JUDGMENT : RAJIV SHARMA, J. 1. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both these petitions, the same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. In order to adjudicate upon the legal issues involved in these petitions, we have taken the facts in extenso of CWP No. 357/2010. 3. Petitioner was elected Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat, Mawa Sindhian. A complaint was lodged against him on 4.9.2009. Block Development Officer was directed to look into the matter. He looked into the matter and submitted report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 21.10.2009. Sub Divisional Magistrate furnished report to the Deputy Commissioner on 27.10.2009. Deputy Commissioner directed the District Panchayat Officer on 20.11.2009 to take action against the petitioner. In these circumstances, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 7.12.2009. Petitioner filed reply to the same on 21.12.2009. Thereafter vide office order dated 18.1.2010, petitioner was placed under suspension. 4. Mr. Ajay Sharma has vehemently argued that the impugned order dated 18.1.2010 is without jurisdiction, thus, liable to be set aside. According to him, petitioner could not be proceeded against under the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for brevity sake) and Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. His precise case is that as far as the execution of the Watershed Project is concerned, the same is to be done through the agency of DRDA/Zila Parishad/Gram Sabha and according to him; Secretary of the concerned Gram Panchayat is responsible for maintaining accounts etc. He also contended that the funds made available to the Panchayat for the Watershed Project cannot be termed as Panchayat Funds. He lastly contended that the work, in question, was got executed through the agency of Self-Help Group and one Smt. Raj Kumari has only worked and the money was also paid to her and not to Kaushalaya Devi. 5. Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Additional Advocate General has strenuously argued that the petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy of filing the appeal against the impugned order dated 18.1.2010 under section 148 of the Act. He also contended that in view of section 99 of the Act, the funds made available for executing the Watershed Project are required to be treated as Panchayat Funds. He also contended that in view of section 99 of the Act, the funds made available for executing the Watershed Project are required to be treated as Panchayat Funds. He lastly contended that petitioner being the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat was responsible for spending the funds made available and not the Secretary. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record carefully. 7. It will be apt at this stage to quote section 145 of the Act in order to effectively adjudicate this petition. Section 145 of the Act reads thus: "145. Suspension of office bearers of Panchayats.- (1) The prescribed authority may suspend from office any office bearer- (a) against whom charges have been framed in any criminal proceedings under chapter V-A, VI, IX-A, X, XII, section 302, 303, 304-B, 305, 306, 312 to 318, 336-A, 366-B, 373 to 377 of Chapter XVI, section 395 to 398, 408, 409, 458 to 460 of Chapter XVII and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or under the narcotic Drugs and psychotropic substances act, 1985 or under section 41 & 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 or sub-section (1) of section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 or under any law for the time being in force for the presentation of adulteration of food stuff and drugs, supersession of immoral traffic in women and children and protection of civil rights ;or (b) who has been served with a notice along with a charge sheet to show cause under this Act, for his removal from the office. (c) where on a complaint made against him the preliminary enquiry prima-facie discloses the misappropriation, misutilization or embezzlement of Panchayat funds or he has been found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties: Provided that any office bearer, if placed under suspension against whom charges have been framed in any criminal proceedings under clause (a), shall remain under suspension till the final decision of the competent court. (2) Where the inspection or an audit report discloses the misappropriation, misutilization or embezzlement of Panchayat funds by an office bearer of a Panchayat and the prescribed authority is satisfied that continuance in office of such a person will prejudice the enquiry under section 146 and apprehends tampering with record and witnesses, may suspend such a persons and in case he is in possession of any record, money or any property of the Panchayat, order him to hand over such records, money or property to the Secretary of the Panchayat. (2-A) No office bearer shall be placed under suspension under sub-section (1) or (2) unless he has been given an opportunity of being heard. (3) The order of suspension under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be reported, in the case of office bearers of Zila Parishad, to the Divisional Commissioner concerned, and in the case of office bearers of Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat, to the Deputy Commissioner concerned, within a period of ten days from the date of suspension, who shall, thereafter within ten days from the date of receipt of such report, order enquiry under section 146 and shall complete enquiry and action within six months and in case enquiry and action is not completed within stipulated period, the suspension order shall be deemed to have been revoked and formal order shall be issued accordingly. (4) In the event of both the Pradhan and Up-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Chairman or vice- Chairman of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad being suspended under sub- section (1) or subsection (2) the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad shall elect an office bearer qualified to hold the office of Pradhan or Chairman, as the case may be, such person shall perform all the duties and exercise all the powers of Pradhan or Chairman, as the case may be, during the period for which suspension continues. (5) A person who has been suspended under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) shall also forthwith stand suspended from the office of member or office bearer of any other Panchayat of which he is a member or office bearer. Such person shall also be disqualified for being elected, under the Act during his suspension." 