JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar appearing on behalf of appellant - Jagdevsingh B. 2. It is necessary to note that record and proceedings has been called for by this Court, but, while perusing entire record, no notice has been issued by this Court to respondents though matter remained pending at admission stage for about more than 14 years. Appeal was preferred on 14th December, 1994, but, it has been registered in the year 1997. It is also necessary to note that trial Court has decided Regular Civil Suit No.79 of 1987 on 11th October, 1989 and lower appellate Court - District Judge, Rajkot has decided Regular Civil Appeal No.136 of 1989 on 31st August, 1994. The order of termination Ex.22 before trial Court is dated 18th January, 1987. Therefore, in all, matter has taken 23 years to attain finality. 3. The brief facts of present second appeal are that appellant Jagdevsingh was appointed as Rakshak in Railway Protection Force on probation for a period of two years on 18th January, 1985. During course of probation period, certain allegations were made against him and ultimately, notice was issued to him on 13th January, 1987 stating that his performance was not found satisfactory and therefore, he should submit his reply on allegations made against him. The appellant has given explanation/reply on 16th January, 1987. The respondent department has considered his explanation and ultimately, found that work of appellant was not found satisfactory, therefore, his service was terminated by order dated 18th January, 1987 vide Ex.22 during probationary period. The main consideration for passing order of termination against present appellant during period of probation of two years is that appellant used to remain absent without any intimation or without getting his leave sanctioned frequently. He was informed that he was seen with anti-social elements and he was also required to mend his conduct & work. Despite above position and above warning, there was no improvement in his work and behaviour. The appellant was also not attending duty in time. He was also found sleeping during office hours. He was also found absent from duty when checking was made. Once he was found getting down from first class compartment of railway on 27th October, 1986. There he was found in company of his friend showing that they were all travelling unauthorisedly in first class compartment of railway. He was also found sleeping during office hours. He was also found absent from duty when checking was made. Once he was found getting down from first class compartment of railway on 27th October, 1986. There he was found in company of his friend showing that they were all travelling unauthorisedly in first class compartment of railway. The appellant also left headquarter without any permission of concerned authority. The appellant once misbehaved with another staff member on 16th November, 1986, then, he was required to attend extra drill on 17th December, 1986. Yet, there also he attended late by about two hours. Appellant was found threatening to ASI Shri Singh on 3rd January, 1987 and also constable Shri S.D. Mishra. In view of above allegations made against appellant and it was considered by department and also keeping in mind facts alleged against appellant, department found that appellant was not fit to be continued in service and therefore, his service was terminated. In reply submitted by appellant on 16th January, 1987, appellant had merely denied all allegations made against him and no positive defence has been made out by appellant. Main ground for challenging said order is as under : "6. The main ground for challenging the said order and show cause notice taken up by the appellant before that trial Court were that the reasons for termination of services are palpably sanctioned and therefore, appellant cannot be branded of unsatisfactory and unsuitability or alleged misconduct on account of such sickness. That the appellant was suffering from piles and had to remain under medical treatment for such period as per the requirement. That as a matter of fact, appellant is being punished with stigma attached though proceedings are for simple termination of services. That termination amounting to dismissal or removal cannot be made without hearing the appellant and without undertaking process of inquiry as contemplated in Article 311 of the Constitution of India. That the appellant is also entitled to be protected by provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. That there is no application of mind by the authority before issuing show cause notice. That the respondents have not done any objective assessment to the work of the appellant. That juniors to the appellant have been retained in service while terminating the services of the appellant. That there is no application of mind by the authority before issuing show cause notice. That the respondents have not done any objective assessment to the work of the appellant. That juniors to the appellant have been retained in service while terminating the services of the appellant. That one month's notice has not been given in accordance with rules. That on the above considerations, impugned order is illegal, unconstitutional, and ineffective and deserves to be set aside." 4. On the basis of aforesaid ground to challenge termination order, following prayer is made by appellant before trial Court : "7. The appellant therefore prayed to declare that the show cause notice dated 13.01.1987 issued by respondents resulting in final order dated 18.01.1987 is illegal, ineffective, null and void. That appellant further prayed for declaration that he is entitled to be continued on his present post with all benefits of pay, salary, allowances, etc., as if no such order of termination has passed. The appellant further prayed for restraining the respondents from implementing or acting upon the said order. He also prayed for cost of the litigation." 5. The present respondent has resisted suit by filing written statement before trial Court vide Ex.13. According to respondents, appellant was initially appointed as Rakshak in Railway Protection Force on 18th January, 1985, which post is now known as Constable. According to respondent, appellant was appointed on probation for a period of two years and during period of probation, it was observed that work of appellant was found unsatisfactory. The respondent has stated at number of occasions as referred in written statement that work of appellant was found unsatisfactory. In past, warning was given to appellant and he was told specifically to mend his work and performance. Before terminating his services, due notice was given and reasonable opportunity was given for explanation to improve his work, yet, appellant failed to do so. The work and performance of appellant was kept under watch subsequently, but, appellant was found incorrigible even though notice was served upon him. The appellant failed to prove his work as satisfactory and he also started indulging in threatening officers and men of Force. The explanation given against show cause notice dated 13th January, 1987 under Rule 25(2) of R.P.F. Rules, 1959 by appellant on 16th January, 1987. The appellant failed to prove his work as satisfactory and he also started indulging in threatening officers and men of Force. The explanation given against show cause notice dated 13th January, 1987 under Rule 25(2) of R.P.F. Rules, 1959 by appellant on 16th January, 1987. The said representation was properly considered by respondent and after due and proper application of mind, respondent came to conclusion that appellant was not a fit person to be retained in Railway Protection Force's service any more, as his work was not satisfactory and he did not show improvement though sufficient chance was given to him. Therefore, under Rule 25(2) of RPF Rules, 1959, service of appellant was terminated by respondent on 18th January, 1987. The appellant has not justified his performance which found to be unsatisfactory and he was found unsuitable which is not by way of punishment and is also not tainted with stigma. According to respondents, no inquiry was required to be made against appellant in present case. In case when appellant was on leave with permission to leave headquarter, appellant overstayed without any previous intimation or permission. According to respondent, there was objective assessment made by department in respect of work of appellant and in such cases of probationer whose service was terminated because of unsuitability and unsatisfactory work, principle of 'last come first go' is not applicable in present case. There is no question of paying one month notice pay to appellant. Therefore, according to respondent, suit filed by appellant is required to be dismissed with cost. The trial Court has framed issue vide Ex.21 on 20th July, 1988. The trial Court came to conclusion that termination order was not punitive one and respondent had taken into consideration all materials before passing termination order. The work of appellant was not found satisfactory and therefore, respondents were at liberty to terminate services of probationer and therefore, order of termination is considered to be legal and valid and cannot be quashed by civil Court. Accordingly, suit has been dismissed by trial Court with cost of respondents. During pendency of suit proceedings, Ex.5 application for stay has been rejected by trial Court. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Accordingly, suit has been dismissed by trial Court with cost of respondents. During pendency of suit proceedings, Ex.5 application for stay has been rejected by trial Court. 6. Learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar appearing on behalf of appellant submitted that both Courts below ought to have held that though appellant was probationer, his services were terminated on the basis of allegations of serious nature and therefore, it was by way of penalty which could not have been done without undertaking departmental inquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to appellant and without following provisions relating to principles of natural justice in accordance with Article 311(2) of Constitution of India. He submitted that mere issuance of show cause notice while making allegation against appellant and considering reply given by appellant would not satisfy the requirement of Article 311(2) of Constitution of India. He submitted that allegations which are made in show-cause notice being a foundation/motive and in such circumstances, departmental inquiry was absolutely necessary. Therefore, trial Courts have committed gross error in dismissing civil suit filed by appellant and appellate Court has committed gross error in dismissing Regular Civil Appeal. 7. In view of aforesaid submissions made by learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar, following substantial questions of law formulated by him as mentioned in Para 7 of present Second Appeal : "(i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are illegal, null and void (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are attracted in the instant case as the services of the appellant were terminated on the basis of imputation of charges (iii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order of termination of appellant's services is illegal null and void having been passed without holding any inquiry and without affording any reasonable opportunity to the appellant to refute the charges as it violates the principles of natural justice (iv) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the order of termination is bad in law since the same casts a stigma on the appellant without establishing the quilt without conducting any inquiry." 8. The lower appellate Court has considered, in detail, allegations made against appellant in show cause notice and also considered records produced by respondents. The lower appellate Court has considered, in detail, allegations made against appellant in show cause notice and also considered records produced by respondents. The lower appellate Court has also considered various decisions on subject matter whether during probationary period, if probationer's work is found unsatisfactorily and he was unsuitable to the job, then, detailed departmental inquiry is necessary as required under Article 311(2) of Constitution of India or not and whether in such circumstances, principles of natural justice is required to be complied with or not. 9. The relevant discussion is made by lower appellate Court in Para 75 to 87 which are quoted as under : "75. So, the above decisions makes it clear that each and every order of termination of service is not an order of punishment or punitive in nature. Therefore, in all such events, it is not necessary that the department should hold departmental enquiry against all such persons. The enquiry will be necessary in cases of misconduct. The appellant was a probationer and his work was assessed and while assessment of his work was done, it was found that appellant had developed a tenancy to remain absent without any previous intimation to the respondents. It is further found that even after commencement of period of unauthorised absence, appellant never cared to intimate the department that he was sick and therefore, he would not be in a position to attend to the duty. This created a lot of inconvenience and difficulty to the department. As said above, the department has to make alternative arrangement in case of absence by persons. If any previous intimation has been given or any intimation has been given soon after commencement of unauthorised period of leave, then, department can take suitable action for making alternative arrangement, to place some body on duty in place of appellant. But when no body knows that the appellant was sick or was on leave on other consideration, then, there would be no person on duty at the place alloted to the appellant. 76. As said above, the appellant had to perform very important duties to protect and preserve movables and immovables property of the railways as well as of passengers. 77. Therefore, appellant when remained absent all of a sudden very frequently, it was a matter of great deal of inconvenience, to the department. 76. As said above, the appellant had to perform very important duties to protect and preserve movables and immovables property of the railways as well as of passengers. 77. Therefore, appellant when remained absent all of a sudden very frequently, it was a matter of great deal of inconvenience, to the department. It is more so, when the appellant even did not inform the department after commencement of the period of unauthorised absence. Therefore, this sort of attitude or work cannot be expected by a department like Railway Protection Force, wherein, discipline is the basis of service. Even looking to the nature of service to be performed by appellant, it was absolutely necessary for him to intimate the department before proceeding on leave or even soon after commencement of leave, which has not been done by him. Therefore, his work and attitude cannot be treated to be acceptable. 78. Then, it has to be considered that this was a matter of termination of service of a probationer on objective assessment of his work and attitude. Therefore, when this was not by way of punishment or penalty, no inquiry was required to be undertaken and no further opportunity was required to be given to the appellant. Therefore, even provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution will not apply to the facts of the present case. 79. Same way, it cannot be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice. 80. Even with respect to his attachment with antisocial elements, his attention was drawn and he never clarified his position to the department, which shows that he accepted said position. 