Judgment :- 1. Petitioner is a General Manager in the Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation Limited (for short ‘the Corporation’). He joined service of the Corporation in the cadre of Manager and is now in the cadre of General Manager. On 03.08.2011, Managing Director of the Corporation ordered suspension pending enquiry into the reported acts of misconduct of the petitioner. Challenging the said order of suspension this writ petition has been filed. 2. In justification of the said order, statement of objection was filed by the respondents. Petitioner filed a rejoinder statement. 3. Sri K. Subha Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that: (i) By virtue of Rule 21 of the Karnataka Small Industries Development Corporation Servants (Conduct & Discipline) Rules, 1979 (for short ‘the Rules’), the Corporation being the Appointing Authority, Managing Director was devoid of the power to pass order of suspension. Reliance was placed on an order passed in the case of Subramanya vs. Chairman & Managing Director, reported in ILR 1995 Kar 3434. (ii) Even otherwise, there being no urgent and grave circumstances necessitating the passing of an order of suspension, which was only to victimize the petitioner and being a malafide act, was not forthwith reported to the Board of the Corporation. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar & Others Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay & others, reported in AIR 1957 SC 28 . (iii) The impugned order is perverse, since the replies of the petitioner, as at Annexures B1 to B6, to the show cause notices of the Corporation, as at Annexures A1 to A6 and also the proceedings of a meeting held in the chambers of the Chairman of the Corporation on 07.06.2011, as at Annexure-Q, has not been correctly kept in view. (iv) The order of suspension made by the Managing Director being void ab initio, could not be ratified by the Board of Directors of the Corporation, since the illegality which goes to the root of the matter cannot be cured even at a later stage. Reliance was placed on a decision in the case of K.M.Valliappan Vs. The Madras Seva Sadan Higher, reported in (1995) 2 MLJ 488 . (v) Impugned order is arbitrary and also illegal. 4. Reliance was placed on a decision in the case of K.M.Valliappan Vs. The Madras Seva Sadan Higher, reported in (1995) 2 MLJ 488 . (v) Impugned order is arbitrary and also illegal. 4. Sri B.G. Sreedaran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand contended that: i. Managing Director of the Corporation being the Controlling Authority is vested with the power to order suspension of any Corporation servant, pending institution of departmental proceedings. ii. In view of the reported acts of misconduct committed by the petitioner in discharge of the duty, show cause notices, as at Annexures A1 to A6, were issued, to which the petitioner submitted replies, as at Annexures B1 to B6, which upon perusal were found to be prima facie unacceptable and in view of the serious imputations appearing against the petitioner, in order to prevent the petitioner from interfering with the preliminary investigations and tampering of evidence, suspension pending holding of departmental enquiry was made. iii. The Board of Directors of the Corporation was appraised of the circumstances on account of which the order of suspension was made against the petitioner and that the Board in its meeting held on 29.08.2011, appreciated the action taken against the petitioner and also ratified the order of suspension. iv. There is no factual foundation laid in the pleadings by the petitioner with regard to any malafide act or victimization nor has any material been produced, necessitating the examination of the contention with regard to alleged victimization. v. Petitioner occupies a pivotal post in the Corporation and there being possibility of tampering with the evidence, both oral and documentary, the impugned order having become necessary was passed. vi. The impugned order is not by way of punishment, but pending holding of departmental enquiry and would be regulated in accordance with the Rules. vii. Petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands and that there is willful suppression of material facts apart from deliberate acts of misrepresentation. 5. In view of the rival contentions and the record of the case, the points for consideration are: i. Whether Managing Director of the Corporation has power to order suspension of the petitioner in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding? ii. Whether the impugned order of suspension is malafide, arbitrary or illegal? 6. 5. In view of the rival contentions and the record of the case, the points for consideration are: i. Whether Managing Director of the Corporation has power to order suspension of the petitioner in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding? ii. Whether the impugned order of suspension is malafide, arbitrary or illegal? 6. Suspension from service is an action, whereby, an employee is kept out of duty temporarily, pending final action being taken against him for acts of indiscipline, delinquency, misdemeanor etc., when allegations of serious nature are received against such employee and it is decided to institute departmental enquiry into such allegations. Suspension is a first step even before any charge is framed against the employee. Suspension pending departmental enquiry is a safeguard against the employee interfering with the holding of the preliminary investigations and tampering with material evidence. Suspension from service pending departmental proceeding against an employee is not a punishment. 