JUDGEMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. Expressing doubt with regard to the correctness of the decisions rendered in Joydeb Banerjee V/s. Subodh Choudhary & Anr., 2005(1) PLJR 440 , Raghubans Mani V/s. Mahabir Babu Marwari, (2005)4 PLJR 135 , and Prem Shankar Chaudhary V/s. Special Officer, now President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trust & Ors., (2005)4 PLJR 487 , the learned Single Judge thought it apposite to refer the following questions for delineation by a larger Bench: "(i) Whether the Civil Revision against an interlocutory order (an order which could not have finally decided the suit or proceedings in favour of the party applying for revision, if same had been passed by the court concerned in his favour) is maintainable in view of the newly substituted proviso to the sub section (1) of Section 115 of the Code? (ii) Whether, even assuming that there is such a bar, still the High Court can interfere with such orders under "Civil Supervisory Jurisdiction"? (iii) Whether in each and every such Civil Revision, even if a petition has been filed under Section 115 of the Code, the High Court can hear and decide the same in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? (iv) Whether all such revisions filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be allowed to be converted into a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?" In view of the aforesaid situation, the matter has been placed before us. 2 Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) was amended and substituted by the Amendment Act, 1999, which came into force on 1.7.2002. "115. Revision. 2 Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) was amended and substituted by the Amendment Act, 1999, which came into force on 1.7.2002. "115. Revision. (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this Section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.] [(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. [(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.] Explanation.In this Section, the expression, "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.]" 3. It is worth noting that challenge to amendments made to the Code by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 and Amendment Act 22 of 2002 came to be dealt with in Salem Advocates Bar Association V/s. Union of India & Ors., (2003)1 SCC 49 wherein the Apex Court expressed the view that the amendments that have been made do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. 4. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur V/s. Swaraj Developers and Others, (2003)6 SCC 659 , the Apex Court was considering the effect of the amendments to Section 115 of the Code. 4. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur V/s. Swaraj Developers and Others, (2003)6 SCC 659 , the Apex Court was considering the effect of the amendments to Section 115 of the Code. The matter arose from various High Courts holding that the revisions filed before them under Section 115 of the Code were not maintainable, since an order passed in favour of the party applying for revision would not have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. Their Lordships noted that after the amendments, while proviso (a) of the unamended provision has been retained in its totality, in the amended provisions, clause (b) of the proviso has been omitted. In the said case, it has been held that preferring an application under Section 115 of the Code is not a substantive right and it was a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts but does not confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court to approach the High Court for relief. In the said case, a reference was made to the four Judges Bench decision rendered in Hari Shankar V/s. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 , wherein it had been held that the power of hearing a revision is generally given to a superior court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. It is worth noting in the case of Hari Shankar (supra) that a reference was made to Section 115 of the Code to hold that the High Courts powers under the said provision are limited but certain particular categories of cases and the right therein is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. After analyzing the various aspects of the provision in the backdrop of statutory interpretation, the Apex Court has held as follows: "32 A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands makes it clear that the stress is on the question whether the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to suit or other proceeding. If the answer is yes then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is no then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable. If the answer is yes then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is no then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in nature, cannot be the subject matter of revision under Section 115. There is marked distinction in the language of Section 97(3) of the Old Amendment Act and Section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was clear legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is significantly absent in Section 32(2)(i). The amendment relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of procedure is altered the parties are to proceed according to the altered mode, without exception, unless there is a different stipulation." xxx xxx xxx xxx "34. In view of what has been stated above the inevitable conclusion is that the High Courts were right in the conclusion about non-maintainability of revision applications." (Underlining is ours) 5. From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is clear as day that their Lordships have held that in case an order is interim in nature, it cannot be the subject matter of revision under Section 115 of the Code. It has been categorically held that if the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to a suit or other proceedings and the answer is yes, then the revision would be maintainable and, if the answer is negative in nature, then the revision is not maintainable. Thus, the acid test that is to be applied in every case is to discern and find out whether the order though interim would dispose of the suit or other proceedings. 