Judgment :- C.R.P. 2623 of 2011 is a revision presented under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the order dated 08-06-2011 of the learned IX Additional District & Sessions (Fast Track) Court, Visakhapatnam, rejecting I.A.No.2350 of 2010 (an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC r/w Rule 28 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Rules of Practice, seeking amendment of the plaint) in O.S.No.212 of 2007. 2. C.R.P. 2629 of 2011 is a revision presented under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the ‘Rent Control Act’) directed against the order dated 18-04-2011 of the Learned Rent Controller Cum IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, rejecting I.A.No.198 of 2010 (also an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC) seeking amendment of the counter in R.C.C.No. 41 of 2007. 3. T.R.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 is presented under Section 24 CPC seeking transfer of O.S.No.212 of 2007 from the court of the IX Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, to the court of the Principal or any other Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam. 4. All the above proceedings arise out of the orders passed by the respective courts below rejecting applications of the revision petitioners, filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, seeking amendment of the plaint in the suit or of the counter in the rent control case, as the case may be. 5. Heard Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior counsel instructed by Sri. B.Nalin Kumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioners in all the matters; Sri. P.P. Rao, Learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri. P. Balaji Verma, in C.R.P.No. 2629 of 2011; and Sri. S.R. Ashok, Learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri.P. Balaji Verma in C.R.P.No.2623 of 2011 and in Tr.C.M.P. No.453 of 2011, for the respondents. For the sake of convenience, the revision petitioners are referred to as tenants; and the respondent (who is the same in all three matters) as the landlord, hereinafter. C.R.P.No.2623 of 2011 : 6. S.R. Ashok, Learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri.P. Balaji Verma in C.R.P.No.2623 of 2011 and in Tr.C.M.P. No.453 of 2011, for the respondents. For the sake of convenience, the revision petitioners are referred to as tenants; and the respondent (who is the same in all three matters) as the landlord, hereinafter. C.R.P.No.2623 of 2011 : 6. This revision arises out of O.S.No.212 of 2007 filed by the tenants seeking (i) a direction to the landlord to renew the lease for a further period of thirty-three years (entered into initially under a registered lease deed, dated 30-03-1974, in respect of property bearing Municipal No.51-1-4, Seethammadara, T.S.No.50, Visakhapatnam Municipality), vide clause -3(vi) of the lease deed, on a rental of Rs.10,000/- per month or such other sum as the Court considers reasonable; (ii) to direct the landlord (the first defendant) to join the tenants in applying for exemption of the schedule property from the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976 or to extend the exemption granted in G.O.427, dated 01-03-1978 for a period co-terminus with the extended lease; (iii) for a direction that in case the landlord fails to join the tenants in applying for exemption and register the lease within three months from the date of the decree, the Court should itself execute and register the lease at the expense of the landlord and after applying to the ULC authorities to grant exemption under the ULC Act; (iv) for an injunction restraining the landlord and his agents, etc., from interfering with the tenants’ peaceful enjoyment of the property; (v) for an injunction restraining the landlord from creating third party interests in the schedule property by way of sale, mortgage, exchange, gift or other forms of alienation; and (vi) for costs and other incidental reliefs. The case of the tenants–plaintiffs in O.S.No.212 of 2007 : 7. In the context of the issues relevant to this revision, the averments in the plaint are : (a)The first plaintiff is the Chief Editor of Eenadu, a Telugu daily newspaper and the second plaintiff an incorporated company and the publisher of the daily. Desirous of starting a newspaper edition from Visakhapatnam, the first plaintiff negotiated with the landlord (the first defendant) who was owning about 9,600 Sq.mts./11,000 Sq.yds. Desirous of starting a newspaper edition from Visakhapatnam, the first plaintiff negotiated with the landlord (the first defendant) who was owning about 9,600 Sq.mts./11,000 Sq.yds. of vacant site together with the building thereon and entered into a lease agreement, registered on 30-03-1974 in respect of the schedule property, on a rent of Rs.2,500/- for the initial fourteen years and Rs.3,000/- per month thereafter. Clause 3(vi) of the lease deed entitled the lessee (the first plaintiff) to renewal for a further period or periods subject to terms and conditions regarding rental and period of lease as mutually agreed upon, provided the lessee gives notice to the lessor of the intention to renew six months before the expiry of the lease; (b)The first plaintiff is authorised to sub-lease the property to any person of his choice; to alter or improve the existing structures and to put up structures permanent or temporary; (c)The first plaintiff granted a sub-lease in favour of the second plaintiff. As the thirty-three years period of the lease was coming to an end, the first plaintiff issued a notice dated 27-09-2006 to the landlord seeking renewal for a further period and for execution and registration of the lease deed, offering a rent of Rs.10,000/- per month for the first fourteen years with an escalation thereafter; and for a further period of thirty-three years; (d)The first defendant responded to the first plaintiff’s notice (dated 27-09-2006) on 20-10-2006 inter alia alleging that the extent of the property was not 9,200 sq.mts. but more and that in respect of a part of the property there was a denial of the title by the tenants. The landlord also returned the deposit of amount of Rs.10,000/-; (e)By a rejoinder dated 13-03-2007 the first plaintiff denied the allegations by the landlord and returned the cheque for Rs.10,000/-; (f)The allegation (in the landlord’s reply notice) that there was a denial of his title as to a portion of the leasehold property is denied. In fact as the extent in occupation of the plaintiffs under the lease was inadequate in view of the expanding business, an additional area was required and there being available vacant land adjoining the demised premises (belonging to the State Government), the plaintiffs approached the Government for assignment of land of an extent of 872 Sq.mts. lying between the rear side boundary of Eenadu and an internal road adjoining the lay-out. lying between the rear side boundary of Eenadu and an internal road adjoining the lay-out. The Government by proceedings dated 17-04-1985 allotted this extent of land to the 2nd plaintiff; (g)The plaint schedule describes the land as of an extent of 11,000 Sq.yds. or approximately 9,200 Sq.mts. with the eastern boundary enumerated as land belonging to M/s. Ushodaya Enterprises Limited, (the second plaintiff); and (h)Hence the suit for specific performance of enforcement of the renewal clause and for injunction and other reliefs. 8. It requires to be noticed that in the landlord’s reply notice dated 20-10-2006 (issued in response to the tenant’s notice dated 27-09-2006) it was specifically alleged that the tenant’s notice describes the eastern aspect of the schedule premises as though there is property belonging to the second plaintiff beyond the landlord’s eastern boundary. In this reply the landlord further alleged -You are aware that the entire property purchased by our client was let out to you within the said boundaries which is admeasuring 13,098 Sq.mts. equivalent to 11,034.78 Sq.mts., i.e., Ac.2.70 cents.; and that the tenant’s description of the property situated beyond the eastern boundary of the schedule property as property belonging to the second plaintiff tantamounts to denial of the landlord’s title in respect of a portion of the property leased out and the tenants are therefore disentitled to seek renewal of lease. 9. The written statement on behalf of the landlord was filed on 20-09-2007 wherein the landlord specifically pleaded that the description of the schedule property (in the plaint) as comprising 9,600 sq.mts. or 11,000 sq.yds. is a mischievous description; that in the lease deed the property is described as approximately 11,000 sq.yds. or 9,200 sq.mts. with specified boundaries including on the east as bounded by land belonging to A.S.P. Narasinga Rao; and that proceedings of the Collector, Visakhapatnam dated 25-10-1986 disclose abuse of Government process and malafides of the plaintiffs, since para – 2 of the said proceedings refers to a communication by the Director of Eenadu wherein the Collector was requested to assess and fix up a reasonable market value of land of 517 sq.mts. belonging to the newspaper which was given on 11-01-1985 for formation of a road and an extent equivalent thereto be treated as an exchange from out of the 872 sq.mts. allotted to the tenants. belonging to the newspaper which was given on 11-01-1985 for formation of a road and an extent equivalent thereto be treated as an exchange from out of the 872 sq.mts. allotted to the tenants. Further, that the Collector’s proceedings dated 25-10-1986 also referred to a report of the MRO, Visakhapatnam, stating that only Ac.0.07 cents equivalent to 289 sq.mts. belonging to Eenadu was included in the road while the actual extent given to Eenadu is 839 sq.mts. 10. On the basis of the above proceedings of the Collector, the written statement alleged that the plaintiffs misled the authorities by claiming to have surrendered land owned by them; when the plaintiffs did not own any land in T.S.No.50/4 or in the vicinity and therefore could have neither surrendered any land nor sought allotment of land in lieu thereof. 11. On 27-09-2009 issues were settled for trial of the suit and the matter adjourned to 10-06-2009 for trial; and adjourned from time to time thereafter. The trial court framed an additional issue on 14-12-2009 while allowing I.A.No.1286 of 2009 there for. In the landlord’s revision there against, by the judgment dated 12-04-2010, this Court finally settled the issues for trial of O.S.No.212 of 2007, in C.R.P.No.90 of 2010. I.A.No.685 of 2010 (since renumbered as I.A.No.2350 of 2011) was filed on 06-09-2010, while the suit was pending adjudication in the VII Addl. Dist. Court, Visakhapatnam; on 22-10-2010 the suit was ordered to be transferred to IV Addl. District Court. 12. In the affidavit (dated 06-09-2010) accompanying I.A.No.2350 of 2010, the core reasons set out by the tenants for seeking extensive amendments to the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007, are : (a)They had no knowledge or clarity regarding the actual extent of the lease demised property till the survey report dated 05-03-2008 was filed by the landlord in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 on the file of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge – cum – Rent Controller, Visakhapatnam, wherein the extent of the property is shown as Ac.2.71 cents. Had the deponent (first plaintiff) known about the actual extent, there was no reason why the application for exemption under the ULC Act was not filed for the entire extent; (b)Since clarity regarding the extent of the property being Ac.2.71 cents became available from the survey report dated 05-03-2008 (filed in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007) and since the extent mentioned in the sale deed dated 30-07-1968 in favour of the landlord also shows the extent as Ac.2.70 cents, the suit schedule requires to be amended and the extent leased out must reflect as Ac.2.70 cents; (c)The complete facts relating to the execution of the lease deed dated 30-03-1974 (by the landlord in favour of the first plaintiff – tenant) and assignment of 872 sq.mts. of land in favour of the other tenant (second plaintiff) was not mentioned in the plaint; but it is now expedient to plead these facts, in view of the various accusations by the land lord; (d)Assignment of land by the Government in favour of the second plaintiff was mentioned briefly in paragraph –(iii)(l) of the plaint, but elaboration of the relevant facts being necessary, amendment is sought in this regard. The Collector, Visakhapatnam, allotted 872 sq.mts land to the second plaintiff by the order dated 17-04-1985 and the company was put in possession of the same on 20-04-1985, vide delivery receipt of even date. The Government initially fixed the market rate for the land at Rs.300/- per sq. yard vide Collectors proceedings dated 25-10-1986. This was however reduced to Rs.200/- per sq.yd vide Collector’s proceedings dated 05-01-1987; and the entire consideration was paid on 12-02-1987 and 31-01-1982. This assignment in favour of the second plaintiff is outside the extent of the demised premises (belonging to the landlord) and no part of the landlord’s property was surrendered or given in exchange for the land assigned to the second plaintiff. (e)The first plaintiff was busy in litigation with the Government regarding another business concern of his HUF. There were also interlocutory applications in the suit which were litigated at various levels and hence he could not file the application for amendment of the plaint, earlier. 13. (e)The first plaintiff was busy in litigation with the Government regarding another business concern of his HUF. There were also interlocutory applications in the suit which were litigated at various levels and hence he could not file the application for amendment of the plaint, earlier. 