Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is focussed by the plaintiff, animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 17.08.2010 passed by the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Villupuram in A.S.No.79 of 2009 confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.07.2009 passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Villupuram in O.S.No.169 of 2006. 2. The parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The recapitulation and resume of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: a] The plaintiff filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: “"for specific performance, directing the defendants to execute and register a sale deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of the suit property and on their failure to be done by this Hon'ble Court. to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents or servants from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit property. Or in the alternative to direct the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.90,000/- as damages to the plaintiff with subsequent interest at the rate of 12% per annum till realization and to grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble court may deem fit."” (extracted as such) b] Written statement was filed by D1, which was adapted by D2 to D6. D7, being the purchaser of the suit property, filed a separate written statement. c] Whereupon issues were framed. On the side of the plaintiff, he examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A61 were marked. The first defendant/Balaraman examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W2 Sankar (D7) and marked Exs.B1 to B4.. d] Ultimately the trial court dismissed the suit, as against which, appeal was filed by the plaintiff for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 4. Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the courts below, this Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff on various grounds inter alia to the effect that, “both the courts below failed to consider the deposition of P.W2 the witness to Ex.A6-the agreement to sell and P.W3, the scribe of it. Based on extraneous matters, both the courts below held that Ex.A6 was not a believable document. Based on extraneous matters, both the courts below held that Ex.A6 was not a believable document. Without considering as to whether the signature of D1 is forged one or not, the first appellate court erroneously referred to Section 54 of the Indian Stamp Act and decided the case. The courts below were wrong in holding that Ex.A6 will not bind defendants 2 to 6 the children of D1 even though D1 signed the agreement. The other Exhibits marked viz., Ex.A1 to A5 and A7 to A46 were not at all considered by both the courts below.” As such, the following substantial questions of law are found suggested in the memorandum of second appeal. a. Whether the courts below have erred in holding that Ex.A6 is not valid merely because it is executed in an old stamp paper when there is no bar under Section 54 of the Indian Stamp Act for execution of such a document? b. Whether the courts below have failed to follow the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thiruvengada Pillai vs. Navaneetham Ammal and another, 2008(4) SCC 513, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that there is no impediment for using the old stamp papers for an agreement to sell? c. Whether the courts below are right in holding that Ex.A6 will not be binding on defendants 2 to 6, the sons of 1st defendant, when the first defendant has executed the same in favour of the plaintiff and when the defendants had failed to prove that there was partition in the family? d. Whether the courts below are right to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff without considering the Exs.A1 to A5 and A7 to A46, which would show that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the property? e. Whether the courts below have concurrently erred in not appreciating the oral documentary evidence properly and have drawn wrong inference from proved facts by applying the law erroneously? (extracted as such) 5. After hearing both sides, I have been of the considered view that the following substantial questions of law do arise in the facts and circumstances of this case. 1. Whether the plaintiff discharged his burden of proof to prove that D1 signed Ex.A6, the agreement to sell? 2. (extracted as such) 5. After hearing both sides, I have been of the considered view that the following substantial questions of law do arise in the facts and circumstances of this case. 1. Whether the plaintiff discharged his burden of proof to prove that D1 signed Ex.A6, the agreement to sell? 2. Whether both the courts below committed any error in not taking into consideration the depositions of P.Ws.2 and 3 and other documents filed on the side of the plaintiff and if so whether it would cut at the root of the adjudication? 3. Even if Ex.A6 is found to be a genuine one, whether the plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance of the agreement or only for refund of the amount alleged to have been paid by him in a sum of Rs.50,000/- with interest? 6. Both sides took notice of the same and advanced their respective arguments. 7. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with one another. 8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would put forth and set forth his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: a. The trial court as well as the first appellate court failed to take into consideration the depositions of P.Ws.2 and 3. There is no hard and fast rule that necessarily the disputed signature of D1 in Ex.A6 should be got verified with the help of a handwriting expert. b. Even though D1 alone signed Ex.A6 yet D1 being the Kartha /Manager of the Hindu joint family, the said agreement is binding on the other members of the joint family, viz., D2 to D6. Being the purchaser, D7 cannot have any independent case of his own. c. The agreement entered into by the Manager/Kartha of the Hindu family can be specifically enforced at the instance of the proposed purchaser as the other members cannot question the Kartha's right to alienate the joint family property and if at all they do have any right they have to challenge it in separate proceeding on the ground that it was not sold for family necessity etc. d. Any judgement passed without considering the oral and documentary evidence is required to be set aside in second appeal. d. Any judgement passed without considering the oral and documentary evidence is required to be set aside in second appeal. e. If for any reason, it is taken that whole of the agreement cannot be enforced at least to the extent of D1's share in the suit property may be enforced. 