81. Same way, this was not a matter of contraction of cadre or retrenchment and therefore, the fact that juniors have been retained in service will not be a ground for setting aside and quashing the impugned order. 82. Consequently, respondents were not expected to go any the principles 'last come first go'. 83. Same way, no notice was required to be given when it was a matter of termination of service on completion or during the period of probation. 84. 82. Consequently, respondents were not expected to go any the principles 'last come first go'. 83. Same way, no notice was required to be given when it was a matter of termination of service on completion or during the period of probation. 84. On the whole, therefore, it is found that respondents have considered overall performance of the appellant's work during the period of probation and after objective assessment of his work during the said period, the department has come to a decision that the appellant was not a person suitable to be continued in the employment of the Railway Protection Force and therefore, the department found it just and proper terminate the services of the appellant. 85. Looking to the above position, the order does not appear to be punitive in nature, but, it is based on objective assessment of work, performance and duties of the appellant, and regular attendance is also a matter of performance of duties. 86. In that view of the matter, when the order is not punitive in nature, it cannot be quashed and set aside by a Civil Court. The Civil Court cannot sit as a Court of Appeal over the decision of the respondents. The Civil Court can interfere with when there is a patent illegality committed by respondents in the course of process of passing the impugned order. No illegality has been proved to have been committed by the respondents and consequently, appellant is not entitled to pray for setting aside or quashing the impugned order. 87. The trail Court has properly appreciated the above position both legal factual and has not committed any wrong in arriving at the decision that the impugned order is not proved to be illegal and ineffective. The trial Court has therefore properly found that the appellant is not entitled to any decree in the suit. The trial Court was therefore justified in dismissing the suit of the appellant with costs of the respondents." 10. It is also necessary to consider reasoning given by trial Court in Para 22 to 25, 27 and 28 which are relevant observations and finding given by trial Court, therefore, same are quoted as under : "22. I have gone through the provisions of Rule-44 and Sec. 9' of the R.P.F. Act. I believe that the case of the plaintiff is a case of a probationer. I have gone through the provisions of Rule-44 and Sec. 9' of the R.P.F. Act. I believe that the case of the plaintiff is a case of a probationer. In this matter, penalty is not imposed by the defendant - Railway Department, but Railway Department has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not able to perform his duty as a disciplinary Sainik and hence, they have terminated the service of the plaintiff on the last day of the completion of probation period. So, in this matter, plaintiff cannot say that the defendant is required to follow the procedure as per Rule-44 of R.P.F. Rules. I believe that in the case of probationer, this rule would not be applicable and hence, it cannot be said that the order passed by the defendant No.2 is null and void in eye of law. The defendant No.2 has passed this order as per Rule-25 (2) of R.P.F. Rules. @INPARA = 23. In this matter, before passing order of termination show cause notice was given to the plaintiff and thereafter, final order for termination of service was passed by the defendant No.2 and hence, in this matter, case of the plaintiff would not cover by Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India. The case of the plaintiff would be required to consider as a termination of service simplicitor. After passing two years' of probation period, findings given by defendant No.2 are sufficient to hold that the plaintiff was not property performing his duty as a Rakshak of R.P.F. 24. Thereafter, Mr. M.N. Udani from the railway has relied upon one important ruling of Supreme Court reported in case of Bishanlal v. State of Haryana - AIR 1978, SC 363. It was a case of probationer Civil Judge of Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch). In which, it has been held by Supreme Court that :- "In a case of termination of service of probationer, formal inquiry may be sufficient to determine whether a probationer who has no fixed or fully performed right to continue in service (treated in eye of law as a case of "no right" to continue in service) should be continued. The intention behind the inquiry for the probationer is that the probationer cannot say to hold full departmental inquiry or trial is necessary. The intention behind the inquiry for the probationer is that the probationer cannot say to hold full departmental inquiry or trial is necessary. In case of probationer, summary inquiry to determine that the petitioner is entitled to continue in the service or not can be done by the department." So, as per the legal position, it can be said that in this matter also, the probationer cannot be terminated by the Railway Department. In this matter, it is found that sufficient opportunity was given to the probationer plaintiff, but his attitude was such that, he is not found fit for R.P.F. Rakshak. His work was found unsatisfactory and hence, in this matter, it cannot be held that the order which is passed by the defendant is not tenable in eye of law. 25. Lastly, in this matter, learned Advocate of the defendant - Railway Mr. Udani has drawn my attention towards the important authority of our own Gujarat High Court reported in case of Popatlal Vasudev Vyas v. Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board reported in 1982 (2) GLH 82. This is a ruling of Hon'ble Justice J.P. Desai. It was a case of English Stenographer who was appointed on probation. In that case, it is held that :- "If the probationer continued in service after expiry of initial probation period, then also such continuation does not amount to confirmation in service. Mere expiration of probationary period, does not amount to confirmation, unless it is so indicated, in the terms of the appointment or provided in the relevant service rules." So, if the probation period is over and if Government servant would be continued in service, after expiration of probation period then also Government servant cannot say that he is confirmed in Government service. In this matter, position is otherwise. Probation period was over and the probationer plaintiff was terminated from service on the last date and hence, in this matter, there is no question for constitution in service after the expiration of probation period. It is found from the appointment order that there was no intention of the Railway Department to continue the probationer after the expiration of the probation period. If the probationer would not found suitable for the above post then his service may be terminated as per law. It is found from the appointment order that there was no intention of the Railway Department to continue the probationer after the expiration of the probation period. If the probationer would not found suitable for the above post then his service may be terminated as per law. In this matter, it is found that the service of the plaintiff was terminated as per law and hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief before this Court and hence, he cannot say that he should be continued in the service after the completion of probation period. 27. So, in view of the above discussion, I believe that in this case, plaintiff is not entitled to get any declaratory relief before the Court of law. The work of the plaintiff was found poor. So, plaintiff has no right to continue in service. As per the latest legal position laid down by the authorities of Supreme Court and our own Gujarat High Court, I believe that the plaintiff cannot made a grievance that the order of his termination from service on completion of probation period of 2 years is malafide and against the provisions of law and against Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India. The defendant - department has terminated the service of the plaintiff on 17.1.87. So, plaintiff could not be said to be said to continue in service from dt.18.1.87. Service of the plaintiff was come to an end on dt.17.1.87 as per law. I have gone through the record of the suit. In this matter, show cause notice which was issued by the defendant on dt.13.1.87 and the final order of termination of the service of the plaintiff which was passed by the defendant, on dt.17.1.87 is also found as per law. The above order was not a punishing order. The above order was also not violative of Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India. The above order was as per the provisions of Rule-25(2) of R.P.F. Rules. So, in this matter, as per the above discussion, I answer Issue No.1 and 2 against the plaintiff and in the negative. I believe that the show cause notice and the termination order passed by the defendant - department was as per law and as per their power. 28. As per the above discussion, I come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. I believe that the show cause notice and the termination order passed by the defendant - department was as per law and as per their power. 28. As per the above discussion, I come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. The appointment of the plaintiff was temporary. Plaintiff was not able to complete his period of probation successfully as per the requirement of law. Plaintiff was not found suitable for the service of R.P.F. Rakshak. Provisions of Rule-25 (2) of R.P.F. Rules were already observed by the defendants as per law. The order of termination passed by the defendant department is a reasoned order. The defendants have considered the representation and reply given by the plaintiff before passing the final order. So, in this matter, it is not possible to hold that the order of termination is arbitrary, null and void. In my view, a Government servant who is on probation cannot challenge his order of termination on the day of completion of probation period by saying that his termination order is a "dismissal order" or "removal order". In such type of cases, Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India would not be helpful to the probationer. In this matter, the order of termination was as per the Rule-25(2) of R.P.F. Rules, 1959. So, the termination order cannot be said passed by way of punishment. This order of the plaintiff cannot be said an order of dismissal or removal from the service of R.P.F. Under these circumstances, I believe that in this matter, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief of permanent injunction against the defendants. The service of the probationer can be terminated as per the terms of the appointment order. In this matter, service of the plaintiff was terminated by the Railway Department as per the terms of the appointment order. It is true that the termination of the service would be economical death to the plaintiff. But the plaintiff was found unsuitable for the post of R.P.F. Rakshak, and hence, he cannot get any protection before the Court of law as per the latest legal position. I believe that as a probationer, plaintiff is not entitled to get any protection before this Court on the ground that the order of termination is an order of stigma and by way of punishment. I believe that as a probationer, plaintiff is not entitled to get any protection before this Court on the ground that the order of termination is an order of stigma and by way of punishment. So, in view of the above discussion, I hold that the suit of the plaintiff is not tenable and hence, it requires to be dismissed as per the final order passed below." 11. In view of reasoning given by trial Court as well as lower appellate Court as referred above, recently, Division Bench of Delhi High Court has in case of Dy. Director of Education & Anr. v. Veena Sharma reported in 2010 Lab.I.C. 4265 has considered termination of service of probationer who was appointed as upper division clerk. Termination was on ground that services no longer required. It was held that rule empowers employer to terminate services of a probationer at any time when his work is not found satisfactory. It was also held that order directing reinstatement on ground that after expiry of period of probation, employee is deemed to be confirmed and principle of natural justice was not followed, is liable to be set aside. The relevant observations made in Para 11 to 26 by Division Bench of Delhi High Court are quoted as under : "11. The issue that emerges for consideration is whether on the basis of the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the letter of appointment, it can be construed that the respondent had become a confirmed employee under a deemed concept after the expiry of the period of probation. Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the appellants, has commanded us to the decision in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that it will depend on the scheme of the Act and the Rules and the facts and circumstances in each case and, hence, the said decision is distinguishable. The learned counsel placed heavy reliance on Wasim Beg v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1998 (78) F.L.R. 910 . In Dharam Singh (supra), the Apex Court was considering Rule 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961. In the said case, the Rule stipulated that the total period of probation including extensions, if any, shall not exceed three years. In Dharam Singh (supra), the Apex Court was considering Rule 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961. In the said case, the Rule stipulated that the total period of probation including extensions, if any, shall not exceed three years. Their Lordships referred to the earlier view which had consistently stated that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. Under these circumstances, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation, it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed. After referring to the earlier view in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 , G.S. Ramaswamy & Ors. v. Inspector- General of Police, Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 175 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1842 , the Apex Court interpreted Rule 6(3) of the Rules which arose for interpretation therein and expressed the view that when the service rules fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. It is so as such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. 12. In this context, we may refer with profit to a three-Judge Bench decision in High Court of Madhya Pradesh through Registrar and Others v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, AIR 2001 SC 3234 = (2001) 7 SCC 161 . 