13. For the aforesaid reasons in brief the tenants sought amendment of the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007, as follows: a. To add the words “through his father” after the words “The Plaintiff carried on negotiations with the First Defendant” in paragraph III (a) of the plaint. b. To conclude paragraph III a) of the plaint with the sentence ending with the words “… land on a long term basis” and renumber the subsequent part of the paragraph as new paragraph III f). c. add the following paragraphs as paragraph III b) to III e) of the plaint. i. The Plaintiffs submit that Sri M.T. Raju, the late father of the first defendant, was a Member of Indian Administrative Service. Late Sri M.T. Raju retired as the Chief Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh State Government. At the time of entering into the registered lease deed dated 30-03-1974, he was a Member of Parliament having been elected from Narsapur Parliamentary Constituency. ii. Late Sri M.T. Raju was qualified in Law, being a Bar-at-Law. He was adept and proficient in drafting lease documents, notices, plaints, etc. Late Sri M.T. Raju being possessed of many properties was also consulting lawyers and was taking their opinion on various matters. iii. It is submitted that when late Sri M.T. Raju came to know that the first plaintiff was looking for a suitable property to start businesses, he offered to give the suit schedule property, owned by his son, the first defendant herein on lease. In that context, negotiations were held between late M.T. Raju on behalf of the first defendant herein and the 1st plaintiff herein. Late M.T. Raju was in a dominant position at the time of grant of lease. Sri Late M.T. Raju, furnished the details of the suit scheduled property, among others, the extent as well as boundaries. The first plaintiff had no reason to doubt the details furnished by late M.T. Raju as he retired in a responsible position; was a Member of Parliament and well versed in real estate. Sri Late M.T. Raju, furnished the details of the suit scheduled property, among others, the extent as well as boundaries. The first plaintiff had no reason to doubt the details furnished by late M.T. Raju as he retired in a responsible position; was a Member of Parliament and well versed in real estate. Therefore the first Plaintiff readily believed whatsoever information was furnished by late Sri M.T. Raju regarding the suit schedule property. Therefore the lease deed came to be executed on the basis of information furnished by late Sri M.T. Raju without physically measuring the land. iv. It is submitted that under the lease deed dated 30-03-1974 lease was granted in respect of the suit schedule property, major part of which was covered by compound wall on all the four sides, as is evident from the sketch attached to the lease deed. Further, apart from the area situated within the compound wall on all the four sides, there is an open land beyond the boundary wall on the Eastern side, which was also leased to the petitioner which is also shown separately outside the boundary wall on the eastern side. The open land on the eastern side is neither rectangular nor square but it is in an irregular shape, which is clearly demarcated in the sketch attached to the lease deed. It is also relevant to submit that the entire area leased to the first defendant is demarcated in red line in the sketch attached to the lease deed. It is submitted that the said area leased to the first plaintiff is intact ever since the lease was granted to the first plaintiff. That apart, on an application made by the second plaintiff, an area of 872 sq. meters was assigned to the second plaintiff which is situated in Sy.No.52 on the eastern side adjoining the open area leased to the first plaintiff. The Second plaintiff, for the purpose of securing the property as well as for the beneficial management of the property, constructed another compound wall around the open area leased to the first plaintiff on the eastern side beyond the compound wall shown in the lease deed as well as the land that was assigned to them by the State Government. d. To re-number paragraphs III b) to III l) of the plaint as paragraphs III g) to III q). d. To re-number paragraphs III b) to III l) of the plaint as paragraphs III g) to III q). e. To add the following paragraphs as paragraph III r) to III t) of the plaint. i. The Plaintiffs submit that the Collector, Visakhapatnam was pleased to allot an extent of 872 square meters of land to the second Plaintiff by an order dated 17-04-1985. The land was put in possession of the company on 20-04-1985 as evidenced by a delivery receipt dated 20-04-1985. The Plaintiffs submit that the Government has fixed the market rate for the land at Rs.300/-per square yard as per Proceedings of the Collector Visakhapatnam, D.Dis. No.5740/B2 dt. 25-10-1986, but on a representation, reduced it to Rs.200/-per square yard, under Proceedings of the Collector Visakhapatnam, D.Dis. No.5740/B2 dt.05-01-1987. The second Plaintiff paid the entire consideration in the following manner : Challan No. Date Amount in Rate in Extent Sq.Yds Sq. Mts 7378 12-02-1987 84,916 200 428.58 355 8100 31-01-1992 1,23,667 200 618.33 517 Total 2,08,583 1046.01 872 ii. The Plaintiffs submit that this extent of 872 square meters of land allotted/assigned by the government to the Second Plaintiff is to the further East of the suit schedule property. As such the eastern boundary was mentioned in the notice issued by the first Plaintiff, as land belonging to the Second Plaintiff. The Second Plaintiff has paid for the entire extent of land assigned to them and they had not surrendered any part of land belonging to the First Defendant nor was there any exchange of land with the government, as could be gathered from what is mentioned in paragraph III (m) of the plaint. iii. It is respectfully submitted that the first Plaintiff has only been mentioning the extent of lease as 9200 square meters, as the same was furnished by the father of the First Defendant, which was believed in good faith. The Plaintiffs never had an occasion or need to measure the land leased out to them. Further, even by the date of lease of suit schedule property in favour of the first Plaintiff, roads were already formed on the Northern and Western side, as is evident from the schedule to the Lease deed and therefore the question of surrender of land by the Plaintiff for formation of road does not arise. Since Mr. Further, even by the date of lease of suit schedule property in favour of the first Plaintiff, roads were already formed on the Northern and Western side, as is evident from the schedule to the Lease deed and therefore the question of surrender of land by the Plaintiff for formation of road does not arise. Since Mr. A.S.P. Narasinga Rao was no longer the owner of land in Sy.No.52, to the east of suit schedule property, by the date of notice dated 26-09-2006, the question of mentioning his name as neighbour on the Eastern side, does not arise. f. To re-number existing paragraph III n) to III s) as III u) to III z). g. To amend the plaint schedule, substituting the words 11,000 square yards or approximately 9,200 square meters with the words “approximately Ac.2-70 cents equivalent to 13,078 square yards or 11,034.78 square meters”. The landlord’s pleadings in opposition to the application for amendments : (i) The issues in the suit were framed on 27-04-2009. The application for amendment discloses no reasonable cause or diligence; and having been filed after commencement of the trial of the suit, is not maintainable; (ii) The real intention and motive for filing the amendment application is to wriggle out of the criminal case in Crime No.1160 of 2007 wherein a charge-sheet was filed and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, numbered as C.C.No.394 of 2010, pending trial before the IVth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. The present amendment is an attempt to contrive a defence in the said criminal proceedings; (iii) A charge-sheet was filed in Crime No.1160 of 2007, under Sections 406, 409, 417, 418, 420, 423 and 427 read with 34 IPC against the revision petitioners herein and one Cherukuri Kiran (son of the first revision petitioner), Managing Director of the second revision petitioner. The essence of the charges is that having obtained lease of property of an extent of Ac.2.78 cents in Survey No.50/4, the accused with a criminal intention and without the knowledge of the landlord surrendered Ac.0.07 cents in Survey No.50/4 (out of the leased property) for formation of a road, asserting ownership, suppressing the fact of being a lessee. In view of such surrender the petitioners applied to the Revenue authorities through one of the Directors of the 2nd petitioner for assignment of land. In view of such surrender the petitioners applied to the Revenue authorities through one of the Directors of the 2nd petitioner for assignment of land. The Revenue authorities handed over an extent of 872 sq.mts., of which an extent of 289 sq.mts. was in lieu of the land surrendered, belonging to the landlord. Even in Criminal Petition No.7399 of 2007 filed before this Court (for quashing of Crime No.1160 of 2007), the accused including the revision petitioners herein clearly asserted that the landlord had purchased 11,034.78 sq.mts. under a sale deed dated 30-07-1968 but granted lease of only 9200 sq.mts under the lease deed dated 30-03-1974. Even in Criminal Petition No.117 of 2008 (filed for anticipatory bail), the accused clearly asserted that though the landlord purchased 11,034.78 sq.mts. had granted lease only of an extent of 9,200 sq.mts. The revision petitioners had thus clear anterior knowledge of the actual extent of the property belonging to the landlord and as regards their claim, that the assignment of land by the Government was not on account of surrender of any land belonging to the landlord to the State for road formation. (iv) The amendment pertaining to the extent of the lease demised property is mischievous, malafide, belated and based on false pleas as to lack of knowledge of the true extent of the property. The second plaintiff – tenant, in the ULC declaration in C.C.No.1440 of 1976 filed on 15-09-1976 and signed by the first plaintiff claimed exemption under Section – 20 for 9,200 sq.mts. of vacant land while declaring the remaining extent of 2,286.23 sq.mts. as land covered by structures; thus, acknowledging the total extent of the lease demised property as 11,486.23 sq.mts.; (v) Final order dated 30-07-1996 by the Special Officer, ULC after physical inspection of the property declared the extent of 13,558 sq.yds. as non-surplus land in the landlord’s holding, taking into account the total area and the area covered by ten structures therein. The Order of the Special Officer dated 30-07-1996 was filed along with the written statement in the suit, on 20-09-2007. as non-surplus land in the landlord’s holding, taking into account the total area and the area covered by ten structures therein. The Order of the Special Officer dated 30-07-1996 was filed along with the written statement in the suit, on 20-09-2007. The sale deed was also filed along with the written statement, the schedule of which mentions the extent of the property as roughly comprising Ac.2.70 cents; (vi) Certified copy of the plan dated 31-10-1992 approved by the Chief Inspector of Factories in favour of the second plaintiff – tenant describes the suit schedule property as 11,118.025 sq.mts. (filed by the landlord in R.C.C. 41 of 2007) also establishes knowledge of the tenants as to the extent of land, as early as in 1992; (vii) Even the subsequent plan approved by the Factories Department (twelve days prior to the filing of O.S.No.212 of 2007), vide Director of Factories proceedings dated 17-03-2007, reveals that the tenants had shown the extent as 11,118.025 sq.mts. This is the extent mentioned by the tenants in formal applications filed for obtaining approval of plans and licenses from public authorities, in the Factories Department. (viii) Despite the so-called clear knowledge (admitted), of the extent, from the survey report in February, 2010, the tenants failed to raise an issue about the same before this Court in CRP.No.90 of 2010, wherein by the order dated 12-04-2010 this Court framed and settled issues finally for trial of the suit. 15. In O.S.No.212 of 2007 the petitioners/plaintiffs impleaded the Secretary, Revenue (U.C.-III) representing the State of Andhra Pradesh as the second defendant presumably since they were seeking a relief of exemption (for the suit scheduled property) from provisions of the ULC Act. On behalf of the second defendant, the Principal Secretary (Revenue) filed a written statement. To the extent relevant to the present controversy between the parties the assertions in this written statement are : (a) The second plaintiff (second petitioner herein) approached the Collector, Visakhapatnam, for assignment of 872 sq.mts. in survey No.52 on the eastern side of land in T.S.No.50/4 which is in possession of the said plaintiff; (b) By proceedings dated 17-04-1985, the Collector ordered handing over of the said extent to the second plaintiff; (c) Thereafter the second plaintiff by letter dated 23-05-1986 addressed the Collector stating that it had surrendered 517 sq.mts. in survey No.52 on the eastern side of land in T.S.No.50/4 which is in possession of the said plaintiff; (b) By proceedings dated 17-04-1985, the Collector ordered handing over of the said extent to the second plaintiff; (c) Thereafter the second plaintiff by letter dated 23-05-1986 addressed the Collector stating that it had surrendered 517 sq.mts. of land belonging to the said plaintiff on 11-01-1985 for formation of road and requesting to treat surrender of the said extent as exchange of land from out of 872 sq.mts. allotted to it and to assess and fix the market value for the balance extent of land; (d) After considering reports from the RDO & MRO and representations of the said plaintiff, the Collector allowed exchange of 289 sq.mts. of land as claimed by the second plaintiff and for the balance extent permitted the said plaintiff to pay market value at Rs.300/- sq.yds. and directed the MRO to ensure compliance; (e) There is no record as to compliance of the above order by the second plaintiff. Hence, the land continues to vest with the Government; and (f) The ownership of the landlord of land in T.S.No.50/4 is admitted. As the second plaintiff is not the owner but a mere sub-lessee, exchange of land as claimed by the second plaintiff and grant of 289 sq.mts. in lieu of the land surrendered by the second plaintiff is without basis or entitlement; therefore, the entire extent of 872 sq.mts. is vacant as on date and continues to vest with the Government. The Order impugned: 16. I.A.No.2350 of 2010 was dismissed by the impugned order dated 08-06-2011. Having regard to the rival contentions and competing positions, the Court below framed three principal issues for consideration in the application : (a) whether posting the suit for trial after framing of issues amounts to commencement of trial (an issue framed in view of the proviso to Order VI, Rule-17 CPC); (b) whether the petitioners (the tenants) had knowledge regarding the true extent of the schedule property, even prior to filing of the suit; and (c) whether there are bonafides in filing the application. 