JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 31st March, 2005, by which the order passed by the Estate Officer, asking the respondent/writ petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 37,670/-, as damages for alleged unauthorised occupation from 1st Jaunary, 1999 to 6th April, 1999, was set aside. 2. THE short fact of the case is that the respondent/writ petitioner was a Central Government Advocate and he was allotted an accommodation at the premises in question. Under the terms and conditions of service, the respondent/writ petitioner was to pay monthly occupation charge of Rs. 310/- per month. THE respondent/writ petitioner retired from Government service on 30th April, 1998 and thereafter he was allowed to occupy the said premises till 25th August, 1998 and he continued to occupy till 22nd December 1998 and he paid all the occupation charges for the said period. Thereafter, a writ petition came to be filed by the respondent/writ petitioner and in that writ petition learned Single Judge of this Court passed an order of status quo with regard to possession of the premises and also rent. Thereafter, the respondent/writ petitioner handed over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent No.1 (appellant herein) on 7th April, 1999. 3. THEREAFTER, the Estate Officer, being the appellant herein calculated the rent payable by the respondent/writ petitioner from 1st January, 1999 to 7th April, 1999 at penal rate. 4. THE learned trial Judge has set aside and quashed the aforesaid occupation charge amounting to Rs. 37,670/-. THE aforesaid amount was calculated applying the rate of penal rent. The point for consideration before the learned trial Judge was whether the Estate Officer could charge the aforesaid amount on account of occupation charge at the penal rate when the respondent/writ petitioner was in occupation on the strength of interim order passed by this Court. 5. WHILE maintaining and supporting the appeal, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the learned trial Judge ought not to have interfered with the decision of the Estate Officer who is a statutory authority and discharged statutory function and Writ Court is not the proper forum to decide the matter. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee wants to rely on a decision of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Secretary, ONGC Ltd. and Anr. v. V.U. Worrier, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 245 . 6. MR. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee wants to rely on a decision of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Secretary, ONGC Ltd. and Anr. v. V.U. Worrier, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 245 . 6. MR. Mukherjee further contends that the Act, under which the Estate Officer has quantified the said amount, is a self-contained one and appeal lies against the decision of the Estate Officer. Therefore, Writ Court is not the appropriate forum for deciding the matter. In this connection, he has placed reliance on an unreported decision rendered in F.M.A. 835 of 2006, (D.C. Bhattacharyya v. Union of India and Ors.), wherein it has been held by this Court that occupation charges under the rule has to be paid by the person who is occupying, whether legally or illegally. In case of illegal occupation, penal rent has to be charged and realised. Mr. Chatterjee being the respondent, appears in person and contends with the support of a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 (State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh) that the jurisdiction of Writ Court cannot be taken away by any authority and the Writ Court in its discretion can issue appropriate Writ to examine the order of inferior authority or Tribunal. 7. HE also submits that the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion while entertaining the dispute. Therefore, it is no longer open for the appellant to challenge the jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge. 8. WE have heard Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the appellant and Mr. Chatterjee, respondent (appearing in person). The points which have fallen for consideration and decision of this Court are as follows: (i) Whether at the appellate stage, the plea of alternative remedy can be advanced or the Court should examine the same ? (ii) Whether occupation of the respondent/writ petitioner on the strength of Court's order can be said to be an unauthorised occupation, entitling the appellant Estate Officer to charge occupation charge at the penal rate ? While adverting to the first question, we are of the considered view, it is well settled principle of law that power of Writ Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are inviolable portion of the Constitution and it is one of the basic feature of the Constitution too. Therefore, no simple legislation can take away such power. While adverting to the first question, we are of the considered view, it is well settled principle of law that power of Writ Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are inviolable portion of the Constitution and it is one of the basic feature of the Constitution too. Therefore, no simple legislation can take away such power. However, the Writ Court in exercise of its discretion may often refuse to entertain any matter which can be resolved by alternative remedy. It is not that Writ Court cannot interfere in a matter where alternative remedy is available. This position of law has been well explained in the decision cited by Mr. Chatterjee (supra). 9. IN paragraph 10 of the said decision, in late 50s. it has been held as follows : "IN the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that provided the requisite grounds exists, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. II, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the Superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the Superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. IN the King v. Post-Master General; Exparte Carmicheael 1928 - 1 KB 291 (E), a certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the Superior Court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. It has been held that the Superior Court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex v. Wandsworth Justices; Exparte Read, 1942 - 1 KB 281 (F) is an authority in point. IN that case a man had been convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions barred by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction. At p. 284 Viscount Caldecote, C.J., observed : "it remains to consider the argument that the remedy of certiorari is not open to the applicant because others were available. It would be ludicrous in such a case as the present for the convicted person to ask for a case to be stated. It would mean asking this Court to consider as a question of law whether justices were right in convicting a man without hearing his evidence. That is so extravagant an argument as not to merit a moment's consideration. As to the right of appeal to quarter sessions, it may be that the applicant could have had his remedy if he had pursued that Court, but I am not aware of any reason why, if in such circumstances as these, he preferred to apply for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction, the Court should be debarred from granting his application." Likewise in Khurshed Modi v. Rent Controller, Bombay, AIR 1947 Bom 46 (G), it was held that the High Court would not refuse to issue a writ of certiorari merely because there