All these Writ Petitions in­volve common questions of law and facts and, therefore, as agreed by learned counsels for the parties, have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment at this stage under the Rules of the Court. 2. The Writ Petition No. 37610 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the "first Writ Pe­tition") argued as leading case has been filed by 45 petitioners seeking a writ of manda­mus commanding the respondents to regularize them on the post of Assistant from the date of their initial appointment with all service benefits; and a further mandamus not to make any appointment on the post held by the petitioners in various branches of the Corporation pursuant to advertisement (An-nexure-3 to the Writ Petition). 3. The facts in brief, giving rise to the present dispute, as averred in the first Writ Petition, are, that due to shortage of Assis­tants on account of non recruitment for years together, the Branch Managers of various branches of Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the "LIC") requested the Divisional and Zonal Manag­ers to permit them to make appointments on the post of Assistants. After receiving ap­proval there from, requisitions were sent to various employment exchanges. The petition­ers names were forwarded by the concerned employment exchanges. Thereafter they were interviewed and being successful therein were issued appointment letters. Copies of some of the appointment letters have been filed col­lectively as Annexures-7 & 8 to the Writ Petition. The petitioners joined their services as Assistants (except petitioner No. 16 who joined as Typist) on various dates in the years 1998-99. It would be appropriate to place the said details as under: (See table on next page) 4. The work and performance of the peti­tioners claim to be satisfactory. Some of the petitioners were also transferred from one section to another for discharging duties of Assistant and Cashier. However, the petition­ers were not given benefits like annual incre­ment, medical benefit, leave encasement, productivity linked Bonus, lump sum incen­tive, conveyance allowance, provident fund, LTC etc. for which they raised demand through letters dated 02.11.2007, 04.11.2007 and 04.06.2008 (Annexures-12, 13 and 14 to the Writ Petition). It is said that there are permanent vacancies of Assistants and no regular recruitment has been made for the last almost 10 years, therefore, the petitioners are entitled for regularization and all the benefits available to regularly appointed employees. for which they raised demand through letters dated 02.11.2007, 04.11.2007 and 04.06.2008 (Annexures-12, 13 and 14 to the Writ Petition). It is said that there are permanent vacancies of Assistants and no regular recruitment has been made for the last almost 10 years, therefore, the petitioners are entitled for regularization and all the benefits available to regularly appointed employees. However, instead of considering petitioners for regularization, the respondents have pro­ceeded ahead to issue an advertisement noti­fying substantive vacancies of Assistants in- @ Table ------------------- ST. No. Petitioner No. Name Date of Joining Post Branch where posted 1. Suresh Kumar Chaturvedi 09.11.1998 Assistant Renukut 2. Parmanand Singh 03.12.1998 Assistant Renukut 3. Abhay Kumar 30.03.1999 Assistant Ballia 4. Rakesh Kumar Srivastava 14.06.1999 Assistant CBO-2 Varanasi 5. Shiv Pratap Singh 10.04.1999 Assistant Vindhyachal 6. Brijesh Kumar Srivastava 01.01.1999 Assistant Robertsganj 7. Virendra Kumar 26.11.1998 Assistant Renukut 8. Surendra Kumar Singh 03.12.1999 Assistant Renukut 9. Brij Bihari Prasad 13.11.1998 Assistant Renukut 10. Sanjay Kumar 19.11.1998 Assistant CBO-4 Varanasi 11. Ashok Kumar Gupta 18.11.1998 Assistant Ballia 12. Santosh Kumar Singh 03.03.1999 Assistant Vindhyachal 13. Prem Kumar Bharti 20.11.1998 Assistant Mirzapur 14. Sanjay Kumar 19.03.1999 Assistant Robertsganj 15. Ajay Kumar 09.11.1998 Assistant Ballia 16. Tribhuvan 28.10.1998 Typist Jaunpur-2 17. Sanjay Kumar Gupta 28.10.1998 Assistant Jaunpur-2 18. Surya Bali Ram 28.10.1998 Assistant CAB Varanasi 19. Santosh Kumar Sinha 18.11.1998 Assistant CBO Varanasi 20. Chandrika Ram 20.11.1998 Assistant CBO-1 Varanasi 21. Abdul Hanif 18.03.1999 Assistant CBO-1 Varanasi 22. Shy am Mohan 05.05.1999 Assistant CBO-1 Varanasi 23. Sanjay Kumar Srivastava 06.11.1998 Assistant D.B.O. Varanasi 24. Devi Prasad Yadav 06.11.1998 Assistant D.B.O. Varanasi 25. Neel Ratan Singh Details not available N.A. N.A. 26. Prem Chandra Gautam 02.11.1999 Assistant Rasara 27. Vinay Kumar Lal 18.12.1998 Assistant Jaunpur 1 28. Bhanu Pratap Singh 02.11.1998 Assistant Rasara 29. Shrish Chand Shukla 23.11.1998 Assistant Mirzapur 30. Lai Bahadur Kashyap 05.11.1998 Assistant Sarnath Varanasi 31. Sanjay Tiwari 09.11.1998 Assistant Ghazipur 32. Sri Ram 05.11.1998 Assistant CBO2 Varanasi 33. Rakesh Kumar Singh 17.12.1998 Assistant CBO2 Varanasi 34. Rama Shanker 14.06.1999 Assistant CBO2 Varanasi 35. Sandeep Kumar Tiwari 23.11.1998 Assistant Manduadih Varanasi 36. Manoj Kumar Yadav 23.11.1998 Assistant Manduadih Varanasi 37. Vishnu Kumar Singh 02.12.1998 Assistant Sarnath Varanasi 38. Alok Sharma 23.11.1998 Assistant Kerakat Jaunpur 39. Manoj Kumar Shastri 24.05.1999 Assistant Ballia 40. Anil Kumar Dubey 14.12.1998 Assistant Mungra Badshahpur Jaunpur 41. Vinita Gupta 14.12.1998 Assistant Mungra Badshahpur Jaunpur 42. Sandeep Kumar Tiwari 23.11.1998 Assistant Manduadih Varanasi 36. Manoj Kumar Yadav 23.11.1998 Assistant Manduadih Varanasi 37. Vishnu Kumar Singh 02.12.1998 Assistant Sarnath Varanasi 38. Alok Sharma 23.11.1998 Assistant Kerakat Jaunpur 39. Manoj Kumar Shastri 24.05.1999 Assistant Ballia 40. Anil Kumar Dubey 14.12.1998 Assistant Mungra Badshahpur Jaunpur 41. Vinita Gupta 14.12.1998 Assistant Mungra Badshahpur Jaunpur 42. Mahendra Pratap 14.12.1998 Assistant Mungra Badshahpur Jaunpur 43. Jitendra Kumar Yadav 04.01.1999 Assistant Shahganj Jaunpur 44. Shiv Shanker Singh 03.04.1999 Assistant DBO Varanasi 45. Shy am Dev Yadav 23.11.1998 Assistant Manduadih Varanasi eluding those where against the petitioners are working and the petitioners have been advised to compete therein. The action of the respon­dents in advertising the vacancies instead of considering them for regularization has been challenged on the ground that it is wholly arbitrary, volatile of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, amounts to unfair labour practice and also in violation of law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Life In­surance Corporation of India and another v. Kailash Nath and others, 2008(1) ADJ 95: (2008 (2) ALJ (NOC) 548). 5. On behalf of respondents a counter-af­fidavit sworn by Sri Ashwani Kumar, Man­ager (Legal), LIC Allahabad has been filed. It is said therein that LIC is a body corporate established under Section 3 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the "1956 Act") with perpetual succession and common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to sue and be sued in its own name. The LIC is enjoined to carry on Life Insurance business, developed in a manner as to the best advantage of the com­munity. Section 6 sub-section (2) of 1956 Act empowers the Corporation to do all such things as may be expedient or conducive to the proper exercise of any of the powers of the Corporation. Section 23 provides that Corporation may employ such number of persons as it thinks fit for enabling it to dis­charge its functions under 1956 Act. Section 6 sub-section (2) of 1956 Act empowers the Corporation to do all such things as may be expedient or conducive to the proper exercise of any of the powers of the Corporation. Section 23 provides that Corporation may employ such number of persons as it thinks fit for enabling it to dis­charge its functions under 1956 Act. Under Section 48 the power to frame Rules has been conferred upon the Central Government and vide Section 49 power to frame Regulations with previous approval of Central Govern­ment and by notification in the gazette of In­dia has been conferred upon LIC in respect to all matters for which provisions are made in the Act and is expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of 1956 Act including terms and conditions of service of the employees. The LIC has framed Regula­tions, namely, Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the "1960 Regulations"). Chap­ter II provides for appointment, promotion and termination of service and Regulation 8 thereof empowers certain authorities of LIC to make appointment in Class-Ill and Class-IV posts on temporary basis subject to gen­eral and special directions as may be issued by the Chairman from time to time. It is said that in the exigency of circumstances the pe­titioners were appointed purely on temporary basis consistent with Regulation 8 of 1960 Regulations read with Life Insurance Corpo­ration of India (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993"). It was clearly mentioned in the ap­pointment letters that the same is temporary and shall not entitle the petitioners to claim regular appointment or any other benefit on the basis of the said appointment. While sub­mitting joining, all the petitioners submitted acceptance letters whereby they declared to have accepted all the conditions mentioned in the appointment letters. The procedure of appointment on regular basis is different than that of temporary. The petitioners have not undergone such procedure meant for regular appointment. The provisions contained in 1960 Regulations read with Instructions, 1993 are statutory. The petitioners cannot be con­sidered for regularization contrary to the said provisions. The respondents have rightly pro­ceeded to make regular appointment by issu­ing advertisement. The judgment of this Court in Kailash Nath (supra) has no application as that was a case of class-IV employees and stands on totally different facts and provi­sions. The petitioners cannot be con­sidered for regularization contrary to the said provisions. The respondents have rightly pro­ceeded to make regular appointment by issu­ing advertisement. The judgment of this Court in Kailash Nath (supra) has no application as that was a case of class-IV employees and stands on totally different facts and provi­sions. No mandamus can be issued to LIC to act in a manner contrary to the statute. The petitioners are workmen under Industrial Dis­putes Act and have an alternative remedy of raising an industrial dispute for redressed of their grievances before the Industrial Tribu­nal, therefore, also the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is also stated that the petitioners in 2010 (VI) ALJ 739 fact have approached the Regional Commis­sioner, Kanpur and, therefore, also this Court may not entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since it is not a fit case warranting such interfer­ence. 6. The petitioners have filed a supplemen­tary affidavit to meet the preliminary objec­tion that the petitioners have approached the Regional Labour Commissioner, Kanpur and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintain­able. It is pointed out therein that the stand of LIC throughout has been that Industrial Dis­putes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act') is not applicable to the petition­ers who are employed on temporary basis. The petitioners as such are not claiming any relief under any labour legislation and fur­ther that they have no right to raise an indus­trial dispute straightway, therefore, it cannot be said that they have a statutory alternative remedy under 1947 Act or that by approach­ing the Regional Labour Commissioner the petitioners have already invoked jurisdiction touching alternative remedy which may jus­tify dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. In all fitness of the things it would be appropriate that this matter should be heard and decided by this Court on merits particularly since it is squarely covered by a Division Bench deci­sion of this Court in Kailash Nath (2008 (2) ALJ (NOC) 548) (supra). 7. In the rejoinder affidavit, so far as the powers of LIC for framing regulations is con­cerned, the same is not disputed but it is said that Regulation 8 in so far as it deny certain benefits to temporary employees is volatile of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. In the rejoinder affidavit, so far as the powers of LIC for framing regulations is con­cerned, the same is not disputed but it is said that Regulation 8 in so far as it deny certain benefits to temporary employees is volatile of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are not part time em­ployees but they are discharging similar duties as are being discharged by the regular employees. The respondents have no author­ity to continue the petitioner on temporary appointment beyond 12 months. The petition­ers are not back door entries but have been selected after requisition of the vacancies to employment exchanges and have undergone the process of interview, therefore, are entitled for regularization. The temporary appoint­ment means the appointment for a short period but when continue for a long time it seizes to be mere temporary. The vacancies/ posts against which the petitioners have been appointed are permanent vacancies. No ap­pointment on temporary basis can be made against permanent posts/vacancies. The ap­pointments made on temporary basis against permanent posts with an intention to deprive the petitioners certain benefits is per se arbi­trary in view of the Apex Court's decision in Venu Gopal v. Union of India, 2008(2) SCC (L&S) 50: (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 969) and (Contd. on col. 2) the Division Bench judgment in Kailash Nath (supra) is fully applicable. 8. The Writ Petition No. 28833 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the "second writ petition") has been filed by 28 petitioners wherein also the facts are similar. All these petitioners were appointed on various dates in the year 1998 and their appointment let­ters have been filed collectively as Annex-ure-3 to the writ petition. The details of their appointment and place of posting is as un­der: Sr. No. Name Date of Joining Post Branch 1. Manish Dwivedi 25.05.1998 Assistant CBO-1 Jhansi 2. Anand Govind Bhave 25.05.1998 Assistant CBO-1 Jhansi 3. Shrasti Srivastava 25.05.1998 Assistant CBO-1 Jhansi 4. Soma Rai 28.05.1998 Assistant CBO-2 Jhansi 5. Ram Mohan Niranjan 08.06.1998 Assistant Orai 6. Devendra Singh 08.06.1998 Assistant Orai 7. Farhat Alam 08.06.1998 Assistant Orai 8. Suresh Kumar Soni 10.12.1998 Assistant Mahoba 9. Kamlesh Kumar 02.06.1998 Assistant Mahoba 10. Tanzeem Akhtar 02.06.1998 Assistant Mahoba 11. Rekha Singh 10.12.1998 Assistant Mahoba 12. Ashok Pamnani 23.06.1998 Assistant Mauranipur Jhansi 13. Amol Prasad Rajak 23.06.1998 Assistant Mauranipur Jhansi 14. Navad Jafar 18.08.1998 Assistant Rath 15. Devendra Singh 08.06.1998 Assistant Orai 7. Farhat Alam 08.06.1998 Assistant Orai 8. Suresh Kumar Soni 10.12.1998 Assistant Mahoba 9. Kamlesh Kumar 02.06.1998 Assistant Mahoba 10. Tanzeem Akhtar 02.06.1998 Assistant Mahoba 11. Rekha Singh 10.12.1998 Assistant Mahoba 12. Ashok Pamnani 23.06.1998 Assistant Mauranipur Jhansi 13. Amol Prasad Rajak 23.06.1998 Assistant Mauranipur Jhansi 14. Navad Jafar 18.08.1998 Assistant Rath 15. Satya Prakash 23.06.1998 Assistant Rath 16. Narendra Kumar 28.12.1998 Assistant Rath 17. Susheel Kushwaha 27.04.1998 Assistant Jalaun 18. Ashok Kumar 27.04.1998 Assistant Jalaun 19. Kundan Lal 27.05.1998 Assistant Lalitpur 20. Anurag 31.08.1998 Assistant Moradabad 21. Sanjay Nishad 12.11.1998 Assistant Moradabad 22. Musheehad Ali 12.11.1998 Assistant Amroha 23. Sandeep Saxena 10.11.1998 Assistant Moradabad 24. Gautam Devnath 31.08.1998 Assistant Moradabad 25. Aruna 31.08.1998 Assistant Moradabad 26. Neelofar 31.08.1998 Assistant Moradabad 27. Leena 31.08.1998 Assistant Ghaziabad 28. Rekha Saxena 12.11.1998 Assistant Ghaziabad 9. The other pleadings of the parties in the writ petition, counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit being similar to the first writ peti­tion, the same are not being repeated for the sake of brevity. 10. The Writ Petition No. 29166 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the "third writ pe­tition") has been filed by 37 petitioners. They were also appointed on various dates in the year 1998 on the post of Assistant. The other pleadings being similar the same are also not being repeated here for brevity. 11. However, before proceeding further there is an additional feature in respect to the third writ petition which needs to be noted here at. The petitioners No. 23,24,27,28,29, 30, 31 and 32 were appointed in various places which are in the State of Uttarakhand. The other pleadings being similar the same are also not being repeated here for brevity. 