JUDGMENT :- 1. Plaintiff is the appellant. Suit was initially filed for a decree of injunction, but, later, amended for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the suit property as well. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, but, in appeal, the lower appellate court reversing that decree, non-suited the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 2. Notice on admission was issued to the respondent and the records of the case where called for. After service of notice and receipt of records, the appeal was heard to consider its entertainability as to whether any substantial question of law emerge for consideration in the appeal by this court. 3. Suit property is 30 cents of land comprising buildings situated within the bounds of the respondent – a local authority, Plaintiff claimed title and possession over the suit property under Ext.A1 gift deed executed by her mother. The dispute involved in the suit was practically centered over a building put up in two cents of land in the suit property for starting an ‘anganvadi’. Plaintiff alleged that an anganvadi was started in a building in the plaint property five years before the institution of the suit by the Social Welfare Department of the Government. She was appointed as an instructor in the anganvadi during 1990, and thereafter, with the contributions from the public, construction of a new building in the suit property, with more conveniences, to operate the anganvadi proceeded with, but before the completion of that construction, the Social Welfare Department shifted the anganvadi to another building close to the plaint property. However, when the plaintiff took steps to start a tuition centre in the building constructed for the anganvadi, the respondent, local authority, caused obstructions contending that the building belong to the respondent. Suit claim for injunction, on the allegations as above, being resisted by the defendant contending that there was a surrender of two cents of the plaint property by the mother of the plaintiff, the previous title holder, for putting up an anganvadi in such land, with the funds advanced by the Social Welfare Department of the Government, and under the supervision of the respondent local authority, the building was constructed, the plaintiff amended the suit for declaration of her title and possession over the suit property. The defendant resisting such reliefs also, contended that over the two cents of land, which had been surrendered by the mother of the plaintiff, the building was put up with the funds given by the Social Welfare Department and the District Collector for starting an anganvadi, and as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. A sum of Rs.15,000/- was provided by the Social Welfare Department and another sum of Rs.1,00,000/- by the District Collector for construction of the building, and with such funds, the building was put up on the two cents of land surrendered by the mother of the plaintiff and the allegation of the plaintiff that the building was put up with the funds of the public is false, was the case of the defendant local authority submitting that the suit had been laid on false allegations to snatch the possession of the building. 4. The materials placed by both sides consisted of PWs.1 to 3 and Exts.A1 and A2 for the plaintiff and DWs.1 to 3 and Exts.B1 to B3 for the defendant. The trial court held that in the case where the title of the plaintiff over the suit property stood conceded by the defendant there was absence of any convincing material to substantiate its contention of a valid surrender of two cents of property by the mother of the plaintiff in accordance with the Rules and also putting up construction of an anganvadi with the funds of the Social Welfare Department of the Government. In that view of the matter, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, as applied for. In the appeal preferred by the defendant, impeaching the decree of the trial court, the lower appellate court, after re-appreciating the materials tendered in the case, differing from the conclusion drawn by the trial court, holding that there was surrender of two cents of plaint property in favour of the defendant and the building was constructed in such land as contended by the defendant, reversed the decree and non-suited the plaintiff. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower appellate court went wrong in interfering with the decree passed by the trial court and it had misread the evidence and also overlooked the statutory provisions applicable in the case of surrender in entering into a finding that there is a surrender of the land in favour of the defendant – a local authority. The provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act were inapplicable to the defendant – a local authority; and a surrender contemplated under that Act could be only to the Government, and where the defendant in its written statement contended of a surrender of two cents of land out of the plaint property in its favour in the absence of a deed of gift as under the Transfer of Property Act and the same being registered under the Registration Act, the case of surrender set up by the defendant is totally bereft of any value, is the submission of the counsel. Ext.B1, the surrender deed produced by the defendant to prove the case of surrender of the land by the plaintiff’s mother, as rightly and correctly found by the trial court, has no material value and totally worthless to make a claim over the portion of the suit property or the building put up in such property, according to the counsel. The learned counsel relied on John v. Thaikkad Panchayat (1990 (2) KLT 721) to contend that in the case of free surrender to a local authority, it can be done only by a gift specifying the mandatory requirements under the Transfer of Property Act and also the Registration Act. No such gift over any piece of land from the plaint property from the previous title holder, mother of the plaintiff, has been canvassed for, but, only a case of free surrender, that too, by way of relinquishment as under the Land Relinquishment Act, which is inapplicable to the defendant – a local authority – is the submission of the counsel. The decree granted by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff upholding her title and possession over the property was unimpeachable and it was wrongly interfered with by the lower appellate court in non-suiting the plaintiff, is the submission of the counsel to contend that the appeal involves substantial questions of law to be decided by this Court. 6. The decree granted by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff upholding her title and possession over the property was unimpeachable and it was wrongly interfered with by the lower appellate court in non-suiting the plaintiff, is the submission of the counsel to contend that the appeal involves substantial questions of law to be decided by this Court. 