was a right of appeal. It was recognised that ordinarily the High Court would require the petitioner to have recourse to his ordinary remedies, but if it found that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice, the High Court would certainly not hesitate to issue the writ of certiorari. It was recognised that ordinarily the High Court would require the petitioner to have recourse to his ordinary remedies, but if it found that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice, the High Court would certainly not hesitate to issue the writ of certiorari. To the same effect are the following observations of Harris, C.J., in 56 Cal WN 453 : ( AIR 1952 Cal 656 ) (D) at p. 470 (of Cal WN) : (at p. 665 of AIR): "There can, I think, be no doubt that Court can refuse to issue a certiorari if the petitioner has other remedies equally convenient and effective. But it appears to me that there can be cases where the Court can and should issue a certiorari even where such alternative remedies are available. Where a Court or tribunal, which is called up to exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions discards all rules of natural justice and arrives at a decision contrary to all accepted principles of justice then it appears to me that the Court can and must interfere." It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari. (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 14, Article 40, p. 189). (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 14, Article 40, p. 189). If, therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the Superior Court to issue a writ of certiorari to correct the errors of an inferior Court or tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions and not to relegate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the Superior Court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal e.g., by furnishing security required by the statute, should it then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the Superior Court must deny the writ when an inferior Court or tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior Court or tribunal on appeal or revision? The case of 1889 - 22 QBD 345 (C) referred to in 1951 SCR 344 : ( AIR 1951 SC 217 ) (B) furnishes the answer. There the manager of a club was convicted under a certain statute for selling beer by retain without an excise retail licence. Subsequently, he was convicted selling intoxicating liquor, namely beer without licence under another statute. Upon hearing on the later charge the Magistrate treated it as a second offence and imposed a full penalty authorised in the case of a second offence by the latter statute. His appeal to the quarter sessions having been dismissed, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus and it was granted by the King's Bench Division on the ground that the Magistrate could not treat the latter offence as a second offence, because it was not a second offence under the act under which he was convicted for the second time. Evidently, the point was taken that if there has been any error, irregularity or illegality committed by the Magistrate, the quarter sessions could have on appeal corrected the same and that the quarter sessions having dismissed the appeal the Court of Queen's Bench Division could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. Evidently, the point was taken that if there has been any error, irregularity or illegality committed by the Magistrate, the quarter sessions could have on appeal corrected the same and that the quarter sessions having dismissed the appeal the Court of Queen's Bench Division could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. This as repelled by the following observations of Hawkins, J.: "This is true as a fact, but it puts the prosecution in no better position, for if the Magistrate had no power to give himself jurisdiction in finding that there had been a first offence where there had been none, the justices could not give it to him." 10. THIS view has been consistently taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and different High Courts and in the famous case of L. Chandrakumar, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 it has been held as we have observed earlier. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that availability of alternative remedy should also be taken into consideration after disposal of the writ petition on merit and even at the appellate stage. We are of the view, when the learned trial Judge in exercise of his discretion has entertained the writ petition and decided the matter on merit without facing any objection at the initial stage, such a plea cannot be entertained at the appellate stage, even if the alternative remedy would be an efficacious one. Hence, contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the writ petition should not have been entertained and the learned trial Judge ought not to have interfered with the order of the Estate Officer, is hereby rejected. 11. WHILE dealing with the second point, we are of the view that the appellant Estate Officer can realise occupation charge at penal rate when a particular person is declared to be an unauthorised occupant. We accept the observation of the learned trial Judge that the respondent/writ petitioner cannot be said to be an unauthorised occupant for the period from 1st January, 1999 to 6th April, 1999. We accept the observation of the learned trial Judge that the respondent/writ petitioner cannot be said to be an unauthorised occupant for the period from 1st January, 1999 to 6th April, 1999. After having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Judge passed an order of status quo with regard to possession and rent; meaning thereby the respondent/ writ petitioner was prevented from handing over possession on the one hand and the appellant authority was also prevented from taking possession of the premises or take steps for eviction of the respondent/writ petitioner therefrom. The learned trial Judge having satisfied, prima facie that the respondent/writ petitioner was entitled to remain in possession, allowed him to remain in possession. Naturally, such authorization cannot be said to be an unauthorised one; particularly when no appeal was preferred against the said order. 12. BESIDES, it is well settled principle that actus curiae neminem gravabit, meaning the Court's act and action does not injure any person. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the respondent/writ petitioner should be charged with penal rate of rent, is not acceptable and we are also unable to accept the order of the Estate Officer. The learned trial Judge rejected the plea of the Estate Officer who held the respondent/ writ petitioner to be an unauthorised occupant during the relevant period. But at the same time, the learned trial Judge has overlooked another aspect of the matter that the respondent/writ petitioner cannot be allowed to remain in occupation without payment of rent during the period when interim order was subsisting. Accordingly, we modify the order of the learned trial Judge to the extent that the respondent/writ petitioner is to pay usual occupation charge, as is chargeable on the date of retirement. We, therefore, direct the respondent/ writ petitioner to pay the occupation charges at the normal rate, if not paid already, and the same shall be paid within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 13. WITH the aforesaid observations, the appeal stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.