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2011 DIGILAW 1023 (ALL)

KHEM SINGH PACHHARA v. STATE OF U. P.

2011-04-21

ASHOK BHUSHAN, RAN VIJAI SINGH

body2011
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri B.D. Mandhyan, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 8, Shri P.K. Mishra for respondent No. 2 and the learned Sanding Counsel. 2. By this writ petition, petitioner has prayed for a issue of writ, order or direction in the nature of quo warranto directing the District Election Officer/District Magistrate Mathura to quash the election of the respondent No. 8, as Member of Kshettra Panchayat Raya Ward No. 72 Gram Panchayat Lohwan Block Raaya Tehsil Mahawan District Mathura. 3. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the parties this writ petition is finally decided. 4. Brief facts which emerge from the pleadings of the parties are:The petitioner claims to be a social worker and resident of Block Raaya Tehsil Maant, District Mathura. Election for Member of Kshettra Panchayat Raaya, Ward No. 72 was held. The respondent No. 8 filed her nomination and contested the election and was declared elected on 30.10.2010 as Member from Ward No. 72. The petitioner who was not a contesting candidate in the election has come up in this writ petition challenging the election of the respondent No. 8. 5. The petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that the respondent No. 8, being an Anganbari Karyakarti, was not eligible to contest the election as it is in violation of the order dated 28.6.2010, issued by the State Election Commission, U.P. The State Election Commission, U.P. by Government Order dated 28.6.2010, has informed all the District Magistrates that the Anganbari Worker/Sahayika, Asha Bahu, Kissan Mitra, Shiksha Mitra and Gram Rozgar Sewak etc. who received honorarium from the State Government cannot contest the election of Gram Panchayat and local bodies. The petitioner’s case further is that the respondent No. 8, submitted her resignation on 22.12.2010, much after she was elected as Member, Kshettra Panchayat Raaya, Ward No. 72, which information has been provided under the Right to Information Act by Bal Vikas Pariyojana Adhikari, Mathura. 6. In the counter-affidavit, filed by the respondent No. 8, it has been stated that the petitioner neither being a candidate nor anyway connected with the election has no locus standi to challenge the election of the respondent No. 8, by filing this writ petition. 6. In the counter-affidavit, filed by the respondent No. 8, it has been stated that the petitioner neither being a candidate nor anyway connected with the election has no locus standi to challenge the election of the respondent No. 8, by filing this writ petition. It has further been submitted that against the election of respondent No. 8, two election petitions have already been filed in the Court of District Judge, Mathura one by Smt. Radha and another by Sri. Arvind Kumar. It has been stated that the remedy of challenging the election, if any is only by filing election petition and the election of respondent No. 8, cannot be challenged by means of writ petition. It has further been submitted that the respondent No. 8, before filing her nomination as Member Kshettra Panchayat has already submitted her resignation as Anganbari Worker and was fully eligible for contesting the election. It has further been pleaded that her resignation was submitted in the office of District Programme Officer, Mathura which was received on 4.10.2010. The report submitted by the Bal Vikas Pariyojana Adhikari, that the respondent No. 8 resigned on 22.12.2010, is not correct. It has further been submitted that the respondent No. 8 has not received any honorarium after 4.10.2010. 7. Rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner reiterating that the respondent No. 8 being an Anganbari Worker was disqualified from contesting the election. Reliance has been placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Srimati Sarita Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (10) ADJ 484 . 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition contended that the Anganbari worker holds the office of profit and is clearly disqualified from contesting the election as per the Government Order dated 28.6.2010, issued by the State Government as has been laid down by the Division Bench judgment in Srimati Sarita Devi’s case (supra). It is submitted that the respondent No. 8, being disqualified has no authority to hold the office of member of Kshettra Panchayat and a writ of quo warranto be issued. It is submitted that the petitioner being not a candidate in the election cannot file an election petition and the only remedy left to the petitioner is to challenge the election by means of filing the writ petition. It is submitted that the writ of quo warranto is clearly maintainable. 9. It is submitted that the petitioner being not a candidate in the election cannot file an election petition and the only remedy left to the petitioner is to challenge the election by means of filing the writ petition. It is submitted that the writ of quo warranto is clearly maintainable. 9. Shri B.D. Mandhyan, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 8, submitted that this writ petition is essentially a writ petition challenging the election of respondent No. 8. He submits that this writ petition is clearly barred under the provisions of Article 243 ZG of the Constitution of India. He submits that the only remedy left to the petitioner was to challenge the election by filing an election petition in accordance with the Rules framed under the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961, hereinafter called the “Act, 1961”. 