Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. Challenge is to the Order No.45 dated February 28, 2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 2nd Court, Barasat in Title Suit No.140 of 2008 thereby rejecting an application under Order 7 Rule 11(a) & (d) of the C.P.C. The plaintiff / opposite party herein instituted a suit being Title Suit No.140 of 2008 for declaration against the petitioner in respect of the premises in suit as described in the schedule of the plaint before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 2nd Court, Barasat. The defendant / petitioner entered an appearance in the said suit and it is contesting the suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations contained in the plaint. The learned Trial Judge framed issues on the basis of pleadings of both the parties and suit was at the stage of peremptory hearing. At that time, the petitioner filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(a) & (d) of the C.P.C. read with Section 21 of the West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 for rejection of the plaint. That application was rejected by the impugned order. Being aggrieved, this application has been filed. Now, the question is whether the impugned order should be sustained. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the materials on record, I find that the following facts are not in dispute:- i) That the plaintiff got a plot of land bearing plot no.32 in Block DD, Sector-I, Salt Lake City under P.S. Bidhannagar (North) in 1983 by a lease of 999 years from the Government of West Bengal. ii) That the said lease was granted for the purpose of construction of a cinema hall. iii) That the said cinema hall was constructed but it was not viable and the plaintiff incurred huge loss. iv) That on being approached by the plaintiff, the defendant paid a sum of Rs.18 lakh as accommodation loan with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum in 2004. As a security, the defendant was put into the possession of an area measuring more or less 3122 square feet in the basement and 173 square feet on the ground floor of the said building. As a security, the defendant was put into the possession of an area measuring more or less 3122 square feet in the basement and 173 square feet on the ground floor of the said building. v) That it was agreed between the parties that till repayment was not done, the defendant would possess the premises in suit at a monthly rental of Rs.18,000/-per month and such amount would be adjusted against the interest of the accommodation loan advanced to the plaintiff. vi) That the tenancy would be terminated upon payment of the entire loan amount of Rs.18 lakh together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum minus the monthly rent of Rs.18,000/- per month to be adjusted. vii) That the plaintiff took the lease of the land in suit from the Government of West Bengal on condition that the lessee shall not sublet the demised land or the building to be constructed without the consent of the Government first and the Government shall have the right and to be entitled to refuse its consent at its absolute discretion. viii) That in case of transfer or assignment of the leasehold property by the lessee, the lessor (Government) shall have the right of pre-emption and upon exercise of this right, the building constructed by the lessee on the land in suit shall be taken over by the lessor at a valuation of the building, made by the lessor on the basis of construction of the building less the depreciation value. ix) That the defendant became a sub-lessee in respect of the suit premises knowing fully well the terms and conditions of the lease between the Government and the plaintiff. x) That the plaintiff offered repayment of the money to the defendant for taking possession of the leasehold property but the defendant did not deliver the possession of the same. Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has contended that the plaint should be rejected on the ground that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action to file the suit. He points out that though the paragraph no.25 of the plaint lays down the cause of action for filing the suit as on July 13, 2008 when the period given in the said notice had expired and the defendant failed to handover vacant possession of the premises in suit. He points out that though the paragraph no.25 of the plaint lays down the cause of action for filing the suit as on July 13, 2008 when the period given in the said notice had expired and the defendant failed to handover vacant possession of the premises in suit. This is not at all a cause of action. He submits that the cause of action means a bundle of facts and it shall be construed on perusing the plaint as a whole. By referring different clauses, Mr. Roychowdhury submits that the plaint has been drafted in clever way by a legal expert and it lays down various facts. As a result, the said suit suffers from multifariousness. He also submits that the plaintiff company took the first point that the suit premises was delivered to the defendant as a security for an accommodation loan meaning thereby it is a money suit. He submits that as per terms and conditions, lease agreements were executed between the parties on June 25, 2004, inter alia, that the landlord (plaintiff) agreed to let out the premises in suit to the defendant/tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.18,000/- per month and such rent was to be adjusted against the interest to be obtained on the loan of Rs.18 lakh and the interest was at the rate of 18 per cent thereon. So, by laying down such a clause, the plaintiff has wanted to bring out a suit under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He has next submitted that as per plaint case, if the said agreement is not considered as an agreement for creation of a tenancy between the parties to the suit, in view of the superior lease between the plaintiff and the Government of West Bengal, the plaintiff should be treated as a landlord and the defendant as the licensee under the plaintiff. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury has also pointed out that in the last part of the plaint, the plaintiff has contended that if either all the conditions are not entertained and it appears that the suit is not governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 because of the quantum of rent being Rs.18,000/-per month, the suit should be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and as such, the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for recovery of possession on termination of the tenancy. Thus, he submits that the suit suffers from multifariousness and so, the suit should be dismissed. Mr. Roychowdhury has also contended that in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the West Bengal Government Land Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 the suit is not maintainable. Thus, Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has committed errors of law in dismissing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and the said application should have been allowed. On the other hand, Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiff company submits that the suit has been filed for recovery of possession of the premises in suit, different contentions have been raised because of the contract between the Government and the plaintiff and the subsequent agreements between the plaintiff and the defendant. Alternative prayer as made in the plaint is permissible and on perusal of the entire plaint as a whole, it would appear that the plaintiff has shown the cause of action to file the suit and it was filed properly. The suit does not suffer from multifariousness at all. Mr. Roychowdhury has referred to the following decisions in support of his submission:- a) The decision of Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair & ors. reported in (2004)3 SCC 277 particularly the paragraph nos.16 to 18 and thus, he submits that the cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. Thus, he submits that all the causes of action as stated above are independent and so, the suit suffers from multifariousness and so, the plaint should be rejected. b) The decision of Sudhangshu Bimal Ghosh v. Ranjit Kr. Das & ors. reported in 1999 CWN 87 particularly paragraph nos.11 and 12 and relying on this decision Mr. Thus, he submits that all the causes of action as stated above are independent and so, the suit suffers from multifariousness and so, the plaint should be rejected. b) The decision of Sudhangshu Bimal Ghosh v. Ranjit Kr. Das & ors. reported in 1999 CWN 87 particularly paragraph nos.11 and 12 and relying on this decision Mr. Roychowdhury submits that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to go beyond his admission made in the agreements. c) The decision of Prem Raj v. D.L.F.H. & C. Ltd. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1355 particularly the paragraph no.7 and thus, he submits that whether alternative remedy as prayed for in the suit could be considered. d) Mr. Roychowdhury has then referred to the decision of Asansol Durgapur Development Authority & anr. v. Tapas Banerjee & ors. reported 2008(4) CHN 297 and the provisions of the West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 and thus, he submits that as per the decision, the transfer made in favour of the defendant is not permissible and as such, the plaint is liable to be rejected. e) He has next referred to the decision of Dr. Abhijit Banerjee v. Pradip Kr. Dutta reported in (2010)2 CLT 142, the decision of N.V. Srinivasa Murthy & ors. v. Mariyamma (Dead) By Proposed LRS. & ors. reported in (2005)5 SCC 548 and the decision of Khushro S. Gandhi & ors. v. N.A. Guzder & ors. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1468 particularly the paragraph no.9 and thus, he submits that the entire transaction is nothing but a loan transaction but the agreements were made in the aforesaid manner as the sale is prohibited on the lands at Salt Lake. There is a clause for renewal meaning thereby that the defendant would continue the possession so long the other conditions are fulfilled on the part of the defendant, meaning thereby that the lease would continue. Thus, the suit is not maintainable and the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff company barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. By referring these decisions Mr. Roychowdhury submits that the plaint should be rejected. Thus, the suit is not maintainable and the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff company barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. By referring these decisions Mr. Roychowdhury submits that the plaint should be rejected. He has also contended that in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 no Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or to deal with any question which is required to be decided or dealt with under the provisions of this Act and