17. For rejected the amendment application the Court below concluded : (i) that applicants had knowledge about the defence and stand of the landlord even before filing of the suit; (ii) no document was filed to disclose the land given/surrendered, for which 872 sq.mts. 17. For rejected the amendment application the Court below concluded : (i) that applicants had knowledge about the defence and stand of the landlord even before filing of the suit; (ii) no document was filed to disclose the land given/surrendered, for which 872 sq.mts. was given in exchange by the Government; (iii) as per the Government records 289 sq.mts. of land belonging to Eenadu was given in a place where the tenants had no property whatsoever; (iv) the applicants presented different versions before different authorities with regard to the extent of the lease demised property; and (v) the applicants unduly benefitted at the cost of the landlord’s property. 18. The self-same contentions as urged before the Court below are reiterated herein with equal gusto, comparable elaboration and subtler forensic presentation. The issue therefore arises whether the impugned order suffers from an error requiring revision in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 : 19. This revision arises out of R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the tenants (from the same scheduled property as in O.S.No.212 of 2007); for delivery of vacant possession and incidental reliefs. This case was filed under provisions of the Rent Control Act. To the extent relevant and material for the purposes of this revision, suffice it to notice the case of the landlord as pleaded: (a) That the property was originally acquired under a registered sale deed dated 30-07-1968, registered as document No.1495/76. The schedule of this deed sets out the extent as roughly Ac.2.70 cents, equal to 1,029 hectares, equal to 13,078 sq.yds. or 11,034.78 sq.mts.; (b) The sale deed though registered was not available to the landlord as it was not released by the registering authorities on account of technical reasons. The registered lease deed was executed in favour of the first respondent in the RCC (first petitioner herein) on 30-03-1974, mentioning the extent as approximately 11,000 sq.yds. or 9,200 sq.mts. but with specific boundaries; (c) As the thirty-three years period of the lease was coming to a close, the lessee by letter dated 27-09-2006 sought renewal of the lease and intimated the intention to seek renewal for a further period of thirty-three years. This notice mentioned the extent of the leased property as 9,200 sq.mts. or 9,200 sq.mts. but with specific boundaries; (c) As the thirty-three years period of the lease was coming to a close, the lessee by letter dated 27-09-2006 sought renewal of the lease and intimated the intention to seek renewal for a further period of thirty-three years. This notice mentioned the extent of the leased property as 9,200 sq.mts. and the eastern boundary was described as land belonging to Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. There was also no mention about the existing structures in the property which were in the property leased, vide the lease deed dated 30-03-1974; (d) The eastern boundary is also altered. The said tenant also asserted that on an application by Eenadu for allotment of a vacant site, Revenue authorities assigned the same in favour of the Director, Eenadu by proceedings of the Collector, dated 17-04-1985; the market value was also fixed in the Collector’s proceedings dated 25-10-1986; and the eastern boundary of the lease demised premises thus belongs to the second respondent (the sub-lessee); (e) The above acts and assertions of the tenants constitute express denial of the landlord’s title and a complementary claim of title by the tenant in respect of the schedule property on the eastern aspect, of an extent of 1834.78 sq.mts. out of the property originally leased out in 1974 (i.e., 11,034.78 – 9,200); (f) The respondents – tenants also denied the landlord’s request for inspection of the schedule property, contrary to the terms of the lease and the inherent right of the landlord to do so; (g) Since the lease in favour of the first respondent has come to an end by 30-03-2007 by efflux of time and the first respondent continued in occupation of the premises as a tenant holding over and is liable to pay the original and admitted rent which was not paid for the months of April, May and June, 2007, there is willful default of payment of rent and the tenant is liable for eviction; and (h) The petitioner is a businessman and the schedule property is the only non-residential premises belonging to him in Visakhapatnam which is required for his bona fide personal use; Hence the petition for eviction. 20. The schedule to this property was mentioned (in the RCC) as comprising an extent of 13,078 sq.yds., equivalent to 11.034.78 sq.mts. with the eastern boundary set out as property belonging to Narsinga Rao. 20. The schedule to this property was mentioned (in the RCC) as comprising an extent of 13,078 sq.yds., equivalent to 11.034.78 sq.mts. with the eastern boundary set out as property belonging to Narsinga Rao. Defence of the Revision Petitioners in the RCC : 21. Insofar as the extent of the schedule property is concerned, the counter by the tenants (sworn to by the first petitioner herein) asserted that the extent was mentioned in the lease deed as 9,200 sq.mts. and during the previous thirty-three years of subsistence of the lease, the landlord never raised any issue as to the extent being 11,034.78 sq.mts.; the second respondent (second petitioner herein) had to apply for exemption under the ULC Act, 1976, since the total extent of the schedule property was in excess of the ceiling limits and exemption was also granted for 9,200 sq.mts. only and that (9,200 sq.mts.) was the extent shown for seeking exemption as per the lease. 22. The eastern boundary of the schedule property is as mentioned in the notice and not as mentioned in the lease deed, since the State Government had allotted 872 sq.mts. in Sy.No.52 to the second respondent, the eastern boundary stood altered. There is thus no denial of title either in terms of the extent or with respect to the eastern boundary. There is also no bonafide personal requirement of the landlord for this premises; the tenants are entitled to continue in the premises; and there is no default in the payment of rents. The RCC is therefore liable to be dismissed. The Order impugned : 23. By the order dated 18-04-2011 the learned Rent Controller rejected I.A.No.198 of 2010 (filed by the revision petitioners for amendment of the counter) for the following reasons : (a)that the amendment of the counter is sought in respect of areas already covered in the original counter-affidavit filed; (b)with regard to the amendments sought pertaining to the particulars of the extent of land allotted by the Government to Messrs Ushodaya Publications, the respondents (in RCC.41 of 2007) already have knowledge of the facts now sought to be pleaded and additionally; (c)the deletion of certain sentences from the original counter causes prejudice to the landlord; and (d)in the totality of circumstances, the application for amendment of the counter is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Tr.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 : 24. Tr.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 : 24. Some of the observations recorded (by the Court below) for rejecting I.A.No.2350 of 2010 vide the order dated 08-06-2011, have triggered this petition seeking transfer of the substantive suit O.S.No.212 of 2007 from the file of the XI Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC) Visakhapatnam to the District Court or any other District and Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam. 25. The petitioners herein are the petitioners in the other two revisions as well. 26. In the transfer petition setting out brief particulars of O.S.No.212 of 2007; of the Rent Control case filed by the respondent-landlord in RCC.41 of 2007 and the circumstances in which I.A.No.2350 of 2010 [ for amendment of the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 ] came to be filed, the petitioners allege : 7. I submit that in the normal process they would not have filed the present Transfer C.M.P. seeking transfer of the suit from the lower court but for the sweeping findings given by the lower court judge in I.A.No.2350/2010 on the merits of the dispute which has given rise to apprehension in the minds of the petitioners that the lower court has already pre-judged the matter, developed bias against the petitioner, prejudiced their case and that there is no possibility to obtain even handed justice from the lower court. I submit that the lower court far exceeding the scope for amendment petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure gave extraordinary findings on the merits of the disputes even before the commencement of the trial. 27. Some of the observations in paragraph nos.17 to 19, 21, 22 & 25 of the Order of the Court below are referred, to contend that the lower Court pre-judged the merits of the substantive claims asserted in O.S.No.212 of 2007; had recorded comments as to the petitioners having approached the Court without bona fides; recorded observations on the merits of the case asserted by the petitioners-plaintiffs in the application for amendment of the plaint (I.A.No.2350 of 2010); and recorded a finding that the petitioners even played fraud on R-1. The petitioners therefore apprehend that the Court below is prejudiced against their claims and seek transfer of the suit for trial to another Court. 28. The petitioners therefore apprehend that the Court below is prejudiced against their claims and seek transfer of the suit for trial to another Court. 28. Sri D. Prakash Reddy – the learned counsel for the petitioners, contends (in reiteration of the averments in the affidavit filed in support of this transfer application) that while the petitioners would not normally seek transfer of the suit, particularly as the matter is also at an advanced stage of trial, they are nevertheless constrained to do so on account of apprehension of bias and pre-judgment by the Court below on the merits of O.S.No.212 of 2007. 29. Sri S.R. Ashok – learned senior counsel for the respondent-landlord, would contend that none of the observations (of the Court below) referred to by the petitioners in support of their apprehension of bias and pre-judgment are indicative of any bias or pre-judgment. The quoted observations were recorded in the context of elaborate arguments and reference to several documents by the competing parties before the Court below, inviting the Court below to make prima facie observations on the merits of the application as well. Sri S.R. Ashok also contends that the observations as regards elements of fraud and dishonesty were made in the context of considering the application for amendment and not on the merits of the competing claims of the plaintiffs and the defendant in the suit. Chronology of relevant facts : 30. In I.A.No.2350 of 2010 (the order dated 08-06-2011 in this application is the order impugned in C.R.P.No.2623 of 2011) no witnesses were examined for either party. While no documents were marked on behalf of the applicants/revision petitioners, exhibits B.1 to B.44 were marked for the respondent-landlord. On the material placed on record before the Court below and before this Court, the relevant and material sequence of facts is as under: 30-07-1968 A sale deed was executed in respect of the lease demised (suit schedule) property, in favour of the landlord. The sale deed was presented for registration on 30-07-1968. It was pending registration and was ultimately registered in 1976 as document No.1495 of 1976. The landlord being a minor at that time was represented by his father and guardian. The sale deed was presented for registration on 30-07-1968. It was pending registration and was ultimately registered in 1976 as document No.1495 of 1976. The landlord being a minor at that time was represented by his father and guardian. The schedule of this deed describes the property as : All that 30-07-1968: piece and parcel of land comprising roughly an area of 2 acres 70 cents which is equal to 1.029 Hectors which is equal to 13078 sq.yards which is equal to 11034.78 sq.meters in S.No.50 subdivision No.4 situated at and lying in the village Nakkavanipalem … and shown in the plan as red marked portion. The eastern boundary is described as the land of Gottumukkala Ramachandra raju and his brother and S.P. Narasinga Rao. 30-03-1974 By registered lease deed bearing document No.1420 of 1974 30-03-1974 the schedule property was leased for thirty-three years in favour of the first petitioner herein. The terms of the deed enumerate that the lease would come into force from 01-04-1974 and the extent of the lease demised property is described as : … all that piece or parcel of land bearing Municipal D.No.51.1.4 Seethammadhara Visakhapatnam comprising land of an extent of approximately 11000 square yards (Eleven thousand square yards) or approximately 9200 sq.meters (Nine thousand two hundred Sq.meters) with all the super structures thereon morefully set out and described in schedule hereunder and marked in the plan here to annexed herein after called The Demised property … The schedule of this deed also describes the property as measuring approximately 11000 sq.yds or 9200 sq.mts. together with the structures thereon and the eastern boundary as land belonging to Sri A.S.P. Narsinga Rao. 14-09-1976 The first revision-petitioner filed declaration under the ULC Act, 1976 before the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Vijayawada. The declaration set out the area of land occupied by buildings as 2286.23 sq.mts. and the area allowed for convenient enjoinment of these structures as 1143.00 14-09-1976 sq.mts.; and vacant land as 9200 sq.mts. in Annexure – A to the declaration, pertaining to the lease demised property. In Annexure – G exemption was sought under Section-20 of the Act, for 9200 sq.mts. on the ground of public interest as the leased premises is for running a newspaper press and other publications. This declaration dated 14-09-1976 was signed by the first revision petitioner. in Annexure – A to the declaration, pertaining to the lease demised property. In Annexure – G exemption was sought under Section-20 of the Act, for 9200 sq.mts. on the ground of public interest as the leased premises is for running a newspaper press and other publications. This declaration dated 14-09-1976 was signed by the first revision petitioner. 17-01-1985 The Director, Eenadu applied for assignment of vacant land in survey No.52 of an extent of 872 sq.mts. of Resapuvanipalem Village, situate between the rear side boundary of its compound and the internal road of an adjoining layout. 21-02-1985 The District Collector, Visakhapatnam, directed the Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam, (enclosing a copy of the Eenadu application for assignment) to inspect the land applied for assignment and send proposals. 