herein) contended that the orders of the learned Trial Court, impugned in the said revisions, were 'interlocutory orders' and therefore, the respective criminal revisions challenging the correctness of the said orders were not maintainable. In view of that contention, the Revisional Court raised point No.2 for its consideration which reads as: "Whether the order passed by the learned Magistrate is interlocutory order which bars the jurisdiction to interfere over the order under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C." After hearing both the parties on the said point, the Revisional Court answered it in the 'negative' holding that the said orders could not be termed as 'interlocutory orders' so as to bar revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. This finding of the Revisional Court is not challenged by Sri. Krishna S. Dixit, the learned Counsel for the petitioner herein, during his arguments in these petitions. Therefore, I need no consider the correctness or otherwise of the finding recorded by the Revisional Court on the said point. 11. Krishna S. Dixit, the learned Counsel for the petitioner herein, during his arguments in these petitions. Therefore, I need no consider the correctness or otherwise of the finding recorded by the Revisional Court on the said point. 11. Shri Krishna S. Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner-informant, placing his strong reliance on several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts, contended that the petitioner herein, being the Deputy Commissioner and District Election Officer, assigned with the duties of holding elections to the Legislative Assembly Constituencies in Bellary District lodged information before the police concerned alleging that the respective accused in the said cases committed the offences under Section 171E IPC and under Section 3 of the Karnataka Open Spaces (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981 and, on the basis of the said information, the police registered the crimes against the respective accused, conducted investigation and filed charge-sheets against tl1em in the said Criminal Cases for the respective offences and therefore, the petitioner has 'locus standi' to oppose the applications; filed by the learned APP under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. seeking consent of the Trial Court for withdrawal of the said cases from prosecution, by placing before the Trial Court, the relevant material showing that the said applications deserve to be rejected. He further contended that, though there is no specific provision in Cr.P.C., giving the informant in a criminal case a right of audience for opposing the withdrawal application filed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. by the learned APP/Senior APPI Public Prosecutor, in the interest of justice, the informant deserves an opportunity of being heard on the question giving consent by the Court for withdrawal of the case. He further contended that since there is no provision in Cr.P.C. prohibiting such right of audience to the informant, natural justice requires that an opportunity to oppose the withdrawal application shall be given to the informant who sets the criminal law in motion by lodging information before the police. 12. 'Per Contra, Shri K.M. Nataraj, the learned Additional Advocate General (AAG), strongly contended that once the cognizance of an offence is taken by the Trial Court, the informant will have no say in conducting of the criminal case at various stages and therefore, the petitioner, though informant, has no locus standi to oppose the said applications filed by the learned APP seeking withdrawal of the said cases. He further contended that, the question whether or not to give for withdrawal' would be between the prosecution represented by the learned APP and the Court, a third person, though informant, or any of the Charge-sheet witnesses, despite being victim of the Crime, cannot be given any opportunity of being heard in the matter and therefore, the Revisional Court has rightly reversed the orders of the Trial Court holding that the petitioner - informant has no locus standi to oppose the said applications, hence the Common Order of the Revisional Court does not call for any interference in these petitions. He further contended that, in the entire scheme of the provisions in the Code of the Criminal Procedure there is no provision providing for any right of audience to the informant either while considering an application under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. for withdrawal from prosecution, or at any stage of the case after cognizance of the offence is taken. He further contended that if such an opportunity is given to a third person either on the ground that he is informant or on the ground that he is victim of the crime or charge-sheet witness, it amounts to interference by the third party in the 'proceedings of the case and therefore the petitioner herein, though informant, cannot be heard in the matter of withdrawal of the said cases. He has relied upon as many as 30 decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts in support of his contentions. 13. It is not in dispute that the petitioner herein has been the informant in all the said cases and that it is on the basis of the information lodged by him before the police concerned, criminal law came to be set in motion, investigation was conducted and ultimately charge-sheet came to be placed by the said police in all the said criminal cases against the respective accused therein for the respective offences. 14. Since only the question of ' locus standi' of the informant to oppose the application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. in the respective Criminal Cases is involved in all these petitions. 14. Since only the question of ' locus standi' of the informant to oppose the application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. in the respective Criminal Cases is involved in all these petitions. I need not advert to the facts constituting the offences for which the accused therein are charge-sheeted; the merits or demerits of the applications that are filed by the prosecution through the learned APP under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. Further, I need not also consider the authority of the learned APP to file the applications under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. and the power of the Trial Court in either giving or declining to give consent for withdrawal of the said Criminal cases from prosecution. Therefore, I have to focus only on the question' whether the petitioner herein, being the informant in all the said criminal cases, has 'Locus Standi' to oppose the said withdrawal applications. 15. Learned AAG, placing strong reliance on several decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, strongly supported the view taken by the Revisional Court that the petitioner-informant has no locus standi to oppose the said applications for withdrawal. 16. In AIR 1924 Patna 283 (DB) (Gulli Bhagat Vs. Narain Singh, first of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, it is held that Section 494 (old Code), gives the Trial Court full jurisdiction to give or refuse consent . and that the High Court will only interfere in revision if some question of jurisdiction is involved. It is further observed therein that the private prosecutor has no position at all in the litigation; the Crown is the prosecutor and the custodian of the public peace and if it decides to let an offender go, no other aggrieved party can be heard to object on the ground that he has not taken his full toll of private vengeance. It is further observed: "If, therefore, in the present case, the Court has allowed the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case upon insufficient or improper grounds, the Local Government is the only authority who can take action for the correction of that error." 17. Suffice it to say that the above observations of the High Court of Patna do not, in any way, relate to the 'right of audience' claimed by the petitioner-informant while deciding the question' of consent for withdrawal of the criminal case. 18. Suffice it to say that the above observations of the High Court of Patna do not, in any way, relate to the 'right of audience' claimed by the petitioner-informant while deciding the question' of consent for withdrawal of the criminal case. 18. Second of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR (39) 1952 Rajasthan 42 (C.N. 20) (Amar Narian Mathur Vs. The State of Rajasthan and others). In the said case before the High Court of Rajasthan, the 'right of private party to apply in revision' was involved. On that question, the High Court held that private party has no locus standi to apply in revision against the order passed under Section 494 of Cr.P.C. (old Code). This view of the Rajasthan High Court is quite contrary to the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in 1999 Crl.L.J 3566 (M. Balakrishna Reddy Vs. Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others), which is also relied upon by the learned AAG and which according to him, is equally relevant decision to be considered by this Court. In the said decision, High Court of Andhra Pradesh has taken the view that 'even a third party can approach the High Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C invoking revisiona.1jurisdiction and challenge the order giving consent to withdraw the case'. Besides this, the locus of the informant to oppose the application for withdrawal filed by the prosecution was not involved in the said case before High Court of Rajastan, Therefore, the observations of High Court of Rajastan in the said case, are also of no help to the respondent-State. 