9. By way of buttressing and fortifying his arguments, he cited several decisions, whereby he would pray for setting aside the judgements and decrees of both the courts below and for decreeing the original suit for specific performance in toto in respect of the entire suit property. 10. Piloting the arguments on defendants' side and in a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the plaintiff, the learned advocates for D1 to D6 and D7 in unison would submit thus: (i) Ex.A6 is not at all a genuine document and D1 did not sign it. Both the courts below concurrently gave finding to the effect that the plaintiff did not discharge the burden of proof cast upon him to prove the genuineness of Ex.A6. ii) Simply because both the courts below did not refer to the deposition of P.Ws.1 to 3, the ratiocination adhered to by them in giving their finding that Ex.A6 was not proved cannot be found fault with. iii) In fact, the courts below appropriately and appositely, correctly and legally pointed out that the purported agreement to sell Ex.A6, which was apparently dated 24.10.2005 was found scribed on the stamp paper, which was claimed to have been purchased on 16.04.2003. iv) Absolutely, there is no rhyme or reason on the part of the plaintiff in getting the alleged agreement to sell scribed on such an old stamp paper and this itself is indicative of the fact that after execution of the sale by D1 to D6 in favour of D7, the plaintiff got forged and fabricated Ex.A6 with the help of an old stamp paper, which has to be deprecated in unmistakable terms and both the courts below correctly raised their cudgel as against it and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, warranting no interference in second appeal. v) D1 was not authorised by other co-sharers, viz., D2 to D6 to sell the suit property. At no point of time, D1 to D6 thought of selling the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. v) D1 was not authorised by other co-sharers, viz., D2 to D6 to sell the suit property. At no point of time, D1 to D6 thought of selling the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. vi) The plaintiff cannot seek for piece-meal enforcement of the agreement to sell when the suit property itself is measuring an extent of 20 x 133 ft and over which only a hut is existing. As such, the judgments and decrees of both the courts below, warrants no interference and accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the second appeal. 11. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. (i) (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 – HERO VINOTH (MINOR) VS. SESHAMMAL (ii) 2008(4) SCALE 300 – KASHMIR SINGH VS. HARNAM SINGH AND ANOTHER. (iii) 2009-1-L.W.1 – STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS vs. S.N.GOYAL (iv) (2011) 1 SCC 673 [Vijay Kumar Talwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi], certain excerpts from it would run thus: "19. It is manifest from a bare reading of the section that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in the act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronoucements. 23. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread." It is therefore crystal clear from the mere poring over and perusal of the aforesaid precedents that unless there is any perversity or illegality in the rendering of the finding of facts by both the courts below, the question of interfering by the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not arise. 12. 12. I also recollect and call up the maxims, Affirmantis est probare [He who affirms must prove] (ii) Affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio: The burden of proof lies upon him who asserts and not upon him who denies. Those two sister maxims would exemplify and demonstrate that the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. Here, the plaintiff has come to this court with a positive case of his own to the effect that D1 executed the agreement to sell Ex.A6 in favour of the plaintiff by describing himself as the absolute owner of the suit property, which is described here under: Schedule of Property "In Villupuram Registration Division, Valavanur Sub-Registry at Pattarai Street, Karamanikuppam, Kumarakuppam of Valavanur, G.N.S.No.42A/1-55.49 the ground site measuring about 20 feet in east-west and 133 feet in north-south to an extent of 2660 sq.ft and the mud wall and floor built, thatch roofed house constructed thereon bearing Door No.15 in the plinth area of 20' x 20' to an extent of 400 sq.ft Ward No.10, Tax assessment No.1930. Boundaries: pattarai Street on the south: Sankar Site and house on the west; Pattai on the North ; Mahadevan site on the east." (emphasis supplied) 13. No doubt, there is evidence to the effect that even at the time of emergence of Ex.A6 itself the plaintiff was aware of the fact that the suit property happened to be the ancestral property of the family of D1, that the other co-sharers were also having right over it . D1 gave promise, according to the plaintiff that from his children D2 to D6, he would get their signatures while executing the sale deed and if that be so, I am at a loss to understand as to why the plaintiff did not insist that D1 should obtain the signatures of D2 to D6 in Ex.A6 itself. There is no plausible explanation as to why then in Ex.A6, D1 was allowed to describe himself as the absolute owner of the suit property. 14. I would like to point out that Ex.A6 is ex facie and prima facie, not properly stamped. There is no plausible explanation as to why then in Ex.A6, D1 was allowed to describe himself as the absolute owner of the suit property. 14. I would like to point out that Ex.A6 is ex facie and prima facie, not properly stamped. Reference to Article 5(j) to Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 would indicate and display that since 11.07.2001 an agreement to sell, should bear a stamp of Rs.20/-(Rupees twenty only); whereas here, the agreement to sell Ex.A6 is found scribed on a stamp paper of Rs.10/- only along with three green sheets. No doubt, the defendants should have objected to the marking of it and as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the court ought to have dealt with the matter. 15. Be that as it may, now the High Court has got power to direct the recovery of necessary stamp duty and penalty and there is no fetter on the High Court's power to order collection of the deficit stamp duty and penalty. 16. Simply because, the stamp paper used was purchased in the name of the plaintiff on 16.04.2003 and the agreement itself emerged on 24.10.2005, it cannot be taken as the sole ground for disbelieving the document. No doubt, based on such factor court could look askance at it, when there are other evidences in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiff and whereupon analyse and find out the truth involved in it. Necessarily the trial court should have made reference to the depositions of P.Ws.2 and 3, which they did not do so and it is quite obvious and axiomatic from a mere poring over and perusal of the judgments of both the courts below. 17. The contention on the side of the plaintiff that expert opinion need not be taken, in my opinion, fails to carry conviction with this court. 18. No doubt, in all cases the disputed signature need not be referred to an expert. But, I would like to distinguish between mere 'forgery' from 'clever forgery'. In this connection, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2010 (8) SCC 452 [Kapil Corepacks Private Limited and others vs. Harbans Lal (since deceased) through LRs.] could fruitfully be cited. An excerpt from it would run thus: "23. In this case the appellant-defendants denied having signed/executed any agreement/receipt in favour of the respondents. In this connection, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2010 (8) SCC 452 [Kapil Corepacks Private Limited and others vs. Harbans Lal (since deceased) through LRs.] could fruitfully be cited. An excerpt from it would run thus: "23. In this case the appellant-defendants denied having signed/executed any agreement/receipt in favour of the respondents. In the examination under Order 10 Rule 2, the Court did not ask the second appellant whether he had signed the document or not, by showing the document. What was done was confrontation of a signature alone without disclosing the document. When so confronted, the second appellant admitted the signature shown as his signature. But that is not an admission of execution of agreement/receipt. The specific case of the appellants in the written statement was that the agreement/receipt dated 7-9-2003 was a clever forgery. If a signature is a clever forgery, there is a likelihood of the same passing the normal scrutiny of the person to whom it is attributed. Similar is the position in regard to stamping the name of the company. 24. If a false signature is very different from the real signature, and is easily identifiable, it will be a “forgery” but not a “clever forgery”. Therefore, if the document allegedly containing the forged signature is covered in such a manner as to show only a stamp/seal and signature, and if a question is put by the court under Order 10 Rule 2 to identify the seal/stamp and the signature and if the witness identifies the signature as his and the stamp/seal as that of his company, there are two possibilities: The first is that what is shown is the genuine signature of the party and the genuine stamp of his company, and that he has identified and admitted them. The second is that they are clever forgeries and the party could not obviously identify the forgery when it was shown to him by covering other portions of the document, when he is given only a normal glance without an opportunity to scrutinise it properly. The second is that they are clever forgeries and the party could not obviously identify the forgery when it was shown to him by covering other portions of the document, when he is given only a normal glance without an opportunity to scrutinise it properly. Whether it is a forgery or not will have to be determined with reference to the expert evidence and after the evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendants tested by cross-examination." The Hon'ble Apex Court pointed out that in the case of ordinary forgery even by naked eye one will be able to distinguish and differentiate the features between the admitted signature and the disputed signature. But in the case of 'clever forgery', it is not so. Even though Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the court to compare the disputed signature, with the admitted signature that has to be used cautiously and carefully. But, in this case, even that was not done so by both the courts below. 19. When the parties are fighting at arms length and they are at logger heads and could not see eye to eye, either of the parties might compel his witness to depose in his favour and in such an event, the duty of the court would become onerous to find out whether such oral evidence on the side of that party concerned can be believed or not. In such a situation, if expert opinion is also available, certainly the evidence of the witnesses can be analysed coupled with the expert opinion and a just and discerning judgement could be rendered by the court. 20. As such, I am of the considered opinion that necessarily the signature of D1 in Ex.B1 dated 20.03.2006, can be taken as ante litem motem signature, which would serve as a sample signature for the purpose of verifying the disputed signature. If there is any other signature of D1 is available then that can also be furnished so that the expert would be in a position to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature. 21. If there is any other signature of D1 is available then that can also be furnished so that the expert would be in a position to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature. 21. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that once it is established that the agreement to sell was signed by D1, then the plaintiff would be entitled to get the said agreement to sell specifically enforced relating to the entire suit property and D2 to D6 herein would be bound by it and they cannot wriggle out of their liability. 22. In support of his contention, he would cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1988 SC 576 [ Sunil Kumar and another vs. Ram Parkash and others] Certain experts from it would run thus: "9. It has, however, been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court should have held that in appropriate cases where there are acts of waste, a suit for permanent injunction may be brought against the karta of the joint Hindu family to restrain him from alienating the property of the joint Hindu family. This question is not required to be considered as we have already held that the instant suit for injunction as framed is not maintainable. We, of course, make it clear that in case of waste or ouster an injunction may be granted against the Manager of the joint Hindu family at the instance of the coparcener. But nonetheless a blanket injunction restraining permanently from alienating the property of the joint Hindu family even in the case of legal necessity, cannot be granted. It further appears that Defendant 1, Ram Parkash entered into the agreement of sale stating that he is the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff-appellants claim the suit property as ancestral property and they as coparceners of joint Hindu Mitakshara family have equal shares with their father in the suit property. The question whether the suit property is the self-acquired property of the father or it is the ancestral property has to be decided before granting any relief. The suit being one for permanent injunction, this question cannot be gone into and decided. The question whether the suit property is the self-acquired property of the father or it is the ancestral property has to be decided before granting any relief. The suit being one for permanent injunction, this question cannot be gone into and decided. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that the case of specific performance of agreement of sale bearing Suit No. 570 of 1978 had already been decreed on May 11, 1981 by the Sub-Judge, First Class, Kaithal. 10. For the reasons aforesaid we affirm the judgment and decree made by the High Court and dismiss the appeal without any order as to costs. 11. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. (concurring)— I agree that this appeal should be dismissed but I add a few words of my own. The question raised in the appeal is whether interference of the court could be sought by a coparcener to interdict the karta of Hindu undivided family from alienating coparcenary property. The question is of considerable importance and there seems to be but little authority in decided cases. 12. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. In February 1978, Ram Parkash entered into an agreement for sale of certain house property in favour of Jai Bhagwan. The property has been described in the agreement as self-acquired property of Ram Parkash. It was agreed to be sold for Rs 21,400. Jai Bhagwan paid Rs 5000 as earnest money on the date of agreement. He promised to pay the balance on the date of execution of the sale deed. Ram Parkash, however, did not keep up his promise. He did not execute the sale deed though called upon to do so. Jai Bhagwan instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement. In that suit, Rakesh Kumar and his brothers who are the sons of Ram Parkash wanted to be impleaded as parties to the suit. They wanted to resist the suit for specific performance. But the court did not permit them. The court said that they were unnecessary parties to the suit. Being unsuccessful in that attempt, they instituted a suit for permanent injunction against their father. They wanted the court to restrain their father from alienating the house property to Jai Bhagwan, or to anybody else. But the court did not permit them. The court said that they were unnecessary parties to the suit. Being unsuccessful in that attempt, they instituted a suit for permanent injunction against their father. They wanted the court to restrain their father from alienating the house property to Jai Bhagwan, or to anybody else. Their case was that the said house was their coparcenary property and the proposed sale was neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the joint family estate." I would like to point out that the entire judgment should be read for the purpose of understanding the ratio decidendi of it. In para No.9, the Hon'ble Apex court highlighted and spotlighted that a co-owner cannot seek injunction as against the Kartha so as to prevent him from selling the joint family property/co-parcenery property, because, the Kartha is having the right to sell such property for family necessity. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the law that one co-owner should not try to get injunction as against another co-owner and further more, they recognised the concept that the Kartha should have the liberty to deal with the joint family property and his power should not be shackled. However, the Apex court also cautioned in the said judgment that if the Kartha is found to be dissipating or attempting to dissipate the joint family property, then the position would be different. 23. I would like to point out that nowhere in the said judgment it is stated that whenever an agreement holder files a suit for specific performance as against the Kartha, it should be specifically enforced. It is also clearly found spelt out therein that it has to be found out whether the suit property is an ancestral property or self-acquired property. In that particular case, the facts were somewhat different. The Kartha pleaded as though it was his self-acquired property and his sons wanted to implead themselves as parties in the suit for specific performance filed by the purchaser, to resist the suit, but the court concerned refused to allow them to get impleaded. 24. As such, I am of the view that the cited judgment would not in any way buttress and fortify the plaintiff's endeavour to get Ex.A6 specifically enforced as against all the defendants in the event of Ex.A6 being proved beyond reasonable doubt. 25. 24. As such, I am of the view that the cited judgment would not in any way buttress and fortify the plaintiff's endeavour to get Ex.A6 specifically enforced as against all the defendants in the event of Ex.A6 being proved beyond reasonable doubt. 25. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 is extracted here under for ready reference. "12. Specific performance of part of contract - (1) Except as otherwise hereinafter provided in this section the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract. (2) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must be left unperformed by only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct the specific performance of so much of the contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency. (3) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed either - (a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in money; or (b) does not admit of compensation in money; he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, if the other party - (i) in a case falling under clause (a) pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and a case falling under clause (b), [pays or had paid] the consideration for the whole of the contract without any abatement; and (ii) in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant. (4) When a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the court may direct specific performance of the former part." 26. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that here there is no question of piece-meal enforcement as the Kartha's agreement with the plaintiff would be binding on D2 to D6 also and he would also add that even to the extent of the Kartha's share specific performance can be ordered so that the plaintiff would be in a position to sue for partition. 27. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm but without being tautologous, I would like to point out that the suit property is only a small plot with a hut and D1's share is 1/6th of it and even by phantasmagorical thoughts it cannot be stated that 1/6th share should be carved out and handed over to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act could rightly be pressed into service. 28. Here, it is not even the case of either D1 or D2 to D6 that D1 wanted to sell the property and it is also not the case here that D2 to D6 wanted to prevent D1 from selling it. Their contention is that Ex.A6 is a forged one. Hence, this court need not go into the aspects as to whether the Kartha wanted to sell the property for family necessity or not. If at all Ex.A6 is proved to be a genuine document, then at the most, the plaintiff can only ask for return of the alleged amount paid by him to D1 as there is an alternative prayer contained in the plaint itself. But both the courts below failed to take into consideration the pros and cons of the mater in its entirety and arrived at just conclusion, warranting interference in the second appeal to that limited extent. 29. In the result, (i) The substantial question of law No.1 is decided to the effect that the plaintiff did not discharge his burden of proof to prove that D1 signed Ex.A6-the agreement to sell and opportunity has to be given to the plaintiff to prove it. 29. In the result, (i) The substantial question of law No.1 is decided to the effect that the plaintiff did not discharge his burden of proof to prove that D1 signed Ex.A6-the agreement to sell and opportunity has to be given to the plaintiff to prove it. (ii) The substantial question of law No.2 is decided to the effect that both the courts below committed error in not taking into account the depositions of P.Ws.2 and 3 and other documents filed on the side of the plaintiff and the first appellate court should consider it on the matter being remanded to it. (iii) The substantial question of law No.3 is decided to the effect that even if Ex.A6 the agreement to sell is found to be a genuine one, still the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance and he is only entitled to refund of the amount with interest as per law, which might be decided by the first appellate court on the matter being remanded to it. 30. Accordingly, the matter is remanded back to the first appellate court for the limited purpose of sending Ex.A6, for handwriting expert's opinion by adopting the following procedure at the cost of the plaintiff. "1. An Advocate Commissioner shall be appointed- (a) To carry the relevant documents in connection with this case personally in a sealed cover; (b) and produce the same before the Forensic Expert; (c) leave it in his custody under his acknowledgement for as many days as the Forensic Expert may require; (d) collect the record from the Forensic Expert on the day as may be fixed by him; (e) bring it back and lodge it with the Court. The Forensic Expert is directed to complete the examination of the records in any event, within 48 hours after the depositing of the same by the Advocate Commissioner with him. 2. After obtaining such opinion, objection should be allowed to be filed by both sides. Whereupon, the courts after hearing both sides and considering the objections, if any, in conjunction with the deposition of P.Ws.2 and 3 and arrive at just decision. 3. In the event of holding that it was D1 who signed Ex.A6, necessarily the first appellate court has to order for refund of the sum of Rs.50,000/-with appropriate interest as per law by D1 in favour of the plaintiff. 31. 3. In the event of holding that it was D1 who signed Ex.A6, necessarily the first appellate court has to order for refund of the sum of Rs.50,000/-with appropriate interest as per law by D1 in favour of the plaintiff. 31. Accordingly, while setting aside the judgement and decree of the first appellate court, the matter is remanded back to the first appellate court to deal with the matter as mandated supra. The parties are directed to appear before it on 21.03.2011. The first appellate court shall take all endeavours to dispose of the matter within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgement. The first appellate court, at its discretion could entertain additional both oral and documentary evidences, if any, which might be adduced by the parties also. 32. With the above direction, this second appeal is disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to costs.