12. In this context, we may refer with profit to a three-Judge Bench decision in High Court of Madhya Pradesh through Registrar and Others v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, AIR 2001 SC 3234 = (2001) 7 SCC 161 . In the said case, the Apex Court was considering the effect and impact of Rule 24 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1955. Be it noted, their Lordships were considering the correctness of the decision in Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. & Another, AIR 1997 SC 3269 , which was also a case under Rule 24 of the Rules wherein it was laid down that as no order of confirmation was passed within the maximum period of probation, the probationer judicial officer could be deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of four years period of probation. Their Lordships, after referring to the decisions rendered by the Constitution Bench in Dharam Singh (supra) and Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, AIR 1974 SC 2192 = (1974) 2 SCC 831 and after scanning the anatomy of Rule 24, came to hold as follows: "11. The question of deemed confirmation in service Jurisprudence, which is dependent upon the language of the relevant service rules, has been the subject matter of consideration before this Court, times without number in various decisions and there are three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. The other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry the order of termination has not been passed. The inference in such cases is that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry the order of termination has not been passed. The last line of cases is where, though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor has the person concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired." 13. After so holding, their Lordships referred to the decision in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) wherein the Constitution Bench was considering the question of confirmation under Rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930 which provided that a candidate on first appointment to the service shall remain on probation for a period of 18 months and the proviso thereto enabled the respondents not to extend the period of probation. Rule 24 of the said Rules provided that on completion of the period of probation prescribed or extended, a member of the service would be qualified for substantive appointment. The three-Judge Bench observed that the fact that a person is a probationer implies that he has to prove his worth and suitability for the higher post in which he is officiating and if his work is not found to be satisfactory, he is liable to be reverted to his original post even without assigning any reason. 14. Thereafter, their Lordships referred to the decision in G.S. Ramaswamy & Ors. (supra), another Constitution Bench decision which was considering a case of promotion of Sub-Inspector of Police under Rule 486 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual which provided that all officers who are promoted will be on probation for a period of two years and they would be reverted at any time during the aforesaid period if their work and conduct were not found to be satisfactory or they were found unsuitable for the appointment to which they had been promoted. The three-Judge Bench while discussing the ratio of the Constitution Bench came to hold that the Constitution Bench had repelled the contention and held that such a Rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, as a promoted officer can be confirmed under the Rules only if he has given satisfaction, which conduct of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be confirmed under the Rules and the same obviously means that the authority competent to confirm an officer must pass an order to the effect that the probationer has given satisfaction. 15. After dealing with the ratio of the aforesaid two Constitution Benches, their Lordships proceeded to deal with the view expressed in Akbar Ali Khan (supra) wherein the Constitution Bench has held thus: "The law on the point is now well settled. Where a person is appointed as a probationer in any post and a period of probation is specified, it does not follow that at the end of the said specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed in that behalf. Unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period, or there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. At the end of the period of probation an order confirming the officer is required to be passed and if no such order is passed and he is not reverted to his substantive post, the result merely is that he continues in his post as a probationer. ...The terms of appointment do not show that the appellant would be automatically confirmed on the expiry of the first six months of probation nor is any rule brought to our notice which has the effect of confirming him in the post after six months of probation. The position of the appellant, therefore, till the abolition of the post on 4.11.1958, was that he continued to be a probationer and has no right to the post. It, therefore, follows that when the tenure of the post came to an end, he was automatically reverted to his original post as an Inspector on which he had the lien." 16. It, therefore, follows that when the tenure of the post came to an end, he was automatically reverted to his original post as an Inspector on which he had the lien." 16. At this juncture, we may state with profit that in Satya Narayan Jhavar (supra), their Lordships distinguished the decision in Dharam Singh (supra). After noting Rule 6(3) of the relevant Rules and reproducing a passage from the decision, their Lordships opined thus: "19. From the aforesaid passage, it would be clear that as Rule 6 did not require a person to pass any test or to fulfill any other condition before confirmation, this Court was of the view that upon the expiry of maximum period of probation the probationer could be deemed to have been confirmed which goes to show that if such provision would have been there in the Rules, the conclusion might have been otherwise." 17. Be it noted, the decision rendered in Wasim Beg (supra) was pressed into service which has also been heavily relied upon by Mr. Khan in the case at hand. While dealing with the ratio in the said case, their Lordships referred to the relevant Rule relating to confirmation, which is as follows: "Confirmation - An employee directly appointed or promoted to any post in the Corporation shall be deemed to have become a confirmed employee in that grade after he has successfully completed the period of probation." 18. After referring to the said Rule, their Lordships referred to the facts and eventually came to hold as follows : "21. In the said case no maximum period of probation was prescribed either by the letter of appointment or the rules. The Rules laid down that an employee shall be deemed to have become a confirmed employee after he has successfully completed the period of probation. From the affidavit filed by the Corporation as well as from the report of the Managing Director, it was clear that the incumbent was considered by the Board as having satisfactorily completed his period of probation on 9.1.1979 i.e. before expiry of one year period of probation and was considered as a regular employee from 10.1.1979. From the affidavit filed by the Corporation as well as from the report of the Managing Director, it was clear that the incumbent was considered by the Board as having satisfactorily completed his period of probation on 9.1.1979 i.e. before expiry of one year period of probation and was considered as a regular employee from 10.1.1979. From the affidavit filed by the Corporation it was clear that the services of the incumbent were satisfactory for the first few years and work was very good and only thereafter his work deteriorated as a result of which the Corporation suffered losses. Thus in view of the stand taken that the incumbent had successfully completed the period of probation, he was deemed to have become a confirmed employee, as enumerated in the Rules referred to above." 19. After distinguishing the said case, the three-Judge Bench referred to Samsher Singh (supra), Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 , Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 364, State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla, (1996) 9 SCC 190 and Chief General Manager, State Bank of India v. Bijoy Kumar Mishra, (1997) 7 SCC 550 and expressed the view as follows: "37. Ordinarily a deemed confirmation of a probationer arises when the letter of appointment so stipulates or the Rules governing service conditions so indicate. In the absence of such term in the letter of appointment or in the relevant Rules, it can be inferred on the basis of the relevant Rules by implication, as was the case in Dharam Singh (supra). But it cannot be said that merely because a maximum period of probation has been provided in the Service Rules, continuance of the probationer thereafter would ipso facto must be held to be a deemed confirmation which would certainly run contrary to the seven-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shamsher Singh (supra) and the Constitution Bench decisions in the cases of Sukhbans Singh (supra), G.S. Ramaswamy (supra) and Akbar Ali Khan (supra). 20. 20. In this context, it is apposite to refer to Commissioner of Police, Hubli & Another v. R.S. More, AIR 2003 SC 983 wherein the Apex Court was addressing itself to the question whether the continuance of the probationer on the post beyond the probation period or extended period, as the case may be, entitled him to have any claim to deemed confirmation in the absence of any specific order passed by the competent authority to that effect. Their Lordships referred to the decision in Satya Narayan Jhavar (supra) and held as follows: "8. In our view, the case at hand falls under category 3. As noticed, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 requires that a probationer shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. No specific order having been passed by any authority, certifying the satisfactory completion of probation period of the respondent, has been brought to our notice. Mr. Hegde, learned counsel, submitted that no order as contemplated under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 has been passed by the competent authority. Admittedly, the order discharging the respondent, in exercise of powers under Rule 6, has been passed after the extended period of probation was over. In our view, however, that itself would not entitle the respondent to have claimed deemed confirmation in absence of the specific order to that effect. In service jurisprudence, confirmation of service on a particular post is preceded by satisfactory performance of the incumbent unless service rules otherwise prescribe. In the instant case, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Rules provides that unless there is a specific order that the probationer has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, he shall not be entitled to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the probation by reason of his being continued in service beyond the extended period of probation. The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter, resulting in miscarriage of justice. In our view, the High Court fell into error resulting in miscarriage of justice." 21. Coming to the obtaining factual matrix, as has been stated earlier, the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn inspiration from Section 8 of the Act. On a reading of the said provision, we really perceive nothing therein which would be of any aid or assistance to the learned counsel for the respondent. Coming to the obtaining factual matrix, as has been stated earlier, the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn inspiration from Section 8 of the Act. On a reading of the said provision, we really perceive nothing therein which would be of any aid or assistance to the learned counsel for the respondent. The said provision deals with the procedure how an employee of a recognized private school could be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or terminated from service. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 provides that subject to any rule, no employee of a recognized private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the director. Rule 105 of the Rules which deals with probation clearly stipulates that every employee shall, on initial appointment, be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended by the appointing authority with the prior approval of the director and the services of an employee may be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee during the said period is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory. The second proviso to Rule 105 raises a postulate that no termination of the service of an employee on probation shall be made by a school, other than a minority school, except with the previous approval of the director. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 which is relevant for the present purpose, we think it appropriate to reproduce again: (2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation as the case may be, confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the said period. 22. The submission of Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, is that if the language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 is properly appreciated, it would clearly convey that after the expiry of the period of probation or extended period of probation, there is deemed confirmation. 22. The submission of Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, is that if the language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 is properly appreciated, it would clearly convey that after the expiry of the period of probation or extended period of probation, there is deemed confirmation. On a scanning of the Rule, it is manifest that the concept of deemed confirmation does not arise on two counts, namely, there is no fixed period of probation and secondly, it is hedged by the condition that the work and conduct of an employee during probation or extended period of probation is satisfactory. Clause 3 of the letter of appointment postulates that the appointment is on probation for one year and afterwards, a confirmation letter would be issued subject to the suitability and satisfactory service rendered by the respondent. Thus, the employee was also made aware that the confirmation is not automatic but subject to the suitability and satisfactory service rendered by her. 23. The reliance placed on by Mr. Khan on the decision in Wasim Beg (supra) has been distinguished in Satya Narayan Javar (supra) because of the position of Rule in this regard and the affidavit filed by the Corporation which showed that the services of the incumbent were satisfactory for the first few years and the work was very good. In that case, he was deemed to have become a confirmed employee. It is apposite to note that the Rule which was under consideration in Wasim Beg (supra) clearly stipulated that an employee directly appointed or promoted to any post in the Corporation shall be deemed to have become a confirmed employee in that grade after he has successfully completed a period of probation. In the present case, the language employed in the Rule is quite different. It does not use the words 'shall be deemed to have become a confirmed employee'. That apart, a condition precedent is attached to the effect that the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation has to be found to be satisfactory. Quite apart from that, in Wasim Beg (supra), the Apex Court had held that his work was satisfactory for number of years. That apart, a condition precedent is attached to the effect that the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation has to be found to be satisfactory. Quite apart from that, in Wasim Beg (supra), the Apex Court had held that his work was satisfactory for number of years. In the case at hand, regard being had to the language employed and keeping in view the decision rendered in Satya Narayan Javar (supra), we are of the considered view that the employee could not be put in the compartment of confirmed employee after the expiry of one year of probation and accordingly, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on this score is set aside. We may also proceed to state that the learned Single Judge has opined that the services of a confirmed employee cannot be dispensed with in violation of principles of natural justice. As we have not concurred with the finding that the employee was a confirmed employee, the conclusion arrived at as an inevitable corollary relating to the violation of the doctrine of natural justice is also set aside, for there is no stigma attached to the order of termination. 