06-04-1985 The Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam, forwarded a report to the District Collector stating that the land in question is partly covered by open space of the adjoining layout and partly by plot No.8; that the open space in the layout vests with the Municipal Corporation and the space covered by plot No.8 belongs to the concerned land holder; and that Eenadu needs to approach Municipal Corporation for assignment of open land and will have to purchase the area covered by plot No.8 (from its owner). 17-04-1985 The Collector, Visakhapatnam, ordered handing over of an extent of 872 sq.mts. in survey No.52 to the Director, Eenadu. 20-04-1985 Pursuant to the above order, 872 sq.mts. to the east of the schedule property was recorded as having been handed over to the representative : Eenadu, Visakhapatnam, in survey No.52. 25-10-1986 In the proceedings of the Collector, Visakhapatnam, addressed to the Director, Eenadu and Revenue officials, it is stated that Eenadu, had requested the Collector to assess and fix a reasonable market value of the land, claiming that 517 sq.mts. of Eenadu land was given on 11-01-1985 for formation of a road and an equal extent may be treated as an exchange out of the 872 sq.mts. allotted (to Eenadu) in the Collector’s proceedings dated 17-04-1985; that the MRO Visakhapatnam had reported on 21-08-1986 that only Ac.0.07 cents, equivalent to 289 sq.mts. of Eenadu land was given on 11-01-1985 for formation of a road and an equal extent may be treated as an exchange out of the 872 sq.mts. allotted (to Eenadu) in the Collector’s proceedings dated 17-04-1985; that the MRO Visakhapatnam had reported on 21-08-1986 that only Ac.0.07 cents, equivalent to 289 sq.mts. belonging to Eenadu was included in the road while the actual extent allotted to Eenadu is 839 sq.mts.; that the RDO and MRO, Visakhapatnam had reported that land in survey No.52 stands registered as “Inam Dry” belonging to one Aresu Apparao Naidu, which was subsequently constituted into an approved layout; and that a market value of Rs.300/- per square yard would be reasonable. 05-01-1987 Proceedings of the District Collector, Visakhapatnam (erroneously recorded as dated 05-01-1986, but signed on 06-01-1987) recorded herein that the Collector’s proceedings dated 25-10-1986 is on the higher side, the prevailing rate in the area is Rs.150/- per sq.yd.; the assigned land was uneven and considerable money had to be spend for leveling the same, and requesting revision and fixation of a reasonable rate. Recording the decision to reduce the rate to Rs.200/- per sq.yd. and directing the MRO, Visakhapatnam to collect market value at Rs.200/- per sq.yd. for 550 sq.mts. [839 sq.mts of allotted land (less) an extent of 289 sq.mts. of land presumably in the schedule property surrendered for road formation – vide Collector’s proceedings dated 25-10-1986]. 29-01-1987 The Director of Factories, A.P., approved the plans submitted by the second petitioner enumerating detailed measurements of the scheduled property. 30-10-1986 Another approval by the Director of Factories, A.P., for a revised plan in favour of the second petitioner. In the approved plan annexed to these proceedings (signed by the Director of the second petitioner and the Joint Chief Inspector of Factories, Andhra Pradesh) the plot area is recorded as 11,118.02 sq.mts. 27-09-2006 The first petitioner-tenant addressed the landlord seeking renewal of the lease for another period of thirty-three years; describing the extent of the property in the schedule to this letter also as: an extent of 9,200 Sq. Mts. Bearing Municipal No.51-1-4. 27-09-2006 The first petitioner-tenant addressed the landlord seeking renewal of the lease for another period of thirty-three years; describing the extent of the property in the schedule to this letter also as: an extent of 9,200 Sq. Mts. Bearing Municipal No.51-1-4. The eastern boundary is described as land belonging to the second revision petitioner -M/s. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. 20-10-2006 In response to the first petitioner’s letter dated 27-09-2006 the landlord asserted serious objections to the description of the extent of the property and to the eastern boundary being described as property belonging to the second petitioner. The reply notice asserted that the initial lease deed (dated 30-03-1974) described the property as approximately 11000 sq.yds. or approximately 9200 sq.mts.; that the tenant is aware that the entire property purchased by the landlord and leased out within the definite and enumerated boundaries is of an extent of 13098 sq.yds. equivalent to 11034.78 sq.mts. or 2.07 cents. The tenant was also intimated that the tenancy stands terminated on expiry of the period of the lease and the letter be treated as a notice of termination; that the lease comes to an end by 31-03-2007; the landlord intends to use the scheduled property for his own business needs; and that the tenant is liable to be evicted in view of mala fide denial of title. 13-03-2007 In response to the landlord’s reply notice dated 20-10-2006 the tenant got issued a rejoinder notice through counsel asserting that the extent of the property is the same as in the lease deed; that on an application made by Eenadu, 872 sq.mts. forming part of survey No.52 was assigned in favour of the Director, Eenadu by proceedings of the Collector, Visakhapatnam, dated 17-04-1985. Subsequently by Collector’s proceedings dated 25-10-1986 the market value for the assigned land was also fixed at Rs.300/- and therefore the eastern boundary having been assigned to Eenadu by the Government was described in the notice as property belonging to Eenadu. 17-03-2007 Another plan submitted by the second petitioner is approved by the Director of Factories. The dimensions of the scheduled property are set out in the plan annexed to these proceedings, signed by the Managing Director of the second petitioner and by the Joint Chief Inspector of Factories, Andhra Pradesh. 24-03-2007 The counsel for the landlord addressed the counsel for the tenant in response to the landlord’s rejoinder notice dated 13-03-2007. The dimensions of the scheduled property are set out in the plan annexed to these proceedings, signed by the Managing Director of the second petitioner and by the Joint Chief Inspector of Factories, Andhra Pradesh. 24-03-2007 The counsel for the landlord addressed the counsel for the tenant in response to the landlord’s rejoinder notice dated 13-03-2007. Suffice it to note that in this letter it was asserted that since the eastern boundary of the schedule property is land belonging to A.S.P. Narsinga Rao and there was no Government land around, there was no question of any allotment by the Government, of 872 sq.mts. of land (to Eenadu). 30-07-1996 Pursuant to a declaration filed by the landlord under Section 6 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the competent authority passed final orders declaring the landlord to be within ceiling limits and a non-surplus land holder. Insofar as the schedule property is concerned, the competent authority upheld the contention of the landlord that an extent of 11034.78 sq.mts. of land covered by ten buildings in survey No.50/4 was given on lease for a period of thirty-three years in 1974 and therefore the said extent is protected under Section 4(ii) of the Act. 24-03-2007 Rejoinder notice by landlord through counsel reiterating the assertions and allegations in the earlier reply notice dated 20-10-2006. December, 2007 The petitioners and the Managing Director of the second petitioner – accused Nos.1 to 3 in Crime No.1160 of 2007 (of III Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam) filed Criminal Petition No.7399 of 2007 in the High Court for the relief of quashing of the FIR. In this petition in para-2 it is pleaded : 2. The first respondent is the owner of land and structures thereon, to an extent of Ac.2.70 cents equivalent to 13078 sq. yards or 11034.78 sq. mtrs in Sy.No.50/4 in Nakkavanipalem of the erstwhile Allipuram Ward, Visakhapatnam having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 30-07-1968 registered as document No.1495/1976. The first respondent out of the above extent granted lease of 9200 sq. meters or 11000 sq. yards in TS No.50/4, bearing Municipal No.51-1-4, Seethammadhara, Visakhapatnam under registered lease deed dated 30th day of March, 1974 in favour of the first petitioner herein. and in para-5(v) that : (v) The first respondent purchased 13078 sq. yds or 11034.78 sq. The first respondent out of the above extent granted lease of 9200 sq. meters or 11000 sq. yards in TS No.50/4, bearing Municipal No.51-1-4, Seethammadhara, Visakhapatnam under registered lease deed dated 30th day of March, 1974 in favour of the first petitioner herein. and in para-5(v) that : (v) The first respondent purchased 13078 sq. yds or 11034.78 sq. mtrs of land under sale deed dated 30-07-1968 but granted lease of only 9200 sq. meters or 11000 sq. yds under lease deed dated 30-03-1974. January, 2008 Petitioners and the Managing Director of the second petitioner (accused Nos.1 to 3 in Crime No.1160 of 2007) filed Criminal Petition No.117 of 2008 in the High Court for anticipatory bail. In paras 2 & 5(iv) of this petition assertions identical to those in Criminal Petition No.7399 of 2007 (extracted above) are reiterated, with respect to the extent of the scheduled property. 18-05-2010 Final report (charge-sheet) filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in respect of Crime No.1160 of 2007. Cognizance was taken and prosecution initiated in the Court of the IV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, in C.C.No.394 of 2010 under Sections 406, 409, 417, 418, 420, 423 and 427 r/w Section 34 IPC against the petitioners and the Managing Director of the second petitioner. The distillate of the conclusions – recorded by the investigating officer and enumerated in the charge-sheet reads : During the process of investigation, requisitions were addressed to the Revenue Officials for certain records. The scene of offence was inspected and photographed by LW-20. During the course of investigation, LW-14 handed over the original file with the proceedings of the then Hon’ble Dist. Collector, (LW-2) vide Rc.No.37/85 PS dt.17-4-1985; which revealed that the Director, Eenadu, Visakhapatnam submitted a letter on 17/1/85 for assignment of the bit of vacant land in S.No.52 of Resapuvanipalem village measuring an extent of 872 sq. meters lying between the rear side boundary of Eenadu compound and the internal road of the adjoining lay out for their use for which, LW-2 ordered to hand over the bit of land of 872 sq. meters in S.No.52 of Resapuvanipalem village, to the A-2 for proper protection and maintenance. The original proceedings showed that the land was ordered to be handed over to A-2 for a limited purpose of maintenance only. meters in S.No.52 of Resapuvanipalem village, to the A-2 for proper protection and maintenance. The original proceedings showed that the land was ordered to be handed over to A-2 for a limited purpose of maintenance only. But somehow, A-1 & A-2 got the words “for maintenance” struck off after the “maintenance” and not found and the word “immediately” which was not there in the original order was type written and struck off. In the original order, there is side initial at the signature of the District Collector and it is missing in the documents filed by A-1 & A-2 in the suit. It is manifest that the accused have fobbed off false document to substantiate their false claims. During the course of investigation, LW-5 supplied the certified copies of the sale deed and lease deed documents vide Nos.1495/1976 and 1420/1974. LWs-6 issued his report vide Rc.No.255/2008 dt.25/2/2008 that an extent of Ac.0.07 cents in S.No.50/4 in Resapuvanipalem village is covered by road widening and LW-8 re-verified and issued his report addressing to the Joint Collector, Visakhapatnam vide Rc.No.A/4/339/2008 confirming the same. During the course of investigation, LW-12, Assistant Registrar of Companies, Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad submitted the material vide No.RAP/CC/1671/2008-2009 dt.24.12.2008 in the matter of M/s.Ushodaya Enterprises Private Limited that, Cherukuri Ramojirao was the Chairman cum Managing Director of Ushodaya Publications, while Atluri Ramamohanarao was the Director and Cherukuri Kiran was the Managing Director and Cherukuri Suman was the Managing Director and Indukuri Venkat was the Whole Time Director and Gajjala Srinivas was the Secretary. During the course of investigation, LW-14 issued the original file No.D.Dis No.37/85 PS dt.04.05.1985 containing 18 Cf and 1 Nf, Rc.No.923/2008, E2 dt.26.02.09. During the investigation, LW-15 submitted his report vide Rc.No.923/2008, E2, dt.17.05.2010 that the available record in connection with file No.37/85 PS dated 17.4.1985 was already sent to the police for investigation and that the letter dt.17.01.1985 from the Director Eenadu, Visakhapatnam-13 was sent to the then Tahasildar, Visakhapatnam, by the then collector, Visakhapatnam vide letter dt.21.02.1985 and the 05-03-2008 then Tahasildar, Visakhapatnam submitted a report vide his letter Rc.No.1117/1985, dt.06.04.1985. The request of the applicant was discussed in para 1 of the report of Tahasildar, Visakhapatnam and it is available at page 7 of the disposal and secondly, the files closed as D.Dis shall remain in the records only up to a period of 10 years. The request of the applicant was discussed in para 1 of the report of Tahasildar, Visakhapatnam and it is available at page 7 of the disposal and secondly, the files closed as D.Dis shall remain in the records only up to a period of 10 years. According to the information available, the file bearing No.5740/1986 was closed on 15.01.1987 as D.Disposal. As such, the life time of the file was over by 14.01.1997 and it is not traceable. The facts and circumstances, i.e., handovering the land to Government without the knowledge of LW-1 and further correspondence made by the accused, A-1 to A-3 with revenue officials by falsely representing that as if they are the owners of the land in S.No.50/4 and correspondence regarding getting the land clearly shows the fraudulent and dishonest intention of accused at the time of making false representation. As per the documentary evidence of LWs.2 to 8, it is evidenced that the accused had wrongful gained from the government and caused wrongful loss to LW-1 and they are well established with the available documentary evidence. As per the survey reports, the accused are still in possession of the same and the accused not only cheated the LW-1, but also dishonestly induced the government to deliver the property in Survey No.52. The fraudulent and dishonest and criminal intention of accused was well proved in a number of circumstances such as (1) at the time of handing over the land to Government for road formation (2) Making false representation as if the accused are the absolute owners of the leased land, (3) obtaining the possession of property with dishonest intention and false representation (4) Paying the amounts through challan for wrong full gain (5) Keeping the LW-1 in dark forever without allowing him to know the fact. The accused A2 and A-3 shared the fraudulent dishonest and criminal intention of A-1 in the commission of offence. Thus, A-1 and A-3 through A-2 fraudulently deprived the LW-1 of land over an extent of 872 Sq.Mts. in Sy.No.52 and also his due as absolute owner of the land in S.No.50/4 and thereby caused wrongful loss to LW-1 and Government and wrongful gain to themselves. 