Order By Court Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The appellant is aggrieved against the judgment dated 20th December, 2006 by which the C.W.J.C. No. 856 of 1993(R) and 859 of 1993(R) were allowed and the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference Case No. 32 of 1989 and Reference Case No. 35 of 1989 had been set aside. 3. The award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference Case Nos. 32 and 35 of 1989 was under challenge by preferring writ petitions before this Court and those writ petitions being C.W.J.C. No. 856 of 1993(R) and 859 of 1993(R) were dismissed vide order dated 10th August, 1998 upholding both the awards passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The order dated 10th August, 1998 was challenged by preferring two Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 424 and 425 of 1998 (R), which too were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 17th May, 1999. The employees preferred Civil Appeal No. 1902 and 1903 of 2000 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 16th January, 2006, remanded the matter to this Court. The operative part of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 16th January, 2006 is as under :- “It appears that the Tribunal and the High Court did not consider the factual position in the background of the legal position as noted above. Of court at the point of time when the matter was decided Air India's case (supra) held the field. But, in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authority's case (supra) the matter needs to be re-examined by the High Court. Though it was submitted by Mr. Upadhyay that there is a finding about the appellant having adopted a camouflage, there is no definite finding by the Tribunal and/or the High Court in this regard. Mere reference to certain observations of this Court would not suffice without examination of the factual position. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Additionally, the effect of omitting the names of the claimants whose cause was being espoused by the Union has not been considered by the High Court in the proper perspective. Similar is the position regarding purported settlement. In these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to re-consider the matter. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the High Court so that learned Single Judge can consider the matter a fresh taking to account the principles set out above and consider their applicability to the background facts on the issues raised by the appellant. As the matter is pending since long, learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to allot the matter to a learned Single Judge who shall make and effort to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of six months from the date the matter is allotted by the learned Chief Justice”. 4. After this remand, the matter was heard by the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge, vide judgment dated 20th December, 2006 allowed the writ petition and set aside the award passed in Reference Case Nos. 32 and 35 of 1989; hence this L.P.As. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter to decide the issues mentioned in the order of remand and to record findings on those issues; first, as to whether the employer adopted camouflage by creating a contractor in between the employer and employee and if it is a camouflage then, second, whether the employees can be treated to be employees of the principal i.e., respondent. Third question was that what was the effect of non mentioning of the names of the claimants in the reference question sent by the Government to the Tribunal whose cause was being espoused by the Union and third question was that what was the effect of purported settlement. Along with the above questions, the question of delay so as to find out whether the claim of the claimants became a stale claim was also required to be considered. It is submitted that no other question was referred by the Supreme Court to this Court. Learned Single Judge, ignoring the terms of the remand order, proceeded to decide the matter afresh and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that no other question was referred by the Supreme Court to this Court. Learned Single Judge, ignoring the terms of the remand order, proceeded to decide the matter afresh and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it has been claimed by the employer that there was settlement but admittedly that settlement was not placed before the appropriate authorities as required under Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 58 of the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules, 1957 and according to the learned counsel for the appellant, if Rule 58 (4) is not complied with then the settlement is no settlement in the eye of law and cannot be enforced, nor can be used against the employees. 6. So far as delay is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that it is not a case of delay but in fact, it may be a case of dilatory tactics adopted by the employer. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that workers were stopped from working from 9th July, 1977; thereafter, some representations were submitted and ultimately discussions were held on 23rd February, 1981 and thereafter the workmen raised the dispute on 3rd October, 1981 and then the dispute was raised through Union on 28th May, 1982. On raising the dispute by the Union on August, 1982, notice of conciliation was issued on 11th May, 1983 upon which, after failure of conciliation proceeding, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, there is no delay and the appellants were pursuing their remedy and they have not waived their right in any manner. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that, so far identity of the claimants is concerned, that has been well established and a finding of fact has been recorded by the Tribunal with the help of a document Ext. W-6 which was the document submitted before the competent authority for raising the dispute wherein names of those workmen were already there which have been disclosed before the Tribunal by the Union in the claim petition itself and, therefore, an absolutely wrong plea has been taken by the employer. W-6 which was the document submitted before the competent authority for raising the dispute wherein names of those workmen were already there which have been disclosed before the Tribunal by the Union in the claim petition itself and, therefore, an absolutely wrong plea has been taken by the employer. It is submitted that if the Government has committed some mistake in not describing the claimants' properly in the reference question, even then in this case, no prejudice has been caused to the employer as names were disclosed by the Union even before the reference was made to the Tribunal and forthwith before the Tribunal itself and the employer could has contested the identity of the claimants etc. Be that as it may, names of some of the claimants is already in the settlement which has been shown and admitted by the employer, therefore, the plea taken by the employer is not only afterthought and cannot be accepted as ground for rejection of the claims. In view of the above reasons, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge also committed error of law by addressing on the issues whether the workmen completed 240 days in a calendar year or not. It is submitted that said finding of the learned Single Judge is factually wrong and contrary to the finding recorded by the Tribunal as Tribunal has clearly held that the workmen were working since 1974 till 1977 as well as the work was perennial and permanent in nature. The Tribunal rightly held that contractor is a creation of the employer to deprive the workmen from their legitimate benefits of rendering services. It is also submitted that the claimants were working in the mines and in mines, the contract labour is prohibited under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and, therefore, any engagement of workmen in violation of Section 10 of the Act of 1970 amounts to direct employment of the workmen with the principal employer. In the finding, the word as such “camouflage” may not have been used in the order passed by the Tribunal but all the incidence of declaring the creation of contractor as camouflage is indicated in detail in the award, which has been ignored by the learned Single Judge. 7. In the finding, the word as such “camouflage” may not have been used in the order passed by the Tribunal but all the incidence of declaring the creation of contractor as camouflage is indicated in detail in the award, which has been ignored by the learned Single Judge. 7. It is also submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Workmen of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Vs. Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. reported in 1970(20) FLR 308, held that settlement arrived at during conciliation proceeding, if is not placed before the authorities and there is noncompliance with Rule 58(4) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, then that non-compliance renders the settlement illegal. In view of the above, the purported settlement is illegal and is not binding. 8. Contesting, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted that there is no evidence on record that any notification was issued by the Central Government under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 prohibiting the employment of contract labour in the establishment of the respondent and, therefore, the Tribunal proceeded under the assumption only. It is also submitted that even when a work is given to a contractor who has not obtained any certificate of registration as required by Section 7 of the Act of 1970 then effect is given in Section 9 of the Act of 1970 and the consequence of violation of Section 9 of the Act of 1970, may be penal but the employee of the contractor cannot be deemed to be the employee of the principal. In support of the said plea, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Dena Nath & Others Vs. National Fertilisers Ltd. & Others reported in (1992) 1 SCC 695 and the Constitution Bench judgment delivered in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Others Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers & Others reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 . Therefore, the contractor's labour cannot be deemed to be employee of the principal i.e., of the respondent. 9. National Fertilisers Ltd. & Others reported in (1992) 1 SCC 695 and the Constitution Bench judgment delivered in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Others Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers & Others reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 . Therefore, the contractor's labour cannot be deemed to be employee of the principal i.e., of the respondent. 9. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the respondent employer, that it is the admitted case of the workmen themselves that they worked under the contract and that too from the month of March, 1976 till July, 1977 and in view of the documents available on record, existence of which is not in dispute, i.e. the note of discussion with the representative of the Union dated 13th October, 1978 as well as the settlement dated 10th April, 1980, copies of which have been placed on record by both the parties, it clearly indicates that the claimants-workmen themselves claimed their absorption with the plea that they were deployed by the contractor and that fact is clearly mentioned in the settlement. Not only this, the fact that the employees did not work for 240 days is also proved from these two documents wherein it has been clearly mentioned that the persons who have put in more than 190 days attendance, will be given benefit of employment. Not only this, some benefit was given to the persons who worked even for less than 190 days of whom relevant records were not available. In settlement dated 10th April, 1980, there is reference of 16 workmen who were seeking absorption and who were working for sump cleaning through the contractor. Therefore, the Tribunal has committed serious error of law by ignoring the material piece of evidence including even the claim petition of the claimants and furthermore, in ignoring the exhibit W-6 referred in the award while considering the question of continuous work of these claimants. It is submitted that, once the Tribunal has not recorded the finding with respect to the working of each of the employees, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the award as has been passed. It is submitted that, once the Tribunal has not recorded the finding with respect to the working of each of the employees, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the award as has been passed. It is submitted that it was the claim of the claimants that they were entitled to employment then it was their duty to show the source of their right and as per the Industrial law, one could have this right only upon working for 240 days continuously in one calendar year. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that burden to prove this fact that the workmen worked for 240 days lies heavily upon the workmen themselves, which the view declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Range Forest Officer Vs. S.T.Hadimani reported in (2002) 3 SCC 25 . It is also submitted that the reference itself was absolutely vague and in Reference No. 32/1989, names of the claimants were not given and the reference court has no jurisdiction to alter or modify or include the names of the claimants in the reference question. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the workmen had no right to even approach the reference court when they were already offered employment whose names are in the settlement and the persons whose names are not in settlement were not even working or if worked, they did not work even for 190 days, much less to 240 days. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Mahendra L.Jain & Others Vs. Indore Development Authority & Others reported in (2005) 1 SCC 639 in support of his plea that the reference court cannot travel beyond the question referred. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that it is true that some questions have been indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its remand order dated 16.01.2006 but those questions have been referred in the order to give reasons for setting aside the orders passed by this Court in L.P.A. and in writ jurisdiction with direction to the learned Single Judge of the High Court to reconsider the matter. Therefore, in addition to above issues, the fundamental question which is required to be addressed for relief to the claimants inherently involved in the reference cannot be ignored and that question is of right of the claimants to seek continuation of the job as the reference to the labour court in two references was as under : Reference No. 32 of 1989 “Whether the action of the Management of Sudamdih Colliery of M/s. BCCL in denying employment to Shri Karma Rout and 21 others witheffectfrom9.7.1977isjustified?Ifnot,to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled?” Reference No. 35 of 1989 “Whether the action of the management of Sudamdih Area of M/s BCCL in denying employment to Sh. Bhagwat Singh, and 3 others, viz. Shri Sapan, Karan Sahi and Shanti Thakur, who were enaged as sump clearing mazdoors is justified ? If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled?” 10. The relief could have been granted only if the Tribunal would have reached to the conclusion that a right has been created in favour of the workmen by virtue of any of the provisions of law and in the facts of this case only under the Industrial Disputes Act where the retrenchment in violation of Section 25-F is illegal and order of reinstatement could have been passed. 11. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record and relevant documents particularly, which have been referred by the learned counsel for the parties. 12. We are of the considered opinion that even if in Reference Case No. 32/1989 names of the workmen have not been mentioned as such, but the Tribunal was fully justified in taking help of the document (Ext. W-6) which is a document not created after the reference court received the reference from the appropriate Government and in fact exhibit W-6 is a document whereby dispute was raised and therein the names of 22 workmen have been disclosed. If those names specifically had not been mentioned in the Reference Case No. 32/1989, even then the names were rightly traced out by the Tribunal from the record of origination of the proceeding for reference. 13. If those names specifically had not been mentioned in the Reference Case No. 32/1989, even then the names were rightly traced out by the Tribunal from the record of origination of the proceeding for reference. 13. So far as question of delay is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the workmen alleged to have been stopped from working from 9th July, 1977 and thereafter some negotiations took place and therein a final decision was taken in the form of, according to respondent, a settlement dated 10th April, 1980. We have no reason to disbelieve this document wherein it is mentioned that after prolonged discussion, there was agreement between the Management and the Union that persons who have put in 190 days attendance will be taken as Badli Miners/Loaders of Sudamdih Project. These workers are claiming that they were working in the Sudamdih Project. Not only this, the names of some of the workmen are also within the list given in the alleged settlement dated 10th April, 1980. It will be worthwhile to mention here that learned counsel for the workmen also submitted that the names of some of the workmen/claimants are in the settlement dated 10th April, 1980. The plea taken by the workmen that even if they have not completed 240 days of work, the Management itself has taken a decision to re-employ the workmen who worked for 190 days, clearly indicates to be a stand which is blowing hot and cold as the claimants themselves want to discard the settlement dated 10th April, 1980 for violation of Rule 58(4) of the Rules of 1957 and want to take benefit under the same settlement when question of number of working days comes. It is true that settlement dated 10th April, 1980 has not been placed before the appropriate authorities as required under Rule 58(4) of the Rules of 1957 and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Workmen of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Vs. Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. (Supra), this settlement cannot be recognized as it becomes illegal. Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. (Supra), this settlement cannot be recognized as it becomes illegal. If it is so, then it is all the more worst for the workmen because the workmen could have claimed the benefit under the settlement dated 10th April, 1980 upon their working of 190 days but because of the fact of non-compliance of Rules 58(4) of the Rules, they cannot get any benefit under such settlement. Assuming for the sake of argument that any agreement wherein compliance of Rule 58(4) has not been made, then such settlement may be void to the extent of detrimental to the interest of the workmen even then this is not a reference for enforcement of the settlement dated th April, 1980 so as to claim re-employment or continuation of service under this settlement. Therefore, in either case, the claimants are not entitled for any relief under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for want of their requisite working with the employer and employment even in a case where the creation of the contractor between the employer and employee is a camouflage. The camouflage only required to be removed to find out real relation and, therefore, if we remove the camouflage then the real relation between the respondent and the workmen may be of employer and employee but that itself is not sufficient ground for passing award in their favour when they failed to establish that they have worked for 240 days so as to claim benefit under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. At this juncture, it would be relevant to mention here that the alleged settlement dated 10th April, 1980, if, is found to be illegal, then it can be found to be illegal for the main purpose and it cannot be enforced but this document can be used for the collateral purpose to prove certain facts like the names of the workmen and their working days etc. and, therefore, the document dated 10th April, 1980 which is a settlement or record of note of discussion between the Management and Union is certainly has its own evidentiary value for the limited purpose. 14. and, therefore, the document dated 10th April, 1980 which is a settlement or record of note of discussion between the Management and Union is certainly has its own evidentiary value for the limited purpose. 14. It will be worthwhile to mention here that the claimants-workmen also relied upon the report of Sri A.D.Shukla dated 27th October, 1979 wherein also, there is a reference of some findings which, according to the claimants, helps the claimants and reference of same report of Sri A.D.Shukla is also in the above document dated 10th April, 1980, therefore also, the fact stated in the document dated 10th April, 1980 are reliable facts and can be believed. 15. In view of the above reasons, even if it is held that the settlement set up by the respondent is illegal and the delay is not fatal, in peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and employment through contractor may be camouflage, even then the basic finding which could have been only basis for relief to the claimants, had not been recorded by the learned Tribunal and learned Single Judge rightly, after appreciation of the evidence, reached to the conclusion that the workmen did not work for 240 days in a calendar year. Therefore, the award deserves to be set aside on the grounds mentioned above in addition to the grounds given by the learned Single Judge. In view of the above reasons, both the L.P.As are dismissed. No order as to costs.