8. Petitioner was called upon, vide show cause notice dated 7.12.2009 issued under section 141 (1) (c) of the Act, to file reply to the same within a period of fifteen days. Such person shall also be disqualified for being elected, under the Act during his suspension." 8. Petitioner was called upon, vide show cause notice dated 7.12.2009 issued under section 141 (1) (c) of the Act, to file reply to the same within a period of fifteen days. Petitioner filed detailed reply on 21.12.2009. Thereafter the District Panchayat Officer on 18.1.2010 placed the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect. 9. Mr. Ajay Sharma on the basis of Annexures P-1, P-2 and P-3, Clause 36 of Annexure P-1 and Clause 17 of Annexure P-3 has strenuously argued that the Gram Panchayat is in no manner responsible for the execution of Watershed Project. According to him, Watershed Projects are to be undertaken and completed through the agencies of DRDA/Zila Parishad and Gram Sabha. He also contended that the funds made available to the Panchayat for the execution of the Watershed Project cannot be treated as Panchayat Funds as per section 99 of the Act. 10. We have summoned the original records to see the manner in which payments were made as per the allegations levelled in the show cause notice. Original records were made available to us. We have perused the same. Mr. Ajay Sharma has drawn the attention of the Court to original record to establish that one Smt. Raj Kumari and not Kaushalaya Devi has worked while undertaking work of plantation. According to him, the work of plantation was carried out by Self Help Group. The learned Additional Advocate General has refuted the submission of Mr. Ajay Sharma. According to him, petitioner being the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat was responsible for utilisation of funds in accordance with law and neither Gram Sabha nor Secretary was responsible for the same. According to him, the funds made available through the agency of DRDA to the Gram Panchayat were Panchayat funds. 11. We are of the considered view that efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under section 148 of the Act against the order dated 18.1.2010. 12. Mr. Ajay Sharma has forcibly argued that since the order passed by the District Panchayat Officer is without jurisdiction, his client is not required to file appeal and this Court can decide the matter on merits. He has relied upon Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 13. 12. Mr. Ajay Sharma has forcibly argued that since the order passed by the District Panchayat Officer is without jurisdiction, his client is not required to file appeal and this Court can decide the matter on merits. He has relied upon Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 13. After going through the contents of show cause notice Annexure P-6, reply Annexure P-7 and the impugned order dated 18.1.2010 read with sections 99 and 145 of the Act, we are of the view that the order dated 18.1.2010 cannot be termed without jurisdiction. It is settled law by now that the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the alternative remedy available if the order passed is without jurisdiction, is in violation of fundamental rights and principles of natural justice. The writ petition is also maintainable even though alternative remedy is available if the vires of the Act and Rules is challenged specifically. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal v. The Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others, AIR 1964 SC 1419 have held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. Their Lordships have further held that ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226, where the petitioner has alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Their Lordships have further held that the High Court does not act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Their Lordships have further held that the High Court does not act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. Their Lordships have held as under: "7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and sought to re-open the decision of the taxing authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Art. 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up." 15. The Apex Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. And others v. Union of India and others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 have held that so far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies, however, it is equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. Their Lordships have held as under: "So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 - or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 - is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment." 16. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment." 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Bridge Corporation Limited and others v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, (2004) 4 SCC 794 have held that specific remedy provided for in the statute is to be availed and the High Court may not deviate from the general rule and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India except when a very strong case is made out. Their Lordships have held as under: "11. We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of the respondent-Union at all. The dispute was an industrial dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well the UPIDA, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the respondent- Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act. In The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kemlekar Shantaram Wadke 1976 (1) SCC 496 , it was held that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under the Act. This was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide "a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill afford. The procedure followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and re-make the contracts, settlement, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them". 