no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit in respect of any such question. Thus, he submits that the learned Trial Judge should have allowed the application for rejection of the plaint. On the other hand, Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that several causes of action arising out of the same set of facts can be tagged and by virtue of Order 2 Rule 3 of C.P.C., the reliefs as sought for are permissible. He also submits that in the instant suit, the plaintiff has prayed for recovery of possession by evicting the defendant from the premises in suit, permanent injunction, mesne profits and other reliefs. After making construction for the purpose of a cinema hall for which the relevant plot was allotted to the plaintiff company, when he incurred heavy burden of financial crisis, he was compelled to take money from the defendant / petitioner and as a security for the accommodation loan, the three deeds of agreement were executed and he delivered the possession of the premises in suit.. But, ultimately, when the plaintiff company tendered money, the defendant refused to deliver the vacant possession of the premises in suit and as such, the plaintiff was compelled to file the suit. Moreover, as per provisions of the West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 his client is debarred from subletting or alienating the property to any other person. So, the recovery of possession has been sought for according to the terms of agreement. The plaintiff can pray for such reliefs. In support of his submission, Mr. Chatterjee has referred to the following decisions:- A) The decision of Mst. Ramdayee v. Dhanraj Kochar & ors. So, the recovery of possession has been sought for according to the terms of agreement. The plaintiff can pray for such reliefs. In support of his submission, Mr. Chatterjee has referred to the following decisions:- A) The decision of Mst. Ramdayee v. Dhanraj Kochar & ors. reported in AIR 1972 Calcutta 313 and thus, he submits that in a suit for recovery of possession simpliciter by a landlord against a tenant before a competent Court is not barred by Section 20 of the W.B.P.T. Act, 1956. He has also contended that the instant suit does not suffer from multifariousness and such types of reliefs could well be considered in a suit for recovery of possession arising from the same set of facts. In the instant suit, the recovery of possession has been sought for and the relationship between the parties with regard to the suit premises has arisen out of the three agreements executed on June 25, 2004. So, according to the various terms of the agreements between the parties, the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff company in the suit based on the same set of facts could well be made in one suit. He has referred to the decision of Mst. Ramdayee (supra) as for example. He has referred the observations as made in paragraph nos.6, 11, 13 and 15 and for convenience gist of the same is reproduced below:- “Where a suit was filed for recovery of possession of ‘A’ Schedule premises against tenant defendant 1 and for possession of ‘B’ Schedule premises against defendants 1 and 2 as trespassers, for declaration of title in respect of ‘B’ Schedule premises and for damages, it was held that the suit was not bad for multifariousness as common questions of fact and law would arise if suits in respect of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedules were filed separately. It was further held that High Court would not be justified in interfering with the discretionary order of trial Court allowing the suit to proceed as the plea of multifariousness was raised more than five years after framing of issues and other proceedings had taken place.” Applying the ratio of the said decision, I am of the view that Mr. Chatterjee has rightly submitted that the suit does not suffer from multifariousness and the present suit for recovery of possession is quite maintainable. Chatterjee has rightly submitted that the suit does not suffer from multifariousness and the present suit for recovery of possession is quite maintainable. B) He has next referred to the decision of Sm. Sukla Chowdhury v. Miss Manjolyn Tweedi & anr. reported in AIR 1975 Calcutta 427 particularly the paragraph nos.1, 2 and 6 and thus, he submits that joining of several causes of action in one suit based on the same set of facts and by virtue of Order 2 Rule 3 of the C.P.C., the joining of several causes of action on the same set of facts is permissible. Thus, he submits that in the instant suit, since the causes of action have arisen out of the agreements between the parties, several causes of action may be joined arising out of selfsame set of facts. This decision also appears to me to be applicable in the instant situation. C) Mr. Chatterjee has next referred to the decision of Popat & Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association reported in (2005)7 SCC 510 particularly paragraph no.25 and thus, he submits that diverse claims may be the basis for the main relief sought for in the suit and for that reason, the plaint should not be rejected. He has also contended that on perusal of the plaint without addition or subtraction, it must be shown that the plaint is barred by any law to attract the application under Order 7 Rule 11, but it is not the same situation in the present case. On perusal of the plaint, it appears that the plaintiff has prayed for same reliefs on alternative grounds as available to him in view of the agreement