11. However, before proceeding further there is an additional feature in respect to the third writ petition which needs to be noted here at. The petitioners No. 23,24,27,28,29, 30, 31 and 32 were appointed in various places which are in the State of Uttarakhand. A preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition on behalf of the aforesaid peti­tioners is not maintainable before this Court since the entire cause of action to the said petitioners has arisen in the State of Uttrakhand and the mere fact that the adver­tisement has been published by North Cen­tral Zonal Office, Kanpur for vacancies of various Divisions in State of U.P. and Uttarakhand would not confer any territorial jurisdiction upon this Court to maintain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution inasmuch as the relief No. 1 i.e. the adver­tisement is dependent upon the second relief sought by these petitioners i.e. a mandamus commanding the respondents to regularize the services of petitioners as class-Ill employees and for getting the second relief executed the petitioners have imp leaded the Senior Divi­sional Manager, Divisional Office, Dehra-doon as respondent No. 4. For the relief of regularization the entire cause of action has arisen in the State of Uttarakhand. Even a part of cause of action has not arisen in the State of U.P. conferring territorial jurisdiction upon this Court to maintain this writ petition on behalf of aforesaid petitioners here at. Hence the third writ petition is liable to be dismissed qua petitioners No. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. 12. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 13. Besides oral submissions, Sri B.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in the first writ petition and Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the respondents have also submitted their written submissions. The other learned counsels appearing for the pe­titioners have adopted arguments advanced by Sri B.N. Singh. 14. Coming firstly to the preliminary ob­jection with respect to maintainability of third writ petition on behalf of petitioners No. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32,1 find that the substantive relief of the petitioners is that they should be regularized as class-III employees pursuant to their temporary appointment and against the posts they are holding. 14. Coming firstly to the preliminary ob­jection with respect to maintainability of third writ petition on behalf of petitioners No. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32,1 find that the substantive relief of the petitioners is that they should be regularized as class-III employees pursuant to their temporary appointment and against the posts they are holding. It is in fur­therance thereof that they have challenged the advertisement (Annexure-1 to the writ peti­tion) since it is their claim that the posts on which they are working have also been ad­vertised by the respondent No. 2 and once regular selection is made there against, the petitioners will not be able to get any effec­tive relief with respect to regularization. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not dispute that so far as the second relief is con­cerned no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court i.e. in the State of U.P. and if the writ petition so far as this part of cause of action is con­cerned is held to be without jurisdiction, the petitioners would not be able to make any effective case in respect to relief No. 1 also. In these circumstances, Sri B.N. Singh, as­sisted by Sri Satya Veer Singh, learned coun­sel for the petitioners stated at the bar that so far as the petitioners No. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 are concerned they may be given liberty to avail appropriate remedy be­fore the appropriate forum and to this extent their petition be dismissed as withdrawn. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has no objection to this re­quest. 15. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition No. 29166 of 2008 is dismissed qua petition­ers No. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 as withdrawn with the liberty to avail such rem­edy as available in law before the appropri­ate forum. 16. Another preliminary objection of the respondents is about the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy since the petitioners being workmen are entitled to raise an industrial dispute un­der 1947 Act. 16. Another preliminary objection of the respondents is about the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy since the petitioners being workmen are entitled to raise an industrial dispute un­der 1947 Act. It is submitted that in fact a reference was made to the Central Govern­ment Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court, Kanpur U.P. vide Government of India's or­der dated 2nd April, 2009 to the following effect: - "Whether the action of the management of LIC of India in not regularizing the ser­vices of Shri Suresh Kumar Chaturvedi & 46 other temporary assistant working (As per Annexure-A) since 1998 is just and legal? What relief these workmen are entitled to?" 17. Sri Manish Goyal, therefore, submit that since an industrial dispute has already been raised by some of the petitioners, they should be relegated to alternative remedy and all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 18. Sri B.N.Singh, drew my attention on Supplementary Affidavit -IV filed on behalf of the petitioners in July, 2009 stating that an application was filed by the petitioners be­fore the Industrial Tribunal that since writ petition is already pending before the Allahabad High Court, filed much earlier, therefore, the adjudication case pending be­fore the Tribunal be dismissed as not pressed so that there may not be any impediment in the decision of the writ petition. 19. It appears that no objection thereon was raised by the respondents and thereafter the Tribunal by its order dated 29th May, 2009 permitted to withdraw the I.D. Case No.23 of 2009. In these circumstances no reference under 1947 Act can be said to be pending before the Tribunal. 20. In the present matter, one of the ques­tion for consideration may be whether such kind of withdrawal of industrial dispute is permissible and secondly whether the refer­ence having been allowed to withdraw can be revived again by raising an industrial dis­pute or not. On this aspect, learned counsels for the parties could not throw much light but one thing is clear that LIC also did not op­pose the withdrawal of reference on the ground observing that there is no provision where under the Tribunal can decline to answer a reference on the ground that the work-1 man wants to withdraw the same. On this aspect, learned counsels for the parties could not throw much light but one thing is clear that LIC also did not op­pose the withdrawal of reference on the ground observing that there is no provision where under the Tribunal can decline to answer a reference on the ground that the work-1 man wants to withdraw the same. When with I the consent of the employer such an order de I facto has been passed by the Tribunal, should I the petitioners be rendered without any remedy when the dispute before this Court is I pending from a period much prior to the date when the reference was made. Even other­wise, I find as well also be shown later that there is a very long chain of litigation between the employees of LIC and LIC itself through­out the country which has traveled the Apex Court a number of times. Pure legal issues are raised which do not require investigation into disputed question of facts. In these cir­cumstances, I am not inclined to non suit the petitioners on the ground of alternative rem­edy since the decision of this Court shall not only avoid multiplicity of litigation but also save parties from further state of indecisive-ness, which would be conducive for the peaceful functioning of the employer's insti­tution and its development. 21. Now I proceed to consider the respec­tive submissions advanced by the parties to decide all these writ petitions on merits. 22. Sri B.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners has formulated seven questions which according to him need adjudication. I propose to first mention the aforesaid issues and thereafter shall consider them separately noticing the rival submissions. "A. Whether petitioners are to be treated as temporary employee under regulation 8(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulation 1960 (For short "Regulation")? B. Whether a temporary employee permit­ted to be appointed only for 85 days or maxi­mum 120 days by competent authority under Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993, if con­tinue beyond the said period would be en­titled for absorption/ regularisation against regular vacancies without undergoing the pro­cedure of recruitment prescribed under In­structions 1993? C. Whether petitioners' appointment would be/is a back door entry or the result of a fair and bona fide selection at the relevant time as per orders of the competent author­ity? C. Whether petitioners' appointment would be/is a back door entry or the result of a fair and bona fide selection at the relevant time as per orders of the competent author­ity? D. Whether petitioners are entitled to be granted relaxation for appointment under regulation No. 86 of the Staff Regulation if there has been any irregularity in the process of appointment of the petitioners? E. Whether petitioners are entitled to get equal pay for equal work, increment, allow­ances and other services benefits as admis­sible to regular assistant from the initial date of appointment keeping in view of the provi­sion of the Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Con­stitution of India? F. Whether the action of the corporation keeping the petitioner as temporary asstt., against a permanent job and post and deny­ing to the petitioners regular scale of pay, annual increment, deduction of Provident Fund, medical benefits, leave, productivity link lump sum incentive (P.L.L.I.), L.T.C., promotion in next Higher Grade, after completion of 10 years of service, computer increment/allowances leave encashment, graduation allowance etc. which is paid to regular assistant is discriminatory and amount to "Unfair Labour Practice"?" G. Whether provisions of "Unfair Labour Practice" as defined under section 2(ra) read with schedule Vth of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947,(for short "1947 Act") is not appli­cable as pleaded by the respondents in para 5 CA and whether the provision of section 2(ra) read with schedule Vth, are in conflict with the provision of staff Regulation? 23. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the respondents referring to the aforesaid questions contended where the statutory pro­visions do not empower the employer to regularise certain persons not appointed in accordance with rules, and the employees claim is also barred by statutory provisions, no relief in any manner can be granted to the petitioners. Questions A & B 24.1 propose to deal with the questions A and B together. It is the case of the petition­ers themselves as is evident from para 6 of the writ petition and Annexure-5 thereof also that the Divisional Office of LIC, Varanasi permitted the Branch Manager, LIC (Branch Renukut) to make temporary appointments, though for a longer period i.e. to continue till the regularly selected candidates are not avail­able. Para 1 of Annexure-4 of the writ peti­tion reads as under: (Vernacular matter omitted.... Ed.) 1. Para 1 of Annexure-4 of the writ peti­tion reads as under: (Vernacular matter omitted.... Ed.) 1. These temporary appointments are to be made for a long period, that is, these appoint­ments shall continue until they are filled by regularly selected candidates. Hence, you shall requisition a new list from the local Em­ployment Exchange and shall make appoint­ments after holding interviews etc. as per rule. Take note that these temporary appointments are not to be made from the already existing list or panel received from the Employment Exchange. Full details of the appointed persons be sent to us after their appointment. A copy of the list received from the Employment Ex­change for these appointments must also be sent to us." (English Translation by Court) 25. Further the requisition sent to Employ­ment Exchange also mention that recruitment on the post of Assistant is for temporary ap­pointment, it was also mentioned in the com­munication issued by the Employment Ex­change to the petitioners as is evident from Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The only pro­cess of selection followed in the case is inter­view and thereafter the appointment letters were issued. The entire record shows and in fact this is not disputed by the petitioners that their appointments were temporary. It would be useful to reproduce the conditions of ap­pointment contained in one of such appoint­ment letter i.e. of petitioner No. 1 in the first writ petition: (Vernacular matter omitted.... Ed.) "For five temporary posts of Assistants falling vacant due to the matter of regular recruitment of employees in the Runukul of­fice of your Corporation being undecided, appointment is being proposed vide this let­ter, at the remuneration of Rs. 36747- per month, which is equivalent to the minimum pay applicable to your post of temporary ap­pointment and allowances admissible there on. 2- The aforesaid temporary appointment of yours shall be governed by the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Em­ployment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993 and the said temporary appointment shall be restricted up to the period till regular recruitment is made of any candidate. 2- The aforesaid temporary appointment of yours shall be governed by the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Em­ployment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993 and the said temporary appointment shall be restricted up to the period till regular recruitment is made of any candidate. 3- Any provision of Life Insurance Cor­poration of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, save its Rule 8, or any rules enforced by the Central Government under section 48 of Life Insurance Corporation of India shall not be applicable to you during the duration of your temporary appointment in the Corporation, but you shall comply with written and oral orders and instructions issued from time to time by any person or authority under whose control your services are vested at that time 4-(A) Besides the remuneration mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph No. 1, you will be also entitled to get the following leave facili­ties: - 1. If your temporary appointment is of 30 days or above, you will be able to avail ca­sual leave at the rate of 11A days per month, on one occasion subject to completion of one month of such appointment. For this calcula­tion, 'one month' will mean 'the period of 30 days'. Casual leave shall be sanctioned for the whole or half of the working time. 2. Earned leave shall be admissible at the rate of one day for every spell of 11 days' actual working. (B) As written above, you will be able to avail earned leave only during the duration of temporary appointment. Any leave not availed during the duration of temporary ap­pointment, shall terminate only with the ces­sation of your appointment. 5- By virtue of this temporary appointment you will not be entitled to get any other ben­efit of any sort as a temporary measure. Be­sides, you should clearly understand that on the basis of this temporary appointment you will be able neither to seek any priority in the appointment to any post nor to lay any claim for absorption regularization in the services of the Corporation. 6- This appointment of yours is being made purely on a temporary basis which will cease I on the expiry of the term mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph - 1, and if it become a necessary, this term shall be terminated with-i out assigning any reason. 6- This appointment of yours is being made purely on a temporary basis which will cease I on the expiry of the term mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph - 1, and if it become a necessary, this term shall be terminated with-i out assigning any reason. 7- If you are willing to accept the above-written terms and conditions, you are required to immediately report to the Corporation of­fice mentioned in paragraph -1 for assuming charge. In any circumstance, this proposal shall be treated as cancelled on your failure to report within the period of seven days." (English Translation by Court) 26. It is not disputed that similar condi­tions of appointment are contained in other letters of appointment of remaining petition­ers, therefore, what was represented by the respondents to the petitioners as also the pro­cess of recruitment and appointment etc. makes it very clear that appointment of peti­tioners was temporary. 