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2011 DIGILAW 1023 (GAU)

Humayun Kabir v. Monoranjan Das

2011-12-23

SWAPAN CHANDRA DAS

body2011
JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, presented by the petitioner, challenging order dated 7.11.2011 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Court No. 3), West Tripura, Agartal in case No. Misc. (Review) 112 of 2010. Briefly stated, the fact necessary for disposal of this petition is that the respondent Nos 1 and 2 presented a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short, 'M.V. Act') for granting compensation for the death of their daughter Anjali Das due to motor vehicle accident and that petition was registered as case No. TS (MAC) No. 326 of 2003 in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala. The present petitioner being the owner and the respondent No. 3 being the insurer of the offending vehicle were included as respondents in the claim case before the Tribunal and the Tribunal by impugned judgment dated 13.5.2010 awarded compensation to the claimants-petitioners (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) of an amount of Rs. 1,95,000/- and directed the present petitioner, the owner of the offending vehicle to make payment of the compensation. The observation made by the Tribunal was that the owner of the vehicle produced insurance certificate covering the risk on the date of accident but did not produce the driving licence of the driver and, therefore, responsibility of payment was fixed on the owner of the vehicle i.e. the petitioner of this revision petition. Being aggrieved by that order, the owner of the vehicle, the present petitioner, filed a petition under Section 114 of CPC seeking review of the judgment and award dated 13.5.2010 passed in T.S. (MAC) No. 326 of 2003 which was registered as Misc. (Review) No. 112 of 2010. The Tribunal by order dated 7.7.2011 refused to entertain the review each petition and rejected the same on the ground that the petitioner failed to, assign any reason to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the fact regarding production of driving licence was not within the knowledge of the petitioner at the time of disposal of the claim petition or that there was any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Now, the petitioner approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking redress. 2. I have heard Mr. M. K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Now, the petitioner approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking redress. 2. I have heard Mr. M. K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Insurance Company. 3. Mr. M. K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner produced the certificate of insurance of the vehicle and the driving licence of the driver to his lawyer, but his engaged lawyer only submitted the insurance certificate but did not submit the driving licence of the driver before the Tribunal and the Tribunal without considering the pleadings of the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle passed the order directing the petitioner to make payment of the compensation though the petitioner had valid insurance of the vehicle on the date of accident. Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3-Insurance Company has submitted that there is no provision prescribed in the M.V. Act authorizing the Tribunal to review the order and secondly the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable since there is provision for preferring an appeal against any order passed by the Tribunal. 4. Let us first decide the point whether a petition in the form of review was/is maintainable or not. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a special law made by the Parliament and it is a self-contained law with both substantive and procedural laws. Chapter XII, in Sections 165 to 176 deals with the matters of claim petition in respect of payment of compensation to a victim of motor accident. It deals with the constitution of Claims Tribunal, procedure for filing claim petition and disposal thereof etc. Section 169 has prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal thus :- S.169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal.--(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Section 169 has prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal thus :- S.169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal.--(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material Objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf; the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. Section 114, IPC prescribes the law regarding review which runs thus :- 114. Review.--Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved,- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) By a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make, such order thereon as it thinks fit. Procedure for review is prescribed in Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. Rule 1 of Order XLVII is relevant which prescribes thus :- 1. Procedure for review is prescribed in Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. Rule 1 of Order XLVII is relevant which prescribes thus :- 1. Application for review of judgment.-- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed; but from which no appeal has been preferred; (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which/after and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 5. The Claims Tribunal is to substantially follow the provisions prescribed in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rules framed thereunder while disposing a claim case. Section 176 of the Act prescribes the power of the State Government to make Rules for carrying into effect the provision of Sections 165 to 174 of the M.V. Act. The State Government (Government of Tripura) made the Tripura Motor Vehicles Rules, 1991 but in the said Rule, no provision was/is made in respect of the matters prescribed in Sections 165 to 174 of the Act. Rule 125 of Tripura Rules prescribes that the Central Rules in respect of fines, fees, forms etc regarding motor vehicle as prescribed by the Central Government shall be applicable to the State of Tripura. The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 prescribes no provision regarding the matters dealt with in Sections 165 to 174 of the Act. It is interesting to note here that the Motor Vehicles Act vested Rule making power in respect of the provisions of each Chapter separately either on the State Government or on the Central Government and sometimes on both. The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 prescribes no provision regarding the matters dealt with in Sections 165 to 174 of the Act. It is interesting to note here that the Motor Vehicles Act vested Rule making power in respect of the provisions of each Chapter separately either on the State Government or on the Central Government and sometimes on both. In respect of Chapter XII, the Act has authorized the State Government only to make Rules and Central Government has not been authorized to make any such Rule and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Central Government in making such Rule. 6. It is a settled 'principle of law that a Tribunal should follow the principles of natural justice substantially and shall follow the law made by the Parliament or State Legislature while dealing, with any subject for which such Tribunal is set up. It is not expected that the Tribunal would undertake to exercise such power which has not been vested on it by law. 7. The power of review of judgment/order is a statutory power. Unless a particular enactment prescribes such power authorizing a Tribunal to exercise such power of 'review' or revision, a Tribunal is not ordinarily required to use such powers. In ordinary course, the provisions of CPC is followed to deal with all disputes of civil nature unless otherwise barred. It is settled principle of law that a special law always prevails over the general law. While a special law prescribes a special procedure to deal with the particular subject under that law, the Court or Tribunal is supposed to follow that special law and not otherwise. 8. Section 175 of the M.V. Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of the motor accident claims. The intention of the Legislature, thereby, may be clearly understood that the procedure prescribed for the ordinary Civil Court shall not be applied in the Claims Tribunal while disposing the claim cases. The Tribunal, for fair ends of justice, to arrive at a just decision and to determine a reasonable and equitable compensation shall follow the procedural aspect as prescribed by law and the Tribunal has been authorized to follow such procedures as it may feel necessary for fair ends of justice. Chapter XII in Section 173 of the M.V. Act prescribes procedure of appeals only. Chapter XII in Section 173 of the M.V. Act prescribes procedure of appeals only. The Legislature did not prescribe any provision of review or revision in the Act. It may be presumed that the Legislature left it open for the Tribunal to exercise such power or procedure for fair ends of justice in the course of deciding a claim case. Though no provision is prescribed in the M.V. Act or Rules framed thereunder regarding amendment of pleadings, addition of parties etc. the Tribunals random allow such amendment etc in exercise of the powers and procedures prescribed under CPC or in exercise of such inherent power of a Civil Court. 9. In the case of Pranab Dhar v. Rajesh Deb & Another reported in (2010) ACJ 1926 which corresponds to AIR 2009 Gau 121 , this Court has held that the Claims Tribunal is vested with wide discretion to follow summary procedure as it thinks fit for holding inquiry under Section 168 of the M.V. Act and the Tribunal has not been prohibited to follow general procedure prescribed under Order XLVII, Rule (1), CPC. Review of an order for doing substantive justice cannot be avoided always. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case reported in 1979 ACJ 442 has held that Claims Tribunal while disposing of claim cases acts as a Court-and the provision of CPC applies even, though the Rules framed by the State Government do not refer to the provision of CPC." The Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra 'Kumar v. Rambhai and Others in Civil Appeal No. 2842 of 2002 decided on 18-4-2002 reported in "Twelve Years Supreme Court Accident Judgment" 1995 to 2006 in para 5 held thus:-- The limitations on exercise of power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order of which review is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order, and permitting the order to stand Will lead to the failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order of which review is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order, and permitting the order to stand Will lead to the failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. In the case of Milan Rani Das v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. reported in AIR 2000 Gau 136 , a Full Bench of this Court has held the application for judicial review by insurer on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149 of the M.V. Act as maintainable. In the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ram Das & Others reported in AIR 2000 MP 63 , the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that revision is maintainable if discovery of fraud or collusion between claimants and insured after passing of the award. The Tribunal itself can be approached for review. In Grindlays Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 , the Apex Court has held-- the expression 'review" is used in the two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is not only inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. When review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The Tribunal's order setting aside its ex parte order amounts to a procedural review. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , the Supreme Court has held that the Supreme Court's power of review, is not an appeal in disguise. Its purpose is to ensure that justice is not defeated and that errors leading to miscarriage of justice are remedied. The power of review cannot be exercises merely to substitute a point of review. Errors requiring review are those which are patent and apparent from the face of the record and the errors of inadvertent and not those that need to be fished out. The power of review cannot be exercises merely to substitute a point of review. Errors requiring review are those which are patent and apparent from the face of the record and the errors of inadvertent and not those that need to be fished out. Review may be recalled where new and important matters has been discovered which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the petitioner at the time of passing of the judgment under review. In the case of United India Insurance Company v. Rajendra Singh reported in (2000) 3 SCC 581 , the Insurance company filed a Review application before the Tribunal alleging that the claimants secured compensation from Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal practicing fraud. The Tribunal dismissed the petition on ground of want of power to review its own award. High Court, on a writ petition also refused to interfere. The Apex Court in the case held thus- A party complaining of fraud having been practiced on him as well as on the Court by another party resulting in a decree, can avail himself of the remedy of review or even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as there is no other alternative remedy available to him. This Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Samar Roy reported in 2002 (2) GLT 595 has held thus :-- Though the provision of review has been contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, it has not been incorporated in the M.V. Act yet being a Presiding officer of Civil Tribunal constituted under the M.V. Act obviously for limited purpose. The learned Member, Tribunal has the power to review his own order if he is satisfied that the order is passed contrary to the provision of law or passed inadvertently having by passed any law and that is barred on the face of the record without taking further evidence. The learned Member, Tribunal has the power to review his own order if he is satisfied that the order is passed contrary to the provision of law or passed inadvertently having by passed any law and that is barred on the face of the record without taking further evidence. That power of review is implicit in every Court of civil nature regardless of the power expressly provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, of course, in exercising such implicit power of review, the Court/Tribunal is supposed to follow the procedure prescribed under Order XLVII, Rule (1)of CPC In Pranab Dhar (supra), this Court again elaborately discussed on the issue and has held:-- From the aforesaid view of the Apex Court it cannot be ruled out that when the Legislature in a statute conferred a power either on a Court or on a Tribunal to adopt its own procedure for deciding an issue, then that Tribunal is not debarred to review its order for the interest of justice. Therefore, the said case of Kewal Chand, Mimani (supra) does not help us to decide the issue involved in the instant case, As it appears from the sub-section (1) of Section 169 that Legislature conferred the power on the Tribunal to decide its own summary procedure in an inquiry under Section 168of the Act subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal is totally barred from following the general procedure of law as prescribed in the CPC including the provisions of review. 10. In ordinary parlance, a Tribunal is a body invested with the judicial power of the State. 'Tribunals' though are not full fledged Courts, yet exercise quasi-judicial functions and are within the ambit of word 'Tribunal' in Article 136 of the Constitution. The Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India v. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. reported in AIR 2004 Kant 1, has held- The distinction between Court and tribunal is well known and their composition and formation is distinct and separate, though both of them have similar functions to perform as tribunals are clothed with trappings of the Court. Though all the 'Courts' are tribunals all the 'tribunals' are not Courts. Though all the 'Courts' are tribunals all the 'tribunals' are not Courts. The distinguishing feature between the Courts and tribunal or special forum is that the Court is constituted by a State as a part of the normal hierarchy of Courts civil judicature maintained by the State under its constitution exercising judicial power of the State except those which are excluded by law from their jurisdiction, whereas Tribunal is constituted under the Special Act to exercise special jurisdiction in order to decide certain controversy arising under special laws. 11. The primary object of all statutes is to address the grievances of litigants, to regulate the society in right direction and maintain all forms of social order. The Courts and Tribunals are set up to address the disputes of litigants. Tribunals are intended to address disputes of special nature and for dispensation of quick remedy without procedural hazard. Therefore, Tribunals are required to follow principles of natural justice and may adopt a summary procedure as it thinks fit, as has been, prescribed in Section 169 of the M.V. Act. While the Tribunal is vested with such wide power of following procedure of natural justice, as it thinks fit, it will be improper even to imagine that the Tribunal cannot correct a wrong after a matter is disposed by it. Be it a power of review as prescribed in Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC, or an inherent power of exercise of natural justice, while adopting a summary procedure of its own, the Tribunal should be presumed to have vested with all power to correct a wrong apparent on the face of the record. 