19. Third decision relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1980 SC 1510 (A) (Manohar Lal Vs. Bansi Lal and Others). In the said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question that fell for consideration was, 'whether the Committing Magistrate is competent to given consent to withdraw the case from prosecution despite the case being triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. Therefore, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at para No.7 therein, as under: "Para 7. There is no warrant for thinking that only the Court competent to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provisions of the Code can exercise the power under Section 321, Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at para No.7 therein, as under: "Para 7. There is no warrant for thinking that only the Court competent to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provisions of the Code can exercise the power under Section 321, Criminal Procedure Code. The power conferred by Section 321 is itself a special power conferred on the Court before whom a prosecution is pending and the exercise of the power is not made dependent upon the power is not made dependent upon the power is not made dependent upon the power of the Court to acquit or discharge the accused under some other provision of the Code. The power to discharge or acquit the accused under S. 321 is a special power founded• on S. 321 itself, to be exercised by the Court independently of its power of enquiry into the offence or to try the accused. Again, the expression "judgment" in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be committed to a Court of Session." Since the question of locus of the informant' in opposing the application for withdrawal was not considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision, the above proposition is also of no help to the respondent State. 20. Fourth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is 1991 Crl.L.J. 3211 (Kerala High Court) (Saramma Peter and others Vs. State of Kerala). In the said case before the High Court of Kerala, 'an application for withdrawal was filed by the complainant, but not by the prosecutor'. Therefore, the High Court of Kerala held that it was only the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor. in-charge of the prosecution, who could file an application under Section 321 of Cr. P.C. for withdrawal of the case and this power cannot be subject to the wishes of a third person even though he might be interested directly in the case. But it is not the case of the prosecution in the instant cases, that the informant himself filed the application for such withdrawal. P.C. for withdrawal of the case and this power cannot be subject to the wishes of a third person even though he might be interested directly in the case. But it is not the case of the prosecution in the instant cases, that the informant himself filed the application for such withdrawal. It is not laid down in the said decision that the informant has no locus standi to oppose an application filed by the prosecution under Section 321 CrP.C. Therefore, the said decision of the High Court of Kerala is also totally inapplicable to the present cases. 21. Fifth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Balakrishna Reddy and others Vs. Principal Secretary to Government, Home Dept. and others reported in 1999 Cri.L.J. 3566. The question that was considered in the said case was, 'whether a third party could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court'. Therefore, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that ever a third party can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court and even if a third patty does not bring a matter to the notice of the High Court, still the High.-Court will have 'suo motu' power to call for and examine the records of any proceedings. It is further held that this power is not only available to the High Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (Section 435 in old Code), but also available to the High Court in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Suffice it to say that the said proposition cannot be made applicable to the present cases in considering the locus of the petitioner-informant to oppose the withdrawal applications. 22. Sixth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is 2004 Crl.L.J. 747 (Delhi High Court) (Kiran chowdhary Vs. State). The facts of the said case were: "workers of two rival political parties were indulged in riotous conduct by pelting stones and damaging each other's vehicles. Therefore, the accused were charge-sheeted in the said case. Trail was not yet commenced in spite of lapse often years. At that stage, the prosecution was sought to be withdrawn. Consent was also given. The latter was taken to the High Court. Therefore, the accused were charge-sheeted in the said case. Trail was not yet commenced in spite of lapse often years. At that stage, the prosecution was sought to be withdrawn. Consent was also given. The latter was taken to the High Court. "On these facts, while considering the merits of the said application, legality and correctness of the order giving Consent for withdrawal, the High Court held that if withdrawal was not allowed it could perpetuate enmity between two rival groups instead of maintaining peace and restoring cordial relationship in the locality. The question of locus of the informant to oppose the withdrawal application was not considered by the High Court. Therefore, this decision is also of no help to the respondent-State. 23. Seventh of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is 2003 Crl.L.J. 2894 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) (K. V. V. Krishna Rao Vs. The State of A.P. and Others). Para No. 23 in the said judgment, on which reliance is placed by the learned MG, reads as under: "Para.23. The other contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is entitled to notice and since no notice were given before issuing the impugned G.O. the same liable to be set aside. AB already noticed, no notice is contemplated under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. However, it cannot be understood that he cannot challenge the G.O. provided he could establish that there are gross violations of the conditions prescribed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. As already pointed out, in the instant case, there are no such violations. Hence, this contention also merits ~ejection." From the above observations, it is clear that it was the contention of the petitioner therein that no notice was given to him before the impugned G.O. for withdrawal of the case from prosecution was given and therefore, the Court made the above observations are also not applicable to the facts of the instant cases. 24. Eighth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1996 SC 911 (C) (Thakur Ram and others Vs. The State of Bihar). The learned AAG has placed strong reliance on Head Note (C) therein which reads as under: "(C) Criminal P.C. (5 of 1898), Section 435 Revision-Scope-whether private party can invoke jurisdiction under section. 24. Eighth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1996 SC 911 (C) (Thakur Ram and others Vs. The State of Bihar). The learned AAG has placed strong reliance on Head Note (C) therein which reads as under: "(C) Criminal P.C. (5 of 1898), Section 435 Revision-Scope-whether private party can invoke jurisdiction under section. In a case which has proceeded on a police report a private party has no locus standi No doubt, the terms of Section 435 (old code) are very wide and he can even take up the matter suo motu. The criminal law is not, however, to be used as an instrument of wrecking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against the person who, according to that party, had caused injury to it. Barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book." (Para 9) [Emphasis supplied} From the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the question, 'whether a private party can invoke revisional jurisdiction, under Section 435 of old Code,' was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the said question, the Supreme Court made the above observations. This being so, the above observations are totally inapplicable to the facts of the present cases inasmuch as the learned AAG has not been able to convince this Court as to how the petitioner herein, who is none other than the Deputy Commissioner and District Election Officer, a public servant discharging his duties as Election Officer under the Election Commission of India, a Constitutional Functionary could have any private vengeance against the accused in the said cases. 25. In Ninth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, i.e., in AIR 1957 SC 389 (The State of Bihar Vs. Ram Naresh Pandey and another) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Section 494 (old Code) is enabling one and vests in the Public Prosecutor the discretion to apply to the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any permit. Ram Naresh Pandey and another) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Section 494 (old Code) is enabling one and vests in the Public Prosecutor the discretion to apply to the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any permit. It is further observed that the function of the Court in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial function; it follows that in granting consent the Court must exercise a judicial discretion. It is also observed in the said decision that Public Prosecutor, though an executive officer, is, in a larger sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. These observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court do not, in any way, indicate whether the informant in a criminal case, who sets criminal law in motion, has locus to oppose the application for withdrawal of the case. Therefore, in my considered view, these observations are also of no help to the respondent-State. 