27. The factum of process for appointment followed by the respondents and the condi­tions with which the appointment letters were issued are, in fact, not in dispute. The dispute really centred around is whether legally such appointment can be said to be temporary as claimed by the respondents or confer some sort of right upon the petitioners to claim se­curity of tenure and other benefits as are ad­missible to other regular' appointees. 28. Therefore, in order to proceed further, it would be necessary to have a bird eye view of the relevant provisions applicable in the matter. 29. The LIC was constituted under the 1956 Act. This Act was enacted to provide for nationalization of life insurance business in India by transferring all such business to a Corporation established for the purpose, and, to provide for regulation and control of the business of the Corporation and for matters connected thereto with or incidental thereto. Section 48 of Act, 1956 enables the Central Government to make Rules to carry out pur­poses of the Act by notification in the Offi­cial Gazette. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of Act, 1956 lays down certain matters for which Rules may be made without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1). As usual, sub-section (3) provides for placing the rules by the Central Govern­ment before each House of Parliament. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of Act, 1956 lays down certain matters for which Rules may be made without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1). As usual, sub-section (3) provides for placing the rules by the Central Govern­ment before each House of Parliament. Sec­tion 49 of the Act, 1956 enables LIC to make Regulations not inconsistent with 1956 Act and the Rules made there under, with the pre­vious approval of the Central Government by notification in the Gazette of India to provide for all matters for which provision is expedi­ent for the purpose of giving effect to the pro­visions of the Act, 1956. Sub-section (2) of Section 49 of 1956 Act, lists certain matters for which Regulations, without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub­section (1), be made. Clause (bb) of sub-sec­tion 2 thereof was introduced in 1956 Act, by Amendment Act 17 of 1957 with retrospec­tive effect and it relates to terms and condi­tions of service of persons who have become employee of LIC under sub-section 1 of Sec­tion 11 of the Act. 30. In exercise of power under Section 49(2) (b) and (bb) of Act, 1956, LIC framed LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "1960 Regulations") which were notified in the Gazette of India dated 23.7.1960 and came into force on 1.7.1960. The said Regulations were framed with the previous approval of the Central Government. Regulation 2 provides for application and reads as under: "2. They shall apply to every whole-time (salaried) employee of the Corporation (in India) unless otherwise provided by the terms of any contract, agreement or letter of ap­pointment. Explanation: "Employee" excludes insur­ance agents and work-charged employees whose salaries are charged to particular prop­erty/properties or work/works. In the case of a female employee "he" and "his" are to be read as "she" and "her". 31. Regulation 4 empowers the Chairman of LIC to issue such instructions or directions as may be necessary to give effect and to carry out the provisions of the Regulations and to secure effective control over the staff em­ployed in the Corporation. Regulation 7 pro­vides for direct recruitment and promotion and reads as under: "7. (1) All recruitment and promotions shall be made against the vacancies in sanc­tioned posts. Regulation 7 pro­vides for direct recruitment and promotion and reads as under: "7. (1) All recruitment and promotions shall be made against the vacancies in sanc­tioned posts. (2) In making selections and promotions the appointing authority (vide Schedule I) shall be assisted by Committees herein pre-scribed:- Posts belonging to Class III. (a) Superintendents- one officer not below the rank of a Divisional Manager and two of­ficers not below the rank of Assistant Divi­sional Managers. (b) Higher Grade Assistants and Section Heads - one officer not below the rank of Assistant Divisional Manager and two offic­ers not below the rank of Administrative Of­ficers. (c) Assistants, Record Clerks and other similar posts - three officers not below the rank of Administrative Officers. Posts in Class IV: One Officer not below the rank of Admin­istrative Officer and two officers not below the rank of Assistant Administrative Offic­ers. Provided, however, the appointing author­ity may nominate on the aforesaid Commit­tees additional members if necessary. (3) Promotion shall be based on merit, suit­ability of the candidate for a particular post and seniority. Merit and suitability may be judged by confidential reports and/or inter­views and/or examinations. (4) Where an appointing authority subor­dinate to the Corporation is unable to accept the recommendation of the Committee it shall record in writing the reasons for disagreeing with the recommendation of the committee and pass such orders as it may deem fit." 32. Regulation 8 talks of appointment of temporary staff as follows: "8 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations, a Managing Director, Executive Director (Personnel), a Zonal Man­ager or a Divisional Manager may employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis subject to such general or special direc­tions as may be issued by the Chairman from time to time. (2) No person appointed under sub-regu­lation (1) shall only by reason of such ap­pointment be entitled to absorption in the ser­vice of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any post" 33. Regulation 14 talks of probation and 17 is in respect to officiating arrangement, and read as under: "14. (1) Persons appointed to posts belong­ing to Classes I & II shall, on the first ap­pointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. Regulation 14 talks of probation and 17 is in respect to officiating arrangement, and read as under: "14. (1) Persons appointed to posts belong­ing to Classes I & II shall, on the first ap­pointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. (2) Persons appointed to posts belonging to Classes III & IV shall, on the first appoint­ment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for 6 months. (3) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force the appointing authority may, at its discretion, dispense with, reduce or extend the probationary period, but in no case shall the total period of probation exceed - (a) In case of employees belonging to Classes I & II Two years (b) In other cases. One year. (4) During the period of probation an em­ployee shall be liable to be discharged from service without any notice." "17. (1) notwithstanding anything con­tained in Regulation 7, the competent author­ity may at its discretion appoint an employee to officiate in a vacancy in a sanctioned post in a higher cadre. (2) No person appointed to officiate un­der sub-regulation (1) shall by virtue of such appointment be entitled to any claim for pro­motion or for any increment in the higher scale. (3) An employee appointed to officiate in higher post shall be liable to be reverted with­out notice during the officiating period." 34. Regulation 86 confers power upon the Executive Committee of the Corporation to relax any of the provisions of Regulations in individual cases and reads as under: "86. The Executive Committee may, in the interest of the Corporation, for reasons to be specified in its resolution, relax any of the provisions of these Regulations in individual cases." 35. With effect from 31.1.1981, 1956 Act was amended by LIC (Amendment) Act, 1981. Section 2 thereof amended Section 48 of the 1956 Act by inserting Clause (cc) in sub-section (2) after clause (c) thereof. The new clause refers to the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the LIC including those who became employees and agents of the LIC on the appointed day under the Act. After sub-section (2) of Sec­tion 48 of the Act, three more sub-sections numbered as (2-A), (2-B) and (2-C) were in­troduced. The new clause refers to the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the LIC including those who became employees and agents of the LIC on the appointed day under the Act. After sub-section (2) of Sec­tion 48 of the Act, three more sub-sections numbered as (2-A), (2-B) and (2-C) were in­troduced. They read as follows: "(2-A) The regulations and other provi­sions as in force immediately before the com­mencement of the Life Insurance Corpora­tion (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of em­ployees and agents of the Corporation includ­ing those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day un­der this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, have effect accordingly. (2-B) The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of sub-section (2) shall include- (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and (ii) the power to amend by way of addi­tion, variation or repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2A), with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2-C) The provisions of Clause (cc) of sub­section (2) and sub-section (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospec­tive effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from the date, notwith­standing any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwith­standing anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force." 36. Section 49 of 1956 Act was amended by omitting clause (bb) and the words "and the terms and conditions of service of em­ployees or agents" in clause (b) of sub-sec­tion (2). Section 49 of 1956 Act was amended by omitting clause (bb) and the words "and the terms and conditions of service of em­ployees or agents" in clause (b) of sub-sec­tion (2). sub-section (3) was inserted after sub-section (2), which reads as follows: "Every regulation made under this sections shall be laid as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and if, be­fore the expiry of the session immediately following the session of the successive ses­sions aforesaid, both Houses agree in mak­ing any modification in the regulation or both Houses agree that the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation." 37. The validity of Amendment Act, 1981 and the Rules framed thereunder by the Cen­tral Government pertaining to bonus and dear-ness allowances for Class III and Class IV employees was challenged in A.V. Nachane v. Union of India 1982 (1) SCC 205 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1126 ). The said provisions were up­held except insofar as the Rules sought to ab­rogate the terms of certain settlement between LIC and workers of 1974, relating to bonus. It further appears that validity of certain pro­visions of 1960 Regulations with reference to the provisions of 1947 Act was challenged time and again by the employees of LIC through their associations. One of such deci­sion is of Hon'ble Madras High Court (Full Bench) in Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees' Welfare Association v. Sr. Divisional Manager, LIC of India Ltd. 1993 (1) SLR 290 and summing up its conclusions, the Hon'ble Court observed, (1) the LIC Staff Regulations, 1960 are valid and they are ap­plicable to the petitioners. (2) The provisions of Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to the petitioners with reference to matters covered up by Section 48 (2) (c) of LIC Act. 38. I am not referring to other conclusions being of no consequence for the issue to be adjudicated in this case. The judgment was rendered by the Hon'ble Madras High Court on 27.7.1992. (2) The provisions of Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to the petitioners with reference to matters covered up by Section 48 (2) (c) of LIC Act. 38. I am not referring to other conclusions being of no consequence for the issue to be adjudicated in this case. The judgment was rendered by the Hon'ble Madras High Court on 27.7.1992. It had no occasion at that stage to consider, then recently delivered judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana & oth­ers v. Piara Singh & others (1992) 4 SCC 118 : ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ), which indicate about the scheme for regularization of ad hoc/ tem­porary employees in Government and Public Sector undertakings. The matter against the judgment dated 27.7.1992 of Madras High Court was taken in appeal before the Apex Court in SLP (C) Nos. 20393-10413 of 1992 (E. Prabavathy & others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & another) and taking note of the decision in Piara Singh (supra), the Apex Court required LIC to work out a scheme for the purposes of regularization of employees who were granted ad hoc appoint­ment for 85 days at intervals from time to time. Pursuant to the said direction, it appears that LIC drafted a scheme and placed before the Apex Court which was approved by it with certain modifications and appeal was dis­posed of vide judgment dated 23.10.1992 in the following manner: "Mr. Salve, the learned counsel for the LIC, also informed us that in regard to future ad hoc appointments/ regularization the LIC is in the process of making a Scheme consis­tent with the guidelines laid down in Piara Singh's case so that this device of employ­ment for 85 days which has not been approved may not be resorted to in future. The Scheme contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of paragraph 1, which is as under, is approved subject to the postponement of the recruitment sched­uled in November, 1992 by at least six weeks and the LIC will proceed to regularize the employee eligible under the Scheme in ac­cordance with law. The Scheme contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of paragraph 1, which is as under, is approved subject to the postponement of the recruitment sched­uled in November, 1992 by at least six weeks and the LIC will proceed to regularize the employee eligible under the Scheme in ac­cordance with law. Scheme; (a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85 days in any two consecu­tive calendar years with the Life Insurance Corporation between 20th May, 1985 up till date and who conformed to the required eli­gibility criteria for regular recruitment on the dates of their initial temporary appointment will be permitted to compete for the next regu­lar recruitment to be made by the Life Insur­ance Corporation after the regular recruitment for these posts currently scheduled for No­vember, 1992. (b) The Candidates will be considered in their merits with all other candidate who may apply for such appointments, including those from the open market. (c)These Candidates will be given an age relaxation for applying for regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment for se­curing regular appointment with the Life In­surance Corporation. (d) If these candidates are otherwise eli­gible, they can apply for regular recruitment in the normal course. This regularization will in the circum­stances, be by selection for appointment. We make the above clauses of the Scheme a part of our order. Mr. Ramamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, further submitted that certain questions of law in regard to the interpreta­tion of Section 48 of the LIC Act, 1956 as amended by the LIC Amendment Act, 1981 and Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Dis­putes Act, 1947 arise for consideration in the present case in view of the judgment of the Madras High Court. We may state that we express no opinion on the said questions of law as they do not survive in view of the Scheme which LIC has worked out and which we have approved. It is not necessary for us to go into those questions and we leave them open for decision in an appropriate case in future. The Civil Appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs." 39. The issue decided by the Madras High Court, therefore, with reference to the 1947 Act vis-a-vis 1956 Act, became open for de­cision in future in an appropriate case. The Civil Appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs." 39. The issue decided by the Madras High Court, therefore, with reference to the 1947 Act vis-a-vis 1956 Act, became open for de­cision in future in an appropriate