Judgment : 1. The appellants are defendants 1 and 2 in O.S.No.418 of 1988 on the file of the Munsiff, Thiruvalla. The respondents herein instituted the above suit seeking a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the appellants and the third defendant with a plea that Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is belonging to the respondents and that Item No.2 is belonging to the appellants over which the respondents had been walking through for ingress and egress to Item No.1 and that the defendants had been attempting to block the same for which they have got no manner of right. To restrain the so called attempt to block the pathway, the injunction was sought for. 2. The third defendant remained ex-parte. The appellants, inter alia contended that, the respondents had no manner of right over Item No.2 and that Item No.3 being a temple property, respondents and others had been walking here and there. The said usage would not confer any right over the same in favour of the respondents and prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 3. After raising the issues, the parties were sent for trial. On the side of the respondents, PWs.1 to 5 were examined and Exts.A1 and C1 were marked. The appellants did not adduce any evidence. The Trial Court decreed the suit. 4. Though the appellants preferred an appeal as A.S.44 of 1992, they were not successful. Now this second appeal. 5. The following are the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal memorandum: “I. Whether in the absence of prayer for declaration or plaintiffs’ title and possession over plaint schedule item 2, or declaration of their right of easement over the same, the suit for mere relief of injunction will lie? II. Whether in the absence of pleading and proof of plaintiffs’ title and possession or of facts on which a right of easement can be founded, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction? III. Properties on the north and west of the temple compound lying continguously upto the public road, having been under one common ownership earlier till recently, is it open to the plaintiffs’ to contend that they have no other way for ingress and egress to the public road on the south? IV. III. Properties on the north and west of the temple compound lying continguously upto the public road, having been under one common ownership earlier till recently, is it open to the plaintiffs’ to contend that they have no other way for ingress and egress to the public road on the south? IV. Whether it can be held that people walking through temple compound lying open, is doing so in exercise of their right of way and as of right, and can such persons acquire any right of easement or any other right so as to entitle them to injunct the temple authorities from closing the temple compound? V. Whether on the pleadings and evidence the plaintiffs have made out a case for injunction?” 6. Either side was heard. Perused the judgment under appeal. While confirming the decree and judgment of the Trial Court, the lower appellate court arrived the following finding in para.10. “(T)rue that plaintiffs have not claimed any easement right over Item No.2. But that will not give rise to any right to the defendants who have not proved its title to close it or to diminish its width or to commit any sort of waste therein”. (A)s Item No.2 is used by the plaintiffs for entering Item No.1 for several years as their means of access and defendants have not proved their right to obstruct if they have no manner of right to close it or to diminish its width or to commit any sort of waste therein. So plaintiffs are entitled for a decree for injunction”. 7. The title of the appellants over Item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties is not disputed. On the other hand, it specifically admitted that Item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties belongs to the appellants. The lower appellate court omitted to note the fundamental principle that when the respondents/plaintiffs admitted the right and title of the appellants/defendants 1 and 2, the appellants need not further prove their right or title. 8. There is no whisper in the pleadings that the respondents had perfected any sort of right of way through Item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties. 8. There is no whisper in the pleadings that the respondents had perfected any sort of right of way through Item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties. While arriving a finding that though respondents had not claimed any easement right over Item No.2, the lower appellate court observed that it would not give rise to any right to the appellants, who have not proved their title to close or to diminish the width of the pathway. The lower appellate court omitted to note that since the title of the appellants over Item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties is admitted, they have got every freedom and authority to exercise their right over the property or to use the same in the manner, which they chose. Unless the respondents could establish any right over Item No.2, they are not entitled to the decree of injunction sought for. 9. The courts below should have noticed that item No.2 is an open temple property and that persons, including adjacent property owners, walking hither and thither along an open temple property would not accrue any right by such walking so long as such usage is without any right. It appears that the respondents had walked through item No.2 of the plaint schedule as it was left open without fencing and not because of or under any right. Such usage would neither reduce the right of the titleholder to fence the property nor entitle the respondents to get an injunction as sought for. 10. The finding of the lower appellate court that, the appellants, who had title, had no right to obstruct, is in fact perverse and not sustainable. 11. At this juncture, it would be relevant to have a look at S.38(3) of the Specific Relief Act. S.38(3) reads as follows: “When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:- (a) Where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) Where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) Where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) Where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings”. 12. 12. On a repeated reading of the pleadings in the plaint, I find that the respondents had not pleaded any of the circumstances mentioned in S.38(3) to seek a decree of perpetual injunction. In the absence of any claim of perfected right of way, either by necessity, prescription, grant or otherwise, the respondents are not entitled to seek a decree restraining the appellants to whom Item No.2 belongs to restrict the manner of usage and the court should not have granted it. The decree under challenge is unsustainable as it is an infringement of right of the appellants for which there is no legal sanction. It is further contrary to the above provisions of the Specific Relief Act. It is liable to be set aside. In the result, while allowing this appeal, the decree and judgment under challenge are set aside. The suit before the lower court would stand dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.