Judgment :- 1. The petitioner claims to have acquired right, title and interest in Site No.519, BTM II Stage, I Phase measuring 30’ x 40’; allotted to the 2nd respondent, by the 1st respondent – Bangalore Development Authority (for short ‘BDA’) under an agreement of sale dated 10/04/2001 Annexure-“C” and a General Power of Attorney dated 10/04/2001 Annexure –“D” allegedly executed by the 2nd respondent. It is the assertion of the petitioner that acting on the terms of the agreement to sell and the Power of Attorney, the site was conveyed by way of sale to one B. Viswha Kumar, for a valuable consideration, by executing an absolute sale deed dated 8/8/2006. There having arisen certain disputes between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, the purchaser is said to have reconveyed the property to the petitioner under an absolute sale deed dated 1/4/2009 for a higher sale price. As things stood thus, the petitioner is said to have addressed a communication dated 7/10/2009 Annexure –“H” to the 1st respondent-Bangalore Development Authority informing the authority of the transactions between himself and the 2nd respondent over the property in question and to forbear from executing any documents without notice to him. The BDA, acting on the said communication, is said to have referred the matter to the Superintendent of Police, Special Task Force (STF) attached to the BDA and issued an endorsement dated ‘nil’ Annexure –“J” stating that further action would be taken after receipt of the report from the Superintendent of Police, Special Task Force. There afterwards, by yet another letter dated 2/11/2009 Annexure –“K”, the petitioner called upon the 1st respondent – BDA to execute a sale deed conveying the property in favour of the petitioner while willing to pay the charges and fees, which when not responded, led to issue of a notice dated 30/11/2009 Annexure –“L” through legal counsel reiterating the very same demand, failing which threat of legal action. There being no response, the petitioner has preferred this petition for a mandamus directing the 1st respondent – BDA to act on the representations Annexure “H”,”L”’ and “M”. 2. There being no response, the petitioner has preferred this petition for a mandamus directing the 1st respondent – BDA to act on the representations Annexure “H”,”L”’ and “M”. 2. Petition is opposed by filing statement of objections dated 18/02/2010 of the 1st respondent interalia contending that in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease-cum-sale agreement entered into between itself and the 2nd respondent – allottee, permission was accorded to create a mortgage of the property to secure a loan to put up construction of a residential building and it has neither terminated the lease-cum-sale agreement nor executed an absolute sale deed conveying the property allotted to the 2nd respondent. It is further stated that the BDA unaware of the execution of the alleged agreement to sell and the General Power of Attorney in respect of the property in question, called upon the 2nd respondent to have her say over the complaint which was responded to by letter dated 2/11/2009 denying the execution of the documents. The petitioner’s representation was referred to the Superintendent of Police (STF) whence the petitioner and the 2nd respondent gave their respective statements, having appeared in person. It is further stated that the execution of the sale deed conveying the site in question by the petitioner in favour of third parties is not a fetter on its rights over the property in question. Lastly it is contended that the BDA not invested with a jurisdiction to adjudicate upon either the genuineness of the documents or the rights flowing there under as claimed by the petitioner is incompetent to decide the dispute between the parties. 3. The petition is also opposed by filing Statement of objections dated 1/9/2010 of the 2nd respondent interalia denying the execution of the documents in favour of the petitioner, but at Paragraph 10 contends that the petitioner took undue advantage of her helplessness and innocence by obtaining her signatures on blank papers assuring the eviction of the lessee from the schedule premises while however reserving her right to file appropriate legal proceedings. Lastly it is contended that the BDA has no jurisdiction to resolve the alleged controversy between herself and the petitioner over the property in question. 4. Lastly it is contended that the BDA has no jurisdiction to resolve the alleged controversy between herself and the petitioner over the property in question. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner advances only one contention that the 1st respondent – BDA’s inaction in not considering the petitioner’s representations is a denial of legitimate expectation by placing reliance upon the following decisions: 1) L.I.C. OF INDIA AND ANOTHER vs. CONSUMER EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE AND OTHERS ( AIR 1995 SC 1811 ) at page 1827 Para 45 2) PUNJAB COMMUNICATIONS LTD., vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( AIR 1999 SC 1801 ) at Page 1810 Paragraph 31 3) RAM PRAVESH SINGH & OTHERS ( (2006) 8 SCC 381 vs. STATE OF BIHAR & OTHERS at page 390 Paragraph 15 4) SOUTHERN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES CO. LTD., vs. ELECTRICITY INSPECTOR & E.T.I.O & ORS ( AIR 2007 SC 1984 ). At page 2012 Paragraph 146 5. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent, while reiterating the averments in the Statement of objections, contends that there being no privity of contract between the petitioner and the 1st respondent, over the site in question, no mandamus can ensue to consider the representations. According to the learned counsel, petitioner instead of asserting his rights under the alleged agreement of sale and the General Power of Attorney, in an appropriate legal proceedings before a competent court of law for necessary declaration it cannot be said that the petitioner has a right, title and interest in the property in question to the exclusion of the 2nd respondent allottee. It is lastly contended that the lis between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent cannot be adjudicated by the BDA as it has no jurisdiction to do so. 6. Sri K.N. Puttegowda, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent critically opposed the submission of the petitioner on the premise that the petitioner has no right, title or interest to the property in question and therefore, is disentitled to even maintain a writ petition. According to the learned counsel, a writ of mandamus is not a writ of right that can be issued at the mere asking of the petitioner in the absence of a legal right. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings as well as the reported opinions supra, at the threshold, the petition deserves to be rejected with exemplary costs. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings as well as the reported opinions supra, at the threshold, the petition deserves to be rejected with exemplary costs. Indisputably, the site in question is allotted to the 2nd respondent as evident from the allotment letter, the lease-cum-sale agreement, the Possession memo executed by the BDA and therefore a privity of contract between the respondents. The right of the petitioner is said to stem from an agreement of sale and a Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the 2nd respondent which is specifically denied by the 2nd respondent. In the face of denial of execution of the documents it is for the petitioner to establish his alleged rights flowing under the aforesaid two documents, and secure necessary declaration from a competent civil court. The very fact that the 2nd respondent has denied the execution of the documents, it is needless to state that the petitioner’s right to the property in question is not recognized in law. 8. The making of a representation, perse, to the BDA calling upon it to forbear from execution of documents in favour of the 2nd respondent in respect of the site in question and yet another representation to execute the sale deed conveying the site in question in favour of the petitioner on the premise of the terms of agreement of sale and the Power of Attorney, alleging acquisition of right, title and interest in the said site, the question is whether the 1st respondent is obliged in law to execute the sale deed in favour of the petitioner? I am afraid, the answer to the question is an emphatic ‘no’. 9. The principles governing the issue of a writ of mandamus, in a catena of reported opinions of the apex court could be summarized thus: (a) A writ of Mandamus is not a writ of right, but is awarded only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and to compel performance of an act, which in equity and good conscience ought to be performed, and the granting of writ does not follow of necessity the showing of legal right. A Mandamus , it is elsewhere said, is designed to remedy a wrong, not to promote one, and where the right of the plaintiff is at all confused or in doubt, where it would work injustice and where is would be requiring a person to do what the law forbids him to do, the court will not issue. In other words, a writ of mandamus is not issued where it would not promoted substantial justice or to promote manifest injustice and to accomplish a wrong or in aid of illegitimate or unlawful action. A writ of mandamus is inappropriate unless the petitioner has a clear right to the relief requested and there is plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of the respondent to do the act in question and no other adequate remedy is available. (b) A writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only where: a) There is a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought: b) There is an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; c) The lack of any other adequate remedy; and d) Properly invoked jurisdiction of the court; 10. In MANI SUBRAT JAIN ETC. ETC. V. STATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS ( AIR 1977 SC 276 ), the Apex Court held thus: “It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be judicially enforceable right as well as legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus.” 11. Having regard to the aforesaid well-established legal principles, applying the same to the facts of this case, it is needless to restate that in the absence of a legal right vested in the petitioner, over the property in question, is disentitled to a writ of mandamus. 12. The contention of the petitioner of a legitimate expectation in the matter of consideration of his representations by the 1st respondent – BDA is without merit. The observations of the Apex Court in Ram Parvesh Singh’s case supra, in the circumstances is apposite: “15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right, it is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The observations of the Apex Court in Ram Parvesh Singh’s case supra, in the circumstances is apposite: “15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right, it is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term “established practice” refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a “legitimate expectation” of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above “fairness in action” but far below “promissory estoppels”. It may only entitle an expectant: (a) To an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) To an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bonafide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the “legitimate expectation”. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognized legal relationship with the authority. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognized legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly”. 13. In the admitted facts of the case, the petitioner’s right allegedly stems from the terms of the agreement to sell and General Power of Attorney, allegedly executed by the 2nd respondent in respect of the property in question. In the absence of a declaration of the rights by a competent court of law, it is too far-fetched to contend that the petitioner has a legitimate expectation flowing from a promise or established practice of the 1st respondent – BDA. Admittedly there being no privity of contract between the petitioner and the 1st respondent – BDA, in my opinion, it cannot be said that there is an established practice of the 1st respondent – BDA to answer the petitioners’ representations. In the facts of the case, the alleged expectation of the petitioner to execute the sale deed of the property in question in the name of the petitioner by the 1st respondent – BDA is not only unreasonable but illogical and invalid and therefore, not being a legitimate expectation, is not enforceable as such. Moreover, there is want of material by which the 1st respondent – BDA is said to have promised the petitioner either expressly or impliedly of a consideration of the petitioner’s representation. 14. As observed by the Apex Court, the doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice, can be invoked only by the 2nd respondent who has dealings with the 1st respondent – BDA and not by the petitioner. As noticed supra, the petitioner claims to have a recognized legal relationship with the 1st respondent – BDA through the 2nd respondent – allottee which in fact is denied by the 2nd respondent – allottee. As noticed supra, the petitioner claims to have a recognized legal relationship with the 1st respondent – BDA through the 2nd respondent – allottee which in fact is denied by the 2nd respondent – allottee. Thus, in my view, the petitioner being a total stranger unconnected with the 1st respondent- BDA and having no previous dealings with the 1st respondent cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation on the premise that the 1st respondent has a general obligation to act therein. 15. Viewed thus, the other reported opinions of the Apex Court have no application to the facts of the case. 16. Sufficient public time is spent on a frivolous litigation instituted by the petitioner and therefore, I deem it necessary to impose exemplary costs quantified at Rs.10,000/- to be made over to the Registry of this court within 15 days, failing which the Registrar General is directed to recover the same as arrears of land revenue as if this order is a decree.