Rakesh Tiwari, J.;- Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 15.9.2005 passed by the Prescribed Authority in P.A. Case No. 04 of 1998: Alakh Kumar Ghosh Vs. Messors Mool Chand Prakash Chand. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 6.12.2010 passed by Additional District Judge, Room No. 2, Jhansi in Rent Appeal No. 09 of 2005: Messors Mool Chand Prakash Vs. Alakh Kumar Ghosh. 3. The facts in brief are that the plaintiff-respondent instituted suit no. 04 of 1998: Alakh Kumar Ghosh Vs. M/S Mool Chand Prakash Chandra Bidiwale and another, for eviction of the petitioner-tenant, under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the ground of his personal need and hardship. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that he is running a school in the name and style of New Era Public School wherein education is imparted to small kids; that he has purchased a two seater vehicle for bringing these children from home to school and from school to home, as such, the garage which was occupied by the petitioner is required for parking the aforesaid two seater. The suit was contested by the tenant by filing written statement denying plaint allegations, particularly that plaintiff-respondent owns two seater vehicle for small kids studying in the school. 4. The case of petitioner-tenant before the Court below was that he has not defaulted in payment of rent and when the landlord refused to accept the rent, he had sent the same by money order which was also refused. Compelling him by circumstances to deposit the amount towards rent due, under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 5. After about four years of filing of the written statement, an amendment application appears to have been filed by the plaintiff-respondent under Order VI Rule 17 CPC stating therein that as his son has purchased an Indica car for which parking, space is also now required in the garage in dispute. Additional written statement was filed by the plaintiff-respondent rebutting the averments of the amendment application. It appears from the record that plaintiff-respondent had submitted rejoinder affidavit wherein it has been averred that share of his brother in plot no. Additional written statement was filed by the plaintiff-respondent rebutting the averments of the amendment application. It appears from the record that plaintiff-respondent had submitted rejoinder affidavit wherein it has been averred that share of his brother in plot no. 35/1 has been sold out and as such he has no other place except the garage in dispute. 6. It also appears from records that the plaintiff-respondent filed an affidavit stating therein that petitioner-tenant is also in possession of house no. 276, situated in Mohalla Badagaon Gate, Jhansi, where he can park his vehicle if the garage under his tenancy is released to the landlord and will not suffer any hardship. The petitioner-tenant then rebutted his averments by filing counter affidavit to the affidavit stating therein that house no. 276 is situated in a narrow lane and it would not be possible to park his car in the said house is above the plinth level. 7. An Amin was appointed for spot inspection for survey of house no. 276. He submitted his report on 31.4.2000 inter alia that for entering into the house 4 steps are required to be climbed and the vehicle cannot be parked in the accommodation in it but if in place of the stairs a slope is constructed, vehicles can be parked. The petitioner filed objection against the report submitted by Amin. Thereafter a fresh report was again called for by the Court below. Pursuant thereto the Amin again inspected the spot on 22.3.2001 and submitted his report paper no. 49C2/3 along with map being paper no. 29C2/4. 8. After considering rival contention of the parties and the documents on record, the trial Court framed two issues regarding bona fide need and comparative hardship. Both the aforesaid issues were decided against the petitioner-tenant. It was held that the approach road to house no. 276 of the tenant is quiet wide and the petitioner-tenant can park his car. The plea of the tenant that he has been using the garage of the landlord on rent since long will not declined the landlord from his rights for its release and that the landlord has proved his case of bonafide need of the said garage. 9. 276 of the tenant is quiet wide and the petitioner-tenant can park his car. The plea of the tenant that he has been using the garage of the landlord on rent since long will not declined the landlord from his rights for its release and that the landlord has proved his case of bonafide need of the said garage. 