26. In tenth of the decisions i.e., in AIR 1977 SC 2265 (Balwant Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar) relied upon by the learned AAG, the question 'when the prosecution can be withdrawn and the facts to be considered while dealing with such applications', fell for its consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. I have gone through para No.2 in the said decision which the learned AAG persuaded me to consider, I do not find any observation, in the said para, as to the question of locus of informant in opposing the application for withdrawal. Further, in eleventh of the decisions i.e., in AIR 1980 SC 423 (Sub hash Chander Vs. The State (Chand Admn.) and others) relied upon by the learned AAG also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not considered this aspect of the case though it has held that withdrawal of prosecution is within the exclusive powers of the Public Prosecutor and that his decision must be independent and not in obedience to directions from District Magistrate or higher authorities. The question of locus of the informant to oppose such application was not considered and decided in, the said case. Therefore, I am of the considered view that both these decisions cannot be made applicable to the instant cases. 27. The question of locus of the informant to oppose such application was not considered and decided in, the said case. Therefore, I am of the considered view that both these decisions cannot be made applicable to the instant cases. 27. Twelfth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is 2006 Law Suit (SC) 815 (Ghanshyam Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh). At para No. 11, on which strong reliance is placed by the learned AAG, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "Para 11. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot " ender that discretion to anyone. The Public Prosecutor may Withdraw from the prosecution no merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant factors as well in order to further the broad ends of justice, public order, peace and tranquility. The High Court while deciding the revision petition clearly observed that the material already available on record was insufficient to warrant conviction. The flow of facts and the possible result thereof as noticed by the Public Prosecutor and appreciated by the Courts below, constituted the public interest in the withdrawal of the said prosecution. The High Court clearly Came to the conclusion that the application for withdrawal of the prosecution and grant of consent were not based on extraneous considerations." [Emphasis supplied by me] From the above observation, it is clear that while considering the merits of the application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. seeking withdrawal from prosecution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the said observation and, ultimately, held that the said application for withdrawal of the prosecution and grant of consent were not based on extraneous considerations. Therefore, I am of the view that the above observations also are in applicable to the present cases. 28. In 2006 Crl.L.J. 148 (S.K. Shukha and Others Vs, State of U.P. and Others), the 13th of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in the matter of withdrawal from prosecution, the Public Prosecutor cannot act like a post box or act on the dictate of the State Governments. Therefore, the said decision is also in applicable to the present cases. Similarly, the 14th of the decisions relied Upon by the AAG i.e., AIR 2008 SC 961 (Vijaykumar Baldev Mishra @ Sharma Vs. Therefore, the said decision is also in applicable to the present cases. Similarly, the 14th of the decisions relied Upon by the AAG i.e., AIR 2008 SC 961 (Vijaykumar Baldev Mishra @ Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra), wherein refusal of consent was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is also not applicable to the present cases, 29. Fifteenth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 2004 SC 4674: (2004) 7 SCC 338 (Adalat Prasad Vs. Rooplal Jindal and others). In the said case, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question was, "whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction to review his order issuing process passed by him pursuant to taking cognizance of the offence". While considering the said question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: After taking cognizance of the complaint and examining the complainant and the witnesses if Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint, he can issue process by way of summons under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is, the satisfaction of the Magistrate, either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under Section 202, that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint to issue process under Section 204 of Code. .........It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provision of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Proceeded Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate Criminal Courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of Code." 30. Placing reliance on this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned AAG strongly contended that if the Magistrate affords an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-informant to oppose the application of the prosecution for withdrawal, it amounts to exercise of inherent 'powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which are not vested in the Subordinate ate criminal Courts. Placing reliance on this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned AAG strongly contended that if the Magistrate affords an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-informant to oppose the application of the prosecution for withdrawal, it amounts to exercise of inherent 'powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which are not vested in the Subordinate ate criminal Courts. I am not able to accept this contention for the reason that passing of an order by the Magistrate recalling his earlier order under Section 204 Cr.P.C issuing process against the accused, cannot be equated with the giving of an opportunity to the informant to submit his say in the matter of withdrawal from prosecution. Therefore I am of the considered view that this decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court also has no application to the instant cases. 31. Sixteenth of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1993 SC 1082 (C) = 1993 AIR SCW 423 (Union of Indian and Another. Vs. W.N. Chandha). The learned AAG has placed his strong reliance on Head Note (C) in the said decision, which reads as under: "(C) Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), Section 157 - Investigation Investigating agency collecting material for ascertaining whether prima facie case is made out - Accused not entitled to opportunity of hearing at that stage - Cr.P.C. itself provides for giving hearing to accused under specified circumstances - But no under Chap. XII of the Code. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at para Nos. 95 and 98 of its judgment in the said case as under: "Para. 95. It is relevant and significant to note that a police officer, in charge of a police station, or a police officer making an investigation can make and search or cause search to be made for the reasons to be recorded without any warrant from the Court or without giving the prior notice to anyone or any opportunity of being heard. The basic objective of such a course is to preserve secrecy in the mode of investigation lest the valuable evidence to he unearthed will be either destroyed or lost. The basic objective of such a course is to preserve secrecy in the mode of investigation lest the valuable evidence to he unearthed will be either destroyed or lost. We, think it unnecessary to make a detailed examination on this aspect except saying that an accused cannot claim any right of prior notice or opportunity of being heard inclusive of his arrest or search of his residence or Seizure of any property in his possession connected with the crime unless otherwise provided under the law". "Para 98: If prior notice an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation as lifeless, absurd and self-defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary." 32. It is clear from the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court that they pertain to the right of the accused to interfere with investigation of a criminal case at its various stages. Therefore, the said observations cannot be applied to the instant cases. 