between the plaintiff company and the Government and the subsequent agreements between the plaintiff company and the defendants. D) Mr. Chatterjee has also referred to the decision of Dr. Abhijit Banerjee v. Pradip Kr. D) Mr. Chatterjee has also referred to the decision of Dr. Abhijit Banerjee v. Pradip Kr. Dutta reported in 2010 (2) CLT 142 (HC) and submits that if a licensee continues in possession of the premises in spite of expiration of the license is to be equated with that of a trespasser, suit filed by the plaintiff company against the defendant for recovery of possession of the suit premises on revocation of his license is very much maintainable before the Civil Court and Section 21 of the West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 will not be a bar upon the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Thus, from the above facts and circumstances, the decisions referred to by the parties it is obvious that in respect of prohibition clause not to part with possession, the plaintiff company had delivered possession in favour of the defendant on the basis of three agreements executed in 2004. Prima facie, it appears that these three agreements are opposed to public policy. The original lease was executed in such a fashion so that the original lessee may retain the possession of the premises in suit for which it was settled to it almost in a permanent form by way of a lease of 999 years. Therefore, any agreement executed by the plaintiff company in favour of the defendant appears to be not tenable in law. However, I find that by the agreements of 2004 both the parties have become mutually benefited by way of exchange of delivery of possession and money by the plaintiff company and the defendants. So, according to the terms of agreements between the parties, prima facie, it is difficult to say whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff company but at best could be, prima facie, termed as a licensee under the plaintiff company. As an alternative measure, the plaintiff has also claimed recovery of possession contending that if at all it is decided by the Court that the relationship between the parties to the suit cannot be governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 because of the heavy quantum of rent per month, in that case, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act for recovery of possession should be applied. These facts, I am of the view, could only be decided at the stage of trial of the suit only and not on the basis of the plaint case itself. The decision of Popot and Kotecha Property (supra) also lays down in such a situation, without recording evidence, the disputed matter could not be decided. So far as the provisions of Section 21 of the 1993 Act are concerned, I am of the view that the dispute referred to in the section is related to in between the original lessor and the first decree lessee, that is, between the Government and the plaintiff company. In respect of a dispute between the Government and plaintiff company, such a dispute is to be resolved by the competent authority and the appellate authority according to the provisions of the said Act and not by the Civil Court as there is a bar under Section 21 of the said Act. But, this Section 21 does not create a bar to institute a suit by a lessee from the Government against a sub-lessee / trespasser or a licensee. My observations get support from the decision of Dr. Abhijit Banerjee (supra) case. The plaintiffs have stated the causes of action in filing the suit and all such causes of action have arisen out of the selfsame facts, that is, the agreements executed between the parties in the year 2004. Such facts have been properly described in the plaint supported by documents and these facts have been clearly stated earlier as not being in dispute. Therefore, prima facie, it cannot be stated that there is no cause of action in filing the suit or that the suit is barred by any other law. The plaint does not ome within the mischief of Order 7 Rule 11(a) & (d) of the C.P.C. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned Trial Judge has rightly rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11(a) & (d) of the C.P.C. The impugned order should, therefore, be sustained. In that view of the matter, the revisional application is dismissed. The suit shall proceed in accordance with law and it is at the stage of recording evidence. Upon recording evidence on behalf of both the sides, the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law. In that view of the matter, the revisional application is dismissed. The suit shall proceed in accordance with law and it is at the stage of recording evidence. Upon recording evidence on behalf of both the sides, the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law. It is also made clear that in coming to the conclusion, I have made certain observations; but, these are of the nature of the prima facie views for the disposal of the revisional application. The learned Trial Judge shall not be swayed away by my observations, at the time of the disposal of the suit. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. After delivery of judgment, Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has prayed for stay of the judgment. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties. Since it is a Contested Application and after discussion of all the aspects of the matter, this judgment has been delivered, prayer for stay of this judgment is considered and rejected.