24. The next issue that emanates for consideration is whether the order of termination is unsustainable as the condition incorporated in the letter of appointment was not fulfilled. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that non-compliance of such a condition would not vitiate the order of termination inasmuch as it is a curable irregularity. Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted with vehemence that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge to the effect that once the condition incorporated in the letter of appointment is not satisfied while passing the order of termination, the same has to pave the path of vitiation is absolutely impeccable. To appreciate the said submission, it is apt to refer to the anatomy of Rule 105. The said Rule clearly postulates that the services of an employee may be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee during the said period is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory. Thus, the Rule does not envisage any kind of issue of notice. The said Rule clearly postulates that the services of an employee may be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee during the said period is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory. Thus, the Rule does not envisage any kind of issue of notice. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in Rakesh Kumar Singh v. Committee of Management, Rai Bareili, (1996) 8 SCC 595 wherein the Apex Court was considering Regulation 25 framed under Section 16-G of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 which stipulated that the services of a temporary employee (other than a probationer) or of a probationer during the terms of his probation may be terminated at any time by giving him one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof. In the said case, neither one month's notice nor one month's pay in lieu thereof was given to the appellant therein. The High Court of Allahabad interpreting Regulation 25 held that it is not a condition precedent to exercise the power under the Regulation and even if one month's notice is not given or one month's pay is not paid at the time of termination, that would not render the order of termination invalid but would only make the employee entitled to one month's salary. The High Court had placed reliance on the decision in Director of Technical Education v. John Mohammad, 1975 All LR 8. Before the Apex Court, reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Managing Committee, Sohan Lal Higher Secondary School v. Sheo Dutt Gupta, 1974 All LJ 465 to buttress the submission that if one month's notice was neither given to the appellant nor was he paid one month's pay, termination of his service ought to have been held as invalid. Their Lordships took note of the decision in Senior Supdt., R.M.S. v. K.V. Gopinath, (1973) 3 SCC 867 wherein the Apex Court had interpreted Rule 5(1)(b) of the Central Services (Temporary) Services Rules, 1965 and the earlier decision in State of U.P. v. Dinanath Rai, 1969 SLR 646 (SC) and thereafter expressed the view as follows: "9. Their Lordships took note of the decision in Senior Supdt., R.M.S. v. K.V. Gopinath, (1973) 3 SCC 867 wherein the Apex Court had interpreted Rule 5(1)(b) of the Central Services (Temporary) Services Rules, 1965 and the earlier decision in State of U.P. v. Dinanath Rai, 1969 SLR 646 (SC) and thereafter expressed the view as follows: "9. Thus the consistent view of the Court is that where the rule permits giving of pay in lieu of the notice of termination and does not further provide as to when the payment is to be made, it only entitles the employee to pay for the period of the notice and payment of notice pay cannot be regarded as a condition precedent to the valid termination of service. But where the rule provides even by implication that payment to the employee of whatever is due to him should be simultaneous with termination of his service then fulfillment of that requirement has to be regarded as a condition precedent to the valid termination. In view of the words "terminated forthwith by payment" in the proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) this Court held that payment was intended simultaneously with termination and that was pointed out as the essential difference between Rule 5(1)(b) with which it was concerned in Gopinath case and the rule which was considered in Dinanath case. 10. A bare reading of Regulation 25 indicates that it is more similar to the rule which fell for consideration in Dinanath case. It gives an option to the management either to give one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof. It does not provide for the mode or time for payment. Thus the rule only entitles the temporary employee or the probationer to pay for the period of notice. As we are of the view that Regulation 25 does not provide payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice as a condition precedent to the effective termination of service, the High Court was right in setting aside the order of the Deputy Director who had taken a contrary view. The view taken by the High Court is correct and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed." 25. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no trace of doubt that the condition incorporated in the letter of appointment is not a condition precedent. The view taken by the High Court is correct and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed." 25. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no trace of doubt that the condition incorporated in the letter of appointment is not a condition precedent. Quite apart from that, the Rule is silent on the said score. On the contrary, the Rule empowers the employer to terminate the services of a probationer at any time when his work is not found satisfactory. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge is not tenable as he has treated the said condition as a condition precedent and accordingly, we are unable to concur with the said view. 26. In view of our preceding analysis, we are of the considered view that the appeal deserves to be allowed and, accordingly, it is so ordered and as an inevitable corollary, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs." 12. Similar view has been taken by Apex Court in case of Khajia Mohammed Muzammil v. State of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2010 Lab.I.C. 4348 SC. Relevant observations made in Para 12 to 23 of aforesaid decision are quoted as under : "12. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the Authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation. Once these ingredients are satisfied the Competent Authority may confirm the employee under Rule 5 of the 1977 Rules. Rule 5(2) places an obligation upon the Authority that at the end of the prescribed period of probation, the Authority shall consider the suitability of the probationer to the post to which he is appointed and take a conscious decision whether he is suitable to hold the post and issue an order declaring that the probationer has satisfactorily competed his period or pass an order extending the period of probation etc. Rule 5(b) empowers the Authority that in the event it is of the view that the period of probation has not been satisfactorily completed or has not passed the special examinations, it may discharge him from service unless the period of probation is extended. Rule 5(2) has been coveted with negative language. It specifically prescribes that a probationer shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. This Rule further clarifies that if there is a delay in issuance of an order under sub-Rule (1), it shall not entitle the probationer to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation. In other words, the framers of the Rules have introduced a double restriction to the concept of automatic confirmation or deemed satisfactorily completion of the probation period. Firstly, the specific order is required to be issued in that regard and secondly, delay in issuance of such orders does not tilt the balance in favour of the employee. Rule 6 (1) states that the Competent Authority may, at any time, during the period of probation, discharge from service, a probationer on grounds arising out of the conditions, if any, imposed by the Rules or in the order of appointment, or on account of his unsuitability for the service of post. However, the said order of discharge would take effect only after it is confirmed by the next higher authority. Rule 6(2) specifically excludes the application or holding of formal proceedings under the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957. It says that such course will not be necessary. In light of this statutory provision, let us also examine the probation period referred to under item No. 2 of Rule 2 of 1983 Rules. Rule states that probation period will be of 2 years and further mandates during that period of probation, the officer must undergo a training, as may be specified by the High Court. This itself has been indicated under the head `minimum qualifications'. It, therefore, clearly shows that it is not the provision dealing with the probation period, extension and discharge of a probationer during that period but is primarily relatable to the minimum qualifications, which are to be essentially satisfied by the officer concerned before he takes over his appointment as a regular judge. It, therefore, clearly shows that it is not the provision dealing with the probation period, extension and discharge of a probationer during that period but is primarily relatable to the minimum qualifications, which are to be essentially satisfied by the officer concerned before he takes over his appointment as a regular judge. The reference to the probation period has to be examined and interpreted with reference to and in conjunction with 1977 Rules which are the primary Rules dealing with probation. These Rules have admittedly been adopted by the High Court. Under the 1983 Rules, the emphasis is on performance and training during the period of probation. In other words, the primary purpose of these Rules is only to ensure that the concerned officer undergoes training during the period of probation. While the significance under the 1983 Rules is on training, under 1977 Rules, all matters relating to probation are specifically dealt with. It would not be permissible to read the relevant part of 1983 Rules to say that it mandates that probation period shall be only for two years and not more. If that was to be accepted, all provisions under Rules 3 to 6 of 1977 Rules will become redundant and ineffective. In fact, it would frustrate the very purpose of framing the 1977 Rules. What will be the period of probation, the circumstances under which it can be extended or reduces and discharge of the Probationer Officer in the event of unsuitability etc. are only dealt with under the 1977 Rules. The 1983 Rules would have to be read harmoniously with 1977 Rules to achieve the real purpose of proper and timely training of Judicial Officers on the one hand and appropriate control over the matters relating to probation of the officers on the other. That, in fact, is the precise reason as to why 1983 Rules do not deal specifically with any of the aspects of probation. In view of this discussion the contention of the appellants has to be rejected. 13. Having referred to the specific Rules on the subject and the entire scheme under the relevant provisions relating to different aspects of probation, let us examine the law and the pronouncements of this Court in some detail. We have already noticed that two views are prevalent. Primarily, the Court has taken the diametrical opposite view. 13. Having referred to the specific Rules on the subject and the entire scheme under the relevant provisions relating to different aspects of probation, let us examine the law and the pronouncements of this Court in some detail. We have already noticed that two views are prevalent. Primarily, the Court has taken the diametrical opposite view. One which accepts the application of the deemed confirmation after the expiry of the prescribed period of probation, while other taking the view that it will not be appropriate to apply the concept of deemed confirmation to the officers on probation as that is not the intent of law. In our opinion, the rules and regulations governing a particular service are bound to have greater impact on determining such question and that is the precise reason that we have discussed Rules 3 to 6 of 1977 Rules in the earlier part of the judgment. What view out of the two views indicated above should be followed in the facts of the present case can be fairly stated only after we have discussed the earlier judgment of the larger as well as Equi-Benches on this aspect. Let us, at the very outset, refer to the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, [ AIR 1968 SC 1210 ] In that case the Court was concerned with Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961 which fixed certain period beyond which the probation period cannot be extended and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation. The view taken by the Court was that there would be confirmation of the employee in the post by implication. We may refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment of this Court: "8. The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to Rule 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to Rule 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to Rule 6(3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers. 9. Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass any test or to fulfill any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were so discharged from services and re-employed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under Rule 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. As the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Article 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court." Seven Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of Shamsher v. State of Punjab [(1974) 2 SCC 834], was concerned primarily, with the question whether termination during probation could be viewed as a punitive action in some case or always has to be as discharge simplicitor during the said period. The Court expressed the view that no abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination, it can never amount to punishment. In the facts and circumstances of the case if the probationer is discharged on the ground of insufficiency or for similar reasons without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity to show cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. But while dealing with this principle question the Bench even discussed, at some length, whether a probationer can automatically be confirmed on the expiry of period of probation. The Court considered the earlier judgment of this Court in Dharam Singh's case (supra) discussing the case of appellant, who had completed his initial period of two years' probation on 11th November, 1967 and the maximum period of three years' probation on 11th November, 1968 and by reason of the fact that he continued in service after the expiry of the maximum period of probation he became confirmed, was the contention raised before the Bench. In that case the relevant Rule 7 (1) provided that every subordinate Judge, in the first instance, be appointed on probation for two years but this period may be extended from time to time expressly or impliedly so that the total period of probation does not exceed three years. In that case the relevant Rule 7 (1) provided that every subordinate Judge, in the first instance, be appointed on probation for two years but this period may be extended from time to time expressly or impliedly so that the total period of probation does not exceed three years. Explanation to Rule 5 (1) further provided that period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. The appellant had also placed reliance on Dharam Singh' case (supra) to contend that the only view possible was that he would be deemed to have been confirmed. However, on the facts of the case before the Bench the Court held as under: "Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the present case because before the completion of three years the High Court found prima facie that the work as well as the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and a notice was given to the appellant on October 4, 1968 to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated. Furthermore, Rule 9 shows that the employment of a probationer can be proposed to be terminated whether during or at the end of the period of probation. This indicates that where the notice is given at the end of the probation the period of probation gets extended till the inquiry proceedings commenced by the notice under Rule 9 come to an end. In this background the explanation to Rule 7(1) shows that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of this period of probation. This implied extension where a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of the period of probation is not found in Dharam Singh's case, ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) This explanation in the present case does not mean that the implied extension of the probationary period is only between two and three years. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh case and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3). The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh case and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3). The proviso to the rule states that the completion of the maximum period of three years' probation would not confer on him the right to be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule 7(3) states that an express order of confirmation is necessary. The proviso to Rule 7(3) is in the negative form that the completion of the maximum period of three years would not confer a right of confirmation till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. The period of probation is therefore extended by implication until the proceedings commenced against a probationer like the appellant are concluded to enable the Government to decide whether a probationer should be confirmed or his services should be terminated. No confirmation by implication can arise in the present case in the facts and circumstances as also by the meaning and operation of Rules 7(1) and 7(3) as aforesaid. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the second proviso to Rule 7(3) which came into existence on November 19, 1970. That proviso of course does not apply to the facts of the present case. That proviso states that if the report of the High Court regarding the unsatisfactory work or conduct of the probationer is made to the Governor before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, further proceedings in the matter may be taken and orders passed by the Governor of Punjab dispensing with his services or reverting him to his substantive post even after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. The second proviso makes explicit which is implicit in Rule 7(1) and Rule 7(3) that the period of probation gets extended till the proceedings commenced by the notice come to an end either by confirmation or discharge of the probationer. The second proviso makes explicit which is implicit in Rule 7(1) and Rule 7(3) that the period of probation gets extended till the proceedings commenced by the notice come to an end either by confirmation or discharge of the probationer. In the present case, no confirmation by implication can arise by reason of the notice to show cause given on October 4, 1968 the enquiry by the Director of Vigilance to enquire into allegations and the operation of Rule 7 of the Service Rules that the probation shall be extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed before the expiry of the period of probation. Inasmuch as Ishwar Chand Agarwal was not confirmed at the end of the period of probation confirmation by implication is nullified." 14. Before we discuss the subsequent judgment to these landmark judgments of this Court it will be quite appropriate to notice that the divergent views by different Benches of this Court and, more so, by different High Courts have been the subject matter of concern and have been noticed again by different Benches of this Court. In the case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. [ (1997) 7 SCC 443 ]. The Court specifically noticed the two line of rulings pronounced by this Court in its different judgments. At the cost of some repetition, we may notice that one line of judgments held that mere continuation of service beyond the period of probation does not amount to confirmation unless it was so specifically provided. The other line, though in very few cases, but, has been taken by this Court is that where there is provision in the Rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period of such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. However, the Bench dealing with the case of Dayaram Dayal's case (supra) did demonstrate that there was not any serious conflict between the two sets of decisions and it depends on the conditions contained in the order of appointment and the relevant rules applicable. Though the Bench in that case held that there was confirmation of the employee and while setting aside the order of termination, granted liberty to hold departmental enquiry in accordance with law. Though the Bench in that case held that there was confirmation of the employee and while setting aside the order of termination, granted liberty to hold departmental enquiry in accordance with law. In order to analyze the reasoning recorded by the Bench we may refer to the following paragraphs as they would throw proper insight into the discussion: "9. The other line of cases are those where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. A question as to its effect arose before the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 1210 ]. The relevant rule there provided initially for a one-year probation and then for extension thereof subject to a maximum of three years. The petitioner in that case was on probation from 1-10-1957 for one year and was continued beyond the extended period of three years (in all four years) and terminated in 1963 without any departmental inquiry. A Constitution Bench of this Court referred Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1962 SC 1711 ], G.S. Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of Police [ AIR 1966 SC 175 ] and State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali Khan [AIR1966 SC 1842] cases and distinguished the same as cases where the rules did not provide for a maximum period of probation but that if the rule, as in the case before them provided for a maximum, then that was an implication that the officer was not in the position of a probationer after the expiry of the maximum period. The presumption of his continuing as a probationer was negatived by the fixation of a maximum time-limit for the extension of probation. The termination after expiry of four years, that is after the maximum period for which probation could be extended, was held to be invalid. This view has been consistently followed in Om Parkash Maurya v. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories' Federation [(1986) Supp. The termination after expiry of four years, that is after the maximum period for which probation could be extended, was held to be invalid. This view has been consistently followed in Om Parkash Maurya v. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories' Federation [(1986) Supp. SCC 95]; M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank [(1987) Supp SCC 643] and State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav [ (1987) 4 SCC 482 ] which are all cases in which a maximum period for extension of probation was prescribed and termination after expiry of the said period was held to be invalid inasmuch as the officer must be deemed to have been confirmed. 10. The decision of the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 1210 ] was accepted by the seven-Judge Bench in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1974) 2 SCC 831 ]. However it was distinguished on account of a further special provision in the relevant rules applicable in Samsher Singh case. The rule there provided for an initial period of 2 years of probation and for a further period of one year as the maximum. One of the officers, Ishwar Chand Agarwal in that case completed the initial period of 2 years on 11-11-1967 and the maximum on 11-11-1968, and after completion of total 3 years his services were terminated on 15-12-1969. But still Dharam Singh case was not applied because the Rules contained a special provision for continuation of the probation even beyond the maximum of 3 years. The Explanation to Rule 7(1) stated (see p. 852) that the period of probation shall be deemed extended if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. The Court held (p. 853) that this provision applied to the extended period of probation. It observed: (SCC para 71) "71. ... This explanation in the present case does not mean that the implied extension of the probationary period is only between two and three years. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh case and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh case and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. (emphasis supplied)" Thus Samsher Singh case while it accepted Dharam Singh case is still not covered by that case because of the special Explanation which clearly deemed the probation as continuing beyond the maximum period of probation as long as no confirmation order was passed. 11. Similarly, the case in Municipal Corpn. v. Ashok Kumar Misra [ (1991) 3 SCC 325 accepted Dharam Singh case and the cases which followed it but distinguished that line of cases on account of another special provision in the rules. There the relevant rule provided for a maximum of one year for the extended period of probation but there was a Note under Rule 8(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants General Conditions of Service Rules, 1961. Rule 8(2) of the Rules and the Note read: "8. (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. Note.--A probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule, but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side." It was held by this Court as follows : (SCC p. 328, para 4) "4. ... Under the Note to sub rule (2) if the probationer is neither confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation, he shall be deemed to have been continued in service as probationer subject to the condition of his service being terminated on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side." The consequence of the Note was explained further as follows: (pp. 328-29) "As per sub-rule (6), on passing the prescribed departmental examination and on successful completion of the period of probation, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed. Then he becomes an approved probationer. 328-29) "As per sub-rule (6), on passing the prescribed departmental examination and on successful completion of the period of probation, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed. Then he becomes an approved probationer. Therefore, after the expiry of the period of probation and before its confirmation, he would be deemed to have been continued in service as a probationer. Confirmation of probation would be subject to satisfactory completion of the probation and to pass in the prescribed examinations. Expiry of the period of probation, therefore, does not entitle him with a right of deemed confirmation. The rule contemplates to pass an express order of confirmation in that regard. By issue of notice of one calendar month in writing by either side, the tenure could be put to an end, which was done in this case." (emphasis supplied) It is clear that the Court distinguished Dharam Singh, Om Parkash Maurya, M.K. Agarwal, and Akhilesh Bhargava because of the Note under Rule 8(2), even though the rule itself provided a maximum of one year for extension of probation. 12. Thus, even though the maximum period for extension could lead to an indication that the officer is deemed to be confirmed, still special provisions in such rules could negative such an intention. 13. It is, therefore, clear that the present case is one where the rule has prescribed an initial period of probation and then for the extension of probation subject to a maximum, and therefore the case squarely falls within the second line of cases, namely, Dharam Singh case and the provision for a maximum is an indication of an intention not to treat the officer as being under probation after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. It is also significant that in the case before us the effect of the rule fixing a maximum period of probation is not whittled down by any other provision in the rules such as the one contained in Samsher Singh case or in Ashok Kumar Misra case. Though a plea was raised that termination of service could be effected by serving one month's notice or paying salary in lieu thereof, there is no such provision in the order of appointment nor was any rule relied upon for supporting such a contention." 15. Though a plea was raised that termination of service could be effected by serving one month's notice or paying salary in lieu thereof, there is no such provision in the order of appointment nor was any rule relied upon for supporting such a contention." 