33. In 2004 Cr1.1.J. 4272 (Tulsamma Vs. Jagannath and others), the 17th of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, this Court held: There is, absolutely, no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure 3mpowering the Magistrate to review or recall the order passed by him. The Code of Criminal Procedure does contain provision for inherent powers namely Section 482, which, however confer these powers on the High Court alone, The subordinate criminal Courts have no inherent powers. Under these Circumstances, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint". Further, in (1997) 1 SCC 361 (Randhir Singh Rana Vs. State (Delhi Administration) and also in (2009) 6 SCC 332 (Mithabhai Pashabhai Patil and Others Vs. State of Gujarat) the 18th and 19th of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, the Hon'ble Sl1preme Court has held that inherent powers under Section 482 of Code are to be exercised by High Court only and subordinate Courts have no such powers. State of Gujarat) the 18th and 19th of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, the Hon'ble Sl1preme Court has held that inherent powers under Section 482 of Code are to be exercised by High Court only and subordinate Courts have no such powers. In any of these three decisions, the question of locus of the informant in opposing the application for withdrawal from prosecution is considered. Therefore, none of these three decisions is applicable to the present-cases. 34. Yet another decision 20th relied upon by the learned AAG is 1963 SC 1430 (A) (Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prakash Chandra Bose Alias Chabi Bose and Another). Head Note (A) in the said case, on which strong reliance is placed by the learned AAG, reads as under: (A) "Criminal P.C. (5 of 1898), Section 202 - Issue of Pricess - Preliminary enquiry into complaint - Position of accused - Accused how far can take part in enquiry before issue of process. The entire scheme of Ch., XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that an accused person does not come into the picture at all tilt process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a Counselor agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that he cannot go. AIR 1960 SC 1113 , Ref. to. But beyond that he cannot go. AIR 1960 SC 1113 , Ref. to. (Para 7) (Emphasis supplied by me) No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section 202, Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinized carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out-what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book: a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under Section 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the Legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part an enquiry. (Para 7) (Emphasis supplied by me) Where two persons who were associates of the accused were examined as Court witnesses on the suggestion of the accused who was permitted to appear through Counsel at the enquiry, the enquiry held by the Magistrate is vitiated. (Para 7) 35. Relying on the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case, learned AAG strongly contended that since there is no provision in Cr.P.C. giving right of ordinance to the informant while considering the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C., if the Magistrate gives the informant such rights that would be outside the scheme of Cr.P.C. and hence the same is not permissible. It is pertinent to note that in the said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court when the Magistrate proceeded to hold enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. on the complaint that was filed before him under Section 200 Cr.P.C he had examined his Court witnesses, two persons who were associate of the accused and that the said persons were so examined at the instance of the accused and therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that at this stage of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. accused will have no right either to cross-examine on behalf and hence the enquiry held by the Magistrate was vitiated. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that giving an opportunity to the informant to oppose the application filed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. by the prosecutor seeking withdr8.wal of the case from the prosecution cannot be equated with the permitting of the accused to participate in the proceedings before issuing process against him at the stage of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Therefore. I am of the considered opinion that the proposition laid down• by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case has no application to the facts of the present case. 36. In (2000) 10 SCC 237 (A) (Abhilasha and another Vs. State of Rajasthan and others), 21st of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the informant may assist the Public Prosecutor but he cannot, as of right, claim to pursue the trial. In the instant cases, it is not the claim of the petitioner-informant that he be, permitted to pursue the trial in the said cases; but his claim is only for an opportunity to oppose the withdrawal applications filed by the learned APP on behalf of the State. This being so, this being so, this decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court is also inapplicable to the instant cases. 37. 22nd of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1998 SC 990 = 1998 AIR SCW 757 (Kishan Swaroop Vs. Gout. of NCT of Delhi). This being so, this being so, this decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court is also inapplicable to the instant cases. 37. 22nd of the decisions relied upon by the learned AAG is AIR 1998 SC 990 = 1998 AIR SCW 757 (Kishan Swaroop Vs. Gout. of NCT of Delhi). The relevant Head Note and para No.3 on which strong reliance is placed by the learned AAG read as under: "Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), Sections 378, S.401 - Appeal Revision - Appea1J Revision against acquittal - Locus standi Private party has no right to file in a case instituted upon a police report - Formal permission of public prosecutor would not entitle him to such right." Para 3: "From the impugned judgment we find that the High Court has referred to the provisions of Sections 378 and 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to conclude that it was the primary responsibility of the State to file appeal/revision and therefore no criminal revision in respect of an order which is appealable at the instance of the State could/should be entertained without the requisite permission of the Public Prosecutor. In drawing the above inference the High Court failed to notice that if the Code of Criminal Procedure did not empower a private party to file a revision petition against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted on a police report a formal permission of Public Prosecutor would not entitle him to do so. To put it differently, a Public Prosecutor cannot vest a private party with a right which it has not got under the Code." [Emphasis supplied] From the above observations of the Supreme Court in the said case, it could be seen that though the State was to file an appeal revision, against an order of acquittal, it did not file, on the other hand, a revision was filed by the private party against the order of acquittal passed in the case that was instituted on police report, and therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the above observations holding that the private party could not maintain the revision. This being so, it is needless to say that the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are not applicable to the instant petitions in deciding the question of 'Locus Standi' of the petitioner informant to oppose the said withdrawal applications. 38. This being so, it is needless to say that the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are not applicable to the instant petitions in deciding the question of 'Locus Standi' of the petitioner informant to oppose the said withdrawal applications. 38. Learned AAG placing his strong reliance on the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court at various paragraphs in the majority and minority views in the case of Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in AIR 1983 SC 194 , vehemently contended that, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case, a private person or even the informant in a criminal case has no locus standi to oppose the application for withdrawal filed by the learned APP. 39. Per contra, Shri Krishna S. Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the" questions that were raised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for its consideration at various paragraphs in the said judgment, strongly contended that the majority view in the said case does not reveal that the 'question of locus' of the appellant Sheonandan Paswan was agitated before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Supreme Court recorded its decision thereon to the effect that the said appellant did not have locus to oppose the application for withdrawal of the criminal cases that was filed by the prosecution and therefore, no law is laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case on the question of locus of an informant in a criminal case in opposing the application for withdrawal of the case. 40. I have read the entire judb'1llent in the said case between the lines. The facts in the said case as could be gathered from majority view per Baharul Islam; J at para Nos. 36, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48 of the judgment ( AIR 1983 SC 194 ) are as under: (a) The appellant therein viz., Sheonandan Paswan was a Member of Bihar Legislative Assembly and he was elected as such from Lok Dal party. In 1972, respondent No.2 Viz., Dr. Jagannath Mishra, became Minister for Co-operation and Agriculture. During June 1974, Sub-Divisional Co-operative Audit Officer, Patna, submitted his report of the Bank in respect of the year 1972-73 alleging number of irregularities in the affairs of the Bank. In 1972, respondent No.2 Viz., Dr. Jagannath Mishra, became Minister for Co-operation and Agriculture. During June 1974, Sub-Divisional Co-operative Audit Officer, Patna, submitted his report of the Bank in respect of the year 1972-73 alleging number of irregularities in the affairs of the Bank. On the- basis of the said report, the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Audit Department, recommended legal action against the Directors of the Bank. (b) After having obtained sanction of the Governor, a criminal case was instituted on 01.02.1978 by the Vigilance Police and on 19.02.1978 a charge-sheet was submitted against the respondents therein and others. On the said charge-sheet, on 21.11.1979, the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Special Judge, Patna, took cognizance (c) Shortly, thereafter, there was a change in the Government of Bihar and 2nd respondent became the Chief Minister again. Then the Government took a policy decision that criminal cases launched "out of political vendetta" in 1978-79 and scam relating to political agitation be withdrawn. Accordingly, the Government appointed on Shri. L.P. Sinha as Special Public Prosecutor along with 3 others sand during June 1981, the said L.P. Sinha filed an application under Section 321 of the Code seeking withdrawal of the case. The learned Special Judge passed his impugned order dated 20.06.1981 giving consent for withdrawal of the cases. (d) Before the said impugned order, giving consent for withdrawal, could be passed, the appellant Sheonandan Paswan filed an application under Section 300(2) of Cr.P.C. The learned Special Judge held that the appellant had no locus standi in the matter. Then the appellant filed criminal revision petition before the High Court and, after hearing the appellant, the High Court, by its order dated 14..09.1981, rejected the revision petition and confirmed the order of withdrawal passed by the learned Special Judge. Therefore, the appellant Sheonandan Paswan approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing his appeal by special leave challenging the correctness of the order of the High Court. 41. At para No. 48 of the judgment (majority view) the three questions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant therein and three other questions raised by the learned Solicitor General appearing for respondent No.1 State of Bihar, are stated. 41. At para No. 48 of the judgment (majority view) the three questions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant therein and three other questions raised by the learned Solicitor General appearing for respondent No.1 State of Bihar, are stated. They read as under: "Para 48: Shri Venugopal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant formulated three points before us: (1) That the permission accorded by the Special Judge to withdraw the case in question was contrary to a series of decisions of this Court and is unsustainable. (2) That Shri L.P. Sinha who had made the application under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case. (3) That in the facts and circumstances of the case. Shri Prasaran, learned Solicitor General, appearing for respondent No.1, the State of Bihar, on the other hand, submitted. (1) that the institution of the case was the result of political vendetta and the vendetta had vitiated the investigation of the case. (2) that Shri. L.P. Sinha was the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case and was competent to make the application under Section 321 of the Code and that his appointment cannot be collaterally challenged; and (3) that the impugned order of the Special, Judge was legally valid. " 42. On plain reading of the above three points that were formulated by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the other three points formulated by the learned Solicitor General appearing for the 1st respondent-State, it could be seen that the question of 'locus standi' of the appellant Sheonandan Paswan in opposing the application that was filed under Section 321 by the State seeking consent for withdrawal of the case or his 'locus standi' before the High Court to challenge the correctness of the order passed by the learned Special Judge giving consent for withdrawal of his 'locus' before the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the correctness of the order passed by the High Court in revision was not raised for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 43. The 1st point has been considered at para Nos. 49 and 50, the 2nd and 3rd points have been considered respectively at para Nos. 52 and No. 58 of the judgment. At para Nos. 43. The 1st point has been considered at para Nos. 49 and 50, the 2nd and 3rd points have been considered respectively at para Nos. 52 and No. 58 of the judgment. At para Nos. 59 and 61, his Lordship has considered additional ground that was raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant therein and recorded findings thereon. Para Nos. 59 and 61 read ad under: "Para 59: The only other submission of the appellant is that there is a prima facie case for trial by the Special Judge and that this Court should send it back to him for trial." "Para 61: Although it does not arise out of the three points formulated by Mr. Venugopal at the start of his argument nor does it arise out of the appellant's petition opposing withdrawal, learned Counsel submitted that there was a prima facie case for trial by the Special Judge and the case should be remanded to him for trial. Let us examine that aspect also as it has been argued at length." [Emphasis Supplied] 44. Further, para No. 62 of the judgment, Baharul Islam, J (majority view) reads as under: "Para 62. Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to mention that in his application before the Special Judge, the appellant did not find fault with any of the grounds of withdrawal in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321. His only Contention was that an attempt was being made by the Public Prosecutor to scuttle the case and that the Court should apply its independent mind before according consent to the withdrawal and that he should be heard in the matter." [Emphasis Supplied] The above observations of His Lordship Bahrul Islam, J clearly go to show that the appellant Sheonandan Paswan was permitted by the learned Special Judge to file his application and also to submit his arguments by taking relevant contentions opposing the application for withdrawal. In other words, the learned Special Judge gave the appellant opportunity to file his application also to submit his oral arguments urging various grounds opposing the withdrawal application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. by the prosecution in the said case seeking consent for withdrawal of the said case. His Lordship, has not observed, at any of the paragraph Nos. In other words, the learned Special Judge gave the appellant opportunity to file his application also to submit his oral arguments urging various grounds opposing the withdrawal application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. by the prosecution in the said case seeking consent for withdrawal of the said case. His Lordship, has not observed, at any of the paragraph Nos. 49 to 62 of his Judgment, that the appellant Sheonandan Paswan had no locus before the learned Special Judge and he could not have been given a right of audience for opposing the withdrawal application. 45. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Misra has observed in his Judgment (majority view) at paragraph No. 72 as: "the application was opposed on variety of grounds by the appellant which I shall deal with in the latter part of the judgment in detail". These observations also clearly go to show that the appellant, who was a third person before the learned Special Judge (Trial Court), had opposed application for withdrawal and he was given opportunity to file application and to submit his arguments opposing the withdrawal application. His Lordship also has not observed in his judgment that the appellant therein should not have been given right of audience by the learned Special Judge opposing the application of the prosecution filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. 46. During the course of his arguments, when asked by this Court as to in which of the paragraphs of the said judgment, either majority view or minority view, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down law as to the 'locus standi' of the informant in a criminal case in opposing the application for withdrawal of the case, the learned AAG could not point at any relevant paragraph in the entire judgment. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the majority judgment in the case of Shenonandan Paswan Vs. The State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 SC 194 ), no law is laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the informant in a criminal case has no 'Locus Standi' to oppose the application filed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. seeking consent of the Court for its withdrawal. 47. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. R. Balakrishna Pillai and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 436 is relied upon by the learned AAG and also by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 47. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. R. Balakrishna Pillai and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 436 is relied upon by the learned AAG and also by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. If para No. 12 of the said judgment is relied upon by the learned AAG, para no. 9 it is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Para No. 12 reads as under: "Para 12. The above are the only material portions of the order of the High Court which would indicate that the High Court which would indicate that the High Court missed the true import of the scope of the matter before it. The High Court went into grounds which were not even urged by the Special Public Prosecutor in his application made under Section 321, Cr.P.C. or otherwise before the learned Special Judge. It delved into administrative files of the State which did not form part of the record of the case and accepted anything which was suggested on behalf of the State Government overlooking the fact that for the purpose of Section 321, Cr.P.C., it is the opinion of the Public Prosecutor alone which is material and the ground on which he' seeks permission of the Court for withdrawal of the prosecution has alone to be examined. It is on account of this palpable error and due to the lack of proper perception of the nature and scope of the High Court not only set aside the well-reasoned and justified order of the learned Special Judge but also proceeded to add that the "Competent Authority will consider whether the prosecution should be continued against any or all of the accused. "We are informed that encouraged by this further, needless and unwarranted observation of the High "Court, steps dare being taken by the State Government for withdrawal of the prosecution against other accused person also. It is sufficient to observe that all consequential steps taken pursuant to any such observations in the impugned order of the High Court also fall automatically on the setting aside of the High Court's order." On careful reading of the above observations of the Supreme Court, it could be seen that they do not pertain to the locus of the informant in opposing the withdrawal application. 48. 48. Relevant portion of para No, 9 in the said judgment ( AIR 1995 SC 436 ) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reads as under: Para 9. "The High Court also took the view that the Leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly, who had appeared to oppose the withdrawal of prosecution, had no locus standi in the matter. We need not go into the question of locus because no learned Counsel appearing before us disputed that the appellant who is an acknowledge public figure of the State has sufficient locus in this matter." [Emphasis supplied] 49. The above observation of the Hon'ble supreme Court in the said decision, which came to be rendered after about nearly eight years of its pronouncement in the case of Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1987 SC 877 ), clearly goes to show that the appellant therein had appeared before the Trial Court to oppose the withdrawal application and the Trial Court had given him opportunity of being heard in the matter. Though the High Court had taken the view that the appellant had no locus in the matter, the learned Counsel appearing for the parties before the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not dispute the locus of the appellant before the Trial Court. This observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court supports the contention of the petitioner-informant that he has locus' before the learned Magistrate to oppose the withdrawal application. In other words, the petitioner-informant has right to be heard in the matter of giving consent for withdrawal of, the said case. 50. Yet another decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the, petitioner is that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. J.K. International Vs. State of Government of NCT of Delhi and, others reported, in AIR 2001 SC 1142 . It is observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court at para Nos. 8,9 and 12 of its judgment in the said case as under: "Para No.8. But the situation here is different, as the accused approached the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant. It may not be that the complainant should have been made a party by the accused himself in the petition for quashing the criminal proceedings, as the accused has no such obligation when the case was charge-sheeted by the police. It may not be that the complainant should have been made a party by the accused himself in the petition for quashing the criminal proceedings, as the accused has no such obligation when the case was charge-sheeted by the police. It is predominantly the concern of the State to continue the prosecution. But when the complainant wishes to be heard when the, criminal proceedings are sought to be quashed, it would be negation of justice to him if he is foreclosed from being heard even after he makes a request to the Court in that behalf. What is the advantage of the Court in telling him that he would not be heard at all even at the risk of the criminal proceedings initiated by him being quashed. It is no solace to him to be told that if the criminal proceedings are quashed he may have the right to challenge it before the higher forums." "Para No. 9:- The scheme envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code; indicates that a person who is aggrieved by the offence committed, is not altogether wiped out from the scenario of the trial merely because the investigation was taken over by the police and the charge-sheet was laid by them. Even the fact that the Court had taken cognizance of the offence is not sufficient to debar him from reaching the Court for ventilating his grievance. Even in the Sessions Court, where the Public Prosecutor is the only authority empowered to conduct the prosecution as per Section 225 of the Code: a private person who is aggrieved by the offence involved in 'the case is not altogether debarred from participating in the trial This can be discerned from Section 301(2) of the Code which reads thus: "If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case." "Para 12. The private person who is permitted to conduct prosecution in the Magistrate's Court can engage a Counsel to do the needful in the Court in his behalf. The private person who is permitted to conduct prosecution in the Magistrate's Court can engage a Counsel to do the needful in the Court in his behalf. It further amplifies the position that if a private person is aggrieved by the offence committed against him or against anyone in whom he is interested he can approach the Magistrate and seek permission to conduct the prosecution by himself. It is open to the Court to consider his request. If the Court thinks that the cause of justice would be served better by granting such permission the Courts would generally grant such permission. Of course, this wider amplitude is limited to Magistrates Courts, as the right of such private individual to participate in the conduct of prosecution in the Sessions Court is very much restricted and is made subject to the control of the Public Prosecutor. The limited role which a private person can be permitted to play for prosecution in the Sessions Court has been adverted to above. All these would show that an aggrieved private person is not altogether to be eclipsed from the scenario when the criminal Court takes cognizance of the offences based on the report submitted by the police. The reality cannot be overlooked that the genesis in almost all such cases is the grievance of one or more individual that they were wronged by the accused by committing offences against them." [Emphasis Supplied] 51. From the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. International Vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi and Others ( AIR 2001 SC 1142 ), it is clear that if the complainant wishes to be heard when the proceedings are to be quashed, he should be given an opportunity of being heard. Further observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case that an aggrieved person is not altogether to be eclipsed fro~ the scenario when the criminal Court takes cognizance of the offences based on the report submitted by the police, clearly go to show that the informant has a right of audience on the question of dropping the proceedings initiated on the basis of the information lodged by him before the police. When that is so, I do not find any reason to accept the contention of he learned AAG that after cognizance is taken, the informant will have no role to play and therefore, he need not be and cannot be given' any opportunity of being heard while deciding the application for withdrawal from prosecution. Further, in view of the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, contention of the learned AAG that if the learned Magistrate allows the withdrawal application and thereby given his consent for withdrawal of case, the informant will have his remedy either by filing a private complaint or by filing a revision challenging the correctness of the order of the learned Magistrate and therefore, he cannot be given any opportunity of being heard opposing the withdrawal application cannot be accepted. If the informant could be given a right to challenge the correctness of the order of the learned Magistrate giving consent to withdraw the case from prosecution, one cannot understand why an opportunity should be denied to the informant to oppose the withdrawal application when it is considered by the Magistrate on merits. 52. In the case of National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 767 , which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at para No. 31 as, "As noted above, the role of victim in a criminal trial can never be lost sight of. He or she is an inseparable stakeholder in the adjudicating process." These observations also support the case of the petitioner informant herein. 