12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy s given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner." 17. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Spinning Company limited v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264 have held that when the disputes relates to enforcement of right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy, is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The persons who insist upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. Their Lordships have considered the entire case law in this case as under: "2. The persons who insist upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. Their Lordships have considered the entire case law in this case as under: "2. The main stand of the appellant before the High Court was that the writ petition filed by the respondents should not be entertained as they had an efficacious, alternative and statutory remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the Act") read with the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the U.P. Act"). 3. The background facts are as follows: The respondents while working in the appellant's concern made claims of 15% of the basic pay as an interim relief as was being paid to the officers and clerical staff at the headquarters of the appellant's concern, as according to them there was no justifiable reason for refusing the said relief to the staff at some units. The writ petition was filed (including amended prayers), inter alia, with the following prayers: (a) to issue a writ, order or direction restraining the respondents from transferring, terminating the services of the petitioners and harassing and causing any harm to the petitioners; (b) to issue a writ, order or direction directing the respondents to pay 15% of the basic pay as interim relief and fixed DA of Rs. 100 to the clerical staff of Maunath Bhanjan Unit Mills; (c) to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; and (d) to award costs of this writ petition to the petitioners against the contesting respondents. 4. It is to be noted that five applications for amendments were filed and some of them were allowed by the High Court. Right from the beginning, the appellant was questioning maintainability of the writ petition as according to it statutory remedies were available and in the writ petition itself the writ petitioners accepted that the standing orders governing the service conditions were in operation. By one of the amendments, the order of dismissal passed was permitted to be questioned. So far as Respondent 1 is concerned, the stand was that the notice of show cause was alleged to have been refused by him when sent by the appellant on 21-11-1987. The same show-cause notice was sent on 23-11-1987 by registered post which was received by Respondent 1 on 26-11-1987. So far as Respondent 1 is concerned, the stand was that the notice of show cause was alleged to have been refused by him when sent by the appellant on 21-11-1987. The same show-cause notice was sent on 23-11-1987 by registered post which was received by Respondent 1 on 26-11-1987. The writ petitioner (Respondent 1) sent his reply to the show-cause notice dated 26-11-1987 which was received by the appellant on 2-12-1987. But the order of dismissal was passed on 1-12-1987. Learned Single Judge rejected the plea relating to existence of alternative remedy and only on the ground that the final order was passed before the receipt of the show-cause reply, quashed the proceedings. 5. So far as Respondent 2 is concerned, it was held that the notice was given by publishing in the news item on the purported ground that he did not join the transferred post. The High Court held that the show-cause notice containing the allegation of non-joining was not established to have been served. 6. Learned Single Judge noted that the writ petition was pending for a great length of time and, therefore, it would not be legal and proper to dismiss the writ petition. He did not find substance in the plea that had the writ petitioners availed a statutory remedy under the Act and the U.P. Act, the employer would have got the opportunity to show that the departmental proceedings were fair by adducing evidence in terms of Section 11-A of the Act. By filing writ petition according to the appellant, such a statutory right was rendered ineffective. 7. In the special appeal filed before the Division Bench, the stands taken were reiterated. It was specifically pointed out that the long pendency of the writ petition was primarily on account of the fact that several amendments were sought for and prayers for new reliefs were introduced. It was further submitted that even if the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that domestic enquiry is vitiated, the employer has a statutory right to lead evidence to show that the order of termination is justified on the materials which may be placed on record. This right was being denied by the workmen approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This right was being denied by the workmen approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court did not consider the plea relating to the existence of alternative remedy and denial of opportunity to justify the order of termination by leading evidence to be of any consequence and held that the learned Single Judge had permitted the appellant employer to proceed further in accordance with law. That since the order of termination was passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice and in a hasty manner the writ petition was maintainable. 8. In support of the appeal, Mr M.