05-03-2008 The Assistant Director, District Survey and Land Records, Visakhapatnam, forwarded a report together with a sketch pertaining to survey of lands in survey No.50/4 & 52 of Resapuvanipalem village. in Sy.No.52 and also his due as absolute owner of the land in S.No.50/4 and thereby caused wrongful loss to LW-1 and Government and wrongful gain to themselves. 05-03-2008 The Assistant Director, District Survey and Land Records, Visakhapatnam, forwarded a report together with a sketch pertaining to survey of lands in survey No.50/4 & 52 of Resapuvanipalem village. According to this report the total extent of land in survey No.50/4 (the schedule property) is Ac.2.78 cents of which Ac.0.07 cents is covered by road widening and an extent of Ac.2.71 cents, the remaining land is covered by the Eenadu Press. In survey No.52 the extent is Ac.4.26 cents belonging to Rudrabatla Jagannadham, of which an extent of Ac.0.23 cents is covered by Eenadu Press and the balance extent of Ac.4.03 cents covered by a built-up area in survey No.52/2. The report states that originally layout plan T.P.No.54/69 and 10/71 were prepared for survey No.52 wherein Ac.0.13 cents in survey No.52 adjacent to plot No.8 was shown as vacant land which vests in the Government. Subsequently, the layout plan was revised by the VUDA vide LP No.28/91. During this revision the open space in Ac.0.13 cents in survey No.52, adjacent to plot No.8 and Ac.0.10 cents in plot No.8 (totally Ac.0.23 cents) is not shown as vacant land but as belonging to Eenadu Press. The report concludes by stating that as at present Ac.2.71 cents in survey No.50/4b and Ac.0.23 cents in survey No.52/1 (a total of Ac.2.94 cents) is under occupation of Eenadu press. Summary of the competing positions: 31. In the context and the sequence of events adverted to above it is apparent that the petitioners -the plaintiffs in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and respondents in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, seek to amend the plaint and counter, respectively. While a clutch of amendments (to the original pleadings) are sought, the crucial amendments are (a) for correction of the extent of the lease demised property and (b) to plead some of the circumstances in which 872 sq.mts. land was assigned to the second petitioner by the Government; land claimed by the petitioners to be adjacent to the lease demised property on the eastern aspect. 32. In O.S.No.212 of 2007 issues were framed and re-framed by the Trial Court on 27-04-2009, 14-12-2009 respectively and finally settled by this Court by the judgment dated 12-04-2010 in C.R.P.No.90 of 2010. land was assigned to the second petitioner by the Government; land claimed by the petitioners to be adjacent to the lease demised property on the eastern aspect. 32. In O.S.No.212 of 2007 issues were framed and re-framed by the Trial Court on 27-04-2009, 14-12-2009 respectively and finally settled by this Court by the judgment dated 12-04-2010 in C.R.P.No.90 of 2010. Whether this amounts to commencement of the trial is in issue. The revision petitioners contend that mere framing of issues does not amount to commencement of trial. The respondent-landlord asserts that it does and therefore the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC comes into operation. 33. It is admitted that the application for amendments to the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 was filed after issues were settled and the suit scheduled for trial; and in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, admittedly after commencement of trial i.e., after issues were settled and affidavit-in-chief on behalf of the landlord was filed. In O.S.No.212 of 2007, while the petitioners contend that trial of the suit has not commenced and mere framing of issues without leading of evidence would not amount to commencement of trial; the respondent-landlord per contra asserts that mere framing of the issues constitutes commencement of trial; that the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 therefore applies; and the application for amendment of the plaint must therefore satisfy the requirements of the proviso. 34. In C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 the respondent-landlord asserts that the revision is not maintainable under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act and cannot also be converted or considered as a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners while equivocally conceding the position that this revision under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act may not be maintainable asserts that it could be considered as a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution. The revision petitioners have filed C.R.P.C.M.P.No.4904 of 2011 for conversion of this revision as a one presented under Article 227 of the Constitution. 35. The revision petitioners have filed C.R.P.C.M.P.No.4904 of 2011 for conversion of this revision as a one presented under Article 227 of the Constitution. 35. The petitioners assert that even if the applications for amendment (of the plaint and of the counter in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, respectively), require to be considered in the light of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17, the amendments must be ordered since these could not be moved before commencement of the trial, despite due diligence; they were filed soon after the petitioners obtained clear knowledge of the extent of the lease demised property; that the applications for amendment could not be filed earlier on account of pre-occupation of the first revision petitioner with other concerns; and that in any case permitting the amendments would not seriously prejudice the respondent-landlord. 36. The landlord contends that the applications are filed mala fide, to wriggle out of the piquant situation arising from the charges framed against the petitioners and another in C.C.No.394 of 2010 (pending trial), before the Court of the IV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam; if the amendments are allowed that would enable the petitioners to bolster a defence in the criminal case; that despite clear knowledge of the true extent of the lease demised property, notice of the unequivocal stand of the landlord on the issues, and assertion of such extent in several formal proceedings filed and declarations made by the petitioners before public authorities on earlier occasions, the petitioners did not choose to seek amendment of the pleadings; and further that as one of the grounds for the landlord seeking dismissal of O.S.No.212 of 2007 (filed for specific performance of a term in a lease agreement for renewal of lease) and eviction of the petitioners/tenants in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, is that the petitioners mala fide and consciously denied the title of the landlord to a part of the property and surrendered a part of the lease demised property to the Government and illegally obtained assignment of Government land partly in exchange of property illegally surrendered, allowing of the application for amendment of pleadings would occasion him serious prejudice. 37. On the competing and combative positions between the parties adverted to above, the following issues fall for consideration : (a)whether C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011, a revision presented under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, is maintainable? 37. On the competing and combative positions between the parties adverted to above, the following issues fall for consideration : (a)whether C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011, a revision presented under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act, is maintainable? (b)if not so maintainable, whether could be considered an application under Article 227 of the Constitution? (c)whether the applications for amendment (of the plaint and counter in the civil suit and rent control case) require to be considered under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC since the trial has commenced. If so whether, discretion was wrongly exercised by the Court in rejecting the applications for amendments? 38. It is appropriate to take up the Issue-A regarding the maintainability of C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 in the first instance. ISSUE – A 39. Section-22 of the Rent Control Act reads : 22. Revision :- (1) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under this Act by the Controller in execution under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2)The costs of and incident to all proceedings, before the High Court under sub-section (1), shall be in its discretion. 40. The scope of this provision was considered in several precedents of this Court including Pasupuleti Krishna Murthy v. Smt. Bondili Bhavani Bai ((1985) 2 ALT 421); M. Nagender Rao v. B.M. Lakshmiah ( 1996 (1) ALD 964 ); Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. T.V.N. Prasad ( 1998 (3) ALD 672 ); and Mohd. Gousuddin v. Shahjahan and another ( 2000 (3) ALT 423 ). This Court consistently interpreted the provisions of Section 22 as excluding the revisional remedy against orders other than those specified in the provision and in particular against orders of the Rent Controller ruling on an application seeking amendment of the pleadings. 41. It requires to be noticed that all the above decisions were specifically in respect of applications of tenants seeking amendment of counters in Rent Control cases filed for their eviction, which having been rejected by the Rent Controller, revisions under Section 22 were filed, and held to be not maintainable. 42. 41. It requires to be noticed that all the above decisions were specifically in respect of applications of tenants seeking amendment of counters in Rent Control cases filed for their eviction, which having been rejected by the Rent Controller, revisions under Section 22 were filed, and held to be not maintainable. 42. The revision under Section-22 of the Rent Control Act is therefore not maintainable. Faced with the clear and unambiguous phraseology of Section-22 and the unvarying precedential authority, Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned counsel, fairly admitted the position that the revision would not be maintainable. He contended that an application for conversion of this revision into one under Article 227 of the Constitution is being filed and since there could be no bar to such conversion; or consideration of the validity of the impugned order of the Rent Control Court, in an application under Article 227, the revision may be considered on merits, as one presented under Article 227. ISSUE – B 44. On behalf of the landlord reliance is placed on the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai ( (1987) 1 SCC 183 ) to contend that if the revision presented under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act is not maintainable it could not be considered as a revision presented under Article 227 either. On facts the appellant before the Supreme Court was a tenant. The respondent-landlord had filed an application under Section 17 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control ) Act, 1965 seeking conversion of the non-residential building to a residential building. This application was rejected by the Accommodation Controller. Thereafter, the landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant on the ground of bona fide need of the premises apart from alleging default in rent. The primary Tribunal dismissed the landlord’s petition for eviction on finding no bona fide need and the appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The landlord’s revision thereagainst was also dismissed by the District Court. The landlord thereupon moved the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC. The High Court reversed the concurrent rulings by the Courts below and directed eviction of the appellant-tenant. Inter alia it was contended before the Supreme Court that a revision under Section 115 of CPC was not maintainable. After analyses of the relevant statutory provisions, the apex Court concluded that revision under Section 115 CPC was not maintainable. The High Court reversed the concurrent rulings by the Courts below and directed eviction of the appellant-tenant. Inter alia it was contended before the Supreme Court that a revision under Section 115 of CPC was not maintainable. After analyses of the relevant statutory provisions, the apex Court concluded that revision under Section 115 CPC was not maintainable. It was alternatively contended on behalf of the respondent-landlord that in that event the matter be remanded to the High Court for consideration of the landlord’s revision as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. In this context the following observation (on which reliance is placed on behalf of the respondent-landlord herein), was recorded by the Supreme Court : ...A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is different from revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two procedures are not interchangeable though there are some common features. It must, however, be emphasized that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act. 45. In Aundal Ammal (supra) the Court while observing that procedures under Section 115 CPC and Article 227 of the Constitution are not interchangeable though there are some common features; emphasized that it was not dealing with the Constitutional powers of the Court under Article 227. In Col. Anil Kak (retd.) v. Municipal Corpn., Indore and others ( (2005) 12 SCC 734 ), the facts were that the respondents initially filed a revision under Section 115 CPC before the High Court challenging the order of the first appellate court modifying an order of injunction granted by the trial court. The High Court having held that no revision under Section 115 CPC could be entertained since an order of injunction was interlocutory in nature. The High Court having held that no revision under Section 115 CPC could be entertained since an order of injunction was interlocutory in nature. Respondents sought conversion of the revision into a petition under Article 227. This plea was allowed. This decision was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that in the circumstances the High Court rightly decided to permit the revision petitioners before it to convert the proceedings as one under Article 227 of the Constitution; and that the Court could have even done it on its own even without a motion in that behalf by the petitioner. 