Chairman, District Primary School Council v. Prithwish Samanta
2011-01-21
AMIT TALUKDAR, PRABHAT KUMAR DEY
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT TALUKDAR, J. 1. IT is now also well settled that a Court of Appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below." Sinha, J. speaking for the Bench in Majunath Anandappa urf Shivappa Hanasi v. Tamanasa and Ors., (2003)10 SCC 390 in Paragraph 36 quoted to the above extent after referring to its earlier decision in U. P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros, reported in AIR 1967 SC 249 , wherein Paragraph 8 it had been held : "........In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion........." 2. In the twilight zone of the same, we will be required to appreciate the verdict of the Hon'ble trial Court returned in W.P. No. 2093(W) of 2009 on 08/04/2010 and see as to whether the same can pass the touchstone of the aforesaid guidelines. His Lordship in the impugned Order referred to above, made a purposive construction of Rule 14 of the Primary Teachers Recruitment Rule, 2001 on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and though the period of minority of an eligible heir has to be excluded in computing the time from the date of death by resorting to the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and directed the respondent No.4 to issue appointment in favour of the Appellant. 3. This has been brought under the scanner of our extended Judicial Review in this Mandamus Appeal at the discretion of the State. 4. For a better appreciation of the Appeal we would outline the respective submissions made at the Bar and see as to whether the views expressed by the Court of First Instance can be sustained. Shri Tulsidas Maiti appearing in support of the Appellant (State of West Bengal) submitted before us that reference made by Hon'ble trial Court to the provisions of Limitation Act, was inappropriate as the same can only have application in a Judicial proceeding and not otherwise. 5.
Shri Tulsidas Maiti appearing in support of the Appellant (State of West Bengal) submitted before us that reference made by Hon'ble trial Court to the provisions of Limitation Act, was inappropriate as the same can only have application in a Judicial proceeding and not otherwise. 5. He was of the view that in the absence of any direction passed by the respondent No.2, no appointment can be given and the directions passed by this Court in this regard was not in tune with the Rules. 6. Shri Maiti submitted that the appellant was a minor when he lost his Father. As such, he cannot have any claim on appointment in the place of his Father. He submitted that Order under Appeal requires to be revisited. 7. Shri Lakshmi Kr. Gupta, learned senior Counsel for the respondent argued at length for maintaining the decision returned by the Hon'ble trial Court. 8. Learned senior Counsel showed the nidus of facts which enwomb the issues before us to the effect that the demise of the Father of respondent No. 1 took place on 24.07.2007. At the relevant point of time he was 15 years 7months and 6 days. After two years of the death of his Father, as soon as he attained the age of 17 and a V2 years, he made a prayer for compassionate appointment. He attained majority on 18.12.2008. Relying on his Return, the learned senior Counsel showed that on 22.12.2008 another prayer for compassionate appointment was made but on 15.01.2009 prayer was refused as the same was made after two years. 9. SHRI Gupta, learned senior Counsel wondered as to how such finding by the respondent No.4 (Page 40 of the Return) could be sustained when the same was made at the first instance just six months short of majority. They could have kept the same pending till he became a major. 10. HE was of the view that in terms of Rule 3D of the Recruitment Rules, 1940 framed under the Bengal (Rural)Primary Education Act, 1930 (Act VII of 1930)for Appointment, Leave and Conditions of Service of primary teachers, there must be proper consideration of such prayer for compassionate appointment. Instead in a cursory fashion the respondent No. 4 declined to accede to the prayer.
