Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. This application is at the instance of the defendant and is directed against the order dated September 10, 2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Additional Court at Purulia in Title Suit No.96 of 2009 thereby rejecting the petition filed by the defendant nos.1 & 3 for rejection of the plaint. The plaintiffs/opposite parties filed the Title Suit No.96 of 2009 praying for a decree of declaration and permanent injunction against the defendant/petitioner and other proforma opposite parties. The plaintiffs/petitioners prayed for a decree for declaration that the so-called election of the Central Purodha Board of Ananda Marga dated September 3, 2003 and the alleged bye-election of the Central Purodha board of Ananda Marga dated May, 2007-2008 are illegal, void and ab initio for declaration that the defendants are not the elected members of the Central Purodha Board of Ananda Marga for the term 2004-2009, for declaration that the General Election of Central Purodha Board of Ananda Marga for the term 2009 – 2014 be held with proper notice, etc. and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 to 4 from acting as members of the Central Purodha Board of Ananda Marga, etc. At the time of filing of the suit, the plaintiffs/opposite parties filed a petition for temporary injunction and the defendants were to file an objection against the petition for temporary injunction. The defendant nos.1 & 3 filed a petition for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the plaintiffs filed the suit for various types of declaration and permanent injunction and the suit valuation being made for Rs.65,000/-, the plaintiffs were required to pay court fees of Rs.17,120/- but they paid court fees of Rs.110/- only and so an amount of balance court fees of Rs.17,010/- was to be paid. The plaintiffs should be directed to pay the deficit court fees accordingly. The defendant nos.1 & 3 also contended that the suit was filed on 04.08.2009 and the learned Trial Judge directed the plaintiffs to take necessary steps for issuance of summons upon the plaintiffs as per amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs should be directed to pay the deficit court fees accordingly. The defendant nos.1 & 3 also contended that the suit was filed on 04.08.2009 and the learned Trial Judge directed the plaintiffs to take necessary steps for issuance of summons upon the plaintiffs as per amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs having not complied with such directions specially with regard to the provisions of Order 5 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 9(1), Order 7 Rule 9 and Order 7 Rule 11(f) of the C.P.C. for non-compliance of such provisions; the plaint should be rejected. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge has rejected the application for rejection of the plaint. Being aggrieved, the defendant/petitioner has preferred this application. Mr. Chaturbedi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant/petitioner, submits that as soon as the suit was filed the plaintiffs were required to file requisites for summons upon all the defendants without any delay and if the plaintiffs caused any delay, the suit was liable to be dismissed, as per provisions of Order 5 Rule 1, Order 5 Rule 9(1), Order 7 Rule 9 and Order 7 Rule 11(f) of the C.P.C. If the plaintiffs did not comply with the directions contained thereon, the plaint was liable to be rejected. The plaintiffs having not complied with such provisions, the plaint should be rejected. He also contends that as per plaint, the plaintiffs have prayed for several types of declaration and injunction. For each type of declaration the plaintiffs were required to pay separate court fees. The plaintiffs have stated the valuation of the suit as Rs.65,000/- but they paid the courts fees of Rs.110/- only though they were required to pay the court fees of Rs.17,010/-. Therefore, the suit is not maintainable. He referred to the decision in (2009) 4 CLT 28(HC), (2009) 2 CLT 59(HC), AIR 1976 SC 263 , AIR 1975 SC 2191, 2008(1) CHN 765 and 2007(4) CHN………. The compliance of directions of the orders referred to above as per provisions of the C.P.C. must be made; otherwise the plaint was liable to be rejected. But the learned Trial Judge has failed to take necessary steps according to the provisions of the C.P.C. and so the order impugned cannot be sustained. It should be set aside and the plaint should be rejected. On the other hand, Mr. But the learned Trial Judge has failed to take necessary steps according to the provisions of the C.P.C. and so the order impugned cannot be sustained. It should be set aside and the plaint should be rejected. On the other hand, Mr. Sanyal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, submits that directions contained under the Rules referred to above cannot be mandatory but directory. The Court should not insist on mere technicalities but to see the ends for justice and for that reason the application filed by the petitioner should be dismissed. Having considered the submission of the learned Advocate for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, I find that the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for reliefs as mentioned earlier. In that suit, the learned Trial Judge directed the plaintiffs to take necessary steps for issuance of summons upon the defendants but the plaintiffs did not put in the requisites in respect of all the defendants but for the defendant nos.2 and 4 only on August 18, 2009. The suit having filed on August 4, 2009, the requisites had been put in after seven days from the date of order dated August 4, 2009 and not within 7 days from the date of order. Therefore, according to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(f) of the C.P.C. the plaint filed by the plaintiff is liable to be rejected subject to the proviso. Mr. Chaturbedi has referred to the decision of Tarak Ch. Roy Vs. Jitubhai Patel & anr. Reported in (2009) 4 CLT 28(HC) and submitted that in that suit the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to dismiss the plaint for non-filing of requisites under Chapter VIII Rules 6 & 8. With due respect to Mr. Chaturbedi, I am of the view that this decision is not applicable in the instant situation because the decision of Tarak Ch. Roy (supra) refers to a proceeding under the Original Side Rules of the High Court for infringement of trademark. In that case, the plaint was rejected for requisites having not been put in within the time of limitation but after one and half years. For that reason, the Hon’ble Single Judge rejected the plaint with direction that the plaintiff would be at liberty to file a fresh suit. In that case, the plaint was rejected for requisites having not been put in within the time of limitation but after one and half years. For that reason, the Hon’ble Single Judge rejected the plaint with direction that the plaintiff would be at liberty to file a fresh suit. This is not the situation at all because the delay was for about 13 days only. In fact, from the materials on record, I find that defendant