46. The jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right by any party, vide Nilkanth v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1962 SC 1135 ); State v. Navjot Sandhu ( (2003) 6 SCC 641 ); SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. ( 2005(8) SCC 618 ). The power could also be exercised suo moto, vide Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. Ram Talel Ramanand ( AIR 1972 SC 1598 ). As observed in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai ( (2003) 6 SCC 675 ), the jurisdiction under Article 227 does not extend to assumption of an unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardships, wrong decisions or error of law or facts. Only in cases where there is a grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, can the Court exercise power under this Article. Further, when the Court below exercises a discretion giving valid reasons, no interference is called for – Subodh Kumar Gupta v. Alpana Gupta ( (2005) 11 SCC 578 ). This principle is expressed in another way viz.; that even if another view is possible than the view taken by the Court or Tribunal below interference would not be justified unless a case of perversity or patent unreasonableness of the decision is made out – State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe ( (1977) 2 SCC 724 ). This principle is expressed in another way viz.; that even if another view is possible than the view taken by the Court or Tribunal below interference would not be justified unless a case of perversity or patent unreasonableness of the decision is made out – State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe ( (1977) 2 SCC 724 ). Jurisdiction could also be exercised where a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which did not have; has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have; or though jurisdiction were available had exercised it in a manner not permitted by law and consequently failure of justice or grave injury is occasioned thereby – Securities Exchange Board of India v. Arihant Cotsyn Ltd. ((2005) 3 SCC 498). Underlying the various nuances of the jurisdiction (under Article 227) illustrated by the above decisions is the generic principle that power under this Article cannot be used as an appellate or revisional power; it is supervisory in nature - Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquin ( (1983) 4 SCC 566 ); Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao ( (2000) 7 SCC 522 ); Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosu Khan Samadkhan Sindhi ( (2010) 1 SCC 234 ); and Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle ( (2010) 2 SCC 432 ). 47. In the light of the above delineated contours of the jurisdiction under Article 227, it is legitimate to conclude that even if the revision (C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011) presented under Section-22 of the Rent Control Act is not maintainable the validity of the impugned order could be verified by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; whether on the application of a party or even suo moto. 48. The revision petitioners have filed C.R.P.C.M.P.No.4904 of 2011 seeking conversion of C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 (filed under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act), to one under Article 227 of the Constitution. This application on the analyses above, is allowed; C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 would be considered on merits. ISSUE – C Analyses of curial authority and scope of the Court’s discretion in allowing amendment of pleadings (whether plaint/petition or written statement/counter) Order VI – Rule 17 CPC reads : 17. Amendment of pleadings. This application on the analyses above, is allowed; C.R.P.No.2629 of 2011 would be considered on merits. ISSUE – C Analyses of curial authority and scope of the Court’s discretion in allowing amendment of pleadings (whether plaint/petition or written statement/counter) Order VI – Rule 17 CPC reads : 17. Amendment of pleadings. --The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 50. Scope of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC and when trial is said to commence : When does trial commence ? (a) In Kailash v. Nanhku and others ( (2005) 4 SCC 480 ) (bench comprising three learned judges – per R.C. Lahoti, C.J.), in the context of an election petition presented under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Court considered the issue when the trial of an election petition commences. The Court observed : 13. In a civil suit, the trial begins when issues are framed and the case is set down for recording of evidence. All the proceedings before that stage are treated as proceedings preliminary to trial or for making the case ready for trial. (b) In Baldev Singh and others v. Manohar Singh and another ( (2006) 6 SCC 498 ) (a Bench of two learned judges – per Tarun Chatterjee, J), after noticing the provisions of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC as amended in 2002 observed that on examination of the record of the civil appeal before it, the trial of the suit had not commenced. The Court observed that it appears from the records that the parties have yet to file their documentary evidence in the suit and the suit was not on the verge of conclusions. The Court observed that it appears from the records that the parties have yet to file their documentary evidence in the suit and the suit was not on the verge of conclusions. The Court observed : …That apart, commencement of trial as used in proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of documents and addressing of arguments. As noted hereinbefore, parties are yet to file their documents, we do not find any reason to reject the application for amendment of the written statement in view of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC which confers wide power and unfettered discretion to the court to allow an amendment of the written statement at any stage of the proceedings. It requires to be noticed that the judgment (of the three Judges Bench) in Kailash (supra) was not noticed and has not been referred to in recording the above observations. (c) In Ajendraprasadji and another v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji and others ((2006) 12 SCC Page 1) (Bench comprising of two learned judges – per A.R.Lakshmanan, J), the appellants were aggrieved by the judgment of the Gujarat High Court rejecting the special civil application against an order of the trial court rejecting their application for relief to amend the written statement. The application for amendment of the written statement was concurrently rejected relying upon the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC and on the view that the appellants failed to establish due diligence, since the application was filed after commencement of the trial. The Supreme Court rejected the civil appeal observing that the appellants lack bona fides; that despite opposition of the contesting respondents the pleas now sought to be raised were not taken in the written statement; the amendments seek to introduce a totally new and inconsistent case; that the application for amendment was filed after issues were settled; the suit was posted for recording of evidence of the plaintiffs; the affidavit deposition of the first plaintiff was filed into the Court and recording of evidence had begun. In para-57, the Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Kailash and observed : …Either treating the date of settlement of issues as date of commencement of trial or treating the filing of affidavit which is treated as examination-in-chief as date of commencement of trial, the matter will fall under proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. (d) In Brij Ballabh Sharma v. Smt. Pushpa Parihar (2006 (4) Civil Court Cases 455) a learned Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court rejected an appeal by the tenant against the order of a learned single judge rejecting the writ petition of a tenant preferred against the order of the Rent Tribunal rejecting his application for amendment of the written statement, under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. In dismissing the appeal the Rajasthan High Court held that since issues were framed and the suit fixed for evidence, the application (for amendment) could be considered a device to delay the trial; the Rent Control Act contemplates time-bound disposal of suits; and in the circumstances rejection of the application for amendment of the pleadings is neither arbitrary nor illegal. The appeal was dismissed. (e) In Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another ( (2009) 2 SCC 409 ) (Bench comprising two learned Judges – per S.B. Sinha, J) the issue whether pleadings could be directed to be amended after hearing of a case begins, was revisited. On a consideration of several earlier precedents on this issue, the Court ruled that the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC is couched in a mandatory form : …The Court’s jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the conditions precedent therefore are satisfied viz. it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial The Court clearly held that the date on which the issues were framed is the date of the first hearing and further that filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the witness would amount to commencement of proceedings. It was further observed that in Ajendraprasadji‘s case (supra) the ratio in Kailash was reiterated to state that trial is deemed to commence when the issues are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence. It was further observed that in Ajendraprasadji‘s case (supra) the ratio in Kailash was reiterated to state that trial is deemed to commence when the issues are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence. The Court also distinguished the decision in Baldev Singh (supra) and observed that this decision was not in authority for the proposition that trial would not be deemed to have commenced on the date of first hearing. (f) In Union of India and others v. Major General Madal Lal Yadav ( (1996) 4 SCC 127 ) (Bench comprising of three learned judges – per K. Ramaswamy, J), an issue falling under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was not directly in issue. The question before the Court was whether the limitation of six months prescribed for commencement of trial of an offender who ceases to be subject to the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, would apply and when trial in a Court Martial commences. 51. In the considered view of this Court, the distillate of the precedents referred to above posits the principle that trial in a suit must be regarded as commenced on the framing of issues. Consequently the trial in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 is held, to have commenced before the respective applications for amendments to the plaint and counter were filed, by the petitioners herein. The scope and effect of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 : (a)In Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand ( AIR 2008 SC 2234 ) (Bench comprising two learned judges – per P. Sathasivam, J), the Court succinctly explained the object of the 2002 amendatory exercise introducing the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC: 10. The entire object of the said amendment is to stall filing of applications for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties had sufficient knowledge of the other’s case. It also helps in checking the delays in filing the applications. Once, the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. In spite of the same, an exception is made in the newly inserted proviso where it is shown that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise a plea, it is for the court to consider the same. Once, the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. In spite of the same, an exception is made in the newly inserted proviso where it is shown that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise a plea, it is for the court to consider the same. Therefore, it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertaining of any later application. As stated earlier, the reason for adding proviso is to curtail delay and expedite hearing of cases. The Court also explained that the discretion of the Court in allowing an application for amendment of the pleadings after commencement of trial is conditioned by the need to be satisfied as to the existence of due diligence. The Court observed that due diligence means reasonable diligence, as a prudent person would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. The appeal was dismissed. (b) In P.A. Jayalakshmi v. H. Saradha and others ( (2009) 14 SCC 525 ) (Bench comprising two learned judges – per S.B. Sinha, J), the scope of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 was again considered. The appellant before the Supreme Court was the defendant in the suit for partition filed in 2004. She filed her written statement on 07-04-2006. In March, 2007, she filed an application for relief to file an additional written statement which was dismissed by the Trial Court and the said decision approved in a revision, by the Madras High Court. Though the application for relief to file additional written statement was filed under Order 8 Rule 9 CPC before the Supreme Court the counsel for the appellant urged that the application should have been considered and treated as one for amendment of the written statement presented under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The Supreme Court while observing that the appellant would have filed the application under Order 8 Rule 9 CPC with a view to obviate the Bar under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17, proceeded to analyse the scope of discretion of the Court and allowing amendments and pleadings and particular applications filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The analyses by the Court on this aspect is instructive : 13. The analyses by the Court on this aspect is instructive : 13. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the courts should be liberal in allowing applications for leave to amend pleadings but it is also well settled that the courts must bear in mind the statutory limitations brought about by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Acts; the proviso appended to Order 6 Rule 17 being one of them. In North Eastern Railway Admn. V. Bhagwan Das the law has been laid down by this Court in the following terms : (SCC p.517, para16) “16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. (Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar)” 14. Yet again, in Bollepanda P. Poonacha v. K.M. Madapa, the law is laid down in the following terms : (SCC pp.183-84, para 15) “15. A belated counterclaim must be discouraged by this Court. (See Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani). We are, however, not unmindful of the decisions of this Court where a defendant has been allowed to amend his written statement so as to enable him to elaborate his defence or to take additional pleas in support of his case. The Court in such matters has a wide discretion. It must, however, subserve the ultimate cause of justice. It may be true that further litigation should be endeavoured to be avoided. It may also be true that joinder of several causes of action in a suit is permissible. The Court, must, however, exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious manner. The Court in such matters has a wide discretion. It must, however, subserve the ultimate cause of justice. It may be true that further litigation should be endeavoured to be avoided. It may also be true that joinder of several causes of action in a suit is permissible. The Court, must, however, exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious manner. While considering that subservance of justice is the ultimate goal, the statutory limitation shall not be overstepped. Grant of relief will depend upon the factual background involved in each case. The Court, while undoubtedly would take into consideration the questions of serious injustice or irreparable loss, but nevertheless should bear in mind that a provision for amendment of pleadings is not available as a matter of right under all circumstances. One cause of action cannot be allowed to be substituted by another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in earlier pleadings shall not be permitted to be taken away. (See State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders, Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Himmat Singh v. ICI India Ltd.)” (emphasis supplied) 15. Yet again, in Vidyabai v. Padmalatha this Court upon taking into consideration the effect of the insertion of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 held as under : (SCC pp. 413 & 416, paras 10 & 19) “10. By reason of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002), Parliament inter alia inserted a proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, which reads as under : ‘Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” It is couched in a mandatory form. The court’s jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the conditions precedent therefore are satisfied viz. it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. 19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed. 19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed. However, proviso appended to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code restricts the power of the court. It puts an embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus, unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found to be existing, the court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint.” The appeal was dismissed with costs. (c) In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others ( (2009) 10 SCC 84 )(Bench comprising two learned judges – per Dalveer Bhandari, J), the appellant filed the suit against the respondent (defendant Nos.1 to 10) for recovery of a specified sum of money with interest, from the date of filing of the suit till payment and claimed to be declared absolute owner of the schedule property on the basis of a sale deed dated 30-09-1987. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking certain amendments in the plaint; to add two additional paragraphs 2(A) & 2(B), a few prayers; for deletion of certain paragraphs in the plaint and deletion of prayers (a), (b) & (c). The trial court allowed the application for amendment which was however reversed by the High Court. The Supreme Court concurred that the application for amendment be rejected. After a detailed analyses of English and Indian authority on the aspect, the Court summarized the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with an application for amendments : 63. The trial court allowed the application for amendment which was however reversed by the High Court. The Supreme Court concurred that the application for amendment be rejected. After a detailed analyses of English and Indian authority on the aspect, the Court summarized the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with an application for amendments : 63. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment : (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 53. The Court also clarified that a decision on an application for amendment is a serious judicial exercise and should never be undertaken in a casual manner. While deciding an application for amendment, Courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments. Resultantly, the Court dismissed the appeal and the application for amendment with costs of Rs.1,00,000/-. 54. Since this Court has concluded earlier herein, that trial in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 has commenced before applications for amendment of the plaint and counter in these causes were filed by the petitioners herein, it requires to be considered whether the amendments applications satisfy requirements of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17. The proviso enjoins a restriction on the plenitude of discretion consecrated in the Court, to allow parties to alter or amend pleadings at any stage of the proceedings – the discretion conferred by the main part of Rule 17 of Order VI. The proviso enjoins a restriction on the plenitude of discretion consecrated in the Court, to allow parties to alter or amend pleadings at any stage of the proceedings – the discretion conferred by the main part of Rule 17 of Order VI. The proviso requires the Court to record a conclusion that the party seeking amendments could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial, despite due diligence. The recording of such conclusion by the Court is a condition precedent to legitimate exercise of the discretion to allow amendment of pleadings, when sought after commencement of trial. 55. In the orders impugned (in C.R.P.Nos.2623 & 2629 of 2011), the Courts below have clearly and unequivocally concluded and correctly that trial has commenced (in the respective proceedings) and the totality of circumstances (referred to in the respective orders) disclose clear and conscious knowledge of the facts now sought to be pleaded even at the time plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and the counter in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 were filed, by the petitioners herein. 56. In the light of the facts, circumstances and the relevant material on record referred to herein before, it is clear that the petitioners (who are plaintiffs in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and respondents in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007) have clear and anterior knowledge of the two crucial aspects on which amendments of the pleadings is sought. These two aspects are : (a) that the extent of the lease demised property is not 9,200 sq.mts. as unequivocally pleaded in the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and in the counter in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 but is a larger extent of Ac.2.71 cents or Ac.2.78 cents, as the case may be; and (b) the entirety of circumstances leading to the assignment of land of 872 sq.mts. by the Government in favour of the second revision petitioner. 57. With regard to the extent of the lease demised property (in the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007) the extent is mentioned as 11,000 sq.yds. or approximately 9,200 sq.mts.; that the second plaintiff had applied to the ULC authorities for exemption under Section-20 and exemption was granted in G.O.Ms.No.425, dated 01-03-1978 wherein also the extent is mentioned as 9,200 sq.mts. The plaintiffs specifically averred that as the area under occupation under the lease was inadequate and the plaintiffs needed additional area they approached the Government for assignment of 827 sq.mts. The plaintiffs specifically averred that as the area under occupation under the lease was inadequate and the plaintiffs needed additional area they approached the Government for assignment of 827 sq.mts. lying to the rear side boundary and an internal road adjoining layout; this was favourably considered and by proceedings dated 17-04-1985 land was allotted. 58. The material on record reveals : (i) That in the lease deed dated 30-03-1974 the scheduled property described as of an extent of approximately 11,000 sq.yds. or approximately 9,200 sq.mts.; and not 11,000 sq.yds or approximately 9,200 sq.mts. The schedule to the lease deed reiterates this position; (ii) The first plaintiff (in O.S.No.212 of 2007) in the declaration signed and filed by him on 14-09-1976 before the ULC authorities enumerated the lease demised property as an extent of 2,286.23 sq.mts. occupied by buildings, the area allowed for enjoinment of the structures as 1143.00 sq.mts; and vacant land as 9,200 sq.mts.; (iii) In the plan submitted by or on behalf of the second plaintiff to the Directorate of Factories, Andhra Pradesh, which was approved by the Directorate in proceedings dated 29-10-1986 detailed measurements of the lease demised property are set out which disclose an extent much in excess of 9,200 sq.mts.; (iv) In the revised plan approved by the Directorate of Factories on 30-10-1992 (to which the Director of the second plaintiff is a signatory) the area of the plot is recorded as 11,118.02 sq.mts.; (v) Nonetheless, in the letter dated 27-09-2006 addressed by the first plaintiff to the landlord (seeking renewal of the lease) the extent of the lease demised property is described as 9,200 sq.mts. (not approximate); (vi) In the landlord’s response dated 20-10-2006 to the above notice it was clearly asserted that the extent is 11,034.78 sq.mts. (not approximate); (vi) In the landlord’s response dated 20-10-2006 to the above notice it was clearly asserted that the extent is 11,034.78 sq.mts. or Ac.2.70 cents and objection is taken to the description of the extent of the property being 9,200 sq.mts.; (vii) On 17-03-2007 another plan submitted by the second plaintiff for approval of the Directorate of Factories was approved and the plan annexed to these proceedings signed by the Managing Director of the second plaintiff as well again sets out dimensions of the scheduled property; (viii) In Criminal Petition No.7399 of 2007 filed before this Court by the plaintiffs and another accused (in Crime No.1160 of 2007 on the file of the III Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam), for quashing of the FIR it is specifically pleaded that the first respondent (the landlord) is the owner of land and structures thereon, of an extent of Ac.2.70 cents, equivalent to 11,034.78 sq.mts. and that out of this extent only 9,200 sq.mts. or 11,000 sq.yds. was granted in lease to the first petitioner (the first plaintiff). This assertion is reiterated at another place in this Criminal Petition; (ix) The above assertions are reiterated by the plaintiffs again in Criminal Petition No.117 of 2008, filed before this Court, seeking anticipatory bail in Crime No.1160 of 2007. 59. From the several facts and circumstances, some of which are adverted to above, it is clear that the petitioners had clear knowledge of the extent of the lease demised property, even earlier to the notices issued seeking renewal of the lease and earlier to the institution of O.S.No.212 of 2007. 60. A similar factual scenario operates in respect of R.C.C.No.41 of 2007. In the Rent Control case the landlord-petitioner specifically sought eviction on the ground that the (respondents/petitioners herein) denied his title and he clearly pleaded that the extent of the lease demised property is 11,034.78 sq.mts. but was however mentioned in the registered lease deed as approximately 11,000 sq.mts. or approximately 9,000 sq.mts. In the counter filed by the petitioners herein (the respondents) it was categorically asserted that even in the application for exemption filed under the Land Ceiling legislation, the second petitioner herein had shown the extent as 9,200 sq.mts. only, for seeking exemption. 61. but was however mentioned in the registered lease deed as approximately 11,000 sq.mts. or approximately 9,000 sq.mts. In the counter filed by the petitioners herein (the respondents) it was categorically asserted that even in the application for exemption filed under the Land Ceiling legislation, the second petitioner herein had shown the extent as 9,200 sq.mts. only, for seeking exemption. 61. In the facts and circumstances the petitioners cannot gainfully contend that they obtained clarity about the actual extent of the lease demised property, only after the report dated 05-03-2008 of the Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records, Visakhapatnam was filed by the landlord in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007. Since the petitioners had clear anterior knowledge, of the actual extent of the lease demised property but have failed to establish that this could not be pleaded before commencement of trial, the applications for amendments, of the plaint and counter in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and R.C.C.No.41 of 2007 cannot be allowed, in view of the bar on exercise of discretion by the Court, enjoined by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17. 62. Insofar as the true and relevant facts relating to the assignment of land of an extent of 872 sq.yds. (by the Government in favour of the second revision petitioner is concerned), the petitioners cannot contend that all the relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to this transaction were not within their knowledge, by the time they filed the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 or the counter in R.C.C.No.41 of 2007; or at any time before commencement of trial; 1. The assignment of 872. sq.mts. in favour of Eenadu was on the application dated 17-01-1985 by the second petitioner; 2. The Collector, Visakhapatnam, ordered handing over of 872 sq.mts. to the Director, Eenadu, by proceedings dated 17-04-1985; 3. In proceedings dated 25-10-1986 the Collector referred to the request on behalf of the second petitioner to treat 517 sq.mts. (given on 11-01-1985 of its own property for road formation) as exchange for part of the 872 sq.mts. allotted to it, in Collector’s proceedings dated 17-04-1985; and 4. On 12-02-1982 and 31-01-1992 amounts were paid to the State by the second petitioner for the extent of land allotted to it. 63. (given on 11-01-1985 of its own property for road formation) as exchange for part of the 872 sq.mts. allotted to it, in Collector’s proceedings dated 17-04-1985; and 4. On 12-02-1982 and 31-01-1992 amounts were paid to the State by the second petitioner for the extent of land allotted to it. 63. Since all the above facts are clearly known to and within the knowledge of the petitioners long prior to O.S.No.212 of 2007 and R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, the petitioners cannot seek amendments now on the plea that these facts could not be pleaded in the first instance or earlier to commencement of trial, despite due diligence. 