JUDGMENT B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J:- By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner, who is citizen of India and resident of village Silewada within the jurisdiction of respondent no. 1 Gram Panchayat, has challenged Resolution No.6 dated 30th July 1994 passed by respondent no. 1 whereby it called for information from house owners about valuation of their houses and provisions of rule 7 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Taxes and Fess Rules, 1960 (for short, the "1960 Rules") in so far as the same permits levy of property tax by respondent no. 1 on the basis of capital value of the lands/ buildings. 2. This Court had issued rule on stay while admitting petition on 25.10.1996. On 24.2.1998 that rule on stay was discharged, with the result, there is no interim order operating in the matter. 3. We have heard Mr C.N. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. T.R. Kankale, learned Assistant Govemment Pleader for respondent no. 3 State Government. Nobody has appeared for respondents no. 1 and 2 though they are served. Mr. Deshpande has invited attention to the Bill of Demand dated 1.4.1996 served upon the petitioner to urge that the new decision taken by the Gram Panchayat has already been implemented. To substantiate this, he has also invited attention to earlier receipt issued by Gram Panchayat on 30.3.1991 to demonstrate that the tax paid by the petitioner was comparatively much less. According to him, resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat on 30th July 1994 is also based upon erroneous presumption that amendment as proposed to 1960 Rules by the State Government had come into force. He has invited attention to that Notification also to show that only the objections and suggestions were then invited. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner points out that because of this erroneous presumption, the Gram Panchayat had cancelled assessment made by resolution no. 6 dated 31.5.1994 and had undertaken exercise of seeking information from the residents of village as to the valuation of their houses so as to enable it to levy tax in accordance with new rules. According to him, this resolution or then the procedure contemplated by it, is not only ultra vires the provisions contained in the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 (for short, the 1958 Act") but also unconstitutional. According to him, this resolution or then the procedure contemplated by it, is not only ultra vires the provisions contained in the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 (for short, the 1958 Act") but also unconstitutional. He has invited attention to the provisions of Section 124 of the Act to urge that the said provisions only permit levy of tax on buildings. The modality therefor is prescribed in 1960 Rules. Attention is invited to rule 3 and rule 4 of the 1960 Rules to state how tax is to be levied and how after final publication, the tax comes into force. According to learned counsel, this procedure has not been followed and hence, tax as levied in furtherance of Gram Panchayat resolution dated 30th July 1994 is unsustainable and contrary to the provisions as contained in rule 7 of the 1960 Rules. He submits that rule 7 of the 1960 Rules permits the Gram Panchayat to levy tax on buildings and lands subject to the provisions of subrule (2) and after following the procedure prescribed in rules 3 and 4 of the 1960 Rules. He states that levy of tax essentially has to be as per the capital value or then based on annual letting value of such buildings. The Act or the Rules no where define or explain the phrase "capital value" and the Rules only envisage levy upon annual letting value. Hence, effort made by Gram Panchayat to levy tax by trying to find out valuation of houses i.e. capital value is contrary to rule 7 of 1960 Rules and also contrary to 1958 Act. 5. Without prejudice to all these contentions or in the alternative, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention to opening part of Section 124 (1) of the 1958 Act to contend that it uses the word "rate" when it employs phrases "maximum rate and minimum rate". According to him. this word "rate" has got significance in so far as assessment of property tax is concerned. He invites attention to Patel Gordhandas Hargovinddas and ors v. The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad and anr. reported in AIR 1963 SC 1742 where the Constitution Bench of Honourable Apex Court has explained the meaning of word "rate". He contends that there the provision which permitted assessment of property tax with reference to capital value of the building has been found unconstitutional and has been quashed and set aside. reported in AIR 1963 SC 1742 where the Constitution Bench of Honourable Apex Court has explained the meaning of word "rate". He contends that there the provision which permitted assessment of property tax with reference to capital value of the building has been found unconstitutional and has been quashed and set aside. He contends that the term "rate", Therefore, needs to be understood only in context of annual letting value of the building. 6. Learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent no. 3 has urged that neither respondent no. 1 nor respondent no. 3 whose action is assailed, is appearing before this Court. It is further urged that the petitioner has not demonstrated that resolution dated 30.7.1994 has been actually implemented and entire arguments advanced are only hypothetical. It is urged that Constitutional challenge, therefore, should not be decided on the strength of such facts. Without prejudice to this, it is pointed out that the provisions of 1958 Act contemplate a remedy of appeal in such matters and action of levy of tax can be assailed by the petitioner before the competent forum. As that remedy has not been exhausted, petition is premature and also unsustainable. On merit, reliance is placed upon other Constitution Bench judgment of Honourable Supreme Court in D.G. Gose & Co. v. State of Kerala and anr reported in (1980) 2 SCC 410 to show that levy of tax by taking into account capital value is also found valid by Honourable Apex Court. It is urged that in present facts, reliance upon Gordhandas Hargovinddas's case (supra) is misconceived. It is also pointed out that provisions of rule 7, as in force, expressly permit basing of levy on capital value. This position has undergone change with effect from 3.12.1999 and "area of building" is now given importance. Learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, states that petition as filed is premature, without any substance and deserves dismissal. 7. The challenge raised by petitioner and prayers made expressly show that the contentions about validity of rule 7 of 1960 Rules or then the constitutionality of levy of tax or then mode and calculation cannot be and could not have been looked into by any Authority functioning under the 1958 Act. The contention about alternative remedy is, therefore, misconceived. 7. The challenge raised by petitioner and prayers made expressly show that the contentions about validity of rule 7 of 1960 Rules or then the constitutionality of levy of tax or then mode and calculation cannot be and could not have been looked into by any Authority functioning under the 1958 Act. The contention about alternative remedy is, therefore, misconceived. It also needs to be noticed that the petition has been admitted way back in 1996 and such contention cannot be entertained at the stage of final hearing, almost 15 years thereafter. 8. The contention that the action of respondents no. 1 and 2 is unconstitutional and bad in law, is equally misconceived. 1960 Rules are the Rules framed by the State Governments under Section 176 of the 1958 Act and that provision is enacted by the state Government. The Gram Panchayats have only to implement the law as framed by the State Government. 9. A perusal of Section 124 (1) of the 1958 Act reveals that it is placed in Chapter IX which deals with taxation and recovery of claims. Heading of that section is, "Levy of taxes and fees by panchayats". Its perusal also shows that tax on buildings is compulsorily required to be levied by the Gram Panchayat. In other words, it is not a "not obligatory" levy. Section 124 (1) (i) envisages tax on buildings within the limits of village subject to the minimum and maximum rates which may be fixed by the State Government and in such manner and subject to such exemptions as may be "prescribed". It also shows that obligation is cast upon Gram Panchayat by using words, "shall levy taxes referred to in clauses (i) and (i-a) of this subsection". The definition clause contained in Section 3 (15) defines word "prescribed" to mean as prescribed by rules. The 1960 Rules are, therefore, framed under Section 176 (2) (xxvi) of 1958 Act. 10. Section 124 (1) requires Gram Panchayat to levy tax on building subject to minimum and maximum rates which may be fixed by the State Government. Those rates are fixed by the State Government and the same are given in the Schedule appended to 1960 Rules. The Schedule contains total five columns and the first column is "Type of building"; columns no. 2 and 3 deal with minimum and maximum rates based on capital value of the building while column nos. Those rates are fixed by the State Government and the same are given in the Schedule appended to 1960 Rules. The Schedule contains total five columns and the first column is "Type of building"; columns no. 2 and 3 deal with minimum and maximum rates based on capital value of the building while column nos. 4 and 5 presclibed minimum and maximum rate based on annual letting value of the building. Thus, the State Government has laid down the minimum and maximum rate at which tax is to be assessed on building or land by the Gram Panchayat. In other words, option has been given to Gram Panchayat to select the rates between minimum figure and maximum figure as rate of tax and the word "rate" used herein is, therefore, to show the sum or amount at which tax is to be levied or assessed. The perusal of judgment of Honourable Apex Court in Gordhandas Hargovinddas's case (supra) reveals that there