6.1 Ordinarily, when serious imputations are made against the conduct of an employee and Disciplinary Authority or Competent Authority is unable to immediately draw the charge, since the allegations have to be gone into thoroughly, the Disciplinary Authority or the Controlling/Authorized Authority, while taking note of serious allegation of misconduct appearing against the employee, after some preliminary enquiry, if were to be of the opinion that the circumstances of the case justify further investigations to be made before definite charge can be framed and in the meanwhile it would not be proper to allow the employee concerned to function in the ordinary way, can keep such employee away from the usual sphere of activity by resorting to suspension from service. However, an order of suspension from service should not be made in a casual manner and unless required in public interest. 7. Rule 21 of the Rules, gives power to the Disciplinary Authority or Competent Authority to place a Corporation servant under suspension pending enquiry. Rule 21 is the pivotal provision around which the main controversy revolves. The same reads as follows:- “21. 7. Rule 21 of the Rules, gives power to the Disciplinary Authority or Competent Authority to place a Corporation servant under suspension pending enquiry. Rule 21 is the pivotal provision around which the main controversy revolves. The same reads as follows:- “21. Suspension pending inquiry – (1) The Disciplinary Authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered in that behalf by Corporation by general or special order, may place a Corporation servant under suspension- (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the Disciplinary Authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the Disciplinary Authority the circumstances in which the order was made.” (Italicized by me) 7.1 Disciplinary Authority in relation to imposition of penalties on a Corporation servant as defined under R.2 (d), means, the Authority competent under the Rules to impose on the Corporation servant the penalty. 7.2 Rule 19(1) gives power to the Board of Corporation to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 18 on any Corporation servant. Sub-rule (2) gives power to impose the penalties specified in Rule 18 on a Corporation servant by the Authorities specified in the schedule or by any other Authority empowered in that behalf by a general or special order of the Corporation. 7.3. Rule 20 is with regard to Authority to institute proceedings. Sub-rule (1) authorizes the Board or any other Authority as indicated in the schedule – (a) to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Corporation servant; (b) direct a Disciplinary Authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Corporation servant on whom that Disciplinary Authority is competent to impose under the Rules any of the penalties specified in R.18. 7.4. Sub-rule (2) authorizes the Disciplinary Authority to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (vii) of R.18, to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Corporation servant for the imposition of any other the penalties specified in clauses (viii) and (ix) of R.18 notwithstanding that such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under the Rules to impose any of the latter penalties. Schedule to the Rules provides that in respect of Heads of Departments (Chief Managers-Grade-I-Selection Grade), Disciplinary Authority to impose the penalty specified in R.18 is the Managing Director and Appellate Authority is the Board. 8. Petitioner was appointed as Chief Manager by the Board of the Corporation. The post of Chief Manager (Administration) was upgraded and re-designated as General Manager (Commercial and Land Acquisition) vide Government Order dated 10.10.2002. petitioner who was working as Chief Manager was permitted to be appointed in the upgraded post. After the Government Order was issued, corresponding amendment with regard to the designation of the Officers in the schedule to the Rules, appears to have not been effected. However, when one V.Seshu, lodged a criminal complaint against the petitioner, a reference was made to the Government with regard to the departmental action to be taken. The Government sent a communication dated 08.06.2011, stating that the Managing Director of the Corporation possesses the Authority, he being the Disciplinary Authority and was instructed to take action against the petitioner as per the Rules of the Corporation. Be that as it may. 9. Impugned order was passed by the Managing Director, who is subordinate to the Board of the Corporation. Rule 21 of the Rules does not come in the way of the subordinate authority to the Disciplinary Authority to place a Corporation servant under suspension, where disciplinary proceedings is contemplated or is pending. When suspension order is made by the subordinate authority, there is an obligation on such authority to “forthwith report” to the Disciplinary Authority, the circumstances in which the order was made. The further point for considerations is, whether Managing Director “forthwith” reported to the Disciplinary Authority, circumstances in which the order of suspension was made against the petitioner? 9.1 Indisputedly, the 319th Board of Directors Meeting of the Corporation had taken place on 30.03.2011. Petitioner was suspended from service on 03.08.2011. The 320th meeting of the Board of Directors took place on 29.08.2011. Subject No.33 of the 320th Board Meeting is with regard to suspension of petitioner from service. Managing Director made a reference, as per Annexure-R1, which contains the circumstances in which the order of suspension was made against the petitioner and sought; i) Ratification of the order, in suspending the petitioner from service, pending enquiry. Subject No.33 of the 320th Board Meeting is with regard to suspension of petitioner from service. Managing Director made a reference, as per Annexure-R1, which contains the circumstances in which the order of suspension was made against the petitioner and sought; i) Ratification of the order, in suspending the petitioner from service, pending enquiry. ii) Authorization to initiate disciplinary action against the petitioner on each of the six cases, detailed therein, and iii) Continuation of the suspension of the petitioner till disciplinary action on all the issues are completed. 