64. On the aforesaid analyses, I.A.No.2350 of 2010 and I.A.No.198 of 2010 filed in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and R.C.C.No.41 of 2007, for amendment of the plaint and written statement in the above proceedings, respectively are liable to be rejected qua the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The orders dated 08-06-2011 and 18-04-2011 passed by the learned XI Addl. District and Sessions (Fast Track) Court, Visakhapatnam and the learned Rent Controller-cum-IVAddl. Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, rejecting the above applications suffer from no infirmity warranting supervisory intervention under Article 227 of the Constitution. 65. Consequently, C.R.P.Nos.2623 and 2629 of 2011 merit rejection. Tr.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 : 66. The petitioners in the other two revisions, seek transfer of O.S.No.212 of 2007 from the Court of the IX Addl. District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Visakhapatnam to the Court of the Principal District Judge or any Addl. District and Sessions Judge, at Visakhapatnam, alleging bias and pre-judgment by the Court below. 67. The basis for the petitioners’ apprehensions of bias and pre-judgment by the Court below, in respect of the issues pending adjudication in O.S.No.212 of 2007, are certain observations and findings recorded in the order dated 08-06-2011 whereby the application of the petitioners herein (I.A.No.2350 of 2010 -which was filed for amendment of the plaint in the suit) was rejected. In paras 7 & 8 of the affidavit accompanying this application, the petitioners set out the observations and findings wherefrom they infer pre-judgment and bias. 68. Certain observations recorded (by the Court below) during analyses of the facts presented and contentions urged in I.A.No.2350 of 2010, in particular those in paragraphs 17 to 19, 21, 22 & 25 of the order dated 08-06-2011 are asserted to be indicative of apprehended bias and pre-judgment. 69. 68. Certain observations recorded (by the Court below) during analyses of the facts presented and contentions urged in I.A.No.2350 of 2010, in particular those in paragraphs 17 to 19, 21, 22 & 25 of the order dated 08-06-2011 are asserted to be indicative of apprehended bias and pre-judgment. 69. It requires to be noticed that in defence to the application presented by the petitioners (for amendments of the plaint), the defendant-landlord had brought on to record and referred to voluminous material which according to the landlord established anterior knowledge of the plaintiffs as to the actual extent of the lease demised property; and the circumstances surrounding assignment by the State Government of 872 sq.mts. in favour of the second plaintiff. The landlord had pleaded that on 13-03-2007 he addressed the first plaintiff to permit him to inspect the suit scheduled property which the plaintiffs equivocally resisted and asked for the date, time and particulars of persons who intend to inspect the property. These exhibits (B.7 & B.8) were cited by the landlord as instances of an unusual conduct by the tenants in response to a request by the landlord to inspect the lease premises. In para-17 of the order, the Court below recorded the inference that the plaintiffs suspected extraneous interest of the landlord in seeking to inspect the leased premises and wanted to guard their interests against any such strategy of the landlord. No inference of bias or pre-judgment or a reasonable apprehension thereof is legitimate, from the observations and analyses set out in para–17. 70. At para-18, the Court below was analyzing exhibits B-11, B12, B13 & B16 which were marshalled by the landlord to contend that 289 sq.mts. of the leased property was surrendered by the plaintiffs-tenants to the State Government and in exchange whereof they obtained 872 sq.mts. by assignment. The landlord pleaded that the plaintiffs failed to establish the circumstances in which the land was given in exchange and which land owned by the plaintiffs was surrendered for the road formation in exchange whereof part of 872 sq.mts. was assigned to it by the State Government. by assignment. The landlord pleaded that the plaintiffs failed to establish the circumstances in which the land was given in exchange and which land owned by the plaintiffs was surrendered for the road formation in exchange whereof part of 872 sq.mts. was assigned to it by the State Government. Though this aspect may not be directly relevant to the claim in O.S.No.212 of 2007 (which was for specific performance of a term in the agreement of lease between the parties), the counsel for the respective parties had expended disproportionate forensic exertions to present to the lower Court the several discordances between the parties; in adjudication of an application for amendment of the plaint. In the circumstances, the Court below proceeded to deal with all the contentions and proceeded to analyse all the material presented before it. 71. Similarly, the judgment in O.S.No.663 of 1988 dated 30-09-1999 (by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, in which the first plaintiff was the second defendant) was also canvassed as indicating a general attitude of the plaintiffs in denying facts clearly within their knowledge with respect to the nature and extent of property belonging to the plaintiffs in that suit as well. This judgment was marked as B-33. In para-19 of its order, the Court below after referring to the contentions on behalf of the landlord merely observed that though Ex.B-33 was not related to the case it is indicative of the attitude of the plaintiffs in respect of the land of others outside the lease demised premises. Exhibit B-33 has no nexus either with the issues arising for consideration in O.S.No.212 of 2007 or I.A.No.2350 of 2010. However, since contentions were urged, the Court below recorded its observations while clearly indicating that there was no relevance to the issue on hand. 72. The petitioners had contended that since the landlord had mentioned the extent of the leased property as 9,200 sq.mts. (in his declaration filed before ULC authorities), he cannot now claim that the extent of the lease demised property is not 9,200 sq.mts. or that it is of any extent in excess thereof. In para-21 of its order, the Court below observed that a statement by the landlord in a declaration before ULC authorities, may not bind him as regards the actual extent of the lease demised property and in respect of a claim of denial of title by the tenants. or that it is of any extent in excess thereof. In para-21 of its order, the Court below observed that a statement by the landlord in a declaration before ULC authorities, may not bind him as regards the actual extent of the lease demised property and in respect of a claim of denial of title by the tenants. Elsewhere in this paragraph referring to exhibit B-38, the Court below observed that the disputes between the parties were being agitated not only in Civil Courts but were the subject matter of criminal processes as well. None of the observations in para-21 (of the order of the Court below) are indicative of prejudgment or bias nor legitimize a reasonable apprehension thereof. 73. In para-22 of the order, the Court below was dealing with the explanation furnished by the plaintiffs for belated filing of an application seeking amendments to the plaint. It was inter alia urged that the first plaintiff was busy managing various businesses and his other preoccupations did not enable filing the applications for amendments, earlier. Responding to this plea, the Court below observed such plea is not available and that in the totality of circumstances the plaintiffs/petitioners did not approach the Court bona fide and even played fraud on R-1. In the considered view of this Court the observations in para-22 can fairly be inferred as emphatic rejection by the lower Court, of the reasons proffered by the plaintiffs for belated filing of the application for amendments; and as a conclusion that the explanation for belated filing of the amendment application, is jejune and not bona fide. 74. In para-25 of the order, the Court below recorded five reasons for disallowing the application for amendments. Nos.1 to 4 are reasons wholly relevant to consideration of an application for amendment of pleadings filed after commencement of trial in the suit, having regard to the mandate of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC and no inference of pre-judgment or bias can be drawn therefrom, even if the reasons recorded be erroneous. The 5th reason recorded by the Court below is : Unduly benefitted at the cost of the property of R-1. This (reason for its conclusion) by the Court below may not strictly be relevant to consideration of an application for amendment of pleadings. The 5th reason recorded by the Court below is : Unduly benefitted at the cost of the property of R-1. This (reason for its conclusion) by the Court below may not strictly be relevant to consideration of an application for amendment of pleadings. It however requires to be noticed that the parties had addressed the Court below at considerable length on the circumstances pertaining to assignment of 872 sq.mts. by the Government to the second plaintiff (on its application). In the documents marshalled by the respondent-landlord (before the Court below) included proceedings of the Collector indicating that the second plaintiff had sought adjustment of 517 sq.mts. (professedly surrendered by the second plaintiff for the formation of a road) and requesting that only the balance extent of land assigned be considered as assigned and for which the second plaintiff was liable to pay the market value to the Government. These documents were marked by the landlord as evidence of illegal surrender of his property by the tenants (plaintiffs), without authority and therefore disentitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. Since there was extensive material marshalled and elaborate arguments advanced by both sides, in the considered view of this Court, the Court below regarded as undue benefit derived by the petitioners at the cost of the landlord’s property as one of the reasons for declining the plaintiffs’ application for amendments to the plaint. It also requires to be noticed that in the totality of the circumstances referred to by the landlord it was contended that the application for amendment of the pleadings by the plaintiffs was dishonest and mala fide as well. 75. Even before this Court (in C.R.P.Nos.2623 & 2629 of 2011) on behalf of the landlord it was contended that applications for amendments of the pleading ought to be rejected as they were mala fide and motivated. The decision in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra) (which was referred to in the Court below as well) is cited to contend that when an application for amendment is mala fide or dishonest, the discretion under Order VI Rule 17 CPC must not be exercised. The Supreme Court while summarizing the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with the applications for amendments observed (in paragraphs 63 & 64 of the SCC report) that the Court should not permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments. 76. The Supreme Court while summarizing the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with the applications for amendments observed (in paragraphs 63 & 64 of the SCC report) that the Court should not permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments. 76. The judgment in Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy and others ( (2010) 8 SCC 383 ) was cited to contend that dishonesty, perpetration of fraud or misrepresentation should not be permitted to bear litigative fruit in favour of perpetrators of fraud, dishonesty and misrepresentation and this principle is equally applicable to a situation where an application for amendment of pleadings is sought. 77. Reliance is placed on another decision of the Supreme Court in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh and others (2010 (5) ALD 97) to contend that whenever a party does not approach the Court with clean hands and seeks aid of the Court, in exercise of discretionary power (this was a case involving condonation of delay), Court should reject the application. 78. Having regard to the concern and intensity with which the revisions were pursued before this Court, it is legitimate to infer that a complementary degree of vehemence, intensity and forensic overkill would have been employed before the Trial Court in pursuing the applications for amendments to the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007 and by the landlord in seeking rejection thereof. In the totality of circumstances, this Court is not persuaded to the view that the observations or findings recorded by the Court below in the order dated 08-06-2011 amount to pre-judgment or bias as regards the issues pending adjudication in the substantive suit or in favour or against any of the parties thereto. We find no basis for a reasonable apprehension by the petitioners, of such bias and pre-judgment either. 79. It is clarified that all the observations and findings by the Court below are in the context of considering the application (I.A.No.2350 of 2010) filed by the petitioners for amendment of the plaint in O.S.No.212 of 2007. None of these observations or findings shall be construed as an expression by the Court below on the merits of the case of the plaintiffs or the defendant, in respect of any of the issues falling for consideration and determination in the suit. 80. On the above analyses, there are no merits and Tr.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 is liable to be rejected. Conclusion : C.R.P.Nos. 80. On the above analyses, there are no merits and Tr.C.M.P.No.453 of 2011 is liable to be rejected. Conclusion : C.R.P.Nos. 2623, 2629 of 2011 and Tr.C.M.P.No. 453 of 2011 are dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. All interim orders granted in these applications shall stand dissolved forthwith.