9. The court found that inspite of having his own garage, under the tenancy of the petitioner he is placed at the mercy of other residents of the locality for parking his vehicles in their houses whereas the petitioner can park his car in his own house no. 276 in the same locality as such the need of the landlord is bonafide. While decreeing the suit in respect of bonafide need, the trial court held as under: @ Hindi @ 10. As regards question of hardship, the Prescribed Authority recorded a finding that it also lies in favour of respondent-landlord and the door at the height of 4 ft from plinth for entrance can be made easily and that the tenancy of the garage in dispute is Rs.3.75 per month and for this reason he is not vacating it compelling the landlord to park his vehicles in other persons' houses. The Court also noted that petitioner tenant is running his business of Bidi in the said premises. The finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority is thus: @ Hindi @ 11. Aggrieved by the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the aforesaid two issues i.e. bonafide need and comparative hardship, the petitioner challenged the same in Rent Appeal No. 09 of 2005: Mool Chand Prakash Chand Vs. Alakh Kumar Ghosh, challenging the validity and correctness of order dated 15.9.2005 passed by the Prescribed Authority. Along with Rent Appeal, petitioner also moved an application for grant of stay/interim relief during pendency of appeal. The appellate Court initially granted interim order which was extended from time to time. The petitioner moved an application paper no. 32C/2 along with his affidavit paper no. 26C/2 for taking additional evidence on record before the appellate court stating therein that the plaintiff-respondent had purchased a plot and after construction of house, he is not only residing therein but is also keeping his Indica car in that premises. The petitioner moved an application paper no. 32C/2 along with his affidavit paper no. 26C/2 for taking additional evidence on record before the appellate court stating therein that the plaintiff-respondent had purchased a plot and after construction of house, he is not only residing therein but is also keeping his Indica car in that premises. The averments made in the said affidavit filed by the petitioner were rebutted by the respondent-landlord stating that the said house is 4-5 kms from the school whereas the garage under occupation of the tenant is immediately adjacent to school and is required for parking of the vehicle for the children and also requires the garage for parking of Indica car used for school purpose. 12. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the appellate court took note of the fact that the plot situated in Ramnath City has been purchased in the name of Arinandam Ghosh and Smt. Madhumita Ghosh who are son and daughter-in-law of the plaintiff-respondent, yet, arbitrarily the appellate court rejected the application of the petitioner by order dated 30.11.2007 for taking additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. The finding of the court on the applications 24 C-2 and 376-C for taking additional evidence on record under Order 41 Rule 27 reads thus: "The application has been filed on false assumption of facts and baseless and that the appellant cannot bring on record any new fact, which is not permitted under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The appellant has come up with this application with an intention to give a new turn to the case and to delay the proceeding, and hence the application and the affidavit filed along with the application are liable to be rejected. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the case record. A perusal of the record it transpires that a belated attempt has been made by the appellant to adduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. at the time of hearing of this appeal. From the grounds mentioned in the application and the affidavit in support thereof, I do not consider it proper to permit the appellant to adduce additional evidence at this stage, as none of the conditions prescribed by Rule 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. has been satisfied. From the grounds mentioned in the application and the affidavit in support thereof, I do not consider it proper to permit the appellant to adduce additional evidence at this stage, as none of the conditions prescribed by Rule 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. has been satisfied. The court under any circumstances cannot allow any party to file fresh evidence at the appellate stage to file in the lacuna in the evidence. Thus, the application 24C-2 is devoid of any merit, therefore, the same is rejected. Application 376-C:- The appellant has filed another application 376C-2, wherein it was stated that the respondent during the pendency of the proceeding has purchased a plot in Ramnath City, Village Rajgarh, district Jhansi, and certified copy of the said sale-deed has been filed by the appellant in this case. The respondent is staying with his family in the said plot and is also keeping his car. Over and above the said plot the respondent has also purchased one banglow in Kailash Residency, Dadiapura, Jhansi and it is necessary to be confirmed in the interest of justice. In order to confirm the said purchase made by the respondent it is highly necessary to depute Amin. Commissioner to make spot inspection and to submit verification report before the court, so that the appeal may be properly adjudicated. The said application was objected by the respondents and the said objection is available on record vide paper no. 38C-2, wherein it was stated that the appellant has filed the present application with an ill intention and motive to finger on the further proceedings of this appeal and on the face of record the application for deputation of Amin Commissioner is liable to be rejected. The contents of the application are self contradictory. The appellant in the garb of the said application is attempting to linger the proceedings and to bring a new turn by introducing the new facts in the case. The respondent except the house situated at 179, Hazaryana, Jhansi, does not posses any plot or house at Ramnath City or any other place, as alleged by the appellant, and hence the application for deputation of the Amin Commissioner is liable to be rejected. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused the case record. The appellant as alleged in the application has filed one Xerox copy of the sale deed. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused the case record. The appellant as alleged in the application has filed one Xerox copy of the sale deed. From a perusal of the said sale-deed it reveals that plot no. B-24, situated at Rajgarh, opposite P.A.C. Camp, Bijauli, Jhansi, has been purchased by one Arindam Ghosh and Smt. Madhumita Ghosh from its Vendors M/S Ramnath Housing private Ltd. Nowhere it is mentioned in the sale deed the said plot has been transferred to the respondent Alakh Kumar Ghosh by its vendors. The other ground taken by the respondent that the respondent has purchased one banglow at Kailash Residency is also not proved by any documentary evidence. From the perusal of the contents I do not any ground to allow the said application as the same has also been filed only to linger the further proceedings of this appeal. The application, therefore, is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, the same is rejected. Let the appeal be posted for tentative hearing on 16.1.2008." 13. He has also argued that both the courts below have failed to appreciate the fact that entire bona fide need was not actual but was manufactured and that on the point of hardship, the courts below have not considered the fact that if slope is constructed on the lane from the entrance of godown/house no. 276, then road will be obstructed and, therefore, it was not practically possible to park his vehicle in the aforesaid house no. 276. He has further submitted that both the courts below have failed to consider the fact that there was specific denial on part of the petitioner that the plaintiff-respondent had any two seater vehicle. Lastly he has submitted that the appellate court has failed to consider the fact that the additional evidence was not within the knowledge of the petitioner at the time when the matter was pending before the Prescribed Authority. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the finding of facts recorded by both the courts below are against the petitioner; that at B/29 Ramnath City, Bijore is about 4 km. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the finding of facts recorded by both the courts below are against the petitioner; that at B/29 Ramnath City, Bijore is about 4 km. away from the school and that garage for parking of two seater vehicle is just adjacent to it and also that he is residing near the school and as such he easily can park his car in the garage in dispute. 15. Thereafter, the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the appellate court vide judgment and order dated 6.12.2010 affirming the finding recorded by the trial court in the suit. The relevant extract of the said order is thus: @ Hindi @ 16. The appellate court in its judgment dated 6.12.2010 has considered the case of the appellant/tenant that he is tenant of a garage in house no. 35 (new no. 31) in Mohalla Ganesh since 1964-65 where earlier he used to park his "Ghora Gadi" or horse carriage. The appellate court has also considered the arguments as well as the document filed by the appellant-tenant such as photographs and registry of the house no. 3/24 Ramnagar and the evidence on record from which it appears that said house B/24 was purchased by the son of the landlord and not by him and even if for sake of argument it is assumed that the house was purchased by the landlord even then the bonafide need and hardship is proved by the landlord. It has also been held that in spite of parking space available to the tenant in his own go down door of which can be modified for ingress and egress where 8-10 car can be parked in addition to open space adjacent to it which has been purchased by him. He has not made any efforts to search out an alternative place for parking his vehicles, hence is not entitled to any relief. 17. The petitioner-tenant is a man of means and he has his own factory and workshop in the same locality where the garage in dispute situate, which is required by him for parking his car and two seater vehicle. He has further submitted that both the Courts below have recorded categorical finding of fact that if garage is not release in favour of the respondent-landlord, he would suffer greater hardship. 18. He has further submitted that both the Courts below have recorded categorical finding of fact that if garage is not release in favour of the respondent-landlord, he would suffer greater hardship. 18. In view of the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below and having regard to the fact that the petitioner-tenant has his own parking space he would not be suffering any hardship, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order impugned where objections of the petitioner are superfluous that lane for car is not wide enough. In this regard, photographs appended by the petitioner in the rejoinder affidavit have also been looked into. 19. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 20. The petitioner-tenant will handover the peaceful vacant possession of the house in dispute to the respondent-landlord within a period of fifteen days from today.