10. Shri P.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2, has also submitted that this writ petition is not maintainable. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Kurapati Maria Das v. Dr. Ambedkar Seva Samajan and others, JT (2009) 7 SCC 387 . 11. We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 12. The petitioner who claims to be a social worker, by means of this writ petition is challenging the election of respondent No. 8 as Member of Kshettra Panchayat Raaya Ward No. 72 Gram Panchayat Lohwan Block Raaya Tehsil Mahawan District Mathura. It is useful to refer to the pleadings of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the writ petition which are as follows: “2. That by means of the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the election of the respondent No. 8 as Member Kshettra Panchayat Raya Ward No. 72 Gram Panchayat Lohwan Block Raaya Tehsil Mahawan District Mathura, the same being in violation of the directives issued by the State Election Commission U.P. Lucknow as contained in the Order dated 28.6.2010. For kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court, a true of the Order dated 28.6.2010 passed by the State Election Commission, U.P. is being filed and marked as Annexure-1 to this writ petition. 3. For kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court, a true of the Order dated 28.6.2010 passed by the State Election Commission, U.P. is being filed and marked as Annexure-1 to this writ petition. 3. That It is relevant to mention here that the petitioner is the social worker and is the resident of same Block e.g. Block Raaya Tehsil Maant, District Mathura and he was not the contesting candidate of Member Kshettra Panchayat Raya Ward No. 72 Gram Panchayat Lohwan Block Raaya Tehsil Mahawan District Mathura, upon which the respondent No. 8 has been elected in violation of directives issued by the State Election Commission, U.P.” 13. The first question which is to be considered is as to whether this writ petition is barred by provisions of Article 243 ZG of the Constitution of India as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. From the pleadings of the petitioner as noticed above, it is clear that the challenge in this writ petition is essentially the challenge to the election of the respondent No. 8. The election of Member Kshettra Panchayat Raya Ward No. 72 Gram Panchayat Lohwan Block Raaya Tehsil Mahawan District Mathura was held in accordance with the Act, 1961 and according to the Rules framed under the said provision namely: U.P. Kshettra Panchayat (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 1994, Rules), the election can be challenged by filing election petition. As pleaded by the respondent No. 8, that two election petitions challenging the election have already been filed in accordance with the relevant rules which are pending consideration, whether election to an office of Kshettra Panchayat has to be challenged under the statutory rules and whether a writ of quo warranto should be entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are the questions to be answered. 14. The Apex Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 , has laid down following : “A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to election law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a strait- jacket. Thus the entire election process commencing from the issuance of the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member or members right up to the final resolution of the dispute, if any, concerning the election is regulated by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of the process being dealt with by different provisions of the Act. There can be no election to Parliament or the State Legislature except as provided by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and again, no such election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute. .........” Thus, the election of a Member of Kshettra Panchayat has to be challenged in accordance with the statutory Rules, 1994 as quoted above. 15. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute. .........” Thus, the election of a Member of Kshettra Panchayat has to be challenged in accordance with the statutory Rules, 1994 as quoted above. 15. Article 243ZG of the Constitution of India provides for Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters which is quoted below: “Article 243ZG.—Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution.— (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.” The judgment of the Apex Court relied on by the counsel for the respondents in Kurapati Maria Das (supra) fully supports the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. 16. In Kurapati Maria Das (supra) a writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the election of appellant as a Councilor. The ground of challenge was that the appellant contested the election as a Scheduled Caste Candidate “Mala” whereas he did not belong to scheduled caste and had wrongly been elected as scheduled caste candidate. The learned single judge allowed the writ petition holding that the appellant was not entitled to contest the election as scheduled caste category candidate. The writ petition was allowed and the Special Appeal filed before the Division Bench was also dismissed. The appellant thereafter filed Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15144 of 2007, in the Apex Court which was heard and decided. 