9.2 The proviso under Rule 21 has the expression “forthwith”. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition), in Chapter 12 – subordinate principles, under a subheading, meaning of some particular expressions, at page 311, observes as follows: “Sometimes a statute requires an act to be done “forthwith” or “immediately”. “Forthwith”, Herman L.J. has said, “is not a precise time and, provided that no harm is done, ‘forthwith’ means any reasonable time thereafter… It may involve action within days: it may not involve action for years.” 9.3 In the case of Sk. Salim Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 653 , after taking into consideration the decision in the case of Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows: “10. Thus, “forthwith” does not connote a precise time and even if the statute under consideration requires that the report shall be made forthwith, its terms shall have been complied with if the report is made without avoidable or unreasonable delay.” 9.4 The Board of Directors of the Corporation having deliberated on the subject No.320/33 “Suspension of Dr.Shankara, the then General Manager (Coml) for having prima facie found to be true that he has caused an estimated loss of Rs.218.40 lakhs to the Corporation by violating Rules, Pending Enquiry – Ratification thereof”, i.e., Annexure-R2, resolved as follows: The Board astonished to note that the irregularities committed by Dr.M. Shankara, General Manager, on the following, prima facie found to be true which led to the loss of Rs.218.40 lakhs to the Corporation besides initiating action for making allotment of 463 plots at Nelamangala and 249 plots at Gammanagatti, Hubli in violation of KSSIDC Allotment Rules 2004 and Government Order NO.CI 28 CSC 80 dated 18.9.1981. (a) Classification of Doddaballapur and Hoskote Industrial Estate in violation of Government Order No.CI 233 SpI 2008 dated 28.12.2009 – loss of 65.90 lakhs. (b) Allotment of plot to Smt.Ramadevi, M/s.Hitash Garments, Mysore, free of cost in violation of Allotment rules, after a lapse of 11 years – loss of Rs.14.15 lakhs. (c) Allotment of plot to Sri Nand Mohan Mehra, M/s. Mannequine World at Jigani, free of cost, misguiding the Board – loss of Rs.32.56 lakhs. (d) Allotment of 4 plots to M/s. Prakash Engineering in Peenya, free of cost, misguiding the Board – loss of Rs.105.79 lakhs. The Board after considering all aspects of the matter as detailed in the agenda notes appreciating the action initiated by the Managing Director in unearthing these irregularities, approved the proposals. Further the Board authorized the Managing Director to investigate further so that the others involved in these cases may also be identified and disciplinary action be initiated against all in common proceedings wherever necessary and to impose penalties as per KSSIDC C&D Rules 1979 at the earliest.” (Italicised by me) 10. The Board of the Corporation being not in session on the date the order of suspension was made, the circumstances under which the petitioner was placed under suspension was drawn as per Annexure-R1 and was placed before the Board, which met on 29.08.2011 and passed the resolution on subject No.320/33 i.e., Annexure-R2. The Board of Directors has appreciated the action taken by the Managing Director in unearthing the irregularities committed by the petitioner in respect of the 4 items shown in the resolution. The Board has approved the proposal submitted by the Managing Director, as at Annexure – R1. In my opinion, the expression ‘forthwith’ does not necessarily and always mean ‘instantaneous’. The expression has to be understood in the context of the provision. The impugned order of suspension having been made by the Managing Director after the 319th Board Meeting of the Corporation, was reported/placed before the 320th Meeting of the Board. Thus, without any delay, Managing Director reported the matter to the Disciplinary Authority. 11. The Chairman of the Corporation had convened a meeting in his chambers on 07.06.2011. The vice-Chairman, Managing Director and Senior Officers, including the petitioner were present. The meeting was held in the backdrop of the news relating to the Corporation which had appeared in Newspapers. Thus, without any delay, Managing Director reported the matter to the Disciplinary Authority. 11. The Chairman of the Corporation had convened a meeting in his chambers on 07.06.2011. The vice-Chairman, Managing Director and Senior Officers, including the petitioner were present. The meeting was held in the backdrop of the news relating to the Corporation which had appeared in Newspapers. An item relating to the petitioner i.e., criminal complaint lodged by one Seshu, also figured in the discussion. Amongst others, it was observed that, as per the Regulations, petitioner was not a member of the Allotment committee. After discussion, it was decided to submit a report to the Government. The Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on 29.8.2011 was presided over by the Chairman of the Corporation. The Chairman, who had held the meeting of the Officials on 07.06.2011, being aware of the discussion, presided the Board meeting on 29.08.2011. The Board approved the order of suspension made by the Managing Director against the petitioner. It is important to observe that the matters discussed by the Chairman in the meeting held on 07.06.2011 are not the same which were debated and shortlisted by the Board in its resolution dated 29.08.2011. Even otherwise, the meeting held on 07.06.2011 was not a Board of Directors meeting. 