nos.1 & 3 had already appeared in the suit. So this decision is not applicable. As regards the decision of Bhairu Ratan Pachisia & ors. vs. International Club & ors. reported in (2009) 2 CLT 59(HC) I find that this is also a matter relating to Original Side Rules of the High Court. The suit was dismissed for not taking any steps for service of writs of summons upon the defendants within the time prescribed by the Original Side Rules of the High Court. In this case, the Hon’ble Single Judge has held that the Court cannot, however, any anxiety to do substantial justice, ignore laws enacted by the legislature, give a go bye to the Rules framed by the Full Court under Clause 37 of the Letters Patent, condone gross negligence. In that case, the writ of summons was not taken out for delivery to the Sheriff for over three years from the date of filing of the plaint. This is not at all the situation in the instant suit. Therefore, I hold that this decision is not also applicable. Mr. Chaturbadi has next referred to the decision of Govind Lal Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee & Ors. Reported in AIR 1976 SC 263 . This decision refers to the use of words such as “shall” or “may”, I hold, such words should not be taken as conclusive on the question whether a particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstances that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevant and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed peremptory. This is a general expression relating to the interpretation of statutes and there is no specific observation which may be applicable in the instant suit. Similarly, Mr. Chaturbedi has relied to the decision of State of Mysore Vs. This is a general expression relating to the interpretation of statutes and there is no specific observation which may be applicable in the instant suit. Similarly, Mr. Chaturbedi has relied to the decision of State of Mysore Vs. V. K. Kangan reported in AIR 1975 SC 2191 and thus he has submitted that the determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory is, in the ultimate analysis, determined upon the intent of the law maker and that has to be covered initially from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, it is designed and the consequences which would fall from construing it in one way or the other. This is also a general principle as to interpretation of statutes. Mr. Chaturbedi has referred to the decision of Ramnath Paswan Vs. Setaur Rahaman reported in 2008(1) CHN 765 and submitted that the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court has decided that the word “must” instead of “shall” fell to be mandatory in nature. This decision relates to election of Prodhan and removal of the Prodhan. This relates to permission of holding election beyond one month period upon taking permission from the higher authority by giving a reasoned order. The provisions of Rule 6 was held to be directory in nature and violation of the said directory provision cannot be a nullity unless prejudice is caused to an aggrieved party for deviation from the provision. It is completely on a different subject save the interpretation of the words “must” and “shall”. Therefore, this decision, I am of the view, does not help the petitioner in any way. On the other hand, Mr. Sanyal, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, referred to the decision of State of Punjab & anr. Vs. Shamlal Muirari & Anr. reported in AIR 1976 SC 1177 . This decision clearly lays down that when a party is required to file three copies of judgments for the perusal of the Hon’ble Three Judges of the Court and if three copies are not filed by mistake, such failure may be an irregularity. Such omission or default is only a proof which can be characterized as an irregularity to be corrected by condonation on application by the party fulfilling the condition within a time allowed by the Court. After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end produce of technicalities. Such omission or default is only a proof which can be characterized as an irregularity to be corrected by condonation on application by the party fulfilling the condition within a time allowed by the Court. After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end produce of technicalities. He has referred also to the decision of Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 2003 SC 189 of which paragraph 16 is very much relevant. For convenience, the paragraph 16 of the decision is quoted below: “16. Our attention has been drawn to Order 7, Rule 11 to which clauses (e) and (f) have been added which enable the Court to reject the plaint where it is not filed in duplicate or where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order 7. It appears to us that the said clauses being procedural would not require the automatic rejection of the plaint at the first instance. If there is any defect as contemplated by Rule 11(e) or non-compliance as referred to in Rule 11(f), the Court should ordinarily give an opportunity for rectifying the defects, and in the event of the same not being done the Court will have the liberty or the right to reject the plaint.” In the instant case, though the plaintiffs did not file the requisites with regard to the defendant nos.1 & 3 within the time, I find from the materials on record that the defendant nos.1 & 3 had already appeared in the suit. Therefore, the question of filing the requisites does not arise. In view of the observations made in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (Tamil Nadu) (supra) passed by the Hon’ble Three Judges of the Apex Court, I am of the view that since the defendant nos.1 & 3 had already appeared in the suit and they are contesting, the question of rejection of the plaint does not arise all. I am of the view that the learned Trial Judge has rightly observed that by the said amount of delay of 13 days is not so fatal that the same will warrant the rejection of the plaint. He has rightly observed that the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(f) of the C.P.C. is not mandatory in nature but directory. I am of the view that the learned Trial Judge has rightly observed that by the said amount of delay of 13 days is not so fatal that the same will warrant the rejection of the plaint. He has rightly observed that the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(f) of the C.P.C. is not mandatory in nature but directory. This being the position, so far as the ground of rejection of the plaint is concerned for non-compliance of certain provisions of the C.P.C. I am of the view that such ground is not tenable at all. As regards court fees, from the last part of the impugned order, I find that the learned Court has observed that the plaintiffs were required to deposit ad valorem court fees upon their own valuation. They have been directed to pay the balance court fees accordingly. In view of the above discussions, I am of the opinion that the present application is meritless. It is, therefore, dismissed. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Advocate for the parties on their usual undertaking.