case. How­ever, LIC was not made to wait for long in this regard inasmuch this aspect came to be considered before a three-Judge Bench of Apex Court very soon in M. Venugopal v. Di­vision Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India (1994) 2 SCC 323 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1343 ). The judgment was rendered on 31.1.1994. The matter arose from a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ application filed on behalf of appellant M. Venugopal wherein the order of termina­tion during the period of probation was chal­lenged on the ground that the same amount to retrenchment and the procedure laid down in 1947 Act, having not been followed, the termination is illegal. The Apex Court held that in view of Section 48(2-C) and Section 48(2)(cc), the Regulations framed under Sec­tion 49 (2) (bb) are to be deemed to be the Rules framed under Section 48 (2) (cc) of 1956 Act, and shall have overriding effect over the provisions contained in 1947 Act. In para 14 of the judgment, the Court held: "14. The amendments introduced in Sec­tion 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Dis­putes Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will be that termination of the service of the appellant shall not be deemed to be a "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(oo) even if sub-section (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once Section 2(oo) is not attracted, there is no ques­tion of application of Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the service of the appellant dur­ing the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with I Regulation 14 of the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act." 40. There are two more provisions which may also be referred here at. The termination of the service of the appellant dur­ing the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with I Regulation 14 of the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act." 40. There are two more provisions which may also be referred here at. In exercise of power contained in Regulation 4 of 1960 Regulations, the Chairman, LIC issued a Cir­cular on 25.2.1993 containing Instructions titled as LIC Recruitment (of Class III and Class IV Staff) Instructions, 1993 (i.e. Instruc­tions, 1993). This superseded the existing In­structions of 1979 issued dated 27.11.1979 having a similar title. The Instructions, 1993 were made applicable to all recruitments in Class III and Class IV posts on administra­tive side. Para 4 of Instructions, 1993 pro­vides that the Instructions, 1993 shall be re­sorted only to the posts enumerated in Annexure 1 which provides following posts in Class III and Class IV: (1) Assistants; (2) Typists (English); (3) Typists (Hindi and regional language); (4) Stenographers; (5) Telephone Operators; (6) Record Clerks (7) Sub Staff (a) Sweepers, Cleaners and Hamals; (b) Peons, Watchmen, Liftmen and Driv­ers. 41. The manner of determination of vacan­cies and mode of recruitment and procedure, eligibility conditions, pre recruitment test, in­terview and process of appointment etc. is contained from paras 5 to 17 which I pro­pose to refer later on as and when necessary. At this stage, I find it expedient to mention that paras 22 and 23 provide for relaxations, concessions and reservations to Scheduled Caste/Schedules Tribe and physically handi­capped persons, as the case may be, but in paras 19, 20 and 21 some other relaxations are provided which are: "19. RLAXATION IN AGE LIMIT: The competent Authority may, in indi­vidual cases where exceptional circumstances exist, relax the upper age limit. Where the Appointing Authority is subordinate to the Competent Authority it may relax the upper age limit with the previous approval of the Competent Authority. Provided, however, employees serving in the Corporation and competing for a higher post in the Corpora­tion shall be entitled to relaxation in upper age limit. Provided further, the candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, Ex-servicemen, Physically Handi­capped shall be entitled to relaxation in up­per age limit as per instructions issued in this behalf from time to time. 20. RELAXATION IN QUALIFICA­TIONS: No relaxation in the minimum educational qualification shall be allowed. Provided further, the candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, Ex-servicemen, Physically Handi­capped shall be entitled to relaxation in up­per age limit as per instructions issued in this behalf from time to time. 20. RELAXATION IN QUALIFICA­TIONS: No relaxation in the minimum educational qualification shall be allowed. Provided the Competent Authority may under exceptional circumstances relax any of the qualifications in individual cases. 21. RELAXATION IN FAVOUR OF NEAR RELATIVES OF AN EMPLOYEE WHO DIES WHILE IN SERVICE OR RE­TIRES AT LEAST 5 YEARS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SUPERANNUATION: (i) There shall be relaxation in upper age limits and educational qualifications in favour of near relatives as defined in (ii) below, of an employee who dies while in service as pre­scribed in Annexure-III hereto. Where an employee is retired prematurely under Regulations 19(3) of the (Staff) Regu­lations, on health grounds or on being inca­pacitated for continuous service at least five years before the date of his superannuation, compassionate appointments may be made of one of the relatives mentioned in (ii) below subject to the candidate satisfying all the re­quirements as prescribed for appointments in the event of death while in service. Such ap­pointment may also be made where an em­ployee is retired prematurely at least five years before the date of his superannuation not for any misconduct but for poor performance. (ii) Such relaxations shall be admissible only in favour of a spouse, son of unmarried daughter of the employee. (iii) The relaxations shall be admissible only where none of the members of the fam­ily spouse, son or unmarried daughter is gain­fully employed. However, if the widow is already employed elsewhere in Private Sec­tor she will be allowed to take up a job in the Corporation in Class III or Class IV cadre commensurate with her qualifications if she opts for the same. (iv) The relaxation shall be admissible ei­ther to the spouse or to one of the children as specified. (v) The relaxations shall be admissible only if a request is received from the relative who satisfies the conditions of minimum edu­cational qualifications, age, etc. as prescribed, within a period of one year from the date of death of the employee or early retirement as specified. (v) The relaxations shall be admissible only if a request is received from the relative who satisfies the conditions of minimum edu­cational qualifications, age, etc. as prescribed, within a period of one year from the date of death of the employee or early retirement as specified. Provided that the time limit of one year may be extended in the cases specified below: a) A widow may be allowed up to 5 years from the date of death of her husband to se­cure the prescribed qualification for appoint­ment to Class III post in the Corporation. b) A major son or unmarried daughter who satisfies the qualification for appointment to Class IV post, may be allowed up to two years from the date of death to secure prescribed qualification for a Class III post if he/she so desires. c) up to three years from the date of death where all the children are minor. (vi) The mode recruitment as prescribed in para 6 supra need not be allowed for ap­pointments under Paragraph 21. (vii) All such appointments shall be sub­ject to the existence of a sanctioned vacancy. (viii) There shall be no pre-recruitment written test for the posts of Assistant, Stenog­rapher, Typist, Telephone Operator and Record Clerk. However, for appointment to the posts of Stenographers, Typists, and Tele­phone Operators, the eligible candidates shall qualify in the trade test as prescribed. (ix) There shall be no application fee pay­able; (x) The relative of the employee, selected for the post of Assistant shall not be required to undergo training as prescribed. (xi) Subject to the relaxations as provided herein, the selection of the relative of the employee, will be subject to his/her being found suitable for the post in the interview by the selection committee and in the medi­cal examination. All such appointments shall be at the minimum of the scale applicable to the post. On appointment he/she will be on probation as prescribed under the (Staff) Regulations and confirmation will be subject to the satisfactory work record. (xii) All appointments made subject to the relaxations herein shall be reported to the Zonal Office in a statement at the end of each financial year, who in turn shall send a con­solidated statement to the Central Office. (xiii) The application form shall be pre­scribed in Annexure IX hereto." 42. (xii) All appointments made subject to the relaxations herein shall be reported to the Zonal Office in a statement at the end of each financial year, who in turn shall send a con­solidated statement to the Central Office. (xiii) The application form shall be pre­scribed in Annexure IX hereto." 42. Immediately after issuance of Instruc­tions, 1993, another set of instructions was issued on 28.6.1993 titled as LIC (Employ­ment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993 (i.e. "Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993"). These Instructions of June' 1993 in the covering letter states that the same shave been framed in the light of the directions issued by the Apex Court while hearing the appeal filed by the temporary employees of Tamil Nadu division i.e. E. Prabavathy (supra) and is consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in Piara Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ) (supra). It further provides that the said instructions supersede all earlier instruc­tions issued from time to time regarding em­ployment of persons on temporary basis. It would be appropriate to reproduce the above paragraphs of the letter dated 28.6.1993 is­sued along with the Temporary Staff Instruc­tions, 1993 as under: "During the course of the hearing of the Special Leave Petitions filed by the tempo­rary employees of the Tamil Nadu Divisions before the Supreme Court, our counsel had informed the Court that hi regard to future ad hoc appointments/regularization, the Corpo­ration is in the process of making a scheme consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the State of Haryana & Ors. v. Piara Singh and Ors. etc. (Ref.: JT 1992 (5) 179): ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ). The Chairman has, accordingly, been pleased to formulate a scheme to regulate the employ­ment of temporary staff. A copy of the scheme known as "Life Insurance Corporation of In­dia (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instruc­tion, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Employment Instructions) is en­closed. The said instructions supersede all the earlier instructions issued from time to time with regard to employment of persons on tem­porary basis, whether badli or temporary or by whatever name they are called." 43. Para II of Temporary Staff Instructions 1993 talks of the persons to whom the said Instructions are applicable, Para III (b) (d) (e) and 0) defines the kind of employees to who the instructions are applicable. Para II of Temporary Staff Instructions 1993 talks of the persons to whom the said Instructions are applicable, Para III (b) (d) (e) and 0) defines the kind of employees to who the instructions are applicable. These are: "b. "Casual employee" means a persons who is employed for work of an occasional or intermittent nature, whether he be paid on a daily rate basis or otherwise." "d. "Part-time employee" means a person appointed other than on a whole-time basis." "e. "Persons on contract basis" or "Self-contractors" means persons engaged on any particular assignment or for the performance of any specific work on payment of lump sum consideration even if such payment be stag­gered over a period of time and whose en­gagement is on the basis of a contract entered into by the Corporation and such contractor." "j. "Work-charged employee" means a per­son whose wages are charged to a particular property/properties or work or works." 44. The terms "Recruitment Instructions" is defined in para 3(f) and the term "Tempo­rary Staff' is defined in para 3 (i) and they read as under: "f. "Recruitment Instructions" means the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Recruit­ment of Class III and Class IV Staff) Instruc­tions, 1993." "i. "Temporary Staff means a person/s who is/are employed on a temporary basis or against a temporary vacancy for a specified period." 45. Para 4 provides the circumstances when temporary staff may be appointed in Class III and Class IV posts and the proce­dure for appointment is provided in para 5 which read as under: "IV. Scope of employment: Employment of temporary staff in Class III and Class IV posts may be made under the circumstances and against the posts men­tioned below: - 1. Temporary appointments to Class III posts: - a. Employment of temporary staff in Class III may be made only to the posts of Assis­tants and Typists and none else. Scope of employment: Employment of temporary staff in Class III and Class IV posts may be made under the circumstances and against the posts men­tioned below: - 1. Temporary appointments to Class III posts: - a. Employment of temporary staff in Class III may be made only to the posts of Assis­tants and Typists and none else. b. The circumstances under which employ­ment of temporary staff in Class in posts may be made are: - i) pendency of the recruitment of staff on a regular basis, in accordance with the provi­sions of the Recruitment Instructions; ii) against vacancies arising out of the ab­sence on maternity leave of a regular female employee or of a regular employee on grounds of sickness for a period exceeding one month; and iii) against ad hoc vacancies sanctioned by the Zonal Manager to cope up with work of a seasonal nature such as to handle new busi­ness or for closing of accounts or the like. 2. Temporary appointments to Class IV posts: a. Employment of temporary staff in Class IV may be made to the posts of peon, watch­man, liftman and sweeper-cum-cleaner and none else. b. the circumstances under which employ­ment of temporary staff in Class IV posts may be made are: i. to raise the number of sub-staff (peons) available in a Branch Officer having a sanc­tioned strength of peons mentioned in col­umn 1 on a particular working day to the level mentioned in column 2 below, on account of absence of regular sub-staff. Branch office The level to which on having sanctioned temporary employment strength of peons the number of peons in Branch Office may be raised to (1) (2) 2 2 3 2 4 to 5 3 6 to 7 4 and ii. against vacancies arising out of the absence of regular staff in the posts of watchman, liftman and sweeper-cum-cleaner. V. Procedure for employment: The procedure for employment of tempo­rary staff in Class III and Class IV posts is as follows: 1. Employment in class III posts:- a. The Recruitment Instructions provide for the preparation of a panel of candidates for appointment on a regular basis. After offer­ing regular appointments to such candidates in their order of ranking to the extent vacan­cies are available the remaining candidates in the panel may be offered appointment on a temporary basis as and when circumstances arise under para IV (1) (b) above. After offer­ing regular appointments to such candidates in their order of ranking to the extent vacan­cies are available the remaining candidates in the panel may be offered appointment on a temporary basis as and when circumstances arise under para IV (1) (b) above. While or­dinarily temporary appointments are to be offered by the Divisional Office to candidates in the panel in their order of ranking, where the vacancy arises in an office at a place which cannot be filled up by a candidate in accor­dance with his ranking and a candidate next available for regular appointment in the or­der of ranking is not willing to accept the tem­porary employment, the order of ranking may be departed from. In such an event, the pro­cedure specified in the following paragraph may be followed. b. In the event of such an arrangement as mentioned in sub-para (a) of para V(1) is not possible, after recording the reasons for the departure from the procedure mentioned in the said paragraph, the Sr./Divisional Man­ager may authorise in writing the Sr./Branch Manager to employ temporary staff from among the persons who satisfy all the eligi­bility conditions for recruitment of Class III staff under the Recruitment Instructions through the local Employment Exchange. 