6. Thus, the acid test that is to be applied in every case is to discern and find out whether the order though interim would dispose of the suit or other proceedings. 6. In Surya Dev Rai V/s. Ram Chander Rai and Others, (2003)6 SCC 675 , a two Judges Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with the impact of the amendment in Section 115 of the Code brought in by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 on the power and jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain petitions seeking a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution or invoking the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution as against similar orders, acts or the remedy of filing civil revision under Section 115 of the Code was available to the person aggrieved. While dealing with the scope of exercise of jurisdiction after amendment to Section 115 of the Code, their Lordships have held thus: "4. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended does not now permit a revision petition being filed against an order disposing of an appeal against the order of the trial court whether confirming, reversing or modifying the order of injunction granted by the trial court. The reason is that the order of the High Court passed either way would not have the effect of finally disposing of the suit or other proceedings. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such a case is taken away by the proviso inserted under sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the CPC. The amendment is based on the Malimath Committees recommendations. The Committee was of the opinion that the expression employed in Section 115 CPC, which enables interference in revision on the ground that the order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made, left open wide scope for the exercise of the revisional power with all types of interlocutory orders and this was substantially contributing towards delay in the disposal of cases. The Committee did not favour denuding the High Court of the power of revision but strongly felt that the power should be suitably curtailed. The Committee did not favour denuding the High Court of the power of revision but strongly felt that the power should be suitably curtailed. The effect of the erstwhile clause (b) of the proviso, being deleted and a new proviso having been inserted, is that the revisional jurisdiction, in respect of an interlocutory order passed in a trial or other proceedings. is substantially curtailed. A revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised unless the requirement of the proviso is satisfied." (Emphasis supplied) 7. After so holding, their Lordships adverted to the impact of the amendment of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and eventually held thus: "38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted: (i) without jurisdictionby assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) in practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 8. In Sadhana Lodh V/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2003)3 SCC 524 [: 2005(2) PLJR (SC)43], a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court was considering the issue whether an insurer can assail the award passed by the tribunal by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as an appeal is totally misconceived under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In that context, their Lordships have held thus: "6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act [see National insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Nicolletta Rohtagi, (2002)7 SCC 456 ]. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act [see National insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Nicolletta Rohtagi, (2002)7 SCC 456 ]. This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of illustration, where a Trial Court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 C.P.C., in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C., no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution." 9. In Sajjan Kumar V/s. Ram Kishan, (2005)13 SCC 89 , their Lordships of the Apex Court were dealing with a case where an application for amendment preferred by the plaintiff was rejected and the High Court declined to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. In that context, their Lordships have held thus: "5. In Sajjan Kumar V/s. Ram Kishan, (2005)13 SCC 89 , their Lordships of the Apex Court were dealing with a case where an application for amendment preferred by the plaintiff was rejected and the High Court declined to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. In that context, their Lordships have held thus: "5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the appeal deserves to be allowed as the trial court, while rejecting the prayer for amendment has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and by the failure to so exercise it, has occasioned a possible failure of justice. Such an error committed by the trial court was liable to be corrected by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, even if Section 115 CPC would not have been strictly applicable. It is true that the plaintiff-appellant ought to have been diligent in promptly seeking the amendment in the plaint at an early stage of the suit, more so when the error on the part of the plaintiff was pointed out by the defendant in the written statement itself. Still, we are of the opinion that the proposed amendment was necessary for the purpose of bringing to the fore the real question in controversy between the parties and the refusal to permit the amendment would create needless complications at the stage of execution in the event of the plaintiff- appellant succeeding in the suit." 10. In Joydeb Banerjee (supra), the learned Single Judge was dealing with the situation wherein the learned Trial Judge had rejected the petitions