JUDGMENT Naik, J. -- 1. This judgment would decide S.A. No.304/99 (Rameshchandra and another v. Kamal Kishore and others) and S.A. No.344/99 (Bhogabai (dead) and others v. Omprakash and others), since both the appeals arise from common facts and documents. 2. S.A. 304/99 is defendants' appeal against the judgment and decree dated 21.4.1999 passed by the Court of District Judge, Gwalior (M.P.), in Civil Appeal No.47-A/98 reversing thereby the dismissal of Civil Suit No.366-A/91 and granting a decree for specific performance. Needless to say that while deciding S.A. No.304/9, references about evidence have been taken from the record of Civil Suit No.366-A/91. 3. Facts relevant herein for the purposes of the said appeal are that the plaintiff Dhannalal (predecessor of respondents) instituted a suit against Ratiram (predecessor of appellants) for specific performance with allegations that the plaintiffs needed Rs.4,000/- in the year 1969 for domestic expenses. He agreed to mortgage the suit house for the said consideration. Defendant got executed registered sale-deed in his favour on 11.4.1969 for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- with a contemporaneous agreement of resale for the same amount simultaneously. Plaintiffs paid a sum of Rs.3,000/- and a fresh agreement was executed on 11.9.1972 by the plaintiffs with a condition that the plaintiffs would pay the balance of Rs.1,000/- within a year and will get the registered sale-deed executed from the defendant. Plaintiffs offered a sum of Rs.1,000/- at times but the defendant avoided to receive it and execute a sale-deed. Therefore, the plaintiffs issued registered notice dated 29.9.1972 and instituted a suit for direction to defendant to receive the balance money and execute the registered sale-deed. 4. Defendant submitted his written statement refuting thereby the allegations contained in the plaint. He stated that the defendant had purchased the suit house vide registered sale-deed dated 11.4.1969. It was an outright sale and the plaintiffs, thereafter, had executed a rent note dated 11.4.1969 in favour of the defendant and are in occupation of the said house on rent at the rate of Rs.50/- per month accordingly. Execution of agreement to resell has been denied. It is further denied that due to expiry of alleged agreement dated 11.4.1969, a fresh agreement was executed by the defendant on 11.9.1972 as alleged in the plaint. Plaintiffs being tenants in the house have already been sued vide Civil Suit No.3-A/73 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent. 5. Execution of agreement to resell has been denied. It is further denied that due to expiry of alleged agreement dated 11.4.1969, a fresh agreement was executed by the defendant on 11.9.1972 as alleged in the plaint. Plaintiffs being tenants in the house have already been sued vide Civil Suit No.3-A/73 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent. 5. Learned trial Judge dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 26.9.1976. Aggrieved by it, plaintiffs through LRs preferred Civil Appeal No.47-A/98 which has been allowed by the learned District Judge, Gwalior, by the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.4.1999 granting thereby a decree for specific performance that the defendants on receipt of balance amount of Rs.1,000/- would execute a registered sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, the present second appeal is submitted which has been heard on the substantial questions of law formulated on 2.7.1999 which are being decided in the following manner. 6. Substantial question of law No.1 : "Whether in the absence of agreement the decree for specific performance is rightly granted by the appellate Court?" It has been argued by Shri Tomar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the alleged agreement of resale dated 11.4.1969 has not been produced at all. In the absence of production and proof about such agreement, a decree for specific performance cannot legally be granted. Shri Tomar, learned senior counsel, placed reliance on Shyam Singh v. Daryao Singh (dead) by LRs and others [ AIR 2004 SC 348 ], K. Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah Gowder [ AIR 1963 SC 1182 ], Bhaskar Waman Joshi (deceased) and others v. Shrinarayan Rambilas Agarwal (deceased) and others [ AIR 1960 SC 301 ], and Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali and another [ AIR 1954 SC 345 ], to buttress his submission that when the registered sale-deed dated 11.4.1969 Ex.D-1 and alleged agreement of resale dated 11.4.1969 were two separate documents as per the pleadings contained in the plaint itself, they cannot be treated as a transaction of mortgage. 7. This Court feels that the following close relationship between the parties must have played a pivotal role in the transaction between the parties: Bhausaheb Kesarbai (wife) Ratiram (defendant) Dhannalal (plaintiff) LRs LRs (defendants/appellants) (plaintiffs/respondents) 8. 7. This Court feels that the following close relationship between the parties must have played a pivotal role in the transaction between the parties: Bhausaheb Kesarbai (wife) Ratiram (defendant) Dhannalal (plaintiff) LRs LRs (defendants/appellants) (plaintiffs/respondents) 8. Learned District Judge, Gwalior, in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment, has observed that Dhannalal, the plaintiff, has clearly stated in paragraph 11 of his statement that the agreement dated 11.4.1969 was taken back by the defendant while executing a fresh agreement on 11.9.1972. This has been countered by Shri Tomar, learned Senior Advocate that the fact that the agreement dated 11.4.1969 was taken back by the defendant has not been pleaded at all and therefore the statement of the plaintiff about the return of the document could not have been considered for want of pleadings. 