15. Similar view was also taken by another Bench of this Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. S. Manjunath [ (2000) 5 SCC 250 ]. In that case the employees had claimed that after the expiry of prescribed period of probation they would be deemed to be confirmed employees and their services were not liable to be terminated simplicitor. Regulation 11 (8), which was pressed into service by the Corporation, provided that a person should not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the period of probation unless specific order to that effect is made and the delay in issuance of certificate would not entitle the person to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of probation. This Court, while noticing that Rule 11(8) was applicable to promotees alone because of the expression of `officiating' having been used, the appellants, before the Court were direct recruits, therefore, covered under Regulation 11 (1) which provides that the probation period shall be for two years extendable by one year and that the period of probation shall not be further extended. In this view of the matter and while referring to the case of Dharam Singh (supra) and Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. [ (1998) 3 SCC 321 ] the Court further noticed that the two view theory expressed in the case of Dayaram (supra) was further extended in the case of Wasim Beg (supra) and after discussing the entire gamut of law such cases were classified into three categories. After detailed discussion on the subject the Court held as under: "10. This Court had an occasion to review, analyse critically and clarify the principles on an exhaustive consideration of the entire case-law in two recent decisions reported in Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. [ (1997) 7 SCC 443 ] and Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. [ (1998) 3 SCC 321 ]. This Court had an occasion to review, analyse critically and clarify the principles on an exhaustive consideration of the entire case-law in two recent decisions reported in Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. [ (1997) 7 SCC 443 ] and Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. [ (1998) 3 SCC 321 ]. One line of cases has held that if in the rule or order of appointment, a period of probation is specified and a power to extend probation is also conferred and the officer is allowed to continue beyond the prescribed period of probation, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed and there is no bar on the power of termination of the officer after the expiry of the initial or extended period of probation. This is because at the end of probation he becomes merely qualified or eligible for substantive permanent appointment. The other line of cases are those where even though there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The Constitution Bench which dealt with the case reported in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 1210 ] while distinguishing the other line of cases held that the presumption about continuation, beyond the period of probation, as a probationer stood negatived by the fixation of a maximum time-limit for the extension of probation. Consequently, in such cases the termination after expiry of the maximum period up to which probation could be extended was held to be invalid, inasmuch as the officer concerned must be deemed to have been confirmed. 11. The principles laid down in Dharam Singh case though were accepted in another Constitution Bench of a larger composition in the case reported in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [(1974)2SCC831] the special provisions contained in the relevant Rules taken up for consideration therein were held to indicate an intention not to treat the officer as deemed to have been confirmed, in the light of the specific stipulation that the period of probation shall be deemed to be extended if the officer concerned was not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. Despite the indication of a maximum period of probation, the implied extension was held to render the maximum period of probation a directory one and not mandatory. Despite the indication of a maximum period of probation, the implied extension was held to render the maximum period of probation a directory one and not mandatory. Hence, it was held that a probationer in such class of cases is not to be considered confirmed, till an order of confirmation is actually made. The further question for consideration in such category of cases where the maximum period of probation has been fixed would be, as to whether there are anything else in the rules which had the effect of whittling down the right to deemed confirmation on account of the prescription of a maximum period of probation beyond which there is an embargo upon further extension being made, and such stipulation was found wanting in Dayaram Dayal case. xxx xxx xxx 14. As indicated by us, the Regulation deals with two different categories of cases - one about the "probation" of an appointee other than by way of promotion and the other relating to "officiation" of a person appointed on promotion. The similarity of purpose and identity of object apart, of such provision, there is an obvious difference and positive distinction disclosed in the manner they have to be actually dealt with. The deliberate use of two different phraseology "probation" and "officiation" cannot be so lightly ignored obliterating the substantial variation in the method of handling such categories of persons envisaged by the Regulations. The mere fact that a reference is made to sub-regulation (3) also in the later part of sub regulation (8) of the Regulation could not be used to apply all the provisions relating to the category of appointees on "officiation" to the other category of appointees on "probation". The stipulation in sub regulation (8) of the Regulation when making the passing of an order, a condition precedent for satisfactory completion specifically refers only to the completion of "period of officiation". Similarly, notwithstanding a reference made to sub-regulation (3) along side sub regulation (4), in stipulating the consequences of any delay in making an order declaring satisfactory completion, the reference is confined only to deemed satisfaction and completion of "the period of officiation", and not of probation. Sub-regulation (9) of the Regulation insofar as it provides for confirmation as a sequel to declaration, only deals with a promotee to a temporary post and not of the other category. Sub-regulation (9) of the Regulation insofar as it provides for confirmation as a sequel to declaration, only deals with a promotee to a temporary post and not of the other category. While dealing with the termination of a candidate, not found suitable for the post, sub regulation (3) of the Regulation envisages such termination being made at any time "within the period of probation", and not at any time after the completion of such maximum period of probation. Consequently, the cases on hand also would fall within the category of cases dealt with in Dayaram Dayal case and Wasim Beg case and the services of the respondents could not be put an end to except by means of departmental disciplinary proceedings, after following the mandatory requirements of law. Therefore, the High Court cannot be faulted for interfering with the orders of termination of the services of the respondents." Therefore, the appeals referred by the Corporation came to be dismissed as the employee had attained the status of confirmed employee. 16. Now let us examine the other view where the Courts have declined to accept the contention that the employees were entitled to automatic confirmation after expiry of the probation period. In the case of High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Satya Narayan Jhavar [ (2001) 7 SCC 161 ] a three Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the three line of cases while referring to Rule 24(1) which provided maximum period of probation, examined the question of confirmation of such a probationer depending upon his fitness for such confirmation and his passing of the departmental examination by the higher standards. Thus declined to accept the principle of automatic or deemed confirmation the Court held as under: "11. The question of deemed confirmation in service jurisprudence, which is dependent upon the language of the relevant service rules, has been the subject-matter of consideration before this Court, times without number in various decisions and there are three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. The other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry the order of termination has not been passed. The last line of cases is where, though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor has the person concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. xxx xxx xxx xxx 35. In the case on hand, correctness of the interpretation given by this Court to Rule 24 of the Rules in the case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. [ (1997) 7 SCC 443 ] is the bone of contention. In the aforesaid case, no doubt, this Court has held that a maximum period of probation having been provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24, if a probationer's service is not terminated and he is allowed to continue thereafter it will be a case of deemed confirmation and the sheet anchor of the aforesaid conclusion is the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 1210 ]. But, in our considered opinion in the case of Dayaram Dayal. Rule 24 of the Rules has not been interpreted in its proper perspective. But, in our considered opinion in the case of Dayaram Dayal. Rule 24 of the Rules has not been interpreted in its proper perspective. A plain reading of different sub-rules of Rule 24 would indicate that every candidate appointed to the cadre will go for initial training for six months whereafter he would be appointed on probation for a period of 2 years and the said period of probation would be extended for a further period not exceeding 2 years. Thus, under sub rule (1) of Rule 24 a maximum period of 4 years' probation has been provided. The aforesaid sub-rule also stipulates that at the end of the probation period the appointee could be confirmed subject to his fitness for confirmation and to his having passed the departmental examination, as may be prescribed. In the very sub-rule, therefore, while a maximum period of probation has been indicated, yet the question of confirmation of such a probationer is dependent upon his fitness for such confirmation and his passing of the departmental examination by the higher standard, as prescribed. It necessarily stipulates that the question of confirmation can be considered at the end of the period of probation, and on such consideration if the probationer is found suitable by the appointing authority and he is found to have passed the prescribed departmental examination then the appointing authority may issue an order of confirmation. It is too well settled that an order of confirmation is a positive act on the part of the employer which the employer is required to pass in accordance with the Rules governing the question of confirmation subject to a finding that the probationer is in fact fit for confirmation. This being the position under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24, it is difficult for us to accept the proposition, broadly laid down in the case of Dayaram Dayal and to hold that since a maximum period of probation has been provided thereunder, at the end of that period the probationer must be held to be deemed to be confirmed on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh." 17. This view was followed by another two Judge Bench of this Court in a subsequent judgment relating to judicial officers in Registrar, High Court of Gujarat v. C.G. Sharma [ (2005) 1 SCC 132 ] holding that termination was proper, no opportunity ought need to be granted because it was a matter of pure subjective satisfaction relating to overall performance. Referring to Rule 5(4) of Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1961 the Court held as under: "26. A large number of authorities were cited before us by both the parties. However, it is not necessary to go into the details of all those cases for the simple reason that sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the Rules is in pari materia with the Rule which was under consideration in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R Saboji [ (1979) 4 SCC 466 ] and we find that even if the period of two years expires and the probationer is allowed to continue after a period of two years, automatic confirmation cannot be claimed as a matter of right because in terms of the Rules, work has to be satisfactory which is a prerequisite or precondition for confirmation and, therefore, even if the probationer is allowed to continue beyond the period of two years as mentioned in the Rule, there is no question of deemed confirmation. The language of the Rule itself excludes any chance of giving deemed or automatic confirmation because the confirmation is to be ordered if there is a vacancy and if the work is found to be satisfactory. There is no question of confirmation and, therefore, deemed confirmation, in the light of the language of this Rule, is ruled out. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent on this aspect has no merits and no leg to stand. The learned Single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench have rightly come to the conclusion that there is no automatic confirmation on the expiry of the period of two years and on the expiry of the said period of two years, the confirmation order can be passed only if there is vacancy and the work is found to be satisfactory. The Rule also does not say that the two years' period of probation, as mentioned in the Rule, is the maximum period of probation and the probation cannot be extended beyond the period of two years. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no question of automatic or deemed confirmation, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. We, therefore, answer this issue in the negative and against the respondent. xxx xxx xxx xxx 43. But the facts and circumstances in the case on hand are entirely different and the administrative side of the High Court and the Full Court were right in taking the decision to terminate the services of the respondent, rightly so, on the basis of the records placed before them. We are also satisfied, after perusing the confidential reports and other relevant vigilance files, etc. that the respondent is not entitled to continue as a judicial officer. The order of termination is termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature and, therefore, no opportunity needs to be given to the respondent herein. Since the overall performance of the respondent was found to be unsatisfactory by the High Court during the period of probation, it was decided by the High Court that the services of the respondent during the period of probation of the respondent be terminated because of his unsuitability for the post. In this view of the matter, order of termination simpliciter cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution. The law on the point is crystallised that the probationer remains a probationer unless he has been confirmed on the basis of the work evaluation. Under the relevant Rules under which the respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge, there is no provision for automatic or deemed confirmation and/or deemed appointment on regular establishment or post, and in that view of the matter, the contentions of the respondent that the respondent's services were deemed to have been continued on the expiry of the probation period, are misconceived." 