Honourable Apex Court has considered the provisions of Section 73 (1) (b) and Section 75 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 and rules 350-A and 243 framed thereunder for open land. Relevant part of Section 73 (1) of the said Act shows that there the Municipality was authorised to impose "a rate on buildings or lands or both situate within the municipal borough". Sedion 75 of the said Act provided for procedure and its clause (iii) contemplated resolution by Municipality about the basis for each class of the valuation on which such "rate" was to be imposed. Explanation to Section 75 then provided that in case of lands the basis of valuation may be either capital or annual letting value. It is in this backdrop that Honourable Apex Court proceeded to evaluate rival contentions and the answer can be found in discussion in paragraph 31 onwards. Honourable Apex Court has noticed that the word "rate" on buildings or lands must have been used in the particular meaning which it had acquired in the legislative history and practice, both in England and India upto the year 1925. Honourable Apex Court has held that whenever that word "rate" was used in Indian Legislation, it meant a "tax" for local purposes imposed by the Local Authority and the basis of tax was annual letting value oflands or buildings or in connection with which it was imposed. Honourable Apex Court has held that whenever that word "rate" was used in Indian Legislation, it meant a "tax" for local purposes imposed by the Local Authority and the basis of tax was annual letting value oflands or buildings or in connection with which it was imposed. The word "rate" used in Section 73 (1) of the said Act has been construed in this backdrop. Honourable Apex Court has observed that the matter might have been different if the words in clause (i) of that section were "a tax on buildings or lands or both situate within the municipal borough". Here, present Section 124 (1) (i) of the 1958 act uses words "a tax on buildings". It is, therefore, apparent that the said Constitution Bench judgment of Honourable Apex Court has no application in present part. In that judgment Honourable Apex Court has clarified that the word "tax" would have wide meaning and would not be confined to any special meaning. Efforts of Mr Deshpande, learned counsel for petitioner, therefore, to limit meaning of word "tax" by importing word "rate" as is understood in its technical sense by the Constitution Bench has to fail. The words "minimum and maximum rate" used in Section 124 (1) of the 1958 Act does not employ the said word with its technical meaning as explained by honourable Apex Court in its judgment. 11. List II in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, particularly entry 49 shows that the power vests with the State Legislators to levy tax on lands and buildings. Mr Deshpande during arguments only mentioned entry no. 86 in List-I which is the power of Parliament. Entry no. 86 permits Parliament to levy taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies. It is, therefore, apparent that the Parliament has been authorised to levy taxes on capital value of assets. The State Legislature has been given power to levy tax on lands and buildings. As held by Constitution Bench of Honourable Apex Court in AIR 1980 SC 271 , D.G. Goure & Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerla, if a tax is levied on all that one owns or his total assets, it would fall within the purview of Entry 86 of List-I and would be outside the Legislative competence of State Legislatures. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerla, if a tax is levied on all that one owns or his total assets, it would fall within the purview of Entry 86 of List-I and would be outside the Legislative competence of State Legislatures. A tax directly on one's land and building is not a tax under Entry 86. One's building may imperceptibly be the subject. matter of tax, say the Wealth Tax, as a component of his assets under Entry 86 (List-I) and it may also be subjected to tax. like a direct tax under Entry 49 (List-II) and two taxes are separate and distinct imposts. Both the entlies, therefore, operate in their respective sphere and, there is no inconsistency or overlapping in the same. The Gram Panchayat is not subjecting capital value of immovable property to tax, but it is building/land on which tax is levied. Use of capital value as measure, therefore, does not constitute that tax as tax on capital value of assets. 