Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 1011 (GAU)

Milan Debbarma v. Biswakanya Debbarma

2011-12-21

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2011
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Deb, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S.B. Debnath, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. None appears for the respondent No. 1. The appellants by filing the instant appeal have challenged the judgment and award dated 28.5.2011 passed by the learned Member, MACT, West Tripura, Agartala (hereinafter referred to as Tribunal in short) seeking enhancement of the award. 2. The facts in brief are that Sita Laxmi Debbarma, wife of the appellant No. 1 Shri Milan Debbarma and mother of the petitioners No. 2 and 3 died due to a motor accident which took place on 28.9.2009 at around 9.45 a.m. at 18 Card area on the way of Champaknagar to Jampaijala road the vehicle suddenly capsized due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle. The deceased was aged 37 years at the time of her death. She worked as a tailoring master and used to earn Rs. 7,000/- p.m. In the accident the vehicle bearing registration No. TR 01-A 2900 (Commander Jeep) got turtled. 3. The O. P. No. 1 owner of the vehicle filed written objection denying the claim and disputing the income of the deceased. In the written objection it was stated that the vehicle was insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd., the respondent/O.R No. 2, and claimed that the vehicle had all the documents for plying the same. The respondent No. 2, Insurance Company also filed written objection disputing the claim. It also made an application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the M.V. Act in short) stating that if the owner did not take all available defences and or abstained from adducing evidence it may be granted the benefit under Section 170 of the M.V. Act to contest the claim on all counts. In the written statement it was asserted that the claim petition was not maintainable inasmuch as it is baseless, highly speculative and exorbitant. In the written statement the respondent No. 2 denied the profession as well as the income of the deceased. 4. The claimants/respondents examined three witnesses including two independent witnesses. No oral evidence was adduced by the O.R On consideration of the evidence and materials on record, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. In the written statement the respondent No. 2 denied the profession as well as the income of the deceased. 4. The claimants/respondents examined three witnesses including two independent witnesses. No oral evidence was adduced by the O.R On consideration of the evidence and materials on record, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 3,83,000/- with 6% interest thereon from the date of presentation of the petition to be paid by the respondent No. 2 Insurance Company within a period of 45 days from the date of order failing which the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 12% P.A. w.e.f. 12.11.2009. It was provided in the said judgment and award that the claimants/petitioners No. 2 and 3 shall be entitled to get awarded amount of compensation with interest in equal share except the amount of Rs. 8,000/- which was awarded to the claimant/petitioner No. 1 as consortium. The appellants are not satisfied with the compensation amount awarded and they have preferred this appeal for enhancement of the award of Rs. 7,57,000/-. 5. Mr. S. Deb, learned Sr. counsel submits that the learned Tribunal committed error in law in holding that the claimants/appellants were not a dependent on the deceased wife purportedly on the ground that the husband, PW 1, in his evidence deposed that his wife left behind her children as her dependents. The learned Tribunal also committed illegality in holding that the income of the deceased was Rs. 3000/- p.m. and determined the amount of compensation at Rs. 36,000/- p.a and granted Rs. 8,000/- as consortium, Rs. 7,000/- as loss of estate and Rs. 10,000/- as funeral expenses which is not in accordance with the existing provision under the M.V. Act. He also submits that for determination of amount of compensation the principle of law enunciated by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (2009) 6 SCC 212 is to be applied to the present case inasmuch as it is held therein that the deceased in the age group of 36 to 40 years would be entitled to get multiplier of 15 and if the number of dependency is 2-3, the deduction towards personal and living expenses should be l/3rd and the deceased being in non-service group, the income determined should be at the time of death. 6. It has been asserted by Mr. Deb, learned Sr. 6. It has been asserted by Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel that the deceased, as per evidence, used to earn Rs. 7,000/- p.m. which remains unshaken and as such, the monthly income of the deceased should be accepted as Rs. 7,000/- and the compensation should be calculated on the basis of income of the deceased so proved. He reinforces his submission by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Latha Wadhwa v. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2001) 8 SCC 197 : 2001 SCJ 1735, wherein it has been held that even the money value of the service rendered by non-earning woman at Rs. 3,000/- p.m i.e. Rs. 36,000/- and along with it conventional amount of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded. The judgment in Latha Wadhwa (supra) was followed in M.S. Grewal and Another v. Deep Chand Sood and Others reported in (2001) 8 SCC 151 . He also submits that there is no dispute on the age of the deceased which was accepted as 37 years at the time of her death and considering her age the multiplier 15 is to be applied to the present case and if the age of the deceased is accepted as 37 years and her income is assessed at Rs. 7,000/- p.m. the annual income of the deceased is to be multiplied by multiplier 15 i.e. Rs. 84,000/- x 15 = Rs. 12,60,000/- where from l/3rd is to be deducted for personal expenses of the deceased considering the fact that she had 3 dependant family members, 1/3 rd of Rs. 12,60,000/= Rs. 4,20,000/- is to be deducted from Rs. 12,60,000/- which means the claim amounts for" Loss of income" was Rs. 8,40,000/-. An amount of Rs. 10,000/- as loss of estate, Rs. 10,000/- as loss of consortium and Rs. 5,000/- as funeral expenses are to be added to Rs. 8.40,000/- which would come to grand total of Rs. 8,65,000/- as total claim of the appellants for loss of income of the deceased. The claimant/appellants would also be entitled to an interest at the 12 % p.a on the said compensation amount of Rs. 5,000/- as funeral expenses are to be added to Rs. 8.40,000/- which would come to grand total of Rs. 8,65,000/- as total claim of the appellants for loss of income of the deceased. The claimant/appellants would also be entitled to an interest at the 12 % p.a on the said compensation amount of Rs. 8,65,000/- from the date of filing of the claim petition before the learned Tribunal w.e.f. 12.11.2009 till the date of presentation of the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 as Insurer of the offending vehicle which was insured with them and as decided by the learned Tribunal on the question of payment of interest. 7. The main contention of the appellants, as per submission of the learned counsel can be summarized as follows:- (1) The learned Tribunal wrongly assessed the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/- instead of Rs. 7,000/-; (2) The learned Tribunal was wrong in not increasing 50% of the actual income of the deceased as future prospect at the time of assessing the compensation; (3) The learned Tribunal at the time of calculating compensation wrongly deducted l/3rd from the assessed income of the deceased; (4) The learned Tribunal awarded meagre amount at the time of awarding loss of estate, loss of consortium and loss of funeral expenses and committed error in not awarding any amount for transportation of dead body; (5) The respondent is barred from taking any defence beyond the periphery of Section 149 of the M.V. Act and from arguing on the merit of the case inasmuch as no leave was granted by the Tribunal under Section 170 of the M.V. Act. 8. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel for the respondent, on the preliminary issue, submits that a significant change has taken place in view of the recent judgment of the Apex Court dated 13.10.2011 in United India Insurance Company v. Shila Datta and Others rendered in Civil Appeal Nos. 6026 and 6027 of 2007 (yet to be reported). The law, before the pronouncement of said judgment was that insurer cannot challenge the award on merit unless there is violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the insurer and leave was granted by the Tribunal to the insurer who wants to contest the claim on all counts under Section170 of the M.V. Act. The law, before the pronouncement of said judgment was that insurer cannot challenge the award on merit unless there is violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the insurer and leave was granted by the Tribunal to the insurer who wants to contest the claim on all counts under Section170 of the M.V. Act. In the said recent judgment of the Supreme Court a distinction has been made between insurer as a 'noticee', i.e. a person to whom a notice is served as required by Section 149 (2) of the M.V. Act and as a party respondent in a claim proceedings It is held therein that where an insurer is impleaded by the claimants as a party, it can contest the claim on all grounds, as there are no restrictions or limitations in regard to contest. But where an insurer is not impleaded by the claimants as a party, but is only issued a statutory notice under Section 149(2) of the Act by the Tribunal requiring it to meet the liability, it is entitled to be made a party to deny the liability on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 produced a copy of the said judgment of the Apex Court obtained through website for perusal of this Court. I have accordingly, perused the said judgment. Paragraphs 14 to 19 of the judgment deal with the said point. It is observed that the scheme of M.V. Act as contained in Chapter XI (Insurance of Motor Vehicle against the Third Party risk) and XII (Claim Tribunals) proceeds on the basis that an insurer need not be impleaded as a party to the claim proceedings and it should only be issued a statutory notice under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act so that it can be made liable to pay the compensation awarded by the tribunal and also resist the claim on anyone of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section(2) of Section 149 whereas subsection (1)(2) and (7) of Section 149 clearly refer to the insurer being merely a noticee and not a party. Similarly Sections 158(6),166(4), 168(1) and 170 clearly provide for and contemplate insurer being merely a noticee for the purpose mentioned in the Act and not being a party-respondent. Similarly Sections 158(6),166(4), 168(1) and 170 clearly provide for and contemplate insurer being merely a noticee for the purpose mentioned in the Act and not being a party-respondent. Section 170 specifically refers to impleading of insurer as a party to the claim proceedings. When an insurer is impleaded as a party respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act, its rights would be significantly different. In cases where the insurer is only a noticee, it can only raise such of those grounds which are permissible under Section 149(2). But if he is a party-respondent, it can raise, not only those grounds which are available under Section 149 (2) but also other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. It, therefore, follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party respondent, for whatever reason, then as such respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and the grounds which may be available to it. 9. What emerges from the said judgment of the Supreme Court is that the Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party respondent but if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a noticee unless under Section 149(2), the insurer would be entitled to urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. In cases where the insurer is already a respondent (having been impleaded as a party respondent), it need not seek the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the M.V. Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section149(2). The entire schemes and structures of Chapters XI and XII are that the claimant files claim petition only against the owner and driver and the tribunal issues notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) so that it can be made liable to pay the amount awarded against the insurer and if necessary deny liability under policy of insurance, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2). In cases where an insurer is only a noticee and not a party respondent, having regard to the decision in Nicolletta Rahtagi, it can defend the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) and not any of the other grounds relating to merits available to the insured/respondent. In cases where an insurer is only a noticee and not a party respondent, having regard to the decision in Nicolletta Rahtagi, it can defend the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) and not any of the other grounds relating to merits available to the insured/respondent. This is the position even where the claim proceedings are initiated suo motu under Sections 149(7) and 158(6) of the M.V. Act, without any formal application by the claimants, as the insurer is only a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act. The aforesaid recent judgment of the Apex Court settles the law that Section 170 of the Act does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment nor does it contemplate the insurer, if he is already impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants, making any application seeking permission to contest the matter on merits inasmuch as Section179 proceeds on the assumption that a claim petition is filed by the claimants, or is registered suo-motu by the tribunal, with only the owner and the driver of the vehicle as the respondents. It also proceeds on the basis that in such a proceeding, a statutory notice would not be issued by the tribunal to the insurer so that the insurer may know about the future liability in the claim petition and also resist the claim, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2). Similarly, Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and the driver will be the parties. Section 170 provides that if during the course of such inquiry, the tribunal finds and satisfies itself that there is any collusion between the claimant and the owner/driver or where the owner/driver has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may suo-motu for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of the claim, who was till then only a noticee, shall be treated as party to the proceedings. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner. Therefore where the insurer is a party respondent, either on account of being impleaded as a party by the tribunal under Section 170 or being impleaded as a party-respondent by the claimants in the claim petition voluntarily, it will be entitled to contest the matter by raising all grounds without being restricted to the grounds available under Section 149(2) of the Act. The claim petition is maintainable against the owner and driver without impleading the insurer as a party. When a statutory notice is issued under Section 149(2) by the tribunal, it is clear that such notice is issued not to implead the insurer as a party-respondent but merely to put it on notice that a claim has been made in regard to a policy issued by it and that it will have to bear the liability as and when an award is made in regard to such claim. It cannot, therefore, as of right, require that insurer should be impleaded as a party-respondent. But it can however be made a party respondent either by the claimants voluntarily in the claim petition or by the direction of the tribunal under Section 170of the M.V. Act. Whatever be the reason or ground for the insurer being impleaded as a party, once it is a party-respondent it can raise all contentions that are available to resist the claim. 10. In the instant case, admittedly, appellants as petitioners impleaded the respondent No. 2, National Insurance Company as O.P. No. 2 i.e. party respondent, and hence the respondent No. 2 can take all defences that are available to resist the claim before the tribunal as well as before the higher forum. The preliminary objection, in view of the aforesaid position of law, is rejected allowing the respondent No. 2 insurer to resist the claim on all available grounds under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. 11. The preliminary objection, in view of the aforesaid position of law, is rejected allowing the respondent No. 2 insurer to resist the claim on all available grounds under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act. 11. In respect of income of the deceased it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the income of the deceased is totally imaginary/false and without any basis and the appellants failed to prove the income of the deceased inasmuch as no document supporting the income of the deceased has been submitted to prove her monthly income was Rs. 7000/-. In paragraph 6 of the claim petition it is stated by PW 1, the husband of the deceased that she was a tailoring master and she had a tailoring shop at Khasidas-para bazar and from the said shop she used to earn Rs. 7000/- p.m. But the independent witnesses PWs 2 and 3 in their evidence stated that the deceased had a tailoring shop at Kalidaspara bazar. The evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 in regard to location of the tailoring shop of the deceased is contradictory from the evidence of PW 1. It is, therefore, submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that when there are two contradictory statements, both the statements should be disbelieved. In this context he relies on and refers to a decision of the Apex Court in Harchand Singh v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1978 SC 344 . 12. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 argues that the existence of the tailoring shop is doubtful. So also her income from the said shop is doubtful and hence the evidence of PW 1 should be disbelieved. He also submits that the evidence of PW 1 is untrustworthy inasmuch as at the time of making complaint before the Officer In-charge, Jirania P.S. he stated that his profession is farmer whereas in his evidence he stated that his profession is business. 13. This submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No, 2 requires consideration. The location of the tailoring shop has been mentioned as Kashidaspara bazaar by the claimants and Kalidaspara bazaar by the independent witnesses in their evidence. 13. This submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No, 2 requires consideration. The location of the tailoring shop has been mentioned as Kashidaspara bazaar by the claimants and Kalidaspara bazaar by the independent witnesses in their evidence. There may be some mistake in the naming of the place where the tailoring, shop of the deceased located Usually some places in the rural area are locally known by more than one names. There is no evidence that Kashidaspara bazaar and Kalidaspara bazaar are two different places at different locations. In cross-examination the respondents' side did not put any suggestion that Kashidaspara bazaar and Kalidaspara bazaar are two different places and the place where the tailoring shop in question situates is not known by Kashidaspara and Kalidaspara bazar. No suggestion was also put to the said P.Ws that the deceased had no tailoring shop at all at either Kashidaspara bazaar or Kalidaspara bazaar. The respondents' side had led no evidence to prove that there are two different places known as Kashidaspara bazaar or Kalidaspara bazar. From the manner of cross-examination of PWs 1 to 3 it can be presumed that the deceased had a tailoring shop at a place known as either Kashidaspara bazaar or Kalidaspara bazaar. Mentioning of the places where the tailoring shop in question existed cannot be doubted and it is accepted that the deceased had a tailoring shop at the said place which was known as either Kashidaspara bazar or Kalidaspara bazar. The real question disturbing the mind of the Court is as to whether the deceased really used to earn Rs. 7000/- from the tailoring shop. It is an accepted position that the deceased belongs to Scheduled Tribe community and she is exempted from payment of income tax and she is not an income tax assessee. 14. It is an accepted position that except the oral evidence of the claimant-husband of the deceased, there is no documentary evidence of income of the deceased. There is, otherwise, evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 that the deceased had a tailoring shop. The avocation of the deceased has been proved by the said witnesses. If the avocation is proved, the Court is cast with a duty to assess the monthly income of the deceased even by a rational guess work taking into account the location and commercial viability of such tailoring shop. The avocation of the deceased has been proved by the said witnesses. If the avocation is proved, the Court is cast with a duty to assess the monthly income of the deceased even by a rational guess work taking into account the location and commercial viability of such tailoring shop. It is an undisputable fact that the tailoring shop in question is located in a rural area and there is no bright commercial prospect. The tailoring shop in such a place does not cater modern fashion loving people but it meets the small demands of unsophisticated local people for bare minimum clothing. From such shop one can hardly earn, at the maximum Rs. 150/- and at the minimum Rs. 100/- per day in average. The minimum Rs. 100/- per day can be accepted as the reasonable guess work in the present case. I fully agree with the guess work done by the learned Tribunal assessing the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 3000/-.The pertinent question is that can there be an addition to the said income of the deceased from her small avocation? For answering this question one has to refer again to the case of Latha Wadhwa (supra). The facts as narrated in the said case are that while the 150th birth anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata was being celebrated on 3.3.1989 within the factory premises and a large number of employees, their families including small children had been invited but the organization had not taken adequate safety measure and on the other hand premises of the factory Acts and Rules had been grossly violated; a divesting fire engulfed the VIP pandal and a number of persons suffered burn injuries. The compensation for dead and injured were claimed. Several housewives who died in the accident were not earning any income and there is no data supporting their income. Attempt was made to determine their compensation on the basis of services rendered by them to the house/family. It was held in the said case that: ..... even in the absence of such data and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family even on a modest estimation should be Rs. 3000/- p.m. and Rs. 36,000/- per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 50 and as such, who were active in life...... 3000/- p.m. and Rs. 36,000/- per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 50 and as such, who were active in life...... In regard to the application of multiplier the Apex Court in the said case, referred to earlier decision rendered in G.M. Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas reported in (1994) 2 SCC 176 and held that the multiplier method is acceptable to the employees of TISCO in death cases. 15. Subsequent to Wadhwa's case (supra) the Apex Court rendered another landmark judgment in Arun Kumar Agarwal v. National Insurance Company reported in (2010) 9 SCC 218 . In the said judgment, the valuable role and contribution of housewives/homemakers have been discussed. A very significant observation has been made by His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Ganguli which tempts me to quote below:-- Women are generally engaged in homemaking, bringing up children and also in production of goods and services which are not sold in the market but are consumed at the household level. Thus, the work of women mostly goes unrecognized and they are never valued. It is well known that women make significant contribution at various levels including agricultural production by sowing, harvesting, transplanting and also tending cattle and by cooking and delivering the food to those persons who are on the field during the agriculture season. Resultantly it was held that the gratuitous services rendered by the wives with their love and affection to children and husband and managing household affairs cannot be equated with the service rendered by wife/mother to the family. On that consideration it was held:-- 36. Though Section 163-A does not, in terms apply to the cases in which claim for compensation is filed under Section 166 of the Act, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependants of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause 6 of second schedule and then apply an appropriate multiplier keeping in view the judgments of this Court in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, Sarla Verma v. DTC and also take guidance from the judgment of Lotha Wadhwa case. The approach adopted by different Benches of the Delhi High Court to compute the compensation by relying upon the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker does not commend our approval because it is most unrealistic to compare the gratuitous services of the housewife/mother with the work of a skilled worker. 16. The Apex Court ultimately held that "even if we go by the formula under clause 6 of the second schedule, the income of the victim comes to Rs. 5,000/- p.m." The victim in the said case died in a road accident and in the claim petition it was stated that she was earning Rs. 50,000/- by engaging herself in paintings and handicrafts. The question raised in the said case was what should be the criteria for determination of the compensation payable to the dependants of a woman who dies in a road accident and does not have a regular source of income. The said question was considered on the basis of gratuitous services rendered by a housewife/home makers as discussed earlier and it was determined that the victim's income should be calculated at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. In the present case, the victim woman, as stated, have been earning Rs. 7,000/- p.m. from her avocation. The learned Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/- p.m. and I have accepted the same as stated earlier. Apart from her avocation the deceased, as a housewife/mother, used to render gratuitous service to her husband and children who are now claiming compensation and as per the judgment rendered in Arun Kr. Agarwal (supra) an additional amount of Rs. 3,000/- as income of the deceased should be added. The income of the deceased should be assessed at Rs. 3,000/- from her avocation plus Rs. 3,000/- for gratuitous service, which comes to Rs. 6,000/- p.m. The compensation for the death should be calculated taking into account the monthly income at Rs. 6,000/- p.m. applying the multiplier 15 and deducting l/3rd therefrom towards personal and living expenses as done by the learned Tribunal. So the annual income of the deceased comes of Rs. 6,000/- X 12 = Rs. 72,000/-. Now if the same is multiplied by 15, the total income comes to Rs. 10,80,000/- wherefrom 1/3rd is to be deducted for personal expenses of the deceased considering the fact that she had 3 Nos. of dependant family members. l/3rd of Rs. So the annual income of the deceased comes of Rs. 6,000/- X 12 = Rs. 72,000/-. Now if the same is multiplied by 15, the total income comes to Rs. 10,80,000/- wherefrom 1/3rd is to be deducted for personal expenses of the deceased considering the fact that she had 3 Nos. of dependant family members. l/3rd of Rs. 10,80,000/- comes to Rs. 3,60,000/- which means the claim amount for loss of income was Rs. 7,20,000/-. To the said amount a sum of Rs. 7,000/- as loss of estate, Rs. 8,000/- as loss of consortium and Rs. 10,000/- as funeral expenses (Rs. 7,000/- + Rs. 8,000/- + Rs. 10,000/-) Rs. 25,000/-, as awarded by the learned Tribunal, should be added. Thus, total compensation is calculated to the tune of (Rs. 7,20,000/- + Rs. 25,000/-) = Rs. 7,45,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Forty-Five Thousand) only. Out of the aforesaid amount, Rs. 20,000/- only as consortium, shall be paid to the appellant/petitioner No. 1 and the rest amount shall be paid to the appellants/petitioner No. 2 and 3 in equal share proportion. 17. There shall be no modification/alteration in regard to the award passed by the learned Tribunal on the liability of payment of compensation and the rate of interest. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid modification in the award enhancing from Rs. 3,85,000/- to Rs. 7,45,000/-. Appeal allowed.