9. Order VI rule 2 CPC provides that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. 10. There is a marked distinction between the material facts and material particulars as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as by this Court in following paragraphs: A. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia [ AIR 1976 SC 744 ], has held: "37. Like the Code of Civil Procedure, this section also envisages a distinction between "material facts" and "material particulars" Cl. (a) of sub-section (1) correspondents to Order 6, rule 2, while clause (b) is analogous to Order 6, rules 4 and 6 of the Code. The distinction between "material facts" and "material particulars" is important because different consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the Court has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation. 38. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are "material facts". In the context of a charge of corrupt practice "material facts" would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound, the substantiate before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election-petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such required to be pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of the case. In short, all those facts which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action, are "material facts" which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of section 83(1)(a). 39. "Particulars", on the other hand, are "the details of the case set up by the party". "Material particulars within the contemplation of clause (b) of section 83(1) would therefore mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements If clause (a) 'particulars' serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative." B. Aforesaid law has been followed in various cases. In Harkirat Singh v. Amarinder Singh [AIR 2006 SC 713], Hon'ble apex Court has observed : "50. A distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars', however, must not be overlooked. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action of defence. 'Particulars', on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action of defence. 'Particulars', on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. 'Particulars' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. 51. All 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial." C. This Court has in the case of Manorama Devi wd/o Parmanand and others v. Suresh s/o Kailash Narain and others [ 1999(1) MPLJ 436 ], observed: "21. A distinction must be made between omission to state material facts and omission to give full particulars. If material facts are omitted, a party should not be allowed to raise a contention on a particular point even if, some materials are available in the evidence. If on the other hand material facts have been pleaded but full particulars have not been given the Court may permit the points to be raised on the basis of the evidence unless the opposite party is thereby materially prejudiced. The first obviously relate to a question of jurisdiction and the second to one of procedure." 11. An agreement of re-sale was executed in favour of plaintiffs is a material fact which is found to have been pleaded in the plaint. The fact that the same was taken back by the defendant at the time of execution of a fresh agreement dated 11.9.1972 may be a material particular. If the same was not produced with the plaint, the defendant could have taken steps under Order XI of CPC. The fact that the same was taken back by the defendant at the time of execution of a fresh agreement dated 11.9.1972 may be a material particular. If the same was not produced with the plaint, the defendant could have taken steps under Order XI of CPC. He could have issued a notice under Order XI rule 16 CPC to produce it. He could have applied under Order XI rule 14 CPC to seek direction from the Court to the plaintiff to produce it. He further could have submitted an application to the Court directing the defendants to make discovery on oath of the said agreement. Defendant has obviously not taken any such step. If the defendant was of the opinion that custody of such document was a material fact, he could have submitted an application under Order VI rule 5 CPC for obtaining further and better particulars with regard to it. Obviously, defendant has not taken any of such steps. Moreover, it has clearly been observed by the learned District Judge that the defendant in his statement has not rebutted the version of the plaintiff Dhannalal that the agreement dated 11.4.1969 was taken back from him by the defendant at the time of execution of fresh agreement dated 11.9.1972. Learned District Judge has found in paragraph 18 of his judgment that the agreement dated 11.9.1972 was executed by the defendant that on receipt of Rs.1,000/- within a year, registered sale-deed in respect of the suit house would be executed in plaintiff's favour. On examination of agreement dated 11.9.1972 (Ex.P-1), it is found that there is a specific mention in it that the defendant had entered into an agreement on 11.4.1969 that the suit house would be sold to Dhannalal. It is also mentioned in Ex.P-1 that the limitation has been extended by Ex.P-1. Defendant vide Ex.P-1 has acknowledged the receipt of Rs.3,000/- towards advance. It is further mentioned that on receipt of Rs.1,000/- within a year with effect from 11.9.1972, the defendant would execute a registered sale-deed for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- in favour of Dhannalal. It is also mentioned in Ex.P-1 that the limitation has been extended by Ex.P-1. Defendant vide Ex.P-1 has acknowledged the receipt of Rs.3,000/- towards advance. It is further mentioned that on receipt of Rs.1,000/- within a year with effect from 11.9.1972, the defendant would execute a registered sale-deed for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- in favour of Dhannalal. Thus, Ex.P-1 is found to be a complete agreement in itself and the non-production of earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969 is not found to have caused any legal hurdle in imparting justice in favour of the plaintiff by granting a decree for specific performance since all the requisite ingredients are found to have been duly proved. 