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2010 DIGILAW 983 (PNJ)

Ashok Kumar v. Union Of India

2010-02-24

JITENDRA CHAUHAN, M.M.KUMAR

body2010
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1 The instant petition is directed against order dated 8.1.2010 (P-8), passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (for brevity, the Tribunal). The Tribunal has rejected the claim of the petitioner for staying the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal trial in case FIR No.15, dated 1.2.2008, under Sections 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, registered at Police Station City Ferozepur. A further prayer has been made for directing respondent Nos.l to 4 to stay the proceedings of departmental inquiry pending against the petitioner till the decision of the criminal case pending against him in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepur. 2 Brief facts of the case are that a case FIR No.15, dated 1.2.2008, under Sections 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, has been registered against the petitioner at Police Station City Ferozepur, on a complaint made by the Superintendent Post Offices, Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur (P-1). The allegations against him are that while working as Sub Post Master, Makhu Gate Post Office, Ferozepur City, he misappropriated Government funds amounting to Rs.2,21,796/- by showing fraudulent withdrawals from different Recurring Deposit Accounts from the post office. On 16.2.2009, challan in the criminal case was presented in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepur, and the case is at the stage of framing of charges against the petitioner. 3 Prior to registration of the criminal case, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 14.12.2007. a departmental inquiry has also been initiated against him. On 10.12.2008, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for brevity, the Rules) with the similar allegations as have been leveled in the FIR (P-2 & P-3). On 2.11.2009, the petitioner made a representation for dropping the departmental inquiry till the decision of the criminal case registered against him (P-4). On 29.12.2009, he was informed that the departmental proceedings could be conducted simultaneously with the criminal trial (P-5). It has been claimed by the petitioner that the witnesses cited both in the departmental inquiry as well as in the criminal case are the same and in case both the proceedings are allowed to continue simultaneously, his defence is likely to be prejudiced. It has been claimed by the petitioner that the witnesses cited both in the departmental inquiry as well as in the criminal case are the same and in case both the proceedings are allowed to continue simultaneously, his defence is likely to be prejudiced. 4 Under the aforementioned circumstances, the petitioner filed OA No. 15-PB-2010 before the Tribunal with a similar prayer which has been made in the instant petition. However, by placing reliance on the judgments of Honble the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 13 and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, (2005)10 S.C.C. 471, the Tribunal has rejected the prayer made by the petitioner insofar as staying the proceedings in the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal trial. In regard to the other prayer of the petitioner during the suspension period the Tribunal has found him entitled to the payment of subsistence allowance as enhanced from time to time, as per Rules. Accordingly, the respondents have been directed to examine the case of the petitioner for payment of subsistence allowance as admissible and enhanced from time to time (P-8). 5 Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner at a considerable length we find no merit in the instant petition warranting admission of the same. There is no legal infirmity in the impugned order dated 8.1.2010 (P-8) passed by the Tribunal. It is well settled that inquiry proceedings and criminal proceedings could be conducted simultaneously. The standard of proof in both the proceedings is entirely different. There is no dearth of authorities for the proposition that unless the facts are complicated and some legal acumen is required there is no bar for continuation of disciplinary as well as criminal proceedings. In NOIDA Enterprises Association v. NOIDA, 2007(2) R.S.J. 504, it has been held that standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge. Even if there is an acquittal in criminal proceedings, the same does not bar the continuation of departmental proceedings. In this case, the decision of the Government in deciding not to continue with the departmental proceedings after acquittal in the criminal charge was held untenable and quashed. Even if there is an acquittal in criminal proceedings, the same does not bar the continuation of departmental proceedings. In this case, the decision of the Government in deciding not to continue with the departmental proceedings after acquittal in the criminal charge was held untenable and quashed. The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings has been highlighted by Honble the Supreme Court in several cases, which were also referred to in the case of NOIDA Enterprises (supra), and in this regard reference was made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T.Srinivas, (2004)7 S.C.C. 442; Uttaranchal Road Transport Corporation v. Mansaram Nainwal, (2806)6 S.C.C. 366; and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra). Furthermore, the position in law relating to acquittal in criminal case, its effect on the departmental proceedings and reinstatement in service has been dealt with by Honble the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, (1997)4 S.C.C. 385. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited, (1999)2 S.C.T. 660, it is again stated that the effect of the acquittal in a criminal case on the departmental proceedings would depend upon the factual situation in each case. 6 For the reasons aforementioned, we find no ground warranting admission of the instant petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed