JUDGMENT : S.K. Seth, J - Appellant is challenging his conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code order by 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain in S.T. No. 191 of 2009. 2. Facts leading to present appeal lying in narrow compass are as under. 3. Wife of the appellant Seema (since de­ceased) died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage, therefore, appel­lant and his aunt-Ramubai were charge-sheeted and committed to stand trial. 4. It is not in dispute that seems died an unnatural death by consuming poison. The dead body was brought by appellant to the Civil Hospital on 06.10.2008 and on intima­tion from the Civil Hospital a Marg intima­tion was registered at Police Station Makdon to start the investigation rolling. 5. According to prosecution, there was dowry demand of Rs.15,000/- which com­pelled Seema to take her life by committing suicide. The inquest was held and dead body was sent for postmortem. The postmortem report is Ex. P-15. After completing the in­vestigation charge-sheet was filed, 6. At trial accused person denied the charges and claimed that they were falsely implicated. 7. Considering the prosecution evidence that has come on record learned trial judge found only appellant guilty of the offences as aforesaid and giving benefit of doubt to the co-accused acquitted her. Her acquittal is not under challenge, hence it has become final. 8. In order to bring home the charges against appellant, prosecution examined Bhurulal (PW-1) Shobabai (PW-2) Bagduram (PW-7); besides the investigat­ing officer and autopsy surgeon. 9. We have to see the evidence of Bhurulal, Shobabai and Baduram to come to the conclusion whether offences punish­able under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Penal Code have been made out against appellant or not. 10. It is relevant to keep in mind that the suicide was committed on 6.10.2008 and on the basis whereof a marg intimation was registered at Police Station Makdon and inquest was held on7.10.2008. Bhurulal fa­ther of the deceased was present at the time of inquest held by P.N. Malviya, Tehsildar fPW.5). At that time Bhurulal did not ex­press any suspicion about the dowry death or cruelty immediately preceding the death, Bhrulal (PW.l) in his deposition before the court stated that deceased never told her directly regarding the dowry demand and he learnt about the same only through his younger daughter-Shoba and brother- in-law-Shivlal. Shivlal has not been examined by prosecution. At that time Bhurulal did not ex­press any suspicion about the dowry death or cruelty immediately preceding the death, Bhrulal (PW.l) in his deposition before the court stated that deceased never told her directly regarding the dowry demand and he learnt about the same only through his younger daughter-Shoba and brother- in-law-Shivlal. Shivlal has not been examined by prosecution. The evidence of Bhurulal is full of material contradiction and omissions, except for making sweeping allegations, there is no other evidence to show that there was demand of dowry either at the time of engagement, marriage or immediately thereafter. The story of dowry demand has been introduced basing upon what he had heard from Shoha. Shobha is examined as PW.2. In her deposition no doubt that she claims that she told her father about the dowry demand but her evidence does not inspire confidence and possibility of her be­ing tutored could not altogether be ruled out. The other material witness is Bagduram (PW.7), uncle of deceased, he says that de­ceased had told him about the dowry de­mand, which in the facts of the case seems highly improbable that a daughter would not tell her father about the dowry demand while narrating this to Bagduram. Apart from this no evidence has been laid by the prosecution to show any perceptible nexus between the death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on Seema. In absence of any evidence to show that soon before her marriage she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by appellant, it is difficult to sustain the conviction of the ap­pellant under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC. 11. No doubt Section 304-B raises a pre­sumption against the accused but it is well established that where the burden of an is­sue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evi­dence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is of course, the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has dis­charged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused, but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. As soon as he succeeds in doing do, the burden is shifted to the prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e., that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this connection one may refer to the dictum of Viscount Sake in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1935 AC 462, that "no matter what the charge is, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no at­tempt to whittle it down can be entertained." The same position prevails in the Criminal Law of India. That does not mean that if the statute places the burden of proof on an accused person. He is not required to estab­lished his plea but the degree and charac­ter of proof that the accused is expected to furnish in support of his plea cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof expected from the prosecution which is required to prove its case. 12. In view of the aforesaid legal position it is clear that the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden cannot be permitted to fall back upon the statutory presump­tion for holding appellant guilt, as has been done by the trial court. Thus, the findings of the trial court in this regard cannot be sustained. As a result, conviction and sen­tence of appellant is liable to be set aside Appeal is allowed. 13. Appellant is in jail. He is directed to be released from the custody forthwith, if not required in any other cause. Fine amount, if any deposited by appellant be refunded to him. 14. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment along with record of the trial court forthwith, 15. Order accordingly. Appeal allowed.