Hon'ble JAIN, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for eviction against the defendants in respect of rented premise on the ground of default in making payment of monthly rent, personal bonafide necessity and denial of title. Trial court decided the issues relating to default in making payment of monthly rent and personal bonafide necessity in favour of the plaintiffs and issue relating to denial of title in favour of defendants. In view of findings on issues relating to personal bonafide necessity and default, trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit. 3. Being aggrieved with the same, an appeal was preferred by the defendants. First appellate court modified the finding with regard to issue relating to default in making payment of monthly rent and did not pass decree of eviction on this ground, but so far as finding with regard to issue relating to personal bonafide necessity is concerned, the same was affirmed by the first appellate court and defendants' appeal was dismissed. Hence, this second appeal has been preferred on behalf of the defendants. 4. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellants is that decree of eviction was passed on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of plaintiff Harish Chandra, who died during pendency of the suit and subsequently his wife Smt. Kisturi Devi also died during pendency of appeal and their son has also joined service, therefore, personal bonafide necessity pleaded for eviction is not in existence and the suit for eviction ought to have been dismissed by the trial court. He relied upon Sheshambal (Dead) Through LRS. vs. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building & Others, reported in (2010) 3 Supreme Court Cases 470. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that suit for eviction was instituted in the year 1980, the necessity of rented premise has to be considered on the date of institution of the suit, plaintiff's wife and son, who were dependent on him on the date of filing of suit, were substituted in his place when he died in the year 1997, the suit was decreed in the year 2001, but tenant preferred appeal and during pendency of appeal, Smt. Kisturi Devi, wife of Harish Chandra died in 2006, and his son being unemployed joined service, but it does not mean that he has no necessity of suit premise, therefore, there is no force in submissions of learned counsel for the appellants. 6. I have considered submissions of learned counsel for the parties and also examined impugned judgments passed by both the courts below. 7. There is no dispute between the parties that present suit for eviction was filed in the year 1980, the plaintiff Harish Chandra died in 1997, the wife and son of plaintiff were substituted, the suit was decreed in 2001, plaintiff's wife Smt. Kisturi Devi expired in the year 2006 during pendency of first appeal. Now tenant's first appeal has been dismissed vide judgment dated 20.01.2011, which is under challenge in this second appeal and the same is now being contested by Om Prakash, son of plaintiff Harish Chandra. 8. Hon'ble Apex Court in Sheshambal(Dead) Through LRS. vs. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building & Others, reported in (2010) 3 Supreme Court Cases 470 in para 17 observed: “While it is true that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings were instituted, it is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the suit, certain developments take place that have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by a party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from consideration.” 9. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para No. 14 of the same judgment i.e. Sheshambal's case(supra) considered subsequent events of that particular case as under: “Superadded to all this is the fact that the legal representatives who now claim to be the family members of the deceased are all married daughters of the deceased couple each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and at different places. That none of them was dependent upon the deceased petitioner is also a fact undisputed before us. Even otherwise in the social milieu to which we are accustomed, daughters happily married have their own families and commitments, financial and otherwise.” 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the same judgment in Para No. 28 observed: “Indeed if the deceased landlords had any dependent member of the family we may have even in the absence of a pleading assumed that the requirement pleaded extended also to the dependent member of their family. That unfortunately, for the appellants is neither the case set up nor the position on facts. That unfortunately, for the appellants is neither the case set up nor the position on facts. The deceased couple did not have any dependent member of the family for whose benefit they could have sought eviction on the ground that she required the premises for personal occupation.” 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Sheshambal's case specifically held that right to relief must be judged by reference to the date of suit, but subsequent developments bearing the right to relief should be taken into consideration. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 14 considered that deceased-plaintiff's dependents were only married daughters, each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and in different places. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 28 specifically observed that indeed if the deceased landlord had any dependent member of the family then the requirement pleaded could have been extended. In the present case suit was filed in the year 1980, unfortunately, the suit could not be disposed off in the life time of plaintiff, who died after 17 years i.e. In the year 1997 and his two dependents, his wife and son, were substituted in his place. The suit was decreed in the year 2001. The first appeal also could not be disposed off for six years i.e. upto the year 2006 when plaintiff's wife died. Now defendants' first appeal has been dismissed in the year 2011. It is fortunate that deceased plaintiff's son Om Prakash is alive, who requires the suit shop and he is contesting the present litigation. He is prepared to leave his present job, which was joined by him in absence of vacant possession of rented premise, therefore, Sheshambal's case relied upon by appellant is not against respondent, but it helps the respondent. 12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Kamleshwar Prasad vs. Pradumanju Agarwal (Dead) by LR.s (1997) 4 S.C.C. 413 ) held, “The crucial date for existence of landlord's requirement is the date of filing of eviction application. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other elder son.” 13. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other elder son.” 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 S.C.C. 604 ) observed that landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system, crucial date for deciding the bona fides of the requirement of landlord, held, is the date of his application for eviction, subsequent developments during pendency of eviction petition occurring because of slowness of process of litigation itself and made use of by sitting tenants, held, cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief when the litigation at last reaches the final stages. Hon'ble Apex Court clarified that subsequent events may in some situation be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness of landlord's need, but only if they are of such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether. 14. Hon'ble Apex Court in above case considered the facts of that case that respondent landlord needing premises for use as clinic by his son, who had just become a doctor and partly as accommodation for a planned post-retirement business, trial court and appellate court allowing eviction petition, litigation lasting 23 years, including 15 years' pendency of appellant tenant's writ petition before High Court, meanwhile the son joining Provincial Medical Service and getting posted out of town, after dismissal of writ petition appellant filing revision petition relying on those subsequent developments, held, subsequent events relied on by appellant tenant were too insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need concurrently found by the two courts of fact. 15. In the present case, the suit was filed in 1980, the trial court took 21 years in decreeing the suit, first appellate court took 10 years in deciding the appeal, therefore, even if deceased plaintiff's son has joined the service, does not mean that he will not start his business and plaintiff's need, which is found to be proved by both the courts below will lapse. 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in Shakuntala Bai and Ors vs. Narayan Das & Ors. 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in Shakuntala Bai and Ors vs. Narayan Das & Ors. ( AIR 2004 S.C. 3484 ) held that the bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate. 17. From the above facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it is clear that plaintiff landlord filed a suit for eviction way back in the year 1980 i.e. 31 years ago. The suit could not be decided for 17 years i.e. upto the year 1997 when plaintiff Harish Chandra died, his wife and his son both were substituted in his place. The trial court ultimately recorded a finding that plaintiff's need for rented premises is proved and decree of eviction on the ground of personal bona fide necessity was passed in year 2001. However, the decree of eviction was challenged by tenant by preferring first appeal, but the same could not be disposed off in 6 years i.e. upto death of Smt. Kisturi Devi, the wife of plaintiff in the year 2006 and appeal was contested by Om Prakash son of deceased-plaintiff Harish Chandra and ultimately, the first appeal of tenant was dismissed in January, 2011 vide judgment and decree dated 20th January, 2011 and the said judgment and decree is under challenge in this second appeal preferred on behalf of defendants/tenants. The bona fide need of rented premises is required to be seen on the date of institution of the suit, the subsequent events in the present case that plaintiff Harish Chandra died during pendency of the suit, his wife died during pendency of first appeal and his son has joined the service are of no consequence as son of plaintiff cannot and could not wait for 31 years to earn his livelihood. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that plaintiff's need of rented premises now does not exist. 18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar vs. Yusuf Ali, reported in (2010) 12 Supreme Court Cases, 740 in para 31 held: “Undoubtedly after evicting Dr. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that plaintiff's need of rented premises now does not exist. 18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar vs. Yusuf Ali, reported in (2010) 12 Supreme Court Cases, 740 in para 31 held: “Undoubtedly after evicting Dr. Sharma from the suit premises, the landlord has not started his business in the said premises but the incident which occurred several decades ago cannot be relevant to determine the actual controversy for the reason that the need of the landlord is to be examined as per the circumstances prevailing on the date of the institution of the case. Thus, an incident too remote from the date of institution of the suit may not be relevant for consideration at all.” 19. The question of personal bonafide necessity of the rented premise in the facts and circumstances of present case is purely a question of fact and there is concurrent finding of facts by both the courts below which cannot be interferred with by this in second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. The second appeal can be entertained only on substantial questions of law. The question of law argued by learned counsel for the appellant in the present case is settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in above referred cases. 20. A three-Judges-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bholaram vs. Ameerchand- (1981) 2 SCC 414 , considered the effect of amendment made in Section 100 of the CPC in 1976, and held as under: “......The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law.” 21. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law.” 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ramaswamy Kalingaryar vs. Mathayan Padayachi- AIR 1992 SC 115 , while considering the scope of Section 100 CPC, held as under: “......Suggested shortcomings in the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below would not alter the situation that those were findings of facts, unquestionable, under the provisions of S.100 CPC, which defi-nes the contours of the power of the High Court in second appeal. ....” 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others vs. Kaki & Others- (2007) 1 SCC 546 = RLW 2007(1) SC 636, considered the true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC by referring the Section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commi-ssion of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under: “81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the Hihg Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the imp-ugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 23. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the Hihg Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the imp-ugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar's case(Supra) held that a second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. The High Court should not entertain a second appeal unless it raises a substantial question of law. It is obligation on the court of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. 24. No substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.