Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 1059 (RAJ)

Heera Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2011-05-17

G.K.TIWARI, SHIV KUMAR SHARMA

body2011
Dr. TIWARI, M.—This is a second appeal under Section 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short 'the Act') against the impugned judgment and decree dated 14.11.2007 of Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota passed in appeal No. 485/2007. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishanganj (Baran) under Section 88, 89, 90 and 188 of the Act against the respondent-defendant (State) through Tehsildar Kishanganj and District Forest Officer (Forest Department) for declaration of khatedari rights and grant of injunction in respect of the suit land on the basis of adverse possession. The suit land is currently recorded as forest land. Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the suit by his judgment dated 30.3.2007 and Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota dismissed the appeal by his judgment and decree dated 14.11.2007, aggrieved against which the appellants have preferred the second appeal in this Court. 3. We have heard the learned counsels of both the parties. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the suit land has been in possession of the plaintiffs for more than thirty years. Thus, the appellants-plaintiffs have acquired khatedari rights by way of adverse possession. The suit land is wrongly recorded as a forest land in the revenue records and these entries should be ignored in view of the long standing possession of the appellants. The impugned judgment of Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority does not discuss any of the issues framed by the trial Court, so the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority is illegal not being in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.). Thus, both the impugned judgments should be quashed and the appellants-plaintiffs should be declared khatedar tenants of the disputed land. The appeal has been filed beyond the limitation of two years. The learned counsel requested for condonation of delay due to the delayed information to the appellants about the impugned judgment. 5. Strongly opposing the contentions of the appellants, the learned Dy. Govt. Advocate contended that the suit land is recorded in the name of Forest Department and no khatedari rights accrue in such land. It is argued that there cannot be adverse possession on forest lands; and so-called adverse possession is not proved. both the lower courts have given concurrent judgments which should not be interfered with in second appeal. 6. Govt. Advocate contended that the suit land is recorded in the name of Forest Department and no khatedari rights accrue in such land. It is argued that there cannot be adverse possession on forest lands; and so-called adverse possession is not proved. both the lower courts have given concurrent judgments which should not be interfered with in second appeal. 6. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, perused the impugned judgments of courts below and gone through the material on record. 7. Admittedly, the suit land is recorded in the Forest Department. Section 16(ix) of the Act prohibits conferment of khatedari rights in forest land. The appellants-plaintiffs have based their claim of khatedari rights on adverse possession. Firstly, there cannot be adverse possession on forest land as no khatedari rights accrue in such land. Secondly, the alleged adverse possession has not been proved in the trial as is evident from perusal of the record of the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishanganj. 8. The judgment of Sub-Divisional Officer is issue-wise and Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority in his appellate judgment has concurred in the judgment of the trial Court. In such a concurring appellate judgment of the first appellate Court, there is no need to discuss all the issues separately de-novo. Broad and general agreement with the findings on issues in the judgment of trial Court is sufficient to meet the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 of the C.P.C. Thus, we are not inclined to agree with the plea of the learned counsel for the appellants that the impugned judgment of Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority is not in accordance with provision of Order 41 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. 9. Both the courts, trial court as well as the first appellate Court, have given concurrent findings of facts and concurrent judgments which do not require any interference at the second appellate stage, as we do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned judgments of courts below. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion there is no merit in the second appeal. This appeal is also filed time barred - almost two years beyond its limitation. Plea given by the appellants in their affidavit for condonation of delay is that their advocate did not inform them about the impugned judgment in time. This plea is too simplistic and unconvincing for condonation of delay. This appeal is also filed time barred - almost two years beyond its limitation. Plea given by the appellants in their affidavit for condonation of delay is that their advocate did not inform them about the impugned judgment in time. This plea is too simplistic and unconvincing for condonation of delay. Evidently the appeal is time barred and there is no cogent and satisfactory reason given by the appellants for condonation of delay. Thus, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is rejected. 11. Resultantly, the appeal stands dismissed. Pronounced.