12. In the present case, the Tribunal committed a gross error while deciding the claim case and directing the present petitioner to make payment of the compensation though there was a valid insurance covering the third party risk. The Insurance Company in their written statement did not state anything against the insurance of the vehicle covering the risk on the date of the accident and only stated that the owner of the vehicle must submit insurance policy, tax token and driving licence and after consideration of all documents necessary order shall be passed. The Insurance Company in their written statement did not state anything against the insurance of the vehicle covering the risk on the date of the accident and only stated that the owner of the vehicle must submit insurance policy, tax token and driving licence and after consideration of all documents necessary order shall be passed. The owner of the vehicle i.e. the present petitioner submitted a written statement, inter alia, stating that the vehicle was insured with National Insurance Company Ltd. covering the risk on the date of accident and also mentioned the insurance policy number and that other papers were valid at the time of accident. The driver's name who was on the steering was not mentioned in the written statement submitted by the owner i.e. the present petitioner. A police case was registered after the accident vide Amtali P.S. case No. 37 of 2003 under Sections 279/304-A, IPC and the seizure list of that police case which was registered immediately after the accident shows that the driving licence of one Khokan Nag, alleged to be the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident, was seized by the police by preparing seizure list. After investigation of the case, police submitted charge-sheet against Khokan Nag for commission of offence punishable under Sections 279/304-A, IPC. It was, therefore already brought on record that one Khokan Nag was the driver of the vehicle at the time of accident. The Tribunal while found that the offending vehicle had a valid insurance was bound to direct the Insurance Company to make payment of the compensation in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Swaran Singh reported in AIR 2004 SC 1531 . The summary of the findings of the Apex Court in the said case has been narrated in para 105 of the judgment which runs as follows:-- 105. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows:-- (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows:-- (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available detence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v) The Court cannot lay down any Criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (v) The Court cannot lay down any Criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learners licence the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The claims tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Sections 149(2) read with sub-section (7) as interpreted by this Court above. The Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears as land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained In sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular Court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims. 13. In the case in hand, the owner of the vehicle submitted written statement disclosing the factum of insurance and enclosing a copy of insurance certificate covering third party risk. The documents of police case record i.e. the copy of seizure list and charge-sheet clearly showing the name of driver of the vehicle at the time of accident. 13. In the case in hand, the owner of the vehicle submitted written statement disclosing the factum of insurance and enclosing a copy of insurance certificate covering third party risk. The documents of police case record i.e. the copy of seizure list and charge-sheet clearly showing the name of driver of the vehicle at the time of accident. The Insurance Company did not raise any point that the driver had no valid driving licence or that the claim case was a result of collusion and under such circumstances the Tribunal was supposed to put the liability of payment on the shoulder of Insurance Company. The Tribunal failed to do so and thereby committed injustice to the claimant and the insured. Further, in the revision petition, the owner/petitioner produced copy of driving licence with an explanation that the lawyer failed to produce the same during trial but the Tribunal again refused to accept it and rejected the review petition drawing adverse inference. The decision of the Tribunal has gone contrary to the ratio laid down in Swaran Singh's case (supra) and therefore, the injustice is liable to be remedied by this Court. 14. In view of the legal position explained above, in the facts and circumstances of the case where the Tribunal committed error in properly considering the insurance policy while deciding a case covering third party risk, the Tribunal was supposed to correct the error applying the power of review of its own judgment and rejection of the same has caused a miscarriage of justice and, therefore, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in the facts and circumstances of the case is found to be maintainable. 15. Accordingly, the order dated 7.7.2011 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Misc. (Review) 112 of 2010 is set aside. The compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in connection with T.S. (MAC) case No. 326 of 2003 shall be paid by the National Insurance Company Ltd. i.e. the respondent No. 3 and the judgment and award dated 13.5.2010 passed by the Tribunal in TS (MAC) No. 326 of 2003 is accordingly reviewed. The respondent No. 3-Insurance Company shall make payment of compensation within forty-five days from today in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal. The petition, accordingly, stands disposed of. Petition disposal of.