2. Employment in Class IV posts: - a. The panels prepared under the Recruit­ment Instructions by the Divisional Office will be made available to all the Branch Of­fices under it. Whenever a need arises for tem­porary employment, a candidate who is re­siding in the area of the concerned Branch and who is next in ranking in the panel will be offered temporary employment if, how­ever, such a candidate is not available for tem­porary employment or is not willing to ac­cept the temporary employment, the order of ranking may be departed from. b. in the event such an arrangement is not possible, after recording the reasons for the departure from the procedure mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, the Sr./ Divisional Manager may authorize, in writ­ing, the Sr./Branch Manager to employ tem­porary staff from among persons who satisfy all the eligibility conditions for recruitment of Class IV staff under the Recruitment in­structions through the local Employment Exchange. c. Where, however, the need is immediate and it is not possible to follow the above pro­cedure, the Sr./Branch Manager may, after recording the steps taken to employ tempo­rary staff in accordance with the provisions above, employ temporary staff from out of the persons available locally, provided such a person satisfies all the eligibility conditions for recruitment of staff to the particular post under the Recruitment Instructions. Since in such appointments neither the procedure pre­scribed under the Recruitment Instructions is adhered to nor the safeguards in the proce­dure under sub-para (b) above are available, in order to ensure that the appointments are not only done in a fair manner but are also perceived to be so, the temporary staff so employed should not be the relative of any serving or retired employee of the Corpora­tion. Needless to add, the occasion for such employment should be very rare and the du­ration of such employment should also be very short. 3. Reservation of posts for SC/ST candi­dates: - The rules for reservation of posts for the SC/ST candidates apply to employment of temporary staff for a period of 45 days or more and are to be complied with scrupu­lously." 46. Para 6 talks of duration of temporary employment and para 7 provides for consid­eration for temporary employee for regular recruitment and para 8 provides for tenure of employment and read as under: "VI. Duration of temporary employment: One temporary employee is not to be re­placed by another temporary employee and he must be replaced only by a regularly se­lected employee. Consequently, in all cases where temporary appointment is being made out of the panels prepared under the Recruit­ment Instructions, such temporary employ­ment may be continued so long as the need for such employment remains or until the short-listed employee in the panel is entitled to be offered a regular appointment as per his ranking in the panel. In the event of the need for temporary employment arising intermit­tently, whether against the same vacancy or not, since it is not a requirement of law that a person who had earlier worked should be of­fered temporary employment for the subse­quent spells as well, the persons employed on earlier occasions in terms of para V(1)(b) or para V(2) (b) or V(2) (c) are not to be employed for the subsequent spells. The person employed temporarily must be specifically put on notice the circumstances under which he is being offered temporary employment i.e., pending recruitment of a regular employee to fill up the concerned vacancy, or during the absence of a regular employee on leave or otherwise, or against an ad-hoc vacancy created for the specific purpose of handling the new business inflow, closing of accounts, etc. In other words, the appointment letter must clearly indicate the vacancy, regular or ad-hoc, duly sanctioned against which the temporary employment is being made and the duration of temporary employment. In no case shall a person be offered temporary employ­ment for a specific period, say 85 days, against a continuing vacancy and, after a break of a few days, be again employed tem­porarily for any number of occasion (as it would amount to an unfair labour practice). As temporary employment can be made only against specified vacancies (regular or ad hoc), long-duration vacancies such as those which are likely to last longer than 120 days (being the maximum number of days of privi­lege leave that can be granted at any one time to a regular employee)have to be filled up necessarily by candidates from the panel pre­pared under the Recruitment Instructions and awaiting appointment on a regular basis and not by any other person. VII. Consideration of temporary employ­ees for regular recruitment: Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 8 of the (Staff) Regulations stipulates that no person appointed on a temporary basis shall only by reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the service of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any post. In view of this and the fact that these instructions provide that temporary employ­ment in vacancies of long duration or in va­cancies arising intermittently, be only of per­sons who have been empanelled in accor­dance the Recruitment Instructions, no tem­porary employee will be considered for ab­sorption. But, he may compete along with other eligible candidates for recruitment on a regular basis under the Recruitment Instruc­tions, as and when such recruitment takes place, provided he satisfies all the eligibility conditions then in force. Where such a tem­porary employee has worked for a minimum period of 85 days or more in a financial year, he will, however, be allowed relaxation in upper age limit to compete in the immedi­ately following regular recruitment under the Recruitment Instructions. VIII. Where such a tem­porary employee has worked for a minimum period of 85 days or more in a financial year, he will, however, be allowed relaxation in upper age limit to compete in the immedi­ately following regular recruitment under the Recruitment Instructions. VIII. Tenure of employment; Though temporary employment can be made only against a vacancy, whether regu­lar or ad hoc, since no temporary employee has a right to the post held by him, such tem­porary employment will automatically come to an end on the expiry of the period for which he is employed. If, however, on account of any misconduct, it becomes necessary to ter­minate such employment before the expiry of the period for which he is employed it may be done only after giving him an opportunity to defend himself against the charge. While this does not mean a departmental enquiry in terms of Regulation 39 of the (Staff) Regula­tions, it is necessary that he be issued a charge-sheet and allowed an opportunity to defend the charges in an oral enquiry." 47. Para 9 provides for wages and condi­tions of service and for our purpose, the rel­evant extract of provision pertaining to wages, being relevant is reproduced as under: "IX. Wages and other terms and conditions of service: 1. Wages: A person employed on a temporary basis for a month or more shall be paid the same wages as are drawn by a regular employee at the minimum of the scale applicable to the post on which the temporary employment is made. If the employment is for a period of less than a month, the temporary employee " shall be paid wages for each day at the rate of l/26th of the minimum monthly wages in the scale of pay applicable to the said post, so, however, that the wages payable for a month does not exceed the salary for the month." 48. Para 10 empowers the Chairman to modify, alter the said instructions at any time and reads as under: "X. In the light of the experience gained on the working of these instructions, the Chairman may at any time modify, whether by way of alteration, addition, deletion or oth­erwise, these instructions or rescind the same." 49. Para 10 empowers the Chairman to modify, alter the said instructions at any time and reads as under: "X. In the light of the experience gained on the working of these instructions, the Chairman may at any time modify, whether by way of alteration, addition, deletion or oth­erwise, these instructions or rescind the same." 49. From a comparison of the provisions under Instructions, 1993 and Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993, certain apparent major differences in mode of recruitment are evi­dent as under: Regular Temporary 1 Zonal Level (For more than one Division) Branch Level 2 Pre-recruitment Test (+) Interview (+) Medical Ex­amination No process. Only requirement to satis­fy eligibility condi­tions i.e., age, edu­cational and trade qualification. 3. Preparation of Ranking List and Empanelment No Ranking List. No empanelment 4. Different marks for Written Test and Interview. No such condition 5. Staff Regulations applicable Staff Regulations not applicable. Appointment con­tractual 6. Separate format of application and advertisement clearly showing the purpose and objective of ad­vertisement and application. Different format clearly stipulating invitation of application for tem­porary purposes only and not for the pur­poses of empanelment 50. Except of para 8 of Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 where a limited right has been conferred upon the staff recruited in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993, no pro­cedure has been provided for regularization of temporary staff appointed in accordance with the procedure provided in Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993. 51. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that under Temporary Staff Instruc­tions, 1993 the appointment could not have been made for a period beyond 120 days as provided in para 6 of Temporary Staff Instruc­tions, 1993. However, since the petitioner, in the case in hand, were appointed in 1998 and 1999 and have continued to work for almost a decade, he submits that after such a long time, the petitioners cannot be treated to be mere temporary staff under Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 but since such a long en­gagement under Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 is prohibited, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be treated as regularly ap­pointed under Instructions, 1993. 52. 52. On the contrary, Sri Manish Goyal sub­mits that the mere fact that the petitioners have continued for a period of more than 120 days, would not make them regular staff in­stead of temporary staff inasmuch a regular staff is only one which is recruited and ap­pointed in accordance with the procedure pre­scribed in Instructions, 1993. Since the peti­tioners have not been recruited according to the said procedure, even if they have contin­ued for a long period, still they cannot get a better status than what was actually conferred upon them. 53.1 propose to consider whether the peti­tioners can be said to be temporary employee or having worked for a period beyond 120 days, they cease to be a temporary employee. The procedure observed by the respondents in making appointment of the petitioners is not in dispute. It is admitted by the petitioners that pursuant to the requisition sent to various Employment Exchanges at divisional level, the names of the petitioners were forwarded by the concerned Employment Exchanges. The two different procedures prescribed under Rules, confer different rights, privileges and tenure. It makes very clear that the incumbents re­cruited in accordance with one set of Rules cannot be said to be the employees at par with those who are recruited following the other set of Rules. One of the foremost principles well established in law is that when a proce­dure is prescribed to do something in a par­ticular manner the things otherwise would be illegal. In Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Lim­ited v. Essar Power Limited, JT 2008(3) SC 336: AIR 2008 SC 1921 the Apex Court said that " It is well settled that where a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner, and in no other manner." 54. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Private Limited and others AIR 2003 SC 511 the Apex Court said "When a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in the same manner or not at all." 55. Similarly, in Meera Sahni v. Lt. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Private Limited and others AIR 2003 SC 511 the Apex Court said "When a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in the same manner or not at all." 55. Similarly, in Meera Sahni v. Lt. Gover­nor of Delhi and others 3.T. (2008) 8 SC 284: (2008 AIR SCW 5807) the Apex Court said: "It is by now a certain law that an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statuette, must be taken, done or per­formed in the manner prescribed and in no other manner." 56. The Apex Court in Meera Sahni (su­pra) traced out the history of the above rule in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 fol­lowed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 wherein it was said that "where a power is given to do a cer­tain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.". The Court found that the said dictum was approved by the Apex Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 Cri.LJ.910 and again in and thereafter in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1527 : 1962 (1) SCR 662 ; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 : 1964 (4) SCR 485 and Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1281 ). I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of other decisions which have fol­lowed the same principle, in the absence of any otherwise view taken by the Apex Court in any other matter. 57. Once it is clear that a clear cut demar­cated distinct procedure is prescribed for the two types of appointment under two sets of statutory provisions, it would be difficult to allow the persons recruited under one set of rules to another particularly in the absence of any enabling provision to do so. Any other view would result in defeating the statutory provisions providing otherwise which is nei­ther permissible nor must be done by this Court being a Court of law and bound to up­hold rule of law. 58. Any other view would result in defeating the statutory provisions providing otherwise which is nei­ther permissible nor must be done by this Court being a Court of law and bound to up­hold rule of law. 58. Besides, the very basic contention that para 6 of Temporary Staff Instructions 1993 provides maximum period of 120 days for a temporary appointee also, in my view, is in-correct and a clear misreading. A perusal of para 6 of Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 shows the following: (i) A temporary employee is not to be re­placed by another temporary employee but must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee; (ii) A temporary appointment made from the panel prepared under Instructions 1993 may continue so long as it is needed or till the short-listed employee in the panel be­comes eligible for regular appointment as per his position in the select list. (iii) Temporary Employment given inter­mittently to one set of temporary employees engaged in one spell need not be necessarily given employment in the subsequent spells. (iv) The appointment letter of temporary employee must contain the period or the con­tingency of engagement. (v) If the vacancy is continuing, the tem­porary employment shall not be made for a specified period like 85 days and there should not be any occasion for artificial breaks, meaning thereby, a temporary appointee should continue so long as such recruitment is there till regular appointment is there. (vi) The vacancies of long duration that is likely to last longer than 120 days be filled up by the candidates from the select list pre­pared under Instructions 1993. 59. From the above it is evident that no provision says that a temporary appointee should not be engaged for a period beyond 120 days. In fact Instructions 1993 were is­sued on 25th February, 1993 while Tempo­rary Staff Instructions 1993 were issued sub­sequently i.e. on 28th June, 1993. It appears that for making temporary appointment, the LIC found some difficulty to make appoint­ments from the select list prepared under In­structions, 1993 as that would have taken a longer time, defeating the very purpose and therefore, another separate set of statutory provisions i.e. Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 was issued on 28th June, 1993. It pro­vides a summary procedure for temporary ap­pointment. It pro­vides a summary procedure for temporary ap­pointment. This is also evident from para IV(1)(b)(i) of Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 which says that temporary appointment may be made in pendency of recruitment of staff on a regular basis, in accordance with the provisions of Recruitment Instructions i.e. Instructions 1993. 