12. In the case of Shyam Singh (supra), it has been observed: "12. .... As the sale and agreement of repurchase are contained in two separate documents although contemporaneously executed, the transaction cannot treated to be a 'mortgage' as defined in S.58(c) read with proviso thereunder of the Transfer of Property Act but it seems to be a transaction akin to a 'mortgage' if not 'mortgage proper'. From the tenor and contents of the two documents contemporaneously executed, it seems that the defendants No.2 to 4 to raise money, sold the property but with a right of repurchase on return of the money. A long period of ten years for obtaining reconveyance was agreed between the original contracting parties to indicate the nature of transaction to be one to satisfy the monetary need of the transferer. Initial period of five years was stipulated for obtaining reconveyance mutually, failing which after expiry of the period of five years, reconveyance could be obtained through Court within an Otter limit of ten years from the original date of the execution of the document. It seems unjust to construe the terms of the document to mean that though the original transferers of the property are unable to raise requisite money within the initial period of five years and thereafter continue to be incapable financially to approach Court for seeking reconveyance, they would have no right to assign or transfer their right on value to others. This would result in deprivation of the property or competitive value altogether to the original owners." 13. This would result in deprivation of the property or competitive value altogether to the original owners." 13. In the case of K. Simrathmull (supra), following earlier majority view of the Federal Court in the case of Shanmughal Pillai v. Annalakshmi Ammal [AIR 1950 FC 38], has been affirmed: "where under an agreement an option to a vendor is reserved for repurchasing the property sold by him the option is in the nature of a concession or privilege and may be exercised on strict fulfilment of the conditions on the fulfilment of which it is made exercisable." 14. Evidence of contemporaneous agreement is always admissible as a surrounding circumstance as has been held in the case Bhaskar Waman Joshi (supra). In the case of Chunchun Jha (supra), the document in question was held to be a mortgage by conditional sale after taking into consideration the language of the document and the evidence on record. In paragraph 6, it has been observed: "6. ..... If the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended." 15. In the light of the material evidence on record, it is already found by the learned District Judge that the registered sale-deed dated 11.4.1969 for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- and contemproraneous agreement of resale dated 11.4.1969 for the same consideration were simultaneously executed. Further agreement dated 11.9.1972 was also executed for the same amount renewing thereby the earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969 In none of the cases cited by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants it has been held that such an agreement of resale cannot be enforced. Even the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Shyam Singh (supra), has observed that such a transaction is akin to a 'mortgage' if not 'mortgage proper'. Even the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Shyam Singh (supra), has observed that such a transaction is akin to a 'mortgage' if not 'mortgage proper'. It has clearly been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gulab Chand (dead) by LRs v. Babulal (dead) by LRs and others [ 1998(1) JLJ 1 (SC)], that if a sale-deed, rent note and agreement to resell are executed on the same day between the parties they would reveal that the transactions were essentially a mortgage in substance and essence. 16. Learned District Judge has granted a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 11.9.1972 (Ex.P-1) as clearly observed in para 12 of the impugned judgment. It specifies the subject-matter of agreement, which is indisputably none else than the suit house itself. Consideration is mentioned as Rs.4,000/- in it with acknowledgment about having received Rs.3,000/- as advance. Balance is stated to be Rs.1,000/ in Ex.P-2 which was payable within a year w.e.f. 11.9.1972. 17. Since ingredients for the grant of decree for specific performance are found proved, the decree for enforcement of the agreement Ex.P-1 is found to have been rightly granted even in the absence of earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969 because as observed by the learned District Judge himself agreement dated 11.9.1972 (Ex.P-1) has been enforced by the Court. Substantial question of law No.1 is, thus, answered against the appellants. 