53. Learned AAG, placing strong reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sk. Abdur Karim Vs. The State and others reported in 1981 Crl.L.J. 219. contended that the petitioner-informant has no locus before the Trial Court to oppose the withdrawal application. It is observed by the High Court of Calcutta, at para No.8 of the judgment, as under: "Para 8:" Having considered all the cases referred to by Mrs. Moitra and Mr. Abdus Sattar the order of the learned Sessions Judge is to be examined to see whether permission was rightly given for withdrawal. It is observed by the High Court of Calcutta, at para No.8 of the judgment, as under: "Para 8:" Having considered all the cases referred to by Mrs. Moitra and Mr. Abdus Sattar the order of the learned Sessions Judge is to be examined to see whether permission was rightly given for withdrawal. The learned Sessions Judge undoubtedly had the principles laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court that it is the administration of justice that should weigh with him in granting permission to withdraw the case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge granted permission improperly upon extraneous matters. I accordingly uphold the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. In this connection I may point out that though there is no direct authority on the point, I am of the view that a private party has no locus standi to move against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge upon an application being made under Section 321 Cr.P. Code to him by the Public Prosecutor in a case which he was conducting. The language of Section 321 of the Code makes it quite clear that the matter is between the Public Prosecutor and the Magistrate or the Judge concerned and a private party has no right to interfere in such matters. "Any Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before •the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any person either generally or in respect of anyone or more of the offences for which he is tried" (Section 321 Cr.P.C.) The Public Prosecutor being "the custodian of public justice" he is the only person who can make an application for withdrawal and, if withdrawal is granted by the Court in the interest of administration of justice, no private party can come up against that order of withdrawal." 54. Yet another decision relied upon by the learned AAG is 1989(1) Crimes 593 (Kerala High Court) (Madan Gopal Vs. State of Kerala and 2 others). Yet another decision relied upon by the learned AAG is 1989(1) Crimes 593 (Kerala High Court) (Madan Gopal Vs. State of Kerala and 2 others). The facts in the said case were: 2nd respondent therein was a doctor employed in Government Service and the third respondent therein was a private Medical Practitioner running a hospital and both of them were charge-sheeted and tried before the learned JMFC, Cochin for the offence under Section 304A of IPC. The learned APP filed, in the said case, an application under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. seeking withdrawal of the said case from prosecution. The learned JMFC consented to the withdrawal. Therefore, the de facto complainant, being the husband of the deceased, filed a revision petition aggrieved by the said order". It is, on these facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, at para No. 13, as under: "Para 13.............that the consideration which weighed with the Government, the Public Prosecutor and the Court are not germane and consent was not properly given. He can still file a private complaint, as held in Sheo Nandan Paswan's case (supra), with the possible risk of a suit for malicious prosecution if his complaint is bereft of any basis, Ram Naresh Pandey's case (supra) may even indicate shat a private complaint may not have a locus standi. When the executive authorities invested with the primary responsibility of prosecuting serious offences, which are classified as cognizable offences, decide to withdraw on grounds which the Court-feels germane, a private individual who claims to be aggrieved by the offence cannot successfully persuade the Court for a direction to compel the State to proceed with the case against its wishes" 55. The learned AAG has also relied upon the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Razack and Others Vs. State of Kerala reported in 2001 Crl.L.J. 275, wherein the learned Single Judge has taken the view that in the matter of withdrawal from prosecution neither complainant nor charge-sheet witness has locus standi in the exercise of discretion by the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution. 56. As to occurrence of any offence, criminal law may be set in motion by any member of the public who comes to know of the occurrence of that offence, and in that regard, he has to lodge his information before the police concerned. 56. As to occurrence of any offence, criminal law may be set in motion by any member of the public who comes to know of the occurrence of that offence, and in that regard, he has to lodge his information before the police concerned. Thereafter, a duty is cast on the State to investigate into the said offence, collect evidence and bring the offender to the' book by submitting charge-sheet against him before the competent Court. All this is 'in the public interest' with a view to maintain law and order in the society. Therefore, launching of the criminal case, its continuation and seeking punishment of the accused, is the responsibility of the State and the same is in the 'public interest'. Thus 'public interest' is involved in instituting a criminal case against a wrong doer and in seeing that he is punished in accordance with law. This is the reason why, as provided under Section 320 Cr.P.C. though certain offences are permitted to be compounded, if the victim of the crime and accused who commits crime mutually agree, certain heinous offences are not allowed to be compounded, even with the permission of the Court. 57. As provided under Section 321 of the Code, the State is authorised to withdraw from prosecution any criminal case through the Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/ Senior Public Prosecutor as the case may be. Such withdrawal shall also be in the 'public interest'. Section 321 further provides that when an application for withdrawal is filed, the Court concerned has to verify the grounds, get itself satisfied that the 'withdrawal is in the 'public interest' and then, it may give its consent for withdrawal. Thus, it is clear that launching of prosecution against a wrong doer member of the public and also its withdrawal, both involve 'public interest'. What is to be seen by the Magistrate Court, while giving or declining to give consent for withdrawal is, 'whether the public interest involved in withdrawal outweighs the public interest involved in proceeding with the case against the accused therein'. For this purpose, the Magistrate/ Court concerned has to consider nature of the offence/ offences for which the accused is/are charge sheeted, the impact of withdrawal/continuation of the case on the society etc., in the background of the grounds urged in the withdrawal application. For this purpose, the Magistrate/ Court concerned has to consider nature of the offence/ offences for which the accused is/are charge sheeted, the impact of withdrawal/continuation of the case on the society etc., in the background of the grounds urged in the withdrawal application. If the informant in the case/ victim of the crime, voluntarily comes forward to assist the Court in deciding the application for withdrawal, it cannot be said that such informant/victim has no voice to say anything in the matter. If the informant succeeds in covincing the Magistrate/Court concerned that the proposed withdrawal does not involve any 'public interest' or that the 'public interest' involved withdrawal of the case does not outweigh the 'public interest' involved continuation of the prosecution, then the withdrawal application has to be rejected. 58. In the instant cases, the informant is none other than a Public Servant viz., the Deputy Commissioner exercising the powers of District Election officer under the Election Commission of India, which is a constitutional body. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner informant has any private right or interest in the matter. 59. In view of the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of V.S. Achuthanandan ( AIR 1995 SC 436 ); J.K. International ( AIR 2001 SC 1142 ); and National Human Rights Commission [ (2009) 6 SCC 767 ] referred to supra and also for the reasons aforesaid, with great respect, I have not been able to subscribe to the view taken by the High Court of Calcutta in 1981 Cri. L.J. 219 (S.K. Abdul' Karim Vs. State of Ors); and also the view taken by Kerala High Court in 1989 (1) Crimes 593 (Madan Gopal Vs. State of Kerala & two others); and in 2001 Cri. L.J. 275 (Razak and Others Vs. State of Kerala) referred to supra. 