17. In the aforesaid case, the question as to whether the election was barred under Article 243ZG (b) of the Constitution of India was also raised and gone into by the Apex Court. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court judgment in K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another, 1999 (4) SCC 526 , was also noted and distinguished. The Apex Court laid down following in paragraphs 27, 29, 31 and 34 which are quoted below: “27. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court judgment in K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another, 1999 (4) SCC 526 , was also noted and distinguished. The Apex Court laid down following in paragraphs 27, 29, 31 and 34 which are quoted below: “27. We are afraid, we are not in position to agree with the contention that K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 , is applicable to the present situation. Here the appellant had very specifically asserted in his counter-affidavit that he did not belong to the Christian religion and that he further asserted that he was a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore, the Caste status of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 . Every case is an authority for what is actually decided in that. We do not find any general proposition that even where there is a specific remedy of filing an Election Petition and even when there is a disputed question of fact regarding the caste of a person who has been elected from the reserved constituency still remedy of writ petition under Article 226 would be available. 29. Shri Gupta, however, further argued that in the present case what was prayed for was a writ of quo warranto and in fact the election of the appellant was not called in question. It was argued that since the writ petitioners came to know about the appellant not belonging to the Scheduled Caste and since the post of the Chairperson was reserved only for the Scheduled Caste, therefore, the High Court was justified in entering into that question as to whether he really belongs to Scheduled Caste. 31. It is an admitted position that Ward No. 8 was reserved for Scheduled Cast and so also the Post of Chairperson. Therefore, though indirectly worded, what was in challenge in reality was the validity of the election of the appellant. According to the writ petitioners, firstly the appellant could not have been elected as a Ward member nor could he be elected as the Chairperson as he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore, though indirectly worded, what was in challenge in reality was the validity of the election of the appellant. According to the writ petitioners, firstly the appellant could not have been elected as a Ward member nor could he be elected as the Chairperson as he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. We can understand the eventuality where a person who is elected as a Scheduled Caste candidate, renounces his caste after the elections by conversion to some other religion. Then a valid writ petition for quo warranto could certainly lie because then it is not the election of such person which would be in challenge but his subsequently continuing in his capacity as a person belonging to a particular caste. 34. Once it is held that the aforementioned case was of no help to the respondents, the only other necessary inference which emerges is that the bar under Article 243-ZG would spring in action. “ 18. The Apex Court in the said judgment has also noticed the submission as to whether the writ of quo warranto can be issued when an incumbent is holding an elected office by virtue of election. The answer was given in negative. It was held that challenge essentially is to the election of the appellant and hence the bar under Article 243 ZG is attracted. The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set-aside. The above judgment of the Apex Court applies in the facts of the present case and in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Kurapati Maria Das case (supra), the writ petition cannot be entertained. The Division Bench judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Srimati Sarita Devi (supra) does not help the petitioner in the present case. The Division Bench judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Srimati Sarita Devi (supra) does not help the petitioner in the present case. The said judgment is an authority that an Anganbari Workers are disqualified from contesting the election of Panchayat and they are not eligible to contest the Panchayat election, but the said case was not a case challenging any election, but the question which was considered in the said case was whether the State Election Officer has any right to debar the Shiksha Mitra/Anganbari Worker from contesting the Panchayat Election and, whether the honorarium received by Shiksha Mitra and/or Aanganbari workers for rendering their respective services falls within the purview of “office of profit.” There cannot be any dispute to the propositions as laid down in the said case. However, the said judgment does not help the petitioner in the present case, and it is not an authority for the proposition to hold that election of an elected member of Kshettra Panchayat can be challenged by filing a writ of quo warranto. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are satisfied that the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the election of respondent No. 8, by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. —————