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. No reason was indicated by the writ petitioners for bypassing the statutory remedies. Even in the writ petition, nothing was said to justify bypassing the statutory remedy. In fact it was clearly stated that the standing orders governing the service conditions were in operation. The High Court should not have considered the passage of time as a factor to justify the action of the writ petitioners in straightaway filing the writ petition. As noted above, the long pendency was on account of the various amendments sought for by the writ petitioners. They should not have been permitted to take advantage of their own dilatory methods. It was however accepted that the appeal is not pressed so far as Respondent 2 is concerned as he had died during the pendency of the appeal and the appellant has settled the matter with the legal heirs of the said deceased Respondent 2. 9. In response, learned counsel for Respondent 1 workman submitted that existence of statutory remedy is not a rule of law but a law of caution and in appropriate cases the High Court can entertain writ petitions. This was a case where there was gross violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition and deciding the matter on merits. Merely because the employer had a right to justify the order of dismissal by adducing evidence, that cannot be a ground to deny the affected party the right to approach the High Court by filing a writ petition. Merely because the employer had a right to justify the order of dismissal by adducing evidence, that cannot be a ground to deny the affected party the right to approach the High Court by filing a writ petition. In fact the employer has been permitted to take such action as is available in law by the orders of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. 10. The issues relating to entertaining writ petitions when alternative remedy is available, were examined by this Court in several cases and recently in State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. ( (2005) 6 SCC 499 ) 11. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided, the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. 12. Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission(( 1954 SCR 738 : AIR 1954 SC 207 ) , Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, (1955) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1955 SC 425 ) , Union of India v. T.R. Varma, (1958) SCR 499 : AIR 1957 SC 882 ), State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, (1958) SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 ) and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras( (1966) 2 SCR 229 : AIR 1966 SC 1089 ) held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. Nooh, (1958) SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 ) and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras( (1966) 2 SCR 229 : AIR 1966 SC 1089 ) held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. 13. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR 1964 SC 1006 ) held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, (1959 Supp (1) SCR 623 : AIR 1959 SC 422 ), Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar( (1965) 2 SCR 653 : AIR 1965 SC 1321 ) , Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133 : AIR 1984 SC 653 ) , S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan( (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616 ) , Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 :1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ), Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 ), A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 ), L.L Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634 ) , Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra( (2001) 8 SCC 509 ), Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1075) and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72 ) . 14. 14. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ) this Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 15. In G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., 1952 SCR 583 : AIR 1952 SC 192 ), CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 75 : AIR 1985 SC 330 ) , Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 295 : AIR 1999 SC 294 ) , Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 : AIR 1999 SC 22 81 ) , C.A Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765 : AIR 1961 SC 609 ) , Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 : AIR 1983 SC 603 ) , H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, (1992 Supp (2) SCC 312) , Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 22 ) , Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar( (1998) 8 SCC 272 : AIR 1999 SC 74 ) , Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999)1 SCC 209) and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569 ) this Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 16. If, as was noted in Ram and Shy am Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) the appeal is from "Caesar to Caesar's wife" the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) the appeal is from "Caesar to Caesar's wife" the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. Though the High Court did not go into that plea relating to bias in detail, yet it felt that alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the writ petition. Since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the question as to why the statutory remedy available was not efficacious, it would not be proper for this Court to consider the question again. When the High Court had entertained a writ petition notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy this Court while dealing with the matter in an appeal should not permit the question to be raised unless the High Court's reasoning for entertaining the writ petition is found to be palpably unsound and irrational. Similar view was expressed by this Court in First ITO v. Short Bros. (P) Ltd. ( (1966) 3 SCR 84 : AIR 1967 SC 81 ) and State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 724 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 335) That being the position, we do not consider the High Court's judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 17. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 17. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO, (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 ) that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies, unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition. 18. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of the few expressions in R. v. Hillington, London Borough Council, (1974) 1 QB 720 : (1974) 2 All ER 643 : (1974) 2 WLR 805) which seem to bring out the position well. Lord Widgery, C.J. stated in this case: (All ER pp. 648/-64%) "It has always been a principle that certiorari will go only where there is no other equally effective and convenient remedy. * * * The statutory system of appeals is more effective and more convenient than application for certiorari and the principal reason why it may prove itself more convenient and more effective is that an appeal to (say) the Secretary of State can be disposed of at one hearing whether the issue between them is a matter of law or fact or policy or opinion or a combination of some or all of these ... whereas of course an appeal for certiorari is limited to cases where the issue is a matter of law and then only it is a matter of law appearing on the face of the order. * * * An application for certiorari has however this advantage that it is speedier and cheaper than the other methods and in a proper case therefore it may well be right to allow it to be used ... I would, however, define a proper case as being one where the decision in question is liable to be upset as a matter of law because on its face it is clearly made without jurisdiction or in consequence of an error of law." 19. After all the above discussion, the following observations of Roskill, L.J. in Hanson v. Church Commrs., (1977) 2 WLR 848 (CA)) may not be welcomed but it should not be forgotten also: "There are a number of shoals and very little safe water in the unchartered seas which divide the line between prerogative orders and statutory appeals, and I do not propose to plunge into those seas...." 20. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, (2004) 4 SCC 268 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 637) it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70) , Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant( (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ), Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70) , Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant( (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ), Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad, (2002) 2 SCC 542 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 317) and in Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 549 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1611) . 22. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 : AIR 1995 SC 1715 ) it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 91-92, para 28) "[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them." 23. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them." 23. In Basant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. ( (1964) 6 SCR 913 : AIR 1964 SC 1260 ) the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows: (SCR p. 920) "It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Act 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act." The above position was recently highlighted in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Employees Union, (2005) 6 SCC 725 : (2005) 6 Scale 430 ) . 24. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. Usually when writ petition is entertained notwithstanding availability of alternative remedy and issues are decided on merits, this Court is slow to interfere merely on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. But the facts of the present case have special features, which warrant interference. 25. The residual question is what would the appropriate direction in such a case be. Stand of the employer is that it could have justified the order of termination by adducing any evidence even if it was held that there was some defect in the departmental proceedings. The solution is found in what was stated by this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar. Stand of the employer is that it could have justified the order of termination by adducing any evidence even if it was held that there was some defect in the departmental proceedings. The solution is found in what was stated by this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar. In para ( (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704) , it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 758, para 31) "In all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. Where after following the above procedure, the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." 26. In view of the above, we set aside the order of learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench by the impugned judgment and direct that within a period of four months the enquiry shall be completed by starting from the stage of service of show-cause notice and consideration of the reply, if any, filed in accordance with the standing orders holding the field. Respondent 1 shall be reinstated to service but without any back wages and other service benefits and his reinstatement shall be solely for the purpose of completing the departmental proceedings. His entitlements, if any, would be adjudicated by the authorities depending upon the result of the disciplinary proceedings." 18. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Committee of Management and another v. Vice Chancellor and others (2009) 2 SCC 630 have held that availability of alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Committee of Management and another v. Vice Chancellor and others (2009) 2 SCC 630 have held that availability of alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the fact that an alternative remedy is available in a case where the same would not be an efficacious one. Their Lordships have further held that when an order has been passed by the authority without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the superior courts shall not refuse to exercise their jurisdiction although there exists an alternative remedy. Their Lordships have held as under: "22. Apart from the fact that a statutory authority cannot consider the validity of a Statute, as has been urged before us by Mr. Choudhari, it is beyond any doubt or dispute that availability of an alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the fact that an alternative remedy is available, inter alia, in a case where the same would not be an efficacious one. 23. Furthermore, when an order has been passed by an authority without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the superior courts shall not refuse to exercise their jurisdiction although there exists an alternative remedy. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. (1998) 8 SCC 1 : "15. .... But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. ...." [See also Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546 19. The rights/obligations and specific remedies are provided under the Scheme of the Act against the orders passed by the authorities in hierarchy. ...." [See also Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546 19. The rights/obligations and specific remedies are provided under the Scheme of the Act against the orders passed by the authorities in hierarchy. Section 8 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Gram Panchayat. The functions of the Gram Panchayat are provided under section 11 of the Act. Chapter-IV whereof provides for judicial functions and the powers of the Gram Panchayat. Chapter-VII deals with financial, taxation and recovery of claims. Chapter-VIII provides for general provisions relating to incorporation, duration, territorial constituencies of Panchayat and qualifications etc. of office bearers. Chapter-IX deals with officers and staff of Panchayats. Section 145, as extracted hereinabove, postulates for suspension of office bearers of Panchayats and section 148 provides for appeal and revision against the orders provided under Chapter-IX. Penalty is provided under Chapter-X. Chapter X-A deals with electoral offences and there is complete machinery for the adjudication of election disputes as per Chapter-XI. State has also framed Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. Rule 142 deals with suspension of office bearers of Panchayat (section 145 of the Act). Rule 143 prescribes the procedure for filing appeal and revision by the aggrieved party or person. The entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder makes it abundantly clear that it is a complete code in itself. The rights/obligations of the parties are enumerated in the Act and there is a complete machinery provided to the aggrieved party/person for the redressal of his grievance by filing appeal or revision. The remedies provided therein are efficacious and ordinarily these remedies are to be availed. 20. In the instant case, the petitioner has been put under suspension under section 145 of the Act and there is a specific remedy for the redressal of the grievance by filing an appeal before the competent authority under section 148 of the Act. We have not gone into the merits of the case in depth since the present petition is not maintainable in the present form for the simple reason that statutory remedy is available to the petitioner. In case we had gone deeper into the merits of the case, it would have prejudiced either of the parties before the Appellate Authority. The order dated 18.1.2010, prima facie, is not without jurisdiction. In case we had gone deeper into the merits of the case, it would have prejudiced either of the parties before the Appellate Authority. The order dated 18.1.2010, prima facie, is not without jurisdiction. Petitioner has been afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard before the order dated 18.1.2010 has been passed. It is settled law by now that if the petition is not found maintainable, the Courts should not go into the merits of the case. 21. Now, we will advert to the facts of CWP No. 2700/2009. In this case, a complaint was received in the office of District Collector on 8.8.2008 made by some villagers of Mava Sindhian regarding irregularities and illegalities for construction of water channel (Kuhal). It was forwarded to Additional District Magistrate, Una to hold inquiry and report the matter in this regard. The Additional District Magistrate, Una conducted and completed the inquiry vide Annexure P-2. The Deputy Commissioner directed the District Panchayat Officer, Una on 17.7.2009 to take appropriate action against the petitioner. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the District Panchayat Officer, Una vide Annexure P-1 dated 28.7.2009. In the meantime, petitioner approached this Court and no final order could be passed by the competent authority. 22. So far as this petition is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the same is pre-mature. Petitioner has only been served with a show cause notice to which he has filed the reply. No final order has been passed by the competent authority till date. The competent authority is required to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after taking into consideration the reply to the show cause notice filed by the petitioner. In case any adverse order is passed against him, he has the opportunity to assail the same before the competent authority in accordance with law. In view of this CWP No. 2700/2009 is dismissed being pre-mature. 23. Accordingly, in view of the observations made hereinabove, CWP No. 357/2010 is disposed of by relegating the petitioner to file an appeal against the order dated 18.1.2010 before the Appellate Authority within a period of three weeks from today. The Appellate Authority shall decide the same expeditiously preferably within a period of another three months. 23. Accordingly, in view of the observations made hereinabove, CWP No. 357/2010 is disposed of by relegating the petitioner to file an appeal against the order dated 18.1.2010 before the Appellate Authority within a period of three weeks from today. The Appellate Authority shall decide the same expeditiously preferably within a period of another three months. Till the filing of the appeal by the petitioner, there shall be stay of the order dated 18.1.2010 and the Appellate Authority shall pass necessary orders on the application to be preferred by the petitioner seeking interim relief. It shall be open to the petitioner to urge all the pleas available to him before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall consider the same in accordance with law. No costs.