18. On a clear analysis of the above enunciated law, particularly, the Seven Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Samsher Singh (supra) and three Judge Bench judgments, which are certainly the larger Benches and are binding on us, the Courts have taken the view with reference to the facts and relevant Rules involved in those cases that the principle of `automatic' or `deemed confirmation' would not be attracted. The pith and substance of the stated principles of law is that it will be the facts and the Rules, which will have to be examined by the Courts as a condition precedent to the application of the dictum stated in any of the line of the cases afore noticed. There can be cases where the Rules require a definite act on the part of the employer before officer on probation can be confirmed. In other words, there may a Rule or Regulation requiring the competent authority to examine the suitability of the probationer and then upon recording its satisfaction issue an order of confirmation. Where the Rules are of this nature the question of automatic confirmation would not even arise. of course, every authority is expected to act properly and expeditiously. It cannot and ought not to keep issuance of such order in abeyance without any reason or justification. While there could be some other cases where the Rules do not contemplate issuance of such a specific order in writing but merely require that there will not be any automatic confirmation or some acts, other than issuance of specific orders, are required to be performed by the parties, even in those cases it is difficult to attract the application of this doctrine. However, there will be cases where not only such specific Rules, as noticed above, are absent but the Rules specifically prohibit extension of the period of probation or even specifically provide that upon expiry of that period he shall attain the status of a temporary or a confirmed employee. In such cases, again, two situations would rise: one, that he would attain the status of an employee being eligible for confirmation and second, that actually he will attain the status of a confirmed employee. The Courts have repeatedly held that it may not be possible to prescribe a straight jacket formula of universal implementation for all cases involving such questions. The Courts have repeatedly held that it may not be possible to prescribe a straight jacket formula of universal implementation for all cases involving such questions. It will always depend upon the facts of a case and the relevant Rules applicable to that service. 19. Reverting back to the Rules of the present case it is clear that Rule 3, unlike other Rules which have been referred in different cases, contains negative command that the period of probation shall not be less than two years. This period could be extended by the competent authority for half of the period of probation by a specific order. But on satisfactory completion of the probation period, the authorities shall have to consider suitability of the probationer to hold the post to which he was appointed. If he is found to be suitable then as soon as possible order is to be issued in terms of Rule 5(1)(a). On the other hand, if he is found to be unsuitable or has not passed the requisite examination and unless an order of extension of probation period is passed by the competent authority in exercise of its power under Rule 4, then it shall discharge the probationer from service in terms of Rule 5 (1)(b). At this juncture Entry 2 of schedule under Rule 2 of 1983 Rules would come into play as it is a mandatory requirement that the probationer should complete his judicial training. Unless such training was completed no certificate of satisfactory completion of probation period could be issued. Obviously, power is vested with the appropriate authority to extend the probation period and in alternative to discharge him from service. The option is to be exercised by the authorities but emphasis has been applied by the framers on the expression `as soon as possible' they should pass the order and not keep the matters in abeyance for indefinite period or for years together. The language of Rule 5(2) is a clear indication of the intent of the framers that the concept of deeming confirmation could not be attracted in the present case. This Rule is preceded by the powers vested with the authorities under Rules 4 and 5(1) respectively. This Rule mandates that a probationer shall not be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. This Rule is preceded by the powers vested with the authorities under Rules 4 and 5(1) respectively. This Rule mandates that a probationer shall not be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. The Rule does not stop at that but further more specifically states that any delay in issuance of order shall not entitle the probationer to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation. Thus, use of unambiguous language clearly demonstrates that the fiction of deeming confirmation, if permitted to operate, it would entirely frustrate the very purpose of these Rules. On the ground of unsuitability, despite what is contained in Rule 5, the competent authority is empowered to discharge the probationer at any time on account of his unsuitability for the service post. That discharge has to be simplicitor without causing a stigma upon the concerned probationer. In our view, it is difficult for the Court to bring the present case within the class of cases, where `deemed confirmation' or principle of `automatic confirmation' can be judiciously applied. The 1977 Rules are quite different to the Rules in some of the other mentioned cases. The 1977 Rules do not contain any provision which places a ceiling to the maximum period of probation, for example, the probation period shall not be extended beyond a period of two years. On the contrary, a clear distinction is visible in these Rules as it is stated that probation period shall not be less than two years and can be extended by the authority by such period not exceeding half the period. The negative expression is for half the period and not the maximum period totally to be put together by adding to the initial period of probation and to extended period. Even if, for the sake of argument, we assume that this period is of three years, then in view of the language of Rules 5 (1) and 5(2) there cannot be automatic confirmation, a definite act on the part of the authority is contemplated. The act is not a mere formality but a mandatory requirement which has to be completed by due application of mind. The act is not a mere formality but a mandatory requirement which has to be completed by due application of mind. The suitability or unsuitability, as the case may be, has to be recorded by the authority after due application of mind and once it comes to such a decision the other requirement is that a specific order in that behalf has to be issued and unless such an order is issued it will be presumed that there shall not be satisfactorily completion of probation period. The Rules, being specific and admitting no ambiguity, must be construed on their plain language to mean that the concept of `deemed confirmation' or `automatic confirmation' cannot be applied in the present case. 20. Another aspect, which would further substantiate the view that we have expressed, is that proviso to Rule 4 shows that where during the period of probation the results of an examination have not been declared which the probationer was required to take, in that event the period of probation shall be deemed to have extended till completion of the act i.e. declaration of result. Applying this analogy to the provisions of Rule 5 unless certificate is issued by the competent authority the probation period would be expected to have been extended as it is a statutory condition precedent to successful completion of the period of probation and confirmation of the probationer in terms of this Rule. 21. In the present case, the appellant was appointed to the post vide letter dated 9/10th May, 1996 and he reported for his duty on 15th May, 1996. He was on probation for a period of two years. Thereafter, as it appears from the record, no letter of extension of probation or order stating that the appellant has completed the period of probation successfully in terms of Rule 5(1) was ever issued. Rule 5 (2), therefore, would come into play and till the issuance of such an order and certificate of satisfactorily completion of probation period, the appellant cannot claim to be a confirmed employee by virtue of principle of automatic or deemed confirmation. His services were terminated vide order dated 24th March, 2000. It was discharge from service simplicitor without causing any stigma on the appellant. His services were terminated vide order dated 24th March, 2000. It was discharge from service simplicitor without causing any stigma on the appellant. We have already discussed in some detail the conduct of the appellant as well as the fact that even prior to his selection as a member of the Higher Judicial Services of State of Karnataka, his name had been placed for surveillance on the of Police Station, Karwar. The original service record of the appellant also does not reflect that he was an officer of outstanding caliber or had done extraordinary judicial work. He is an officer who is not aware of his date of birth and mentioned his age as per his convenience. In these circumstances, we do not feel that, it is a case where in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, we should interfere with the judgment of the High Court as the same does not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity. 22. Before we part with this file, it is required of this Court to notice and declare that the concerned authorities have failed to act expeditiously and in accordance with the spirit of the relevant Rules. Rule 5 (2) of 1977 Rules has used the expression `as soon as possible' which clearly shows the intent of the rule framers explicitly implying urgency and in any case applicability of the concept of reasonable time which would help in minimizing the litigation arising from such similar cases. May be, strictly speaking, this may not be true in the case of the appellant but generally every step should be taken which would avoid bias or arbitrariness in administrative matters, no matter, which is the authority concerned including the High Court itself. Long back in the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Haryana State Electricity Board (1988) Supp. SCC 669] this Court had the occasion to notice that due to delay in recording satisfactory completion of probation period where juniors were promoted, the action of the authority was arbitrary and it resulted in infliction of even double punishment. The Court held as under: "While there is some necessity for appointing a person in government service on probation for a particular period, there may not be any need for confirmation of that officer after the completion of the probationary period. The Court held as under: "While there is some necessity for appointing a person in government service on probation for a particular period, there may not be any need for confirmation of that officer after the completion of the probationary period. If during the period a government servant is found to be unsuitable, his services may be terminated. On the other hand, if he is found to be suitable, he would be allowed to continue in service. The archaic rule of confirmation, still in force, gives a scope to the executive authorities to act arbitrarily or mala fide giving rise to unnecessary litigations. It is high time that the Government and other authorities should think over the matter and relieve the government servants of becoming victims of arbitrary actions." We reiterate this principle with respect and approval and hope that all the authorities concerned should take care that timely actions are taken in comity to the Rules governing the service and every attempt is made to avoid prejudicial results against the employee/probationer. It is expected of the Courts to pass orders which would help in minimizing the litigation arising from such similar cases. Timely action by the authority concerned would ensure implementation of rule of fair play on the one hand and serve greater ends of justice on the other. It would also boost the element of greater understanding and improving the employer employee relationship in all branches of the States and its instrumentalities. The Courts, while pronouncing judgments, should also take into consideration the issuance of direction which would remove the very cause of litigation. Boni judicis est causes litium dirimere. 23. It will be really unfortunate that a person, who is involved in the process of judicial dispensation, is dealt with in a manner that for years neither his confidential reports are written nor the competent authority issues an order of satisfactory completion of probation period or otherwise. Another very important aspect is that in the present days of high competition and absolute integrity and even to satisfy the requirements of out of turn promotions by competition it is expected of the High Court to inform the concerned judicial officer as of his draw backs so as to provide him a fair opportunity to improve. We certainly notice it with some sense of regret that the High Court has not maintained the expected standards of proper administration. We certainly notice it with some sense of regret that the High Court has not maintained the expected standards of proper administration. There is a constitutional obligation on the High Court to ensure that the members of the judicial services of the State are treated appropriately, with dignity and without undue delay. They are the face of the judiciary inasmuch as a common man, primarily, comes in contact with these members of the judicial hierarchy. It is a matter of concern, as we are of the considered view, that timely action on behalf of the High Court would have avoided this uncalled for litigation as it would have been a matter of great doubt whether the appellant could at all be inducted into the service in face of the admitted position that the name of the appellant was stated to be on the rowdy list at the relevant time." 13. Recently, Apex Court in case of Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6877 considered termination of probationary judicial officer where it is held that rule permitting extension of probation period for one year and no order of confirmation passed, then, probationer would be deemed to be continued on probation immediately after expiring of his initial two years of probation. In case when service of probationer not found satisfactory by competent authority, mentioning said fact in order would not make order stigmatic. Mere grant of yearly increments, does not disentitle Full Court of High Court to scrutinize his records of completion of probation. High Court has solemn duty to consider and appreciate service of Judicial Officer before confirming him in service. The order not to confirm his service and to recommend dispensation of his service not liable to be set aside. Therefore, relevant discussion made by Apex Court in Para 13, 14, 18, 19 and 23 are quoted as under : "13. Since the rule permits probation to be extended for another one year and since there was no order of confirmation passed by the respondents confirming his service, the petitioner would be deemed to be continuing on probation immediately after his expiry of the initial two years of probation. Since the rule permits probation to be extended for another one year and since there was no order of confirmation passed by the respondents confirming his service, the petitioner would be deemed to be continuing on probation immediately after his expiry of the initial two years of probation. In this regard, we may refer to the case of Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P. reported in (1996) 1 SCC 560 in which a judicial officer was not given any confirmation letter even after the completion of his two years' of probation period. The rules in the said case provided for the extension of initial two years of probation period for a further period of two years. This Court in that case held at Paragraphs 3 & 5 that : - "3. ...........A reading thereof would clearly indicate that every candidate appointed to the cadre shall undergo training initially for a period of six months before he is appointed on probation for a period of two years. On his completion of two years of probation, it may be open to the High Court either to confirm or extend the probation. At the end of the probation period, if he is not confirmed on being found unfit, it may be extended for a further period not exceeding two years. It is seen that though there is no order of extension, it must be deemed that he was continued on probation for an extended period of two years. On completion of two years, he must not be deemed to be confirmed automatically. There is no order of confirmation. Until the order is passed, he must be deemed to continue on probation. 