6. Perusing the records of the case with reference to the submissions made by the counsel, I find no interference with the decree of dismissal rendered by the lower appellate court, in the given facts of the case, is called for. The one and only issue that was germane for consideration in the nature of the dispute involved, undoubtedly, related to the building put up in two cents of land in the plaint property – whether it was constructed by the plaintiff with contributions from the public as alleged by her, or with the funds of the Social Welfare Department of the Government and the District Collector as contended by the defendant – a local authority. The defendant had not disputed the title and possession of the plaintiff over the rest of the plaint property excluding the two cents where the building was put up to operate an anganvadi. The plaintiff has obtained title over the entire plaint property under Ext.A1 gift deed from her mother, does not by itself indicate the she is the owner of the building in the two cents of land, which had been constructed for operating the anganvadi. On the facts presented in the case where the dispute was confined to the question who is the owner of the building even if the defendant has no title over the land in which the construction was put up, and also irrespective of the validity or invalidity of Ext.B1 land relinquishment letter, whether it satisfied the requirements under the Land Relinquishment Act or any other Statute, ownership of the building required to be examined. Under the Indian Law as distinct from the English Law, one can have ownership over a building in a land without having proprietary title to such land. The maim quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit – whatever is affixed on the soil belongs thereto – followed in English law is not followed blindly under the Indian law. Under the Indian Law as distinct from the English Law, one can have ownership over a building in a land without having proprietary title to such land. The maim quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit – whatever is affixed on the soil belongs thereto – followed in English law is not followed blindly under the Indian law. Plaintiff has alleged that the building in two cents of land in the plaint property was put up with the funds collected from the public while she continued as an instructor in the anganvadi carried in another building in the plaint property. In evidence, she developed that case stating that initially Rs.25,000/- was expended by her father, and the rest from the contributions collected from the public, for putting up the new building. Not a scrap of paper was produced by the plaintiff to substantiate the case so set up to establish her claim of putting up the building in the two cents of land situate in the plaint property. The defendant, on the other hand, producing Ext.B1, a land relinquishment letter given by the mother of the plaintiff, who then was the owner of the plaint property, contended that she had surrendered two cents of land for putting up the building to operate an anganvadi with the funds advanced by the Social Welfare Department. Though the mother of the plaintiff, examined as DW3, denied Ext.B1 and disputed her signature, a perusal of that document shows that the relinquishment form was signed by the District Welfare Officer also, and the declaration thereunder, subscribed with the signature of DW3, attested to by the councilor of the Ward and also the village officer. The councilor was examined in the case as DW2. The evidence of DW2 clearly demonstrate that there was a surrender of two cents of land in favour of the Social Welfare Department by the mother of the plaintiff for putting up the anganvadi. Other than putting forth a suggestive question to the witness DW2 that Nalini, the mother of the plaintiff, had not signed Ext.B1, his assertion that there was surrender of land by her, and the building was put up with the funds provided by the Social Welfare Department and grant from the Central Government, remained unimpeached. Other than putting forth a suggestive question to the witness DW2 that Nalini, the mother of the plaintiff, had not signed Ext.B1, his assertion that there was surrender of land by her, and the building was put up with the funds provided by the Social Welfare Department and grant from the Central Government, remained unimpeached. Plaintiff has no case that DW2, the erstwhile councilor of the Ward, where the suit property is situate, had any axe to grind to perjure against her before a court of law as to surrender of the land by her mother if that were not so. Coupled with the evidence of DW2, the councilor, it is seen, the files produced by the defendant, Exts.B2 and B3 spell out in unmistakable terms that the construction of the anganvadi with the grant of the Social Welfare Department of the Government was carried out under the auspices of the Municipality, that too, providing succour, by way of employment and training for the construction of building, to members of the socially backward and marginalized sections of the Society. After the construction of the building was practically over, it could be seen from the files, plaintiff had caused obstructions to the functioning of the anganvadi situated in another building in her property and also its shifting to the new building, giving rise to police complaints as well. If the plaintiff had put up the building with the funds of the public, and that too, with an initial expenditure of Rs.25,000/- by her father, naturally she could be expected to produce the plan and licence issued to her for putting up the structure from the local authority. As already stated, no material piece of evidence whatsoever to show that the building was constructed with public funds, as contended by her, was tendered in the case. Where the materials produced bear out that the building was put up with the funds of the Social Welfare Department and grant of the Government under the auspices of the Municipality, it presupposes that it could have carried out such construction only after being put in possession of the two cents of land in the plaint property. Where the materials produced bear out that the building was put up with the funds of the Social Welfare Department and grant of the Government under the auspices of the Municipality, it presupposes that it could have carried out such construction only after being put in possession of the two cents of land in the plaint property. There is no prayer for recovery of possession in the suit despite a specific contention raised in the written statement by the defendant that the suit had been filed to take over possession of the building, which was put up by it in the two cents of land, is decisive to conclude that the decree of declaration of title and possession of the suit property claimed by the plaintiff was not allowable. There is no merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on John’s case (cited supra) and also impeaching the validity of Ext.B1 land relinquishment letter to contend that there is no relinquishment of two cents of land out of the plaint property in favour of the defendant Municipality in accordance with law as governed by the Statutes applicable. Irrespective of the question of the validity of the relinquishment and also the proprietary title that could be claimed by the defendant over the two cents of land, in which, the building had been put up with Governments funds, what emerges for consideration, in the given facts of the case, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief of declaration applied for in the suit. No declaratory decree can be obtained as a matter of absolute right. The totality of the facts and circumstances presented in the case govern the exercise of judicial discretion vested with the court in deciding whether the equitable relief of declaration applied for has to be granted or not. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances in which the discretion to grant a declaratory relief should or should not be exercised. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances in which the discretion to grant a declaratory relief should or should not be exercised. In the given facts of the case, where the real dispute was over the building situated in the two cents of land in the plaint property, and the case of the defendant that such building was put up by the funds of the Social Welfare Department and the grant of the Government, under its control and supervision, is more probable, reliable and acceptable on the materials tendered, and, the case of the plaintiff as to putting up such construction with public funds, unworthy of any merit there cannot be any doubt that the conclusion formed by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs canvassed in her suit is unassailable. Appeal is devoid of any merit, and it is dismissed.