60. That being so to contend that an ap­pointment under Temporary Staff Instruc­tions, 1993 could not have been made beyond 120 days and since the petitioners have con­tinued for almost a decade, therefore, they are entitled for absorption on permanent basis against permanent vacancies is not substan­tiated from the above discussed provision nor otherwise is acceptable. 61. At this stage, in order to wriggle out of the Instructions, 1993 and its effect read with Regulation, of 1960, Sri Singh sought to sug­gest that Instructions 1993 and Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 are in the nature of executive orders and cannot be placed at the similar pedestal as that of principal legisla­tion or the rules and regulations framed there ­under. 62. Though on this aspect, learned coun­sel for the petitioners only tried to touch the issue without substantiating the same, but I find it appropriate to clarify the position so as not to leave any confusion for times to come. 63. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (Mrs.) and an­other (1994) 2 SCC 718 : ( AIR 1994 SC 2148 ), the Life Insurance Corporation Re­cruitment of Class III and Class IV Staff) In­structions issued by the Chairman in pur­ported exercise of power under Regulation 4 of 1960 Regulations were held to be statu­tory as under: "These instructions are statutory in char­acter. Therefore, they have the force of law." 64. The Court further held in para 11 of the judgment: "The appellant Corporation being a statu­tory Corporation is bound by the Life Insur­ance Corporation Act as well as the Statutory Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside........................." 65. What holds good for the Instructions issued in 1979 under Regulation 4 shall also apply at par to the Instructions 1993 and Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993. The valid­ity of these Instructions are not under dial-; lenge. 66. The above discussion makes it clear that the two questions under consideration at this stage are to be answered against the peti­tioners. What holds good for the Instructions issued in 1979 under Regulation 4 shall also apply at par to the Instructions 1993 and Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993. The valid­ity of these Instructions are not under dial-; lenge. 66. The above discussion makes it clear that the two questions under consideration at this stage are to be answered against the peti­tioners. At this stage, however, it would be appropriate to notice that delay in regular se­lection of the appointment is for certain rea­sons i.e. a long drawn dispute between the employees of LIC and LIC itself in different 1 Courts whereof they were awaiting final ver­dict in one of the matters, as stated by Sri Manish Goyal. However, Sri Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners on the contrary sought to place before this Court history of litigation in respect to temporary employees of the Corporation and argued that in the light of the scheme formulated in earlier litigation the petitioner should also be dealt with simi­larly but I am afraid that those matters may not cover the present dispute though some of the historical aspects of the litigation have already been referred to in the earlier part of the judgment but just to give a bird's eye view of the entire matter the same may be placed in a chronological manner in brief here under: 67. It appears that some employees of the Corporation raised an industrial dispute in the year 1982 that the Corporation has indulged in unfair labour practice in regard to the en­gagement of temporary, badli and part time employees in its various establishments/of­fices across the country. Reference was made by the Government of India on 20.5.1985 to the National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Justice R.D.Tulpule who passed an interim Award on 15.1.1986 restraining the Corpo­ration from making any regular recruitment. The Award was delivered on 17.4.1986 an­swering the Reference where against the Cor­poration filed writ petition No. 1801 of 1986 before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed on 14.8.1986. Thereafter some dis­pute arose with respect to interpretation of the aforesaid Award resulting in another Ref­erence on 1.6.1987 under Section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act to the National Indus­trial Tribunal presided over by Justice S.M. Jamadar to interpret the Award. During the pendency of this dispute also, the Tribunal initially passed an interim Award on 29.6.1987 restraining the Corporation from making any regular recruitment. During the pendency of this dispute also, the Tribunal initially passed an interim Award on 29.6.1987 restraining the Corporation from making any regular recruitment. The Award was challenged by the Corporation in S.L.P. No. 14906 of 1988, during pendency whereof, it appears, a compromise was arrived at be­tween the Corporation and eight out of nine of its Unions. On the basis of the said com­promise the Apex Court on 1.3.1989 passed an order permitting the parties to implement the terms of the compromise by way of in­terim measure without any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the members of the other. Subsequently, the SLP was converted into Civil Appeal No. 170 of 1989 and was finally disposed of on 7.2.1996. The relevant extract of the order is reproduced as under: "Mr. Rajiv, Learned counsel for the Union which has not accepted the compromise, states that the said union consists of only class IV employees and as such, they are not in a position to comply with the terms and condi­tions of the compromise, especially the pass­ing the test and the interview Mr. Rai, learned senior counsel appearing for the Management states, that the other eight Unions represent­ing 99% of the workmen have amongst their, members class III and class IV employees. According to Mr. Rai, if the Class IV work­ers belonging to the eight Unions have ac­cepted the terms of compromise and have gone through the test and interview, there is no justification for the ninth Union to object to there same. According to him, the over­whelming majority having accepted the terms to the compromise. It would be in the inter­est of industrial peace that the ninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms and conditions of the compromise. We agree with the contentions of Mr. Rai. We are, how­ever, of the view that these workmen have not taken the test since the matter has been pending in this Court. We direct the Manage­ment to exempt the concerned Class IV em­ployees from the test and interview if the man­agement no, power to do so under the regula­tions/Instructions governing their conditions of service. In case the Management has no such power. We direct the Manage­ment to exempt the concerned Class IV em­ployees from the test and interview if the man­agement no, power to do so under the regula­tions/Instructions governing their conditions of service. In case the Management has no such power. We have no doubt in our mind that the test which shall be prescribed for these workmen shall be of a lesser standard than the one which has been prescribed un­der the two circulars mentioned in the com­promise. We have further no doubt that sim­ply because these workmen have approached the Court, the Management shall not take any vindictive attitude towards them. There are two impalement applications before us. Mr. Pal learned counsel appearing for the Management states, that these two workmen and all other workmen similarly situated shall be considered for regularization in accordance with the terms of the com­promise. He however, states that this shall be done in the next regular recruitment. We di­rect the Management to do so within the next two months. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the above order. No costs." 68. Some of the temporary employees who were recruited during the pendency of the two References, were adversely affected from the above compromise arrived at between the parties. Some of them filed writ petition No. 13583 of 1988 Ashish Kumar Sinha and oth­ers v. Zonal Manager, LIC, Kanpur which was dismissed on 13.12.1988: (reported in 1989 Lab IC (NOC) 190) and Special Leave Peti­tion there against was dismissed as withdrawn on 20.2.1989. Thereafter the matter of Badli/temporary and part time employees engaged after 20.05.1985, i.e., the date of first Refer­ence made by the Government to the National Industrial Tribunal, came to be referred as an industrial dispute by the Central Government to the Industrial Tribunal on 4th March 1991 as LD No. 27 of 1991. Simultaneously, a num­ber of writ petitions were filed by temporary employees terminated by the Corporation be­tween 1989 and 1991 before the Madras High Court and the same were dismissed by a Full Bench on 27th July 1992/4.8.1992. The mat­ter was taken up in appeal by the Apex Court in SLP Nos. 20393-10413 of 1992, E. Prabhavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India which was decided on 23.10.1992 di­recting the Corporation to deal with the em­ployees in accordance with the scheme ap­proved by the Apex Court therein. The mat­ter was taken up in appeal by the Apex Court in SLP Nos. 20393-10413 of 1992, E. Prabhavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India which was decided on 23.10.1992 di­recting the Corporation to deal with the em­ployees in accordance with the scheme ap­proved by the Apex Court therein. It further appears that certain petitions raising a simi­lar dispute as was referred before this Court and Madras High Court, before the Andhra Pradesh High Court where also the writ peti­tions were decided following the Apex Court's judgment in E. Prabhavathy (supra) on 3.12.1996 and 19.3.1997. The industrial dispute registered as I.D. No. 27 of 1991 was finalized vide Award dated 18.6.2001 wherein the Tribunal held the action of the Corpora­tion in not regularising the temporary and Badli employees unjust and illegal and there-against writ petition No. (Q4346 of 2001 was filed before the Delhi High Court which was allowed vide judgment dated 15.4.2004 set­ting aside the Award and holding that those employees were also entitled to be dealt with according to the decision of the Supreme Court in E. Prabhavathy (supra) and the Delhi High Court held that the said decision was binding on the Tribunal. 69. A similar issue as raised before this Court appears to have engaged the attention of Delhi High Court in a writ petition filed by Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare Association which was dismissed by the Hon'ble single Judge where against intra court appeal was decided on 21st March, 2007 holding that the appointment made under Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 shall not qualify for absorption auto­matically as regular employees against regu­lar vacancies giving a go by to Instructions, 1993. 70. Now I propose to consider the deci­sion of Division Bench of this Court in Kailash Nath (2008 (2) ALJ (NOC) 548) (su­pra) which is relied on by the petitioners in respect to all these issues. The petitioners therein were Class IV employees appointed temporarily in 1985 and onwards. Initially they were engaged for 10-20 days in a month but since 19th September, 1997 they were engaged on continuous basis. Obviously en­gagement of the petitioners in the Kailash Nath and others (supra) were neither in ac­cordance with Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 nor at the time of their engagement In­structions, 1993 were in existence. Besides, those petitioners were appointed after noti­fying the vacancies to employment exchange. Obviously en­gagement of the petitioners in the Kailash Nath and others (supra) were neither in ac­cordance with Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 nor at the time of their engagement In­structions, 1993 were in existence. Besides, those petitioners were appointed after noti­fying the vacancies to employment exchange. The argument advanced by LIC about back door entry was turned down on the ground that the appointments of the petitioners in that case should not be termed "back door entry" since the appointments were made after noti­fying vacancies to the Employment Ex­change. The Court has said that Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 cannot frustrate claim of the petitioners engaged earlier seeking regularization in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Piara Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ) (supra) applicable at the relevant time. From para 21(b), I find that the Divi­sion Bench observed that it was a case of an exception to the principle laid down in Uma Devi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 ) (supra). Therefore, in my view, the above judgment does not help the petitioners at all. 71. Besides, from the entire judgment, it does not appear that the Court had consid­ered Instructions, 1993 and its co-related con­sequence qua temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 where the temporary appointments are made by LIC after enforcement of both the sets of the above instructions. 72. On the contrary, I do not find anything to show as to how the petitioners before this Court who have been recruited in service fol­lowing the procedure laid down in Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993 can be allowed to by­pass the procedure prescribed in Instructions 1993 for making regular recruitment against regular vacancies, particularly in view of the specific provision denying any right of absorp­tion to the employees recruited on temporary basis under Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993.1 find that the issue somewhat similar as up for consideration before this Court was raised before a Division Bench of Delhi High Court recently in LPA No. 678/2004 Termi­nated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare Association v. Life Insurance Corpo­ration of India and others decided 21.3.2007 and therein the Court held as under: "18. In the present cases there is a specific rule, which provides as to how recruitment has to be made to a vacancy on regular basis. The appellants herein were recruited under different set of Instructions altogether, which were meant for engagement on temporary basis. In the present cases there is a specific rule, which provides as to how recruitment has to be made to a vacancy on regular basis. The appellants herein were recruited under different set of Instructions altogether, which were meant for engagement on temporary basis. The Regulation permits recruitment of temporary staff, which also clearly mandates that no such person, who is appointed as a temporary staff, would be entitled to absorption in the service of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any post. Tem­porary servants appointed under the Regularizations have to be considered for regular appointment for which also provision is made in the same set of Instructions called Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employ­ment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993. Therefore, none of the cases of the appellants would attract a direction to the respondent to absorb them automatically as a regular em­ployee." 73. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the above judgment. Both the issues are accordingly, answered as under: Issue "A' is answered in positive holding that the petitioners are temporary employees under 1960 Regulations. Issue "B' is answered against the petitioner and it is held that unless they are recruited in accordance with Instructions 1993, they will continue to be the temporary employees and cannot lay any claim for absorption/ regularization even if they have been allowed to continue beyond 85 or 120 days as the case may be. Issue No. "C 74. Sri Manish Goyal himself has agreed that recruitment of the petitioners made in accordance with Temporary (Staff) Instruc­tions 1993 would not make them a back door entry and, therefore, the petitioners need not be condemned like an employee engaged as a back-door entry having no right to the post being illegal appointees as held by the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 ) but what he submits is that in the present case the question of back door entry is wholly ir­relevant. Placing reliance on the Apex Court's decision in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1177); C. Balachandran and others v. State of Kerala and others (2009) 3 SCC 179 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 131) and State of West Bengal and others v. Banibrata Ghosh and others (2009) 3 SCC 250 : ( AIR 2009 SC 1845 ), he submits that the petitioners were appointed against different nature of the posts/vacancies and their appointments also being of different tenure and consequences, will not confer a right upon them to stake claim for changing the nature of vacancy, tenure of ap­pointment and other conditions merely by continuing to serve for a long time for any reason whatsoever unless they have under­gone the procedure prescribed for recruitment against the other kind of vacancies and ap­pointments etc. I find substance therein. 