18. Substantial Question of law No.2 : "Whether in the absence of document of agreement, the lower appellate Court was justified in presuming the agreement on the basis of some previous statement?" It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the learned lower appellate Judge has granted a decree for specific performance by presuming the agreement. This is absolutely a misconceived submission. It has clearly been observed in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment that the agreement of sale dated 11.9.1972 is being enforced in the suit which is on record as Ex.P-1. It has already been found in the preceding paragraphs that absence of agreement dated 11.4.1969 is not fatal to the plaintiff's suit. Moreover, the earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969 is found to have been mentioned in the subsequent agreement dated 11.9.1972 (Ex.P-1). It is stated to have been returned to the defendant at the time of execution of a fresh agreement contained in Ex.P-1. Moreover, the earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969 is found to have been mentioned in the subsequent agreement dated 11.9.1972 (Ex.P-1). It is stated to have been returned to the defendant at the time of execution of a fresh agreement contained in Ex.P-1. This is found to have been duly proved. Thus, the learned lower appellate Judge is not found to have committed any error in granting a decree for specific performance on the basis of Ex.P-1 dated 11.9.1972 despite absence of the earlier agreement dated 11.4.1969. Substantial question of law No.2 is, thus, answered accordingly against the appellants. 19. Substantial question of law No.3 : "Whether the execution of sale-deed, rent note and reconveyance in question to get the property reconveyed is mortgage?" It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that Ex.P-1 is not duly proved and such a transaction, being not a mortgage, a decree in plaintiffs' favour could not have been granted. 20. Shri Ramji Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the, plaintiffs-respondents, submitted that sale was not intended vide Ex.D-1 and the same was not acted upon. Such a fact may be proved by evidence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sadasivam v. K. Doraiswamy [ AIR 1996 SC 1724 ]. 21. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the learned lower appellate Judge has committed error in ignoring the expert evidence adduced by the defendants. This is also not an impressive submission because Ex.P-1 is found to have been proved by the primary evidence. Plaintiff Dhannalal himself has stated in the end of his statement that he being not a literate cannot say whether Ex.P-1 contains his signatures or not. This being so, learned lower appellate Judge is not found to have committed any mistake in upholding Ex.P-1 more so because expert's evidence is merely an opinion evidence and is not conclusive. I may successfully refer to the decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Balkrishna Das Agarwal v. Smt. Radha Devi and others [AIR 1989 Allahabad 133]. 22. Learned lower appellate Judge found that the sale-deed and rent note in favour of the defendant and agreement to sell the same property by defendant to plaintiff was executed on the same day i.e. 11.4.1969. 22. Learned lower appellate Judge found that the sale-deed and rent note in favour of the defendant and agreement to sell the same property by defendant to plaintiff was executed on the same day i.e. 11.4.1969. Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Gulab Chand (supra), has clearly held that such transactions are essentially a mortgage in substance and essence. It is further observed that on account of such document no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was created at any point of time. In the case of Shyam Singh (supra), it has been observed by the apex Court that such a transaction even if is not treated as a mortgage proper would akin to mortgage. In this view of the matter also, the learned lower appellate Judge is not found to have committed any illegality in granting a decree for specific performance of agreement Ex.P-1. 23. Shri Tomar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellants, placed reliance on Bal Krishna and another v. Bhagwan Das (dead) and others [(2008)2 SCC 752], Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and another [(2006)4 SCC 432], and Mst. Sugani v. Rameshwar Das and another [(2006)4 SCC 684], to buttress his submission that a decree for specific performance cannot be legally granted in the absence of pleadings and proof about readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. As regards objection in respect of readiness and willingness, firstly, it has not been objected to in the written statement. Secondly, no issue was raised on the question of readiness and willingness in the trial Court. Defendants-appellants did not move any application to frame any issue on this point. Thus, parties were not at issue on the question of readiness and willingness. Thirdly and lastly, it has been long back observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramesh Chandra Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his LRs and others [ AIR 1971 SC 1238 ], that the very fact that the plaintiff promptly filed the suit shows his keel ness and readiness in the matter of acquiring the plot by purchase. It has further been observed in paragraph 7 of the said judgment: "7. ..... Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. It has further been observed in paragraph 7 of the said judgment: "7. ..... Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned ..." 24. Shri Tomar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has been unable to point out any material on record which would indicate that the plaintiff-respondent at any stage was not ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. A period of one year was fixed for getting the registered sale-deed executed vide Ex.P-1 dated 11.9.1972. On finding that the defendant was avoiding the receipt of the balance money, notice was promptly issued on 29.9.1972 and a suit was instituted in the year 1972 itself for specific performance. This is clearly suggestive of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff-respondent more so in the absence of objection in the written statement as well as in the evidence. 