filed by the petitioners under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. The learned Single Judge referred to Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur (supra) and Sadhana Lodh (supra) and expressed the view thus: "7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the materials on record, I find that three Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh V/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1561 has held that where remedy for filing civil revision before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. had been specifically barred by State enactment, only in such cases petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would lie. Ltd. and Another reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1561 has held that where remedy for filing civil revision before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. had been specifically barred by State enactment, only in such cases petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would lie. In the instant case there being no such bar by the State enactment, I hereby hold that this civil revision is maintainable, specially when the question of jurisdiction is involved." 11. In Raghubans Mani & Ors. (supra), the learned Single Judge was dealing with the factual matrix where the application for intervention in the suit being allowed a revision petition was filed, assailing the same. The question of maintainability of the revision was raised by the opposite party. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 8 has opined thus: "8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the materials on record specially the impugned order, it is quite apparent that due to the objection of the intervenor- opposite party no. 2, a lis had arisen as to whether opposite party no. 2 was a necessary party for the proper adjudication of the suit and the said lis has been decided by the learned court below vide the impugned orders. Hence, in my view, according to the decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur (supra), the said orders were revisable under Section 115 C.P.C. after its recent amendment which came into force on 1.7.2002. Even according to another decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of Sadhana Lodh V/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, reported in AIR 2003 SC 1561 equivalent to (2003)3 SCC 524 [:2005(2) PLJR (SC)43], the provision of Section 115 C.P.C. would be attracted in such matters. Hence, it is hereby held that these Civil Revisions are maintainable." 12. In Prem Shankar Chaudhary (supra), the learned Single Judge was addressing himself with regard to the defensibility of an order whereby the learned Trial Judge had directed the opposite parties to remove their locks put on the two wooden entrance gates in a title suit. The maintainability of the revision petition was raised by the opposite parties. The learned Single Judge, while dealing with the maintainability of the revision, has expressed thus: "19. The maintainability of the revision petition was raised by the opposite parties. The learned Single Judge, while dealing with the maintainability of the revision, has expressed thus: "19. So far the question of maintainability of this civil revision is concerned, the Honble Apex Court has specifically held in the case of Neelakantan V/s. Mallika Begum reported in (2002)2 Supreme Court Cases 440 that in cases where finding is recorded by courts below without any legal evidence on the record or on misreading the evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such finding and to take a different view. In another decision of a Bench of three Honble Judges, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh V/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2003)3 Supreme Court Cases 524 has also held that on in such cases where remedy for filing civil revision is expressly barred by State enactment a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie. Hence where there are such perversities in the findings and such legal infirmities in the impugned order which materially prejudices the case and leads to clear violation of law and abuse of the process of the court, the High Court has to interfere under its revisional jurisdiction to uphold the dignity of legal procedure and proper functioning of the judicial system. Furthermore, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that where the subordinate court fails to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or where it has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, this Court can interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. Here in the instance case the lower court has not only failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it but has also failed in its basic duty to uphold the dignity, respectability and effectiveness of the orders and proceeding of the Court of Law. Hence, this civil revision is maintainable." 13. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evincible that the learned Single Judge in Joydeb Banerjee (supra) has placed reliance on the decision rendered in Sadhana Lodh (supra). He has expressed the view that as there is no bar by State enactment, the civil revision is maintainable especially when the question of jurisdiction is involved. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evincible that the learned Single Judge in Joydeb Banerjee (supra) has placed reliance on the decision rendered in Sadhana Lodh (supra). He has expressed the view that as there is no bar by State enactment, the civil revision is maintainable especially when the question of jurisdiction is involved. Be it reiterated, in the said case, an application was filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The learned counsel for the petitioners contend that in the absence of specific bar as regards the entertainability of a civil revision by the State amendment, the view expressed by the learned Single Judge relying on Sadhana Lodhs case (supra) is wholly justified. It is worth noting that the Apex Court was dealing with the maintainability of an appeal at the instance of the insurer under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Their Lordships expressed the view that the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was wholly misconceived. Their Lordships opined that even where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided against the order and judgment of the District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code and where the remedy for filing a revision before the High Court has been expressly barred by the said amendment, only in such a case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would lie. 14. While understanding the ratio of this case, two aspects are to be kept in mind. The Apex Court was dealing with the challenge to an appeal directed against an award passed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, that is a final order putting the controversy to an end at the level of the tribunal. As the appeal is barred, it has been opined, the same could be challenged in civil revision. If there is a prohibition in the State amendment, it is open to the insurer to prefer a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The amended provision that has been incorporated in Section 115 of the Code bars a civil revision in respect of interim orders unless conditions precedent are not satisfied. An award passed under the Motor Vehicles Act is final and is executable as a decree. The amended provision that has been incorporated in Section 115 of the Code bars a civil revision in respect of interim orders unless conditions precedent are not satisfied. An award passed under the Motor Vehicles Act is final and is executable as a decree. It cannot be construed as an interlocutory order. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in Shyam Sunder Agrawal & Co. V/s. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1321 , wherein the Apex Court has held that even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed under that statute, such provision of finality will not take away the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. 15. From the aforesaid decision, it is clear as crystal that unless there is a prohibition, a revision would be maintainable even if finality is attached to the order. 16. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) is not applicable as the same dealt with an award which was final in nature and further the ratio laid down therein cannot be understood to mean that if there is no provision in the State amendment prohibiting entertaining a civil revision, a civil revision would be maintainable. In view of the categorical and unambiguous language employed in Section 115 of the Code which is enacted by the Parliament, the same has to hold the field and where the conditions precedent therein are not satisfied, a civil revision would not be maintainable. We may hasten to clarify that in Sadhna Lodh (supra), their Lordships were not dealing with an order of interlocutory nature and, therefore, the appreciation of the ratio has to be from a different spectrum altogether. 17. In Prem Shankar Chaudhary (supra), the learned Single Judge has referred to the decision in Neelakantan & Ors. V/s. Mallika Begum, (2002)2 SCC 440 . In the said case, their Lordships have opined as follows: "8....It is well settled that the High Court while considering the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction in second appeal or civil revision would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded by the courts below. But it is not an absolute proposition. V/s. Mallika Begum, (2002)2 SCC 440 . In the said case, their Lordships have opined as follows: "8....It is well settled that the High Court while considering the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction in second appeal or civil revision would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded by the courts below. But it is not an absolute proposition. In a case where the finding is recorded without any legal evidence on the record, or on misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view.........." 18. The learned Single Judge also placed reliance on Sadhana Lodh (supra). On the base of the said two decisions, the learned Single Judge has expressed the view that considering the perversities in the findings and such legal infirmities in the impugned order which materially prejudice the case and leads to clear violation of law and abuse of the process of the court, the High Court has to interfere under the revisional jurisdiction to uphold the dignity of legal procedure and proper functioning of the judicial system, because Section 115 of the Code specifically provides that where the subordinate court fails to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or where it has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court can interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. 19. The two decisions in respect of which the learned Single Judge has expressed his doubt with regard to their correctness, as is manifest, are fundamentally based on the decision rendered in Sadhana Lodh (supra) and the principle that unless the High Court rectifies jurisdictional errors, the same would amount to abuse of the dignity of the procedure. We have already delineated the facts on which the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) was rendered and how the same is not applicable while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. In the case of Neelakantan & Ors. (supra), their Lordships were not dealing with the amended provision of Section 115 of the Code even remotely and the question of maintainability was not the issue. In this context, we may fruitfully state that a decision has to be treated as precedent for what it decides. In the case of Neelakantan & Ors. (supra), their Lordships were not dealing with the amended provision of Section 115 of the Code even remotely and the question of maintainability was not the issue. In this context, we may fruitfully state that a decision has to be treated as precedent for what it decides. The Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works V/s. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1073 has held thus: "18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it." 20. In Bhavnagar University V/s. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003)2 SCC 579, it has been observed by the Supreme Court as under: "59.........It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision." 21. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. V/s. N.R. Vairamani, (2004)8 SCC 579 , in paragraphs 9 to 12, their Lordships of the Apex Court have ruled thus: "9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without disclosing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statues, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V/s. Horton, 1951 AC 737, Lord Mach Dermott observed (All. ER p. 14 C-D):- The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V/s. Horton, 1951 AC 737, Lord Mach Dermott observed (All. ER p. 14 C-D):- The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.... 10. In Home Office V/s. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., 1970 AC 1004, Lord Reid said: Lord Atkins speech...is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. (All. ER p. 297g). Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. V/s. Sandham (No. 2) (1971)1 WLF 1062, observed (All. ER p. 1274d): One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russel, L.J. as it were an Act of Parliament; And, in British Railways Board V/s. Herrington, 1972 AC 877, Lord Morris said:(All. ER p. 761c) There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. * * * * Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. * * * * Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 22. The aforesaid principle was reiterated in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. V/s. Smt. Raj Kumari & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 403 , on the following terms: "........ A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclids Theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context." 23. The aforesaid authorities have been recently considered by the Supreme Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai V/s. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2008)1 SCC 494 , and in the said case, their Lordships have referred to certain observations made by Lord Halsbury which read as under: "14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn V/s. Leathern, 1901 AC 495:(AII. ER p.7G-1) Before discussing Allen V/s. Flood, 1898 AC 1, and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said beforethat every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 24. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 24. In Rajbir Singh Dalai (Or.) V/s. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Anr., (2008)9 SCC 284 , their Lordships have opined thus: "34. The decision of a court is a precedent if it lays down some principle of law supported by reasons. Mere casual observations or directions without laying down any principle of law and without giving reasons does not amount to a precedent. 35. In State of Punjab V/s. Baldev Singh, (1999)6 SCC 172 , a Constitution Bench of this Court observed (vide SCC para 43) that a decision is an authority for what it decides (i.e., the principle of law it lays down) and not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent. 36. In Karnataka SRTC V/s. Mahadeva Shetty, (2003)7 SCC 197 , (vide SCC para 23) this Court observed that the only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. 37. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa V/s. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 467, (vide AIR para 13): (AIR pp. 651-52, para 13). 13. ... A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observations found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it..." 25. In this context, we may take note of another principle. A judgment is not to be read as a statute. It has been so held in Union of India & Ors. V/s. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., 1996 AIR SCW 4020: "Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a Statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. No judgment can be read as if it is a Statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents." 26. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions as we are inclined to think that the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) is not applicable and, in fact, the decisions in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur (supra) and Surya Dev Rai (supra) are directly on the point. That apart, the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the decision of Sajjan Kumar (supra) with regard to the maintainability of civil revision in respect of an interlocutory order without meeting the conditions precedent is not apposite. The Apex Court has held that the error that was committed in that case by the Trial Judge was liable to be corrected by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction even if Section 115 of the Code would not have been strictly applicable. 27. As it appears, the learned Single Judge has applied the concept of. deductive method and opined that their Lordships have expressed the view that the revision is maintainable. What has been stated by their Lordships is that it was obligatory to rectify the error in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction even if the revisional jurisdiction as engrafted under Section 115 of the Code would not have been strictly applicable. The concept of supervisory jurisdiction was dealt with in Surya Dev Rai (supra) in paragraphs 22 & 23 of the said judgment. We think it apt to reproduce the same as under: "22. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned hereat. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned hereat. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar. 23. The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, and how the jurisdiction has culminated into its present shape under Article 227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam Singh V/s. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 : 1954 SCR 565 . The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts Act, 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisionsal jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. 28. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to Hari Vishnu Kamath V/s. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 wherein it has been held as follows: "35. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. 28. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to Hari Vishnu Kamath V/s. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 wherein it has been held as follows: "35. It is argued with great insistence that as the object of the Election Rules is to discover the intention of the majority of the voters in the choice of a representative, if an elector had shown a clear intention to vote for a particular candidate, that must be taken into account under Section 100(2)(c), even though the vote might be bad for non-compliance with the formalities. But when the law prescribes that the intention should be expressed in a particular manner, it can be taken into account only if it is so expressed. An intention not duly expressed is, in a Court of Law, in the same position as an intention not expressed at all. 36. The decision in (1875)10 CP 733(T), was cited in support of the contention that for deciding whether the result of the election had been affected it was permissible to take into account votes which had been rendered invalid by the mistake of the polling officer. That was a decision on Section 13 of the Ballot Act, 1872 which provided that no election should be declared invalid by reason of non-compliance with the rules, if it appeared to the Tribunal: "That the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of this Act, and that such non-compliance or mistake did not affect the result of the election". What happened in that case was that all the ballot papers issued at polling station No. 130 had been marked by the polling officer and had become invalid under Section 2 of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the unsuccessful candidate that the mistake of the polling officer rendered the whole election void, without reference to the question whether the result of the election had been affected. It was contended on behalf of the unsuccessful candidate that the mistake of the polling officer rendered the whole election void, without reference to the question whether the result of the election had been affected. In repelling this contention, the Court observed at page 750: "Inasmuch, therefore, as no voter was prevented from voting, it follows that the errors of the presiding officers at the polling stations No. 130 and No. 125 did not affect the result of the election, and did not prevent the majority of electors from effectively exercising their votes in favour of the candidate they preferred, and therefore that the election cannot be declared void by the common law applicable to parliamentary elections." This was merely a decision on the facts that the departure from the prescribed rules of election at the polling stations was not so fundamental as to render the election not one "conducted in accordance with the principles laid down under the body of this Act." 29. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to come to the conclusion what their Lordships in Sajjan Kumar (supra) have, in fact, stated about the duty of the High Court to rectify the error in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. Their Lordships have not dealt with regard to the maintainability of civil revision. 30. The learned counsel appearing for the revisionists would submit that civil revision is not barred if an order is passed which would tantamount to final disposal of the suit or other proceedings and the terms other proceedings have to be understood in their connotative expanse. Their emphasis is on the terms other proceedings. Regard being had to the said submission, it is obligatory on our part to appreciate what the terms other proceedings do convey. 31. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, the term proceeding has been described to mean in a general sense the form and manner of conducting judicial business before a court or judicial officer and includes all possible steps in an action from the commencement till the end. 32. In Advanced Law Lexicon, Third Edition, 2005, by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, the term proceeding has been dealt with at page 3746. The said term, as has been stated therein, signifies that a proceeding in a civil action is an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end. 32. In Advanced Law Lexicon, Third Edition, 2005, by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, the term proceeding has been dealt with at page 3746. The said term, as has been stated therein, signifies that a proceeding in a civil action is an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end. It is a prescribed mode of action in carrying into effect a legal right. 33. The purpose of referring to the various law dictionaries is only to appreciate what meaning is to be placed on the terms other proceeding. As we have already indicated hereinabove, the proceeding must be akin to the suit and it should be an independent proceeding for the phrase used in the proviso to Section 115 of the Code is suit or proceeding. There are several applications which require independent adjudication relating to the maintainability of the suit and once the said adjudication is complete, there can be no doubt that the proceeding comes to an end inasmuch as it would have an effect of finally disposing of the proceeding. The two significant facts indicate that the interlocutory order passed must be such which must fit into the compartment engrafted in the restrictive spectrum of the proviso, i.e., the suit or proceeding would have been finally disposed of. It is further worth noting that the language used in the proviso in the course of a suit or other proceeding is of immense signification. There can be independent proceeding. 