60. Sri Krishna S. Dixit learned Counsel for the petitioner, placing strong reliance on the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court at para No.14 of its judgment in the case of Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar and ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 877 , contended that, the informant in a criminal case has locus to oppose the withdrawal application filed by the State under Section 321 Cr.P.C para No. 14 in the said case reads as under: Para 14: "The learned Counsel on behalf of Dr. State of Bihar and ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 877 , contended that, the informant in a criminal case has locus to oppose the withdrawal application filed by the State under Section 321 Cr.P.C para No. 14 in the said case reads as under: Para 14: "The learned Counsel on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra also raised another contention of a preliminary nature with a view to displacing the locus standi of Sheonandan Paswan to prefer the present appeal. It was urged that when Shri LaBan Prasad Sinha applied for permission to withdraw the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others, Sheonandan Paswan had no locus to oppose the withdrawal since it was a matter entirely between the Public Prosecutor and the Chief Judisial Magistrate and no other person had a right to intervene and oppose the withdrawal, and since Sheonandan Paswan had no standing to oppose the withdrawal, he was not entitled to prefer an appeal against the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court granted permission for withdrawal. We do not think there is any force in this contention. It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak [1984] 2 SCC 500: ( AIR 1984 SC 718 at P.723), this Court pointed out that "punishment of the offender in the interests of the society being one of the objects behind penal statute enacted for larger goods of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed of fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi". This Court observed that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence.Now if any citizen can lodge a first information report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus standi to do so cannot be questioned, we do not see why a citizen who finds that a prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn, cannot oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiation of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. Here in the present case, the offences charged against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others are offences of corruption, criminal breach of trust etc. and therefore any person who is interested in cleanliness of public administration and public morality would be entitled to file a complaint, as held by this Court in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak (supra) and equally he would be entitled to oppose the withdrawal of such prosecution, if it is already instituted. We must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra that Sheonandan Paswan had no locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution. If he was entitled to oppose the withdraw of the prosecution, it must follow a fortiori that on the turning down of his opposition by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate he was entitled to prefer a revision application to the High Court and on the High Court rejecting his revision application he had standing to prefer an appeal to this Court. We must therefore reject this contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra. 61. Sri Krishna Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner referring to the above observations contended that though it is the 'minority view' since no contrary view is taken in the majority Judgment, the above proposition has to be followed. 62. We must therefore reject this contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra. 61. Sri Krishna Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner referring to the above observations contended that though it is the 'minority view' since no contrary view is taken in the majority Judgment, the above proposition has to be followed. 62. Per Contra, while commenting on the above minority view, and placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Desahally Service Co-operative Society Ltd., and Others Vs. The State of Karnataka and others reported in AIR 1980 Kar 122 , the learned AAG strongly contended that the minority view in the said decision cannot be taken as law laid down by the Supreme Court even though the majority view is not contrary to the minority view. 63. Head Note B and para 20 of its judgment in the said case (AIR 1980 Kant 122) the Division Bench of this Court held as under: "(B) Precedent-Decision by majority of Judges of High Court Bench-Observations made by minority of Judges on a point cannot be regarded as laying down the law on that point even if majority of Judges have remained silent on that question. AIR 1975 SC 775 . Rel. on: AIR 1963 Ker 155, Exp]. (Para 26)." Para 20. "Even so, it was contended by learned Counsel for petitioners that it was on account of the existence of the safeguard of hearing the affected co-operative societies before making an order of amalgamation, this Court held in Puttappa's case (AIR 1978 Kant. 148) (FB) that the conferment of power on the Registrar or Deputy Registrar under Section 14-A of the Act, was not unguided or arbitrary and that if the application of the principle audi alteram parterm, is dispensed with, that power becomes arbitrary." 64. As already observed by me supra, in view of the subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. R. Balakrishna Pillai and others ( AIR 1995 SC 436 ); J.K. International ( AIR 2001 SC 1142 ); and National Human Rights Commission [ (2009) 6 SCC 767 ] I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner-informant herein has locus to oppose the withdrawal application before the learned Magistrate. 65. R. Balakrishna Pillai and others ( AIR 1995 SC 436 ); J.K. International ( AIR 2001 SC 1142 ); and National Human Rights Commission [ (2009) 6 SCC 767 ] I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner-informant herein has locus to oppose the withdrawal application before the learned Magistrate. 65. Shri Ravishankar, the learned Counsel for the respondents-accused in these petitions strongly contended that if the sub-ordinate criminal Court passes any order without there being any specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, for passing such order it amounts to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which are vested only in the High Court, but not in any subordinate criminal Court and therefore, if the right of audience is given to the petitioner-informant by the learned Magistrate, it amounts to such exercise of inherent powers and therefore, the learned Magistrate cannot be permitted to do so. 66. Per contra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, referring to some kinds of orders that are being passed by the Magistrate without there being specific provision for passing such orders and which orders are approved by the Apex Court, submitted that giving right of audience to the informant to oppose the withdrawal application does not amount to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In this regard, he referred to the orders dismissing the complaint for non-prosecution, granting interim bail, and an order issuing notice to the informant complainant before accepting the 'B' Summary Report. 67. It cannot be disputed that though there is no specific provision under Cr.P.C for dismissing the complaint or any criminal proceeding, such as maintenance proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C., for default on the part of the complainant/petitioner, in prosecuting the same, the Magistrates have been passing orders dismissing such complaint/criminal proceeding for non-prosecution. Further, despite there being no specific provision under Cr.P.C. as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwant Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and Another reported in AIR 1985 SC 1285 (which is strongly relied upon by the learned AAG) and also in Gangadhar Janardhan Mhatre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 4753 , issuing of notice to the informant/ complainant giving him opportunity of being heard becomes mandatory before the Magistrate accepts the 'B' Summary Report filed by the police before him. 68. State of Maharashtra and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 4753 , issuing of notice to the informant/ complainant giving him opportunity of being heard becomes mandatory before the Magistrate accepts the 'B' Summary Report filed by the police before him. 68. The Apex Court has given its approval for passing above kinds of orders by the criminal Courts, despite there being no specific provision for passing such orders and despite their being no inherent powers vested with them. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that, if the Magistrate gives the informant an opportunity of being heard in the matter of withdrawal of the case from prosecution, it cannot be said that it amounts to exercise of inherent powers by the learned Magistrate which are not vested in him or that it amounts to any illegality committed by the Magistrate. 69. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the present petitions deserve to be allowed. Hence the following: ORDER (a) Criminal Petition Nos. 8070,8071,8072,8073 and 8074 of2010 filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are hereby allowed. (b) The impugned Common Order dated 05.06.2010 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary, in Cr!. R.P. Nos. 137 to 141 of 209 is hereby set aside. (c) The orders dated 29.08.2009 passed by the learned I Additional JMFC, Bellary, in C.C. Nos. 594, 589, 591, 593 and 586 of 2008 on the memo filed by the informant in the said case viz., the Deputy Commissioner and District Election Officer, are hereby restored. (d) The learned Magistrate shall receive from the petitioner informant the objections filed by him to the applications filled under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. by the learned APP in the respective cases seeking consent for withdrawal of the respective cases, hear the arguments of the learned Counsel representing the informant, consider the documents produced by him and then, dispose of the said applications in accordance with law.