75. The vacancies that were notified where against the petitioners had applied were clearly notified as temporary vacancies. This fact is not disputed by the petitioners. All the appointments having been made in 1998 and 1999, it is evident that the statutory Instruc­tions were already in force and applicable and it can safely be presumed that the petitioners and others were well aware of the same. They knew that an appointment on temporary ba­sis under Temporary Staff Regulations, 1993 shall not mature in substantive/permanent appointment which is to be made by observ­ing different procedure under different set of Rules. 76. In para 49 of the judgment in Official Liquidator (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1177) (su­pra) the Apex Court observed: ".....Those who applied in response to the advertisements issued by the Official Liqui­dators must have been aware of the fact that they were being engaged/employed pursuant to the sanction accorded by the Court under Rule 308 of the 1959 Rules in connection with liquidation proceedings; that their appoint­ments will not be against the posts sanctioned by the Government; that they will have no right to claim absorption in the regular cadre and that they will be paid salaries and allow­ances which may be fixed by the Court. They must have accepted the appointment/engage­ment knowing fully well that they will have fixed tenure without any right to continue in service or to seek absorption against the sanc­tioned posts." 77. They must have accepted the appointment/engage­ment knowing fully well that they will have fixed tenure without any right to continue in service or to seek absorption against the sanc­tioned posts." 77. Similarly, in Banibrata Ghosh ( AIR 2009 SC 1845 ) (supra) in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment the Apex Court has ob­served as under: ".....The appointment of the respondent was merely on the basis of an advertisement for filling up the leave vacancy. The respon­dent very well knew that it was for the leave vacancy that he was competing with others. Under such circumstances, we fail to know as to what right was there in the respondent to insist on regularization of his appointment." (Para 19) ".....if the advertisement was for a leave vacancy, it would not have attracted substan­tial number of applications, which would not be the case, if the advertisement was for a permanent vacancy. We fail to understand, therefore, as to how, even without referring to the relevant rules or procedure for recruit­ment of teachers in permanent vacancies, the Division Bench could make such a casual statement in its judgment." (Para 20) 78. The Court also observed that there was a different procedure prescribed for filling up the leave vacancy post and a permanent post and, therefore selection for leave vacancy post would not be treated at par with that of the permanent post. The Court also held that the approval granted for selection and appoint­ment against leave vacancy post would not entitle the incumbent to claim regularization on a permanent post without facing a fresh selection. The Court further held in para 26 as under: ".....The approval of the first panel and also the second panel was after all for a leave vacancy post and not for a permanent post, therefore, such approval was of no conse­quence and it did not in any manner entitle the respondent for the regularization of his post without facing a fresh selection process." 79. This Court may also refer to the obser­vation of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 ) (supra) as under: "If it is a contractual appointment, the ap­pointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appoint­ment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontin­ued." 80. Following the dictum laid down in Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court in Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Ranjodh Singh 2007 (2) SCC 491 : (AIR 2007 SC 1082) held as under: "....no person who was temporarily or ca­sually been employed could be directed to be continued permanently. It was opined that by doing so it would be creating another mode of public employment which is not permis­sible." 81. Considering the above dictum and also the fact that the petitioners were appointed following the procedure laid down for mak­ing temporary appointment though it is true that they cannot be said to be a back door entry and, on the contrary, their appointments have been made in accordance with the stat­ute but yet it has to be added that the appoint­ment of the petitioners is in accordance with the Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993 and not under the. Instructions 1993 which are ap­plicable for regular appointment against regu­lar vacancies and since the two stand on dif­ferent footing, though the appointment of the petitioners is not per se illegal but that by it­self would not help them for staking their claim for absorption/ regularization against regular vacancies. 82. Issue No. "C stands answered accord­ingly. Issues "E',"F'and "G': 83.1 propose to deal with all the three is­sues together. The first two issues are in fact a facet of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" and have been raised on its strength while part of the issue "F' and "G' has raised the same question though from a different angle, i.e., by attributing the action of the re­spondents as constituting "unfair labour prac­tice". 84. Sri Singh sought to place before this Court the definition of "unfair labour prac­tice" under Section 2(a) read with Schedule V of 1947 Act & submitted that the LIC is guilty of unfair labour practice. 85. First I propose to consider as to whether in providing different conditions of service in respect to wages etc., can it be said that the action of the respondents is volatile of Ar­ticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and infringes the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". 86. The application of the above doctrine and the circumstances when different wages conditions can be prescribed is no more res Integra, having already been considered by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. 86. The application of the above doctrine and the circumstances when different wages conditions can be prescribed is no more res Integra, having already been considered by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. Some of the relevant one for our purposes may be referred as under: 87. In Secretary, Finance Department and others v. West Bengal Registration Service Association and others, AIR 1992 SC 1203 the Apex Court held that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judi­ciary and, therefore, ordinarily Courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay Commissions, etc. It does not mean that the Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are un­justly treated by arbitrary State action or in­action. Courts must, however, realise that job evaluation is both a difficult and time con­suming task which even expert bodies hav­ing the assistance of staff with requisite ex­pertise have found difficult to undertake, sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performance of dif­ferent groups of employees. This would call for a constant study of the external compari­sons and internal relativities on account of the changing nature of job requirements. Some of the factors which have to be kept in view for job evaluation may include (i) the work programmed of his department, (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him (iii) the extent of his responsibility and account­ability in the discharge of his diverse duties and functions, (iv) the extent and nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the discharge of his duties, (v) the ex­tent of powers vested in him, (vi) the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exer­cise of his powers,, (vii) the need to coordi­nate with other departments, etc. 88. The Court further says that a pay struc­ture is evolved normally keeping in mind sev­eral factors, like, (i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which recruitment is made, (iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, (iv) minimum educational/technical qualifica­tions required, (v) avenues of promotion, (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities, (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii) public dealings, (ix) satis­faction level, (x) employer's capacity to pay, etc. The list is not exhaustive but illustrative. 89. The list is not exhaustive but illustrative. 89. Considering the difference in mode of recruitment and different service rules, in State of Rajasthan v. Kunji Raman, AIR 1997 SC 693 , the Apex Court upheld different pay scale for work charge employees and those employed in regular establishment. 14. Simi­larly a three judge Bench of the Apex Court upheld such distinction among ad hoc appoin­tees and regular appointees in State of Haryana v. Haryana Veternaty and A.H.T.S. Association and another, AIR 2000 SC 3020 which has been followed in State of Punjab and others v. Gurdeep Kumar Uppal and oth­ers, AIR 2001 SC 2691 , State of Punjab and others v. Ishar Singh and others, AIR 2002 SC 2422 and Punjab State Electricity Board and others v. Jagjiwan Ram and others, JT 2009(3) SC 400: (2009 AIR SCW 1884). 90. In Deb Narayan Shyam and others v. State of West Bengal and others, 2005(2) SCC 286 : (AIR 2005 SC 1167) the Apex Court summarised as to when the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would apply in the light of the exposition of law laid down in catena of its earlier decisions and said: "Large number of decisions have been cited before us with regard to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' by both sides. We need not deal with the said decisions to over­burden this judgment. Suffice it to say that the principle is settled that if the two catego­ries of posts perform the same duties and function and carry the same qualification, then there should not be any distinction in pay scale between the two categories of posts similarly situated. But when they are differ­ent and perform different duties and qualifi­cations for recruitment being different, then they cannot be said to be equated so as to qualify for equal pay for equal work." 91. The above dictum has been followed in Union of India and Another v. Mahajabeen Akhtar, AIR 2008 SC 435 . 92. In Haryana State Electricity Board and another v. Gulshan Lal and others, JT 2009(9) SC 95: ( AIR 2009 SC 3139 ) the Court observed that same or similar nature of work, by itself, does not entitle an employee to in­voke the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Qualification, experience and other factors would be relevant for the said purpose. 93. Qualification, experience and other factors would be relevant for the said purpose. 93. In State of Haryana and others v. Charanjit Singh and others, AIR 2006 SC 161 the Court said that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical applica­tion in every case. Article 14 permits reason­able classification based on qualities or char­acteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course the qualities and characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for clas­sification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frus­tration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that a person has not gone through the process of recruitment in certain cases make a difference. If the the educational qualifications are different then also the doc­trine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are se­lected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on differ­ence in educational qualifications justify a difference in pay scales. The earlier nomen­clature designating a person as a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the con­clusion that he was doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsmen in regular ser­vice. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a com­parison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. 94, This has been followed in Union of India and others v. Dineshan K. K., AIR 2008 SC 1026 , Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others v. G.S. Uppal and others, AIR 2008 SC 2152 and Food Corporation of India and others v. Ashish Kumar Ganguli and others, 2009(8) SCALE 218 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2582 ). Recently in State of Punjab and another v. Surjit Singh and others, 2009(11) SCALE 149 : (2009 AIR SCW 6759) after referring to its earlier judg­ments, the Apex Court has summarised the dictum in the following manner: "In our opinion fixing pay scales by courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high constitutional prin­ciple of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realising this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale iden­tity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an Expert Committee appointed by the Gov­ernment instead of the court itself granting higher pay)." 95. It further says that grant of benefit of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" de­pends upon a large number of factors includ­ing equal work, equal value, source and man­ner of appointment, equal identity of group and wholesale or complete identity. The Apex Court in Surjit Singh (supra) also stressed upon that the principle has undergone a sea change and the matter should be examined strictly on the basis of the pleadings and proof available before the Court to find out whether the distinction between two based on any rel­evant factor or not. The onus to prove lie on the person who alleges discrimination and claims enforcement of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. 96. The onus to prove lie on the person who alleges discrimination and claims enforcement of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. 96. In State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, 2009(11) SCALE 619: (2010 AIR SCW 2748) the Court said that it is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Simi­larity in designation or nature or equation of work is not determinative for equality in the matter of pay scales. The Court has to con­sider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications, na­ture of work, the value thereof, responsibil­ity, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other words the equal­ity clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scale only when there is a whole sale identity between the two posts. 97. The petitioners have been engaged under different process of recruitment with different conditions of service and are gov­erned by different sets of statutory provisions validity whereof is not under challenge. In my view considering the matter in the light of the dictum as discussed hereinabove, it would be difficult to hold that distinction in the matter of wages etc. in the case of the petitioners qua regular employees is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21. 98. Similarly, when an employee is being dealt with in accordance with the terms of his engagement prescribed under the statu­tory provisions, I have serious doubt whether such a case would be covered by "unfair labour practice" under 1947 Act particularly when the provisions of statute or vires thereof is not under challenge. It is not the case of the petitioners that whatever was due to them under the statute and terms and conditions of their service has not been given to them. The petitioners could not show that they were ever assured or promised by the Corporation that without undergoing the process of selection/ recruitment under Instructions 1993, as and when regular vacancy shall be available they shall be considered for regularisation/ absorp­tion etc. It is also not their case that at any point of time, the Corporation assured them to extend various service benefits as appli­cable to the regular employees. 99. It is also not their case that at any point of time, the Corporation assured them to extend various service benefits as appli­cable to the regular employees. 