Instead in a cursory fashion the respondent No. 4 declined to accede to the prayer. Learned senior Counsel submitted that by holding so, the respondent No. 4 has, in a way, sought to defeat the Legislative purpose behind enactment of the aforesaid Rules. 11. THE logic behind the Rule of 18 years, was, according to the learned senior Counsel, that employment being a contract-the minor cannot be a party to the same. THE object of the scheme in question, was to ensure that the ex-employee does not suffer after death and to protect his family in such circumstances, the scheme was initiated and such a narrow interpretation would, in effect, defeat the entire purpose of the scheme. 12. HE was of the opinion that since it involved some Social impact, the Rules should be read by way of giving a wider interpretation. For this purpose he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh reported in AIR 1955 SC 830 . He also placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Namita Pramanik v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2008)1 Cal LT 217and also Khadeja Bibi and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in (2000)2 Cal LJ 108 in support of his contention. 13. SHRI Gupta, learned senior Counsel read out from the famous Treatise of Professor H.W.R. Wade in Administrative Law, Fifth Edn., page 218. 14. LEARNED senior Counsel showed from Professor Wade's Treatises that the Rules here should be read as mandatory and it could not be lost sight of, that the process had started when the Appellant was a minor and upon attaining Majority, he made a second prayer, which was nothing else but the continuation of the earlier, which should have been deemed to be kept pending and the finding of the Authority, respondent No.4 was absolutely erroneous and the Hon'ble trial Court having corrected the wrong interference in Appeal was not justified. Should we prune or trim and even reject the entire piece of meticulous rendering by the learned trial Court ? 15. WE have a wide but circumspective discretion. In the absence of any formidable exigency or forensic necessities, Orders of this nature can hardly be put pen on. 16.
Should we prune or trim and even reject the entire piece of meticulous rendering by the learned trial Court ? 15. WE have a wide but circumspective discretion. In the absence of any formidable exigency or forensic necessities, Orders of this nature can hardly be put pen on. 16. WE are in wholesale agreement with His Lordship that the provisions of Rule 14(1) of the West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2001 has to be read by applying the converse ratio or else it falls foul of Article 14. Inter play of the Limitation Act, which has been found fault with by Shri Maiti -even if excluded from our consideration, we opine that delay, if any, can be countenanced by the simple fact that it is a continuous wrong, which is being suffered by the Appellant and the cause of action being arrived; there is no delay at all in his seeking relief after securing up to age 18. 17. WE find much substance in the submission of Shri Gupta, the learned senior Counsel that the first representation should have been taken into account and the refusal of the second one on the ground of the same being put in after two years; is absolutely a travesty of natural justice. In fact, from the tenor of the Order passed by respondent No. 4 on 24.01.2009, it shows mechanical and apathetic to what extent an Authority can saturate! 18. UNABLE to resist our temptation of quoting from the inimitable words of V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. who authored Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Etc. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. reported in AIR 1980 SC 1896 we found what the learned trial Court did while concluding in the finding impugned; was exactly what Krishna lyer,J. had cherished more than two decades ago: "judicial daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the Court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process." Hon'ble trial Court has absolutely done the right thing in setting aside the palpable wrong suffered by respondent No. 1 hitherto and we must venture to say had it not been the "Judicial daring" of His Lordship before the trial Court, we would have pressed the reversal button. 19.
19. FROM a close conspectus of the various facets of the argument of Shri Gupta, learned senior Counsel on the backdrop of the perfectly correct version of the learned trial Court, we feel that what is required of us in this Appeal, is simply to say amen and conclude by agreeing to dismiss it. 20. THE Hon'ble trial Court, in our opinion, very rightly interpreted Rule 14 sub-Rule (1) of the Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rule, 2001 and returned the impugned finding. While the finding of the Authority (respondent No.4) cannot be a fixture before the Writ Court, certainly, the decision making process rejecting the Application for compassionate appointment is open for Judicial Review as it. 21. LEARNED trial Court very aptly interfered in the Matter, which, on the contrary, does not require our interfere in Appeal. [See : State Bank of India and Anr. v. Somvir Singh, (2007)4 SCC 778 . 22. HOWEVER, we would give six months time for compliance of the trial Court Order. 23. IN view of the disposal of the main Appeal nothing remains in the Application being CAN 6645 of 2010 and the same is accordingly disposed of. Parties to bear their own costs.