5. Under these circumstances, the High Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during the period of his probation. It is not necessary that there should be a charge and an enquiry on his conduct since the petitioner is only on probation and during the period of probation, it would be open to the High Court to consider whether he is suitable for confirmation or should be discharged from service." 14. During the period of probation an employee remains under watch and his service and his conduct is under scrutiny. During the period of probation an employee remains under watch and his service and his conduct is under scrutiny. Around the time of completion of the probationary period, an assessment is made of his work and conduct during the period of probation and on such assessment a decision is taken as to whether or not his service is satisfactory and also whether or not on the basis of his service and track record his service should be confirmed or extended for further scrutiny of his service if such extension is permissible or whether his service should be dispensed with and terminated. The services rendered by a judicial officer during probation are assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance, but also on the probity as to how one has conducted himself. 18. In our considered opinion, none of the aforesaid two orders could be said to be a stigmatic order as no stigma is attached. of course, aforesaid letters were issued in view of the resolution of the full court meeting where the full court of the High Court held that the service of the petitioner is unsatisfactory. Whether or not the probation period could be or should be extended or his service should be confirmed is required to be considered by the full court of the High Court and while doing so necessarily the service records of the petitioner are required to be considered and if from the service records it is disclosed that the service of the petitioner is not satisfactory it is open for the respondents to record such satisfaction regarding his unsatisfactory service and even mentioning the same in the order would not amount to casting any aspersion on the petitioner nor it could be said that stating in the order that his service is unsatisfactory amounts to a stigmatic order. 19. This position is no longer res integra and it is well-settled that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be said to be stigmatic. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 , this Court has explained at length the tests that would apply to determine if an order terminating the services of a probationer is stigmatic. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 , this Court has explained at length the tests that would apply to determine if an order terminating the services of a probationer is stigmatic. On the facts of that case it was held that the opinion expressed in the termination order that the probationer's "work and conduct has not been found satisfactory" was not ex facie stigmatic and in such circumstances the question of having to comply with the principles of natural justice do not arise. In this case court had the occasion to determine as to whether the impugned order therein was a letter of termination of services simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After considering various earlier decisions of this Court in para 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated by this Court thus: (SCC p. 528) "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which ) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if anyone of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld." In para 29 of the judgment, it further held thus: (SCC, p.529) (Para 29 of AIR, AIR SCW) "29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma. Generally speaking when a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job." 23. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job." 23. In the present case, the order of termination is a fall out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such satisfaction even if recorded that his service is unsatisfactory would not make the order stigmatic or punitive as sought to be submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the matter was referred to the State Government for issuing necessary orders." 14. Thereafter, in case of Paramjit Singh v. Director, Public Instructions & Ors. reported in 2010 (13) SCALE 378 , again, this question has been examined that in case of termination of probationer on account of his non-satisfactory performance can individual be treated as penal. Relevant discussion made in Para 10 is quoted as under : "10. It is a settled legal position that termination of a probationer on account of his non-satisfactory performance can never be treated as `penal'. In spite of the said settled legal position, the Tribunal considered termination as `penal' and the said view was confirmed by the High Court. In the circumstances, we do not approve the reasoning of the Tribunal confirmed by the High Court that the termination of the aforestated teachers was penal in nature. As the termination was not penal in nature, no departmental inquiry was required to be conducted before the termination." 15. The similar question has been considered by Apex Court in case of Chaitanya Prakash & Anr. v. H. Omkarappa reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1224. The relevant Para 16 to 20 are quoted as under : "16. It is no longer res integra that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be said to be stigmatic. In this connection, we make a reference to the decision of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences (supra), wherein also a similar letter was issued to the concerned employee intimating him that his performance was unsatisfactory and, therefore, he is not suitable for confirmation. In this connection, we make a reference to the decision of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences (supra), wherein also a similar letter was issued to the concerned employee intimating him that his performance was unsatisfactory and, therefore, he is not suitable for confirmation. We have considered the ratio in light of the facts of the said case and we are of the considered opinion that the basic facts of the said case are almost similar to the one in hand. There also, letters were issued to the concerned employee to improve his performance in the areas of his duties and that despite such communications the service was found to be unsatisfactory. In the result, a letter was issued to him pointing out that his service was found to be unsatisfactory and that he was not suitable for confirmation, and, therefore, his probation period was not extended and his service was terminated, which was challenged on the ground that the same was stigmatic for alleged misconduct. The Supreme Court negatived the said contention and upheld the order of termination. 17. In Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd., (supra) also the concerned employee was kept on probation for a period of two years. During the course of his employment he was also informed that despite being told to improve his performance time and again there is no such improvement. His shortfalls were brought to his notice and consequently by order dated 16.01.1997 his services were terminated, wherein also a reference was made to his unsatisfactory service. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has held that on the basis of long line of decisions it appears that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. In Pavanendra Narayan verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520 ; this court had the occasion to determine as to whether the impugned order therein was a letter of termination of services simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After considering various earlier decisions of this court in paragraph 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated by this Court thus :- "21. After considering various earlier decisions of this court in paragraph 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated by this Court thus :- "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld." 19. In Abhijit Gupta (Supra.), this Court considered as to what will be the real test to be applied in a situation where an employee is removed by an innocuous order of termination i.e. whether he is discharged as unsuitable or he is punished for his misconduct. In order to answer the said question, the Court relied and referred to the decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank Officers Assn. v. Allahabad Bank (1996) 4 SCC 504 ; where it is stated thus :- "14.......As pointed out in this judgment, expressions like "want of application", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" when made in relation to the work of the employee would not be sufficient to attract the charge that they are stigmatic and intended to dismiss the employee from service." 20. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the above-referred decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The respondent was time and again informed during the probation period about his deficiencies and was given ample opportunities to improve them. Therefore, enough precautions were taken by the appellants to see that the respondent improved his performance and such an opportunity was provided to him. But such advices and opportunity were totally misplaced as the respondent considered the same as unnecessary encroachment and interference in his work and wrote back rudely in an intemperate language. Whether or not a person is suitable to be retained and confirmed in service could be considered and assessed by the Managing Director, namely, appellant no. 1, but he after making an appraisal submitted his report along with all other records of the respondent before the Board of Directors, who finally took the decision. Whether or not a person is suitable to be retained and confirmed in service could be considered and assessed by the Managing Director, namely, appellant no. 1, but he after making an appraisal submitted his report along with all other records of the respondent before the Board of Directors, who finally took the decision. The Board of Directors constituted of responsible persons and they while deciding the suitability of the respondent not only considered the Performance Assessment Report but also considered all other records, and thereafter they took a considered and conscious decision that the respondent was not suitable for confirmation and terminate his service. The said decision of the Board of Directors appears to be in parity with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of this Court (supra). The reasons mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1999 - terminating the services of the respondent cannot be said to be stigmatic. The appellant had time and again specifically brought to the notice of the respondent his short comings and no misconduct as such is alleged against the respondent by the appellant and therefore the present case is a case of termination simpliciter due to unsuitability of the respondent and not a case of punishment for misconduct." 16. In view of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court recently and considering substantial questions of law which have been formulated by appellant in present second appeal, the order of termination is found to be held as no departmental inquiry is necessary as required under Article 311(2) of Constitution of India and in such cases, when service of probationer is found unsatisfactory, provisions of Article 311(2) of Constitution of India is not attracted and whatever allegations have been made in show-cause notice by respondents which are relating to unsatisfactory performance and suggested unsuitability of appellant in post of Rakshak/constable and reasonable opportunity was given to appellant before terminating his service by issuing show-cause notice and after considering reply by department, order of termination has been passed, therefore, it cannot consider to be a penal and tainted with stigma. The service of appellant was for a period of two years w.e.f. 18.01.1985 and his service was terminated on 18.01.1987 Ex.22 before trial Court on completion of probation period. The service of appellant was for a period of two years w.e.f. 18.01.1985 and his service was terminated on 18.01.1987 Ex.22 before trial Court on completion of probation period. Therefore, no extension was given to appellant by department and by afflux of time of complete service of probationer for a period of two years, his service was terminated. During two years period, department waited and his conduct was also examined and scrutinized by department and various conduct to remain absent and misbehaved with fellow officers and relation with anti social element and other serious allegations, for that, reply was considered objectively and accordingly, termination order has been passed which cannot consider to be a penal and tainted with stigma, therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar cannot be accepted, hence, rejected. 17. The substantial questions of law which have been formulated by appellant has been considered by this Court and accordingly, it has been answered by this Court, therefore, there is no substance in present second appeal. Accordingly, present Second Appeal stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.