99. In Ganga Dhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 533 : (2006 AIR SCW 6414) non-regularisation of the employees was chal­lenged as constituting unfair labour practice since they were engaged for a number of years. In para 24 of the judgment the Apex Court observed as under: "24. Only because an employee has been engaged as a casual or temporary employee or that he had been employed for a number of years, the same by itself may not lead to the conclusion that such appointment had been made with the object of depriving him of the status and privilege of a permanent employee. Unlike other statutes, the employer does not have any statutory liability to give permanent status to an employee on comple­tion of a period specified therein. What is, therefore, necessary to be considered for drawing an inference in terms of the said pro­visions would be to consider the entire facts and circumstances of the case." 100. The petitioners placed reliance on a two Judge judgment of Apex Court in UPSEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey & others, (2007) 11 SCC 92 : (2007 AIR SCW 6904) but I find that the passages and the observations relied by the petitioners in the above judgment of Pooran Chandra Pandey & others (supra) have been overruled subsequently by a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in Official Liquida­tor (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1177) (supra) as is evident from para 92 of the judgment repro­duced as under: "92. In the light of what has been stated above, we deem it proper to clarify that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge Bench in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, tribunals and other judicial for as nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench." 101. The petitioners have also placed reli­ance upon Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh v. Hari Om Sharma & Ors.: ( AIR 1998 SC 2909 ). The petitioners have also placed reli­ance upon Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh v. Hari Om Sharma & Ors.: ( AIR 1998 SC 2909 ). That was a case where cer­tain promotions were made as Junior Engineer-I in 1990 but neither the salary of the promoted post was paid nor any regular pro­motion was made. The employee approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, who di­rected for payment of salary on the post of Junior Engineer-I and also to consider for promotion on regular basis on the basis of the quota fixed for non diploma holders. It was an admitted case that the employee was the senior most person in the cadre of non-diploma holder and even otherwise fully eligible for regular promotions in his quota. The Court observed that the Government in its capacity as a model employer cannot be per­mitted to raise an argument that an undertak­ing was obtained from the employee con­cerned at the time of ad hoc promotion that neither he would claim regular promotion nor would claim salary of such promoted post. The Apex Court held in para 8 as under: "8...............An agreement that if a per­son is promoted to the higher post or put to officiate on that post or, as in the instant case, a stop-gap arrangement is made to place him on the higher post, he would not claim higher salary or other attendant benefits would be contrary to law and also against public policy. It would, therefore, be unenforceable in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872" 102. I fail to understand as to how the above judgment would apply to the facts and the dispute in the present case. Neither it is the suggestion of the respondents that a tem­porary appointment under Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993 is illegal nor that the re­spondents are not complying all conditions of the statutory provisions i.e. Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993. The above judgment, therefore, does not help to the petitioners at all. 103. Besides, with respect to the provisions of 1947 Act and the matter governed by the Subordinate legislation under 1960 Act, it has been held that 1947 Act would be inappli­cable. In my view, this would also cover the provisions pertaining to "unfair labour prac­tice" where an employee is strictly governed by the statutory provisions of LIC made un­der 1956 Act. Besides, with respect to the provisions of 1947 Act and the matter governed by the Subordinate legislation under 1960 Act, it has been held that 1947 Act would be inappli­cable. In my view, this would also cover the provisions pertaining to "unfair labour prac­tice" where an employee is strictly governed by the statutory provisions of LIC made un­der 1956 Act. Para 13 of the Apex Court de­cision in M. Venugopal (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 969) (supra) may be reproduced at this stage:- "13. Earlier such employees used to be governed by the regulations framed by the Corporation under Section 49 of the Corpo­ration Act as well as by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, being "workman" within the meaning of that Act. It was up to them to enforce the rights or remedies in terms of the regulation so framed under the Corpo­ration Act or in accordance with the provi­sions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But af­ter the amendment introduced by the Parliament in Section 48, the employees of the Cor­poration shall not be entitled to protections to which they were entitled before the com­ing into force of the amendment aforesaid. The amendments cannot be held to be volatile of Article 14 of the Constitution merely on the ground that a section of the employ­ees of the Corporation had the benefit or protection of the provisions of the Industrial Dis­putes Act which now they have been deprived of. The wisdom of the legislature in extend­ing the protection of the provisions of the In­dustrial Disputes Act or denying the same cannot be judged by the courts unless any such step is held to be violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution. This Court has considered the validity of the aforesaid Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 in the case of A.V. Nachane v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 205 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1126 ) and it has been held that the said Amending Act shall operate but prospectively insofar it seeks to nullify the terms of 1974 Settlement in regard to payment of bonus in that case. It was said in the said case that Section 48 (2-C) read with Section 48(2)(cc) authorizes the Central Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act notwithstanding the Industrial Disputes Act or any other law, which meant that in respect of the matters covered by the rules, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or any other law will not be operating. It was pointed out that it was not really the rules framed by the Cen­tral Government that override the Industrial Disputes Act or any existing law but the power of abrogating the existing laws was in sub-section (2-C) of Section 48 enacted by Parliament itself and as such there was no question of any excessive delegation. The grievance that excluding the employees of the Corporation from the purview of the Indus­trial Disputes Act amounted to discrimina­tion against them and as such the provisions of the Amending Act were violative of Ar­ticle 14 of the Constitution, was also re­jected." 104. Though Sri Singh also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Arun Tewari & Ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 331 wherein the appointment was made by notifying applications through Employment Exchange without advertising the same in newspapers to press the submis­sions that the petitioners' appointments have also been made in similar fashion, cannot be said to be illegal since the regular appoint­ments made under Instructions, 1993 are af­ter advertising the vacancies and as per the procedure laid down therein. In my view, the said judgment has no application. There was no statutory provision at that stage compel­ling Government to make recruitment after advertising the vacancies. In the given facts and circumstances, the Government decided to fill in the vacancies under scheme of the Government of India by notifying vacancies to Employment Exchange. This procedure was challenged on the ground that there was no advertisement. The Apex Court did not find the procedure contrary to any statutory provision and particularly considering the facts of that case, as is evident from a bare reading of paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, which is as under: "19...............What is more important, in the special circumstances requiring a speedier process of selection and appointment, appli­cations were invited through Employment Exchanges for 1993 only. In this context, the special procedure adopted is not unfair. 20. There are different methods of invit­ing applications. In this context, the special procedure adopted is not unfair. 20. There are different methods of invit­ing applications. The method adopted in the exigencies of the situation in the present case cannot be labelled as unfair, particularly when, at the relevant time, the two earlier decisions of this Court were in vogue." 105. Another judgment relied is Chief Con­servator of Forests & Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare & Ors.,1996 Lab I.C. 967: ( AIR 1996 SC 2898 ) where the Court, as a matter of fact, found that the permanent status was denied to the employees by the State Gov­ernment only on the ground of financial con­straints and with an objective to deprive the workmen of their dues. However, that is not the position in the case in hand. 106. I am, therefore, of the view that nei­ther the action of the respondents can be said to constitute unfair labour practice nor there is any violation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 107. All the three issues "E1, "F and "G' are answered accordingly. Issue 'D' 108. Now we come to issue "D' with re­spect to relaxation. It is contended that the petitioners have acquired sufficient experi­ence having worked for more than a decade and since they have not been appointed with­out any advertisement etc., it is in the fitness of the things that LIC must consider to exer­cise the power of relaxation in favour of the petitioners and by relaxing the rigor of re­cruitment under Instructions 1993 they can always treat the petitioners as regular employ­ees and can absorb them against regular va­cancies. 109. Sri Manish Goyal however submits that the above provision is not attracted in the case in hand and in any case, since the LIC had already undergone the process of regular recruitment in accordance with the statute i.e. Instructions, 1993, wherein some of the petitioners have also been found suc­cessful, there is no occasion to take recourse to Regulation 86. He also submits that Regu­lation 86 would not apply in respect to In­structions 1993. 110. Regulation 86 reads as under: "86. The Executive Committee may, in the interest of the Corporation, for reasons to be specified in its resolution, relax any of the provision of these Regulations in individual cases." 111. He also submits that Regu­lation 86 would not apply in respect to In­structions 1993. 110. Regulation 86 reads as under: "86. The Executive Committee may, in the interest of the Corporation, for reasons to be specified in its resolution, relax any of the provision of these Regulations in individual cases." 111. It is not in dispute that the Instruc­tions 1993 and Temporary (Staff) Instructions 1993 have been issued by the Chairman in exercise of power under Regulation 4 of 1960 Regulations. Once the Executive Committee of LIC has been conferred power under 1960 Regulations to relax any of the provisions of Regulations in individual cases, it would in­clude within its ambit the Instructions, if any, issued under Regulation 4 also. Further the mandate against absorption of a temporary appointee is contained in Regulation 8(2) and the language thereof shows that this prohibi­tion is against the claim or entitlement if any put forward by the temporary employee him­self but where the employer intends to take a different view the said provision as such may not be pressed. The employer can do so in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Regulation. It is no doubt true that the power of regularization vested in a stat­ute is discretionary but simultaneously it is also true that the discretion cannot be exer­cised in an arbitrary and chameleon/cavalier fashion. Simultaneously, it can also be said that if a discretion is conferred by the statute, the employee can always request the em­ployer to consider the matter in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case as to whether a discretion should be exercised in favour of the employees or not, but, the em­ployer cannot refuse to consider at all as to whether the discretion should be exercised or not and to proceed further ignoring the in­terest of the employee, if any, in the matter. The employees cannot compel the employer to exercise the discretion in a particular man­ner or causing a particular result but obvi­ously, in my view the employee has a right and where the employer fails to do so can also seek a writ of mandamus from this Court requiring the employer at least to consider the expediency as to whether the case of the em­ployee is fit and deserves for attracting re­laxation or not if power of relaxation is avail­able in the statute. 112. 112. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Ashok Ranghaba Ambre JT 2008(1) SC 378: (2008 AIR SCW 647) the Court ob­served as under: "......If there are statutory rules/adminis­trative instructions/guidelines which require minimum educational qualification and/or ex­perience, it is open to the Corporation to in­sist compliance with such rules/instructions/ guidelines. But if there is power of relaxation with the Corporation or any of its Officers, the appellant-Corporation will consider that aspect as well keeping in view the fact that the writ petitioner was appointed in 1984, has completed service of more than twenty years and is having rich experience." 113. Some times the appointments are il­legal i.e. without following the procedure in the statute at all and in flagrant violation and infringement of Article 16 of the Constitu­tion. In such a case, if the employer exercises the power of relaxation, if available in the statute, that might nullify the very process of recruitment conferring fundamental right of equal opportunity of employment upon all persons and in such a case, it may be said that the power of relaxation cannot be exer­cised otherwise the provision empowering the authority to relax the rules itself may be hit by Article 16 of the Constitution. But fortu­nately that is not the case in hand. As I have already observed, the appointments of the petitioners are not ex facie illegal, inasmuch as, though the vacancies were not advertised but the same were notified to the Employ­ment Exchange, which is also a recognized procedure under Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 and therefore, this case cannot be placed on the parity of the cases where the vacan­cies are not at all ever notified or advertised but appointments are made wholly illegally, which have been termed as back door illegal appointment by the Apex Court in Uma Devi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 ) (supra). 114. 114. It is not for this Court to detail as to when and in what manner the discretion should be exercised since admittedly, the LIC in the case in hand has not been shown to have considered the question of relaxation and, therefore, in my view the ends of justice would require that the respondent-LIC and the competent authority therein be directed to consider as to whether in the facts and cir­cumstances of the matter the petitioners' case deserve for relaxation of any of the provisions of Regulations in the light of the provision contained in Regulation 86. 115. Question 'D' is answered accordingly. 116. In view of the above discussion, all the three writ petitions subject to order con­tained in para 15 above, are disposed of per­mitting the petitioners to approach the com­petent authority of the Corporation by mak­ing suitable representations within three weeks from today giving necessary particu­lars justifying the claim of relaxation under Regulation 86 and in case such representa­tions are made by the petitioners, the compe­tent authority shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within two months thereafter. The appoint­ment, if any, pursuant to the advertisement in question shall follow the result/decision taken by the competent authority of the Corpora­tion as above. No costs. Order accordingly.