25. It has been argued that the suit of the plaintiff being barred by limitation, it ought to have been dismissed. Reliance for this purpose is placed on Sampuran Singh and others v. Smt. Niranjan Kaur and others [AIR 1 SC 1047]. 26. Although the aforesaid objections are not covered by any of the substantial questions of law formulated by this Court, an anxious look has been given to the said objections for imparting justice. In the case of Sampuran Singh (supra), it has been held that the acknowledgment for the purpose of section 18 of the Limitation Act ought to be made before expiry of period of limitation. In the case in hand, the decree for specific performance has been granted in respect of the sale agreement dated 11.9.1972 in a suit instituted in the year 1972 itself. This being so, the appellants do not get any advantage from the decision of Sampuran Singh (supra). 27. In view of the aforesaid, substantial question of law No.3 is also I answered against the appellants. [S.A. No.344/99] : 28. S.A. No.344/99 has been preferred by the plaintiffs-appellants against dismissal of their Civil Suit No.361-A/91 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.4.1999 passed in Civil Appeal No.46-A/98. 29. 27. In view of the aforesaid, substantial question of law No.3 is also I answered against the appellants. [S.A. No.344/99] : 28. S.A. No.344/99 has been preferred by the plaintiffs-appellants against dismissal of their Civil Suit No.361-A/91 for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.4.1999 passed in Civil Appeal No.46-A/98. 29. Facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal have already been described while dealing with S.A. No.304/199. At the cost of repetition, briefly stated facts are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent with allegations that the suit premises was purchased by the appellants' predecessor vide registered sale-deed dated 11.4.1969 from the predecessor of respondents. On the same day, rent note was also executed in favour of such predecessor. Suit was instituted on the basis of arrears of rent which were not paid despite demand notice. Decree for eviction on ground under section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was prayed for alongwith arrears of rent. 30. Defendant opposed the suit with allegations that the suit property was not sold but in essence it was a mortgage transaction. Alleged sale-deed was executed for a sum of Rs.4,000/- on 11.4.1969. On the same day, a document of reconveyance for the same amount was executed in favour of the defendant. Rent note was executed to secure the interest. Since the limitation of the agreement of reconveyance dated 11.4.1969 was going to expire, a fresh agreement was executed for reconveyance on 11.9.1972 wherein the plaintiff acknowledged to have received Rs.3,000/- as an advance consideration out of Rs.4,000/- and agreed to execute the sale-deed within a year on receipt of balance money to the tune of Rs.1,000/- Defendant offered the sum which was not accepted. Therefore, Civil Suit No. 175-A/72 was instituted. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between plaintiff and defendant. 31. Learned trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 26.9.1996. Therefore, Civil Suit No. 175-A/72 was instituted. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between plaintiff and defendant. 31. Learned trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 26.9.1996. Aggrieved by it, Civil Appeal No.46-A/98 was preferred by the defendants which having been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree, plaintiffs-appellants have submitted present appeal which has been heard on the following substantial question of law alongwith S.A. No.304/1999 : "Whether in a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, question of title can be decided?" 32. Shri Tomar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, contended that the question of title cannot be decided in a suit for eviction under M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Needless to say that the contention of the learned senior counsel cannot be doubted at all. However, the question of title can be gone into for the purpose of deciding the relationship of landlord and tenant. This Court in the case of Babulal v. Deo Janki [1985 MPWN SN 46], in an eviction suit, has observed: "It may be mentioned that this is not a title suit in which adjudication of the title set up by the defendant has to be made. It is settled that the question of title can be gone into only incidentally in such a suit, for the purpose of deciding the relationship of landlord and tenant." It may further be seen that the suit for eviction as well as for arrears of rent under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act proceeds on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. This Court has already affirmed the findings of the learned District Judge recorded in Civil Appeal No.47-A/98 that registered sale-deed, rent note and the document of reconveyance were executed on the same day i.e. 11.4.1969. Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Gulab Chand (dead) by LRs v. Babulal (dead) by LRs and others [1998(1) JLJ (SC) and AIR 1988 SC 1074 ], has clearly held that in such a situation relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not created at any point of time on the strength of such documents. In the absence of such relationship, the suit is obviously liable to be dismissed and is found to have rightly been dismissed. In the absence of such relationship, the suit is obviously liable to be dismissed and is found to have rightly been dismissed. Thus, for the reasons stated in the judgment of S.A. No.304/1999 and for the aforesaid reason, substantial question of law is answered against the appellants. 33. Resultantly, S.A. No.304/1999 and S.A. No.344/199, both the appeals stand dismissed for want of substance, however, with no order as to costs.