Judgment : 1. By this Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-tenant has questioned the order of the Maharashra Revenue Tribunal dated 29.12.1989 delivered in Revision. The office of M.R.T. has registered proceedings as Appeal No. 14-A.87.P. In view of the short contentions raised before this Court, it is not necessary to refer to the facts at length. 2. Advocate Shri Naik for the petitioner has contended that the status as protected tenant is not in dispute and hence rejection of application filed under Section 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (For short, hereinafter referred as `Hyderabad Act') only on the ground that he did not approach the competent authority under Section 32 for restoration of possession, is arbitrary and unwarranted. According to the learned counsel, it constitutes failure to exercise jurisdiction. 3. Advocate Salunke for respondent no.1 has briefly invited my attention to the previous history. He contends that the petitioner was dispossessed allegedly before 1954 and the respondent no.1 purchased the land in dispute in 1966, therefore, the respondent no.1 never dispossessed petitioner. The respondent no.1 has thereafter transferred the land to his son and taking advantage of that event, the proceedings under Section 98 of the Hyderabad Act came to be filed. Learned counsel states that Section 98 is, therefore, rightly held to be not applicable in such contingency. According to him, Section 32 stipulates limitation of two years for a person like petitioner to move competent authority for restoration of possession. Though Section 98 expressly does not provide for limitation, application thereunder needs to be moved within a reasonable time, that too against the person who has dispossessed the petitioner. 4. Without prejudice to the contentions and in alternative he points out that concurrently the authorities have held that the petitioner is not a protected tenant. He further made attempt to demonstrate this Court that at one point of time, the petitioner has claimed acquisition of ownership to same land. According to him in view of this concurrent finding of fact, the petitioner can not be treated to be a protected tenant and very base on which his argument is founded, therefore, ceases to exists. He therefore requested the Court to dismiss the Writ Petition. 5. Mr. R. P. Dhase Advocate for respondent nos.2(1) to 2(4) adopts the arguments of Advocate Mr. Salunke. 6. He therefore requested the Court to dismiss the Writ Petition. 5. Mr. R. P. Dhase Advocate for respondent nos.2(1) to 2(4) adopts the arguments of Advocate Mr. Salunke. 6. Facts which are on record clearly show that the respondent no.1 has purchased the suit land some time in the year 1966. The claim of the petitioner that he is protected tenant has not been accepted by the authorities. In any case, it is not the contention of the petitioner that he was dispossessed in 1966 by the present respondent no.1. The pleadings to which attention has been invited show that the petitioner claims to have been dispossessed `several years before'. Thus, no specific date of dispossession has been pleaded any where. The moment, it is accepted that the petitioner has failed to establish the case of dispossession, it is obvious that Section 98 can not have any application. Section 98 of Hyderabad Act envisages summary eviction of person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land. However, it also contains a condition that the provision which render possession of person wrongful, must not provide for his eviction. Thus, when there is no provision anywhere for his eviction and the person is found to be unauthorisedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession, then only Section 98 can be taken recourse too. Here, it is not in dispute that Section 32 of Hyderabad Act prescribes procedure for taking possession by tenant or agricultural labour and it further requires him to move application for restoration of possession within a period of two years from the date of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1957 came into force or the date on which the right to such possession accrued to him, whichever may happen later. The application is to be made to Tahsildar in writting in prescribed form for such possession. The petitioner was dispossessed prior to 1957 and the above mentioned Amendment Act came in to force in the year 1957 therefore, within two years, the petitioner could have applied for restoration of possession. He has not moved any such application. 7. When Section 32 prescribes specific remedy to person like the petitioner for restoration of possession, Section 98 can not be interpreted so as to hold that the remedy provided thereunder also overlaps with Section 32. Section 32 contemplates all together different remedy. He has not moved any such application. 7. When Section 32 prescribes specific remedy to person like the petitioner for restoration of possession, Section 98 can not be interpreted so as to hold that the remedy provided thereunder also overlaps with Section 32. Section 32 contemplates all together different remedy. Section 98 contemplates summary eviction only when there is no other remedy available for eviction of a person unathorisedly occupying or wrongful in possession of any land. Section 98 is not available after expiry of period of two years when Section 32 ceases to be of any assistance. 8. Under section 32 or under Section 98 cause of action for the present petitioner can be the loss of possession. The transfer by subsequent purchaser who himself purchased it in 1966 can not confer upon petitioner any such cause of action. 9. In view of this, I find no substance in the arguments advanced by learned Advocate Mr. Naik for petitioner. Writ Petition is dismissed accordingly with no orders as to costs. Rule discharged.