12. In the case of Subramanya (supra), petitioner was placed under suspension by a Joint General Manager of the respondent-bank, in exercise of the power under Regulation 12 of the Indian-Bank Officer/Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The Rules conferred power to place an officer/employee under suspension by a ‘competent authority’, which was defined under Regulation 3(f), meaning, ‘the Authority appointed by the Board for the purposes of Regulations’. The Joint General Manager had not been appointed by the Board of Directors of the bank as ‘the competent authority’ for the purposes of the Regulations. In the said factual background and specific provision, it was held that, the order of suspension made by the Joint General Manager without he being appointed by the Board as competent authority was illegal. The fact situation and the provision in this case noticed supra, being otherwise, the decision in the case of Subramanya being not analogous and distinguishable, does not advance the case of the petitioner. 13. The fact situation and the provision in this case noticed supra, being otherwise, the decision in the case of Subramanya being not analogous and distinguishable, does not advance the case of the petitioner. 13. In the case of K.M.Valliappan (supra), petitioner who was the Head Master of the 1st respondent School, challenged an order issued by the Secretary of the School, placing him under suspension pending enquiry. Since the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 had vested responsibility of taking action against the teachers and other employees of the private school on ‘the school committee’, the order of suspension having been passed by the Secretary who had no power, it was held that, the order being void ab initio, the ratification does not save such a void act. The fact situation and the provision in the instant case being otherwise, noticed supra, the ratio of the decision being distinguishable, does not advance the case of the petitioner. 14. Indisputedly, the petitioner was served with show cause notices as at Annexures A1 to A6, in respect of the matters appearing against him. The petitioner submitted the replies at Annexures B1 to B6. Managing Director having considered the replies as at Annexures B1 to B6, the omissions and commissions on the part of the petitioner, resulting in estimated loss of Rs.218.40 lakhs to the Corporation apart from the loss of reputation of the Corporation, took the decision to keep the petitioner away from a position wherefrom he can interfere with conduct of enquiry, tamper with the oral or documentary evidence. In view of the resolution of the Board of the Corporation, as at Annexure-R2, the impugned order is not arbitrary or without any evidence on record, connecting the petitioner with the misconduct in question. 15. Petitioner has alleged that though innumerable Officers are involved in taking the decisions and implementation, he has been deliberately targeted with a malafide intention at the behest of Managing Director. Mere assertion and bald statement of the petitioner is not enough to hold the action of Managing Director as malafide. The burden of proof of malafides being heavy and being on the petitioner and there being lack of sufficient averments and requisite material on record, it is not possible to hold that there was malice on the part of Managing Director in making the order of suspension against the petitioner. The burden of proof of malafides being heavy and being on the petitioner and there being lack of sufficient averments and requisite material on record, it is not possible to hold that there was malice on the part of Managing Director in making the order of suspension against the petitioner. The charge of malafide is more easily made than made out. In view of the resolution of the Board, as at Annexure-R2, authorizing the Managing Director to investigate further, so that, others involved in the cases may also be identified and disciplinary action initiated against all in common proceedings, wherever necessary and to impose the penalties as per Rules, the impugned order cannot be nullified. 16. The scope of interference in exercise of power of judicial review in matters relating to suspension from service pending disciplinary enquiry is limited. In the case of Director, Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad vs. Narendra Kumar Malik & Another, C.A.1488/93 decided on 29.03.1993, reported in 1993 (S-3) SCC 483, it has been held as follows: “10. …….. In matters of this kind, it is advisable that the concerned employees are kept out of mischief’s range. If they are exonerated, they would be entitled to all their benefits from the date of the order of suspension. Whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the authority concerned and ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question.” (Italicized by me for emphasis) 17. There is prima facie evidence on record connecting the petitioner with the misconduct in question. At this stage, it is inappropriate to record any finding on the correctness of the allegations, since the finding/s may prejudice the case of one or the other party. Hence, I refrain from examining the correctness of the allegations leveled against the petitioner. In the result, the writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed, with no order as to costs. It is made clear that, observations made herein should not be understood as the Court having said anything on the merit of the allegations made against the petitioner. The observations are limited for considerations of the points noticed supra and nothing beyond.