34. Corpus Juris Secundum deals with proceeding as follows: "Proceeding.The terms "proceeding" and "proceedings" are discussed generally in Actions 1 h(c) and, with reference to bankruptcy, in Bankruptcy 1. The terms have been held to be synonymous with "ease" see Actions 1(b)(1), and "cause" see Actions 1(e)(1), and also have been held synonymous with or have been distinguished from, "action", "judgment", "process", "prosecution", and "suit" see Actions 1h(1)(b)." 35. In Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volumn 34, published by West Publishing Co., the term proceeding used in the provision has to be treated as akin to the suit and it has to have the colour and character of an independent proceeding. 36. The acid test which is to be applied is that if by termination of such a proceeding an independent cause of action is put at naught, the application for revision would be maintainable. 36. The acid test which is to be applied is that if by termination of such a proceeding an independent cause of action is put at naught, the application for revision would be maintainable. The interlocutory orders made in the course of hearing of a suit or proceeding is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction if such an order does not put an end to the suit or proceeding and as we have already indicated, the proceeding has to have an independent character. Emphasis in the present provision is whether the order in favour of a party applying for revision would have given finality to the suit or other proceeding. If the answer is yes, then the revision is maintainable and if the answer is in the negative, the revision is not maintainable. The test that is required to be applied in every case so as to find an outcome is whether the order is interim in nature or finally disposes of the suit or other proceeding. 37. We may, at this juncture, give a few examples which are illustrative in nature, viz., an order under Rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper court, an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application to set aside the dismissal of a suit, an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte order, an order under Rule 106 of Order XXI, an order under Rule 9 of Order XXII, an order under Rule 2 of Order XXV, an order under Rule 5 or Rule 7 of Order XXXII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person, and an order dismissing the suit on the ground of nonjoinder of parties are amenable to revisional jurisdiction. 38. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Surajmal S/o Siddhanathji V/s. Sundarlal S/o Nanuram & Ors., [ 2003(2) M.P.L.J. 408 ]. In the said case, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to the scheme of order passed under Section 104 of the Code. It has been opined therein that every order passed in appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not an interlocutory one. In the said case, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to the scheme of order passed under Section 104 of the Code. It has been opined therein that every order passed in appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not an interlocutory one. It will depend upon the nature of the order from which the appeal arises as also the effect of the order passed in this appeal. The Division Bench enumerated that there are two categories of orders. Be it noted, the Bench addressed to the concept of interlocutory order which we may profitably quote: "13. Generally speaking interlocutory order means an order made provisionally in the course of a suit or other proceeding. As per the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (reprint Edition 1992 Page 611), the term "interlocutory" in Law, means not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matter relating to the cause". The expression "interlocutory order has been explained as follows: "An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the cause and before a final hearing on merits. An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit and generally collateral to the issues framed by the pleadings not connected with the final judgment". The learned author quoting an English decision Smit V/s. Cowell (6 QBD 75) further explained: "interlocutory order" is not necessarily confined to an order made between writ and final judgment but it means an order other than final order or judgment." Thereafter, the Bench reproduced Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code which provides for appeals from orders. Thereafter, in paragraph 16, it has been held thus: "16. The orders enumerated above can be classified in two categories. In one category are those orders which finally dispose of the suit or proceeding in which they are made. Orders enumerated in clauses (a), (c), (d), (ja). (k), (n), (na), (t), (u) and (w) belonged to this category. Another category is of those orders enumerated in the remaining clauses (including the one passed on application for temporary injunction), which are purely interim in nature and the lis in which any such order is made survives even after passing of the order and even after disposal of the appeal against that order. Another category is of those orders enumerated in the remaining clauses (including the one passed on application for temporary injunction), which are purely interim in nature and the lis in which any such order is made survives even after passing of the order and even after disposal of the appeal against that order. The orders of latter category are obviously interlocutory and the provisional character of these orders remains unchanged even after disposal of the appeal preferred under Order 43, Rule 1, The appellate proceedings arising out of such interlocutory orders are nothing but collateral or incidental to the suit or proceedings in the course of which those orders are made. It is true that the dictum that appeal is a continuation of suit is not of universal application but it would be so in a case like the one in hand where the suit giving rise to that appeal survives even during the pendency and after disposal of the appeal. The appeal in the instant case had a limited object of testing the correctness or otherwise of the interim order passed in the course of the suit or proceedings without in any manner affecting final disposal of that lis. The order passed in appeal would, thus, fall within the perview of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 and would not be open to revision unless it satisfies the condition laid down by the said proviso in addition to the grounds as enumerated under sub-section (1)." 