12. Section 124 (1) read with Section 176 of the 1958 Act permit the State Government to make rules. Accordingly, Rules have been made in the year 1960. Rules 3 and 4 of the 1960 Rules prescribe procedure for levying tax or fee which is not obligatory. We have already noticed that tax on buildings is mandatory obligation on Gram Panchayat and, therefore, procedure of these rules is not required to be followed. Moreover, in present matter, tax on property i.e. building tax was already levied by Gram Panchayat and the petitioner has paid the same. Receipts for payment of tax so levied have been placed on record. Thus, there was already assessment at maximum of the rates stipulated in Schedule at the end of 1960 Rules as per rule 7 and that was cancelled by the Gram Panchayat. There is no challenge to this cancellation before us. Copy of earlier resolution is also not produced on record. Though vaguely it was argued that by resolution dated 30.7.1994 a new type of tax has been imposed, the petitioner has not pointed out that for all these years he has continued to pay tax on building independently. He has not annexed similar demand in relation to tax on building or its receipt for payment to show that the tax which was not till then in force was made applicable by said resolution dated 30.7.1994. He has not annexed similar demand in relation to tax on building or its receipt for payment to show that the tax which was not till then in force was made applicable by said resolution dated 30.7.1994. It is apparent in the present matter that on 31.5.1994 Gram Panchayat had passed resolution and calculated tax on building at maximum rate i.e. it chose maximum rate as specified by the State Government for that purpose. That was recalled and fresh exercise in terms of its resolution dated 30.7.1994 was undertaken. 13. Perusal of rule 7 as in force when this exercise was undertaken reveals that it deals with rate of tax on buildings and lands. The Rules permit levy of such rates based either on capital value or on annual letting value of the land or building. as may be decided by Gram Panchayat. The only rider is. it cannot go below the minimum or above the maximum rate specified in Schedule annexed to Part II of the 1960 Rules in which said rule 7 appears. As we have noticed, the tax was already in force and hence, while passing resolution on 30th July 1994, it was not necessary to again comply with procedural requirement of rules 3 and 4. The provisions of rule 7 (1) expressly permit levy of tax on capital value. The Schedule appended at the end of Part-II also prescribes minimum rate based upon capital value of the buildings and maximum rate based upon capital value of the buildings. The rates vary depending upon type of buildings. Schedule contemplates four types of buildings. Minimum rate for various types of buildings vmies from 20 paise to 75 paise per Rs. 100 of capital value or fraction thereof. Maximum rate based on capital value of the building is from 30 paise to 100 paise per Rs. 100/- of capital value or fraction thereof. As the word "rate" has not been employed by the State Legislature in Section 124 or word employed in Section 124 (1) (i) is "tax", it is clear that use of capital value of buildings cannot be objected to in the light of law laid down by Honourable Apex Court in Gordhandas Hargovinddas and ors v. The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad and anr. reported at AIR 1963 SC 1742 . Contention that there is no procedure prescribed for detem1ination of capital value is equally without merit. reported at AIR 1963 SC 1742 . Contention that there is no procedure prescribed for detem1ination of capital value is equally without merit. The Gram Panchayat has called upon residents of village to submit valuation of their houses within thirty days and thereafter process of assessment was to be undertaken. Petitioner could have, therefore, given his valuation and if he was aggrieved by the capital value as worked out by Gram Panchayat for this levy or assessment, he could have objected to it by taking recourse to remedy provided in 1958 Act. The challenge by the petitioner to very basis of this exercise is misconceived. 14. Three demand notices issued to the petitioner on 1.4.1996 show different rate at which tax is charged. However, that by itself is not sufficient to render the levy wrong or illegal. If there are any arithmetical mistakes, petitioner could have approached office of Gram Panchayat or then the Appellate Authority for rectification of mistakes. The said error or mistake cannot be made a bone of contention before this Court. Here, petitioner has not demonstrated as to how tax assessed is on capital value of his house property. He has also not pointed out the result of determim tion of capital value thereof, if any. 15. It needs to be noted that provisions of rule 7 of the 1960 Rules have been materially amended on 3.12.1999. The levy of tax permitted is at such rate based on total area on the basis of per square foot of the lands and buildings as may be decided by the Gram Panchayat, but not below the minimum and not exceeding the maximum rate specified in the Scheduled annexed at the end of Part-II. That Schedule has also been amended accordingly on 3.12.1999 and minimum and maximum rate has been specified by classifying "huts" into two types and other type of houses in five different types. There is separate Schedule for calculating tax on land. However, since amended provision has come into force after 3rd December 1999, it is not relevant for adjudication in present controversy. 16. In view of this discussion, we do not find any merit in the petition. Writ Petition is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.