39. Thus, it is quite vivid that the sine qua non is the extinction of a suit or proceeding. We may hasten to add that unless a suit or proceeding would have been disposed of, no revision would lie. That is the seminal test. When an application for intervention or impleadment is allowed or rejected, it does not extinguish the suit or proceeding. As we have already opined, the proceeding must have its own independence and an order passed in the suit must bring the suit or proceeding to an end. Certain instances in this regard have already been cited in Surajmal (supra), that is, when a plaint is returned, an application to set aside the dismissal of the suit is rejected, when an application to set aside the ex parte decree is not allowed and such other matters which have been mentioned hereinabove. Certain instances in this regard have already been cited in Surajmal (supra), that is, when a plaint is returned, an application to set aside the dismissal of the suit is rejected, when an application to set aside the ex parte decree is not allowed and such other matters which have been mentioned hereinabove. The quintessentiality is that the suit or proceeding becomes extinct. 40. The next aspect that arises for consideration is whether the High Court can interfere in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The said position is no more res integra inasmuch the Apex Court has cleared the position in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra). We only proceed to add that the parameters laid down therein are to be strictly followed. 41. The other issue that arises for consideration is whether all the civil revisions filed before this Court under Section 115 of the Code may be allowed to be converted into writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Col. Anil Kak (Retd.) V/s. Municipal Corporation, Indore & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1130 wherein a revision was preferred challenging the order of an appeal that arose from an order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the revision was not maintainable, an application was filed to convert the same into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The said prayer was allowed and the petition was treated to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the High Court proceeded to deal with the merits of the case and passed an order. The said order came to be challenged before the Apex Court. In that context, their Lordships held as follows: "2. All that the High Court has done is to treat the petition filed before it under Section 115 of the Code as a proceeding initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The said order came to be challenged before the Apex Court. In that context, their Lordships held as follows: "2. All that the High Court has done is to treat the petition filed before it under Section 115 of the Code as a proceeding initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The respondents had filed the revision originally and during the pendency of that revision the High Court appears to have taken a view that an order in an appeal arising from a proceeding under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, could not be challenged under Section 115 of the Code since the order was in the nature of an interlocutory order. In such a situation, in our view, the High Court rightly decided to permit the revision petitioners before it, to convert the same as a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. After all, the court could have done it on its own, even without a motion in that behalf by the petitioner. We see absolutely no ground to interfere with the said order on the grounds raised in this special leave petition......" 42. In Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan & Ors. V/s. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur & Ors., (2009)5 SCC 162 , it has been held as follows: "48. If the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain either an appeal or a revision application or a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in a given case, it subject to fulfillment of other conditions, could even convert a revision application or a writ petition into an appeal or vice versa in exercise of its inherent power. Indisputably, however, for the said purpose, an appropriate case for exercise of such jurisdiction must be made out." 43. In view of the preceding analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions in seriatim as follows: (i) The civil revision preferred under Section 115 of the Code is not maintainable unless the conditions precedent engrafted therein are squarely satisfied. (ii) The decisions rendered in Joydeb Banerjee (supra), Raghubans Mani (supra) and Prem Shankar Chaudhary (supra) do not lay down the law correctly and, accordingly, they are overruled and, resultantly, any decision following the said line of decisions stands overruled. (ii) The decisions rendered in Joydeb Banerjee (supra), Raghubans Mani (supra) and Prem Shankar Chaudhary (supra) do not lay down the law correctly and, accordingly, they are overruled and, resultantly, any decision following the said line of decisions stands overruled. (iii) The civil revisions in respect of certain orders which have been stated in the earlier part of the judgment are maintainable, but the list is not exhaustive for the acid test has to be that the suit or proceeding would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (iv) The civil revisions which are pending can be converted into writ petitions on fulfillment of other conditions. 44. The reference is answered accordingly. The matters be placed before the learned Single Judge for delineation in accordance with law.