Judgment : Writ Petition No.25953 of 2011 is filed seeking to issue writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in issuing the alleged provisional notice/order, dated 03-01-2011 followed by the order, dated 7-05-2011 issued by the 3rd respondent and the final order passed by the 2nd respondent in his notice, dated 02-09-2011 wherein huge amounts are demanded to be paid by each of the tenants towards arrears of enhanced differential monthly rent with penal interest at 12% per annum, qualified illegally as illegal, arbitrary and opposed to principles of natural justice offending Articles 14,19,21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and without authority or power and in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) read with Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (Shops) Rental Regulations, 1975 (for short ‘ the Regulations’) without resorting to the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 in the nature of fixing fair rent and consequently direct the respondents to restrain them from in any way giving effect to the impugned action under the above said three impugned proceedings and to allow the petitioners to continue as tenants on paying the enhanced rent from September,2011 without prejudice to their right to question the validity, legality and propriety of such enhancement. 2. The 3rd petitioner filed the affidavit in support of the writ petition stating that all the petitioners are filing the writ petition as a joint application for a common relief and under common cause of action as the petitioners are questioning the action of the respondents in seeking to evict the petitioners from the premises under their occupation as tenants on the ground that enhanced rents have not been paid. The shops under the occupation of the petitioners have been illegally and arbitrarily in a discriminatory manner are locked and they are prevented from availing the premises for the purpose of running their respective businesses. They have right to be in occupation of the tenanted premises which are owned by the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as 'APHB'). The shops in question are situated in Bagh Lingampally and they are 51 in number. The petitioners have cleared the whole of the alleged arrears till 31st August, 2011. Except one of the petitioners, none of the petitioners herein has been in arrears of the rent. The shops in question are situated in Bagh Lingampally and they are 51 in number. The petitioners have cleared the whole of the alleged arrears till 31st August, 2011. Except one of the petitioners, none of the petitioners herein has been in arrears of the rent. All this is adopted by the respondent authorities as a matter of device to see that all the occupants are sent out of the premises on the ground of non-compliance of the demanded rent by the respondents and on the basis of non payment of such amount basing on the enhancement order locked the entire premises in the guise of the common judgment issued by this Court. The petitioners 1 to 10 are the original allottees of shop Nos. 42,43,36,16,17,50,51,20,32,27,25 and 6 respectively which are 12 in number and they have been continuing to be in occupation being allotted and delivery of premises to each of them with reference to the specified number of each shops allotted to each of them. Whereas petitioners 11 to 32 have been paying the rent fixed by the authorities from time to time in accordance with rules. They are doing their businesses in the shops allotted to the original allottees under whose authorization and authority they are running the shops. There has been no transfer of shops without permission of the authorities. The relationship of APHB authorities and the present petitioners is that of landlord and tenant. In case of allotment of 51 shops available for APHB in Bagh Lingampally, initially allotment procedure was followed on receipt of application. The first allotment took place in the year 1982. Similarly during the subsequent years also, till 1990s, they have been allotted to various allottees in pursuance of public auction held. 3rd petitioner came into possession of shop No.36. Shop No.35 was allotted to his wife and she is the 15th petitioner herein. Similarly all other shops are allotted to the selected allottees in the respective years in which selection took place. The rent was fixed in respect of each shop. The allottee or the occupant under his authorization is permitted to continue to pay rent regularly till such rents are enhanced. Such enhancement took place two or three times and pursuant to such enhancement, all the petitioners being the tenants and in occupation of the premises in question have been paying the rents regularly. The allottee or the occupant under his authorization is permitted to continue to pay rent regularly till such rents are enhanced. Such enhancement took place two or three times and pursuant to such enhancement, all the petitioners being the tenants and in occupation of the premises in question have been paying the rents regularly. The allotment and their continuance as occupants depends upon such persons satisfying the terms and conditions as specified in Form 1 as indicated in the Regulation No.10 of the Regulations. If the lessee agrees to renew the lease in his favour at an amount which shall not be less than 50% over the existing monthly rent in which case a fresh rental agreement in Form 4 shall be executed. In any event the shops under the occupation of the petitioners have never been chosen to be in public auction for the purpose of allotment to any other person after following the procedure laid down under the Regulations. The petitioners are allowed to continue to be in possession and enjoyment of the premises for all these years subject to payment of rents enhanced by the authorities from time to time. Thus the petitioners are treated as tenants and the rents payable by them as tenants are accepted by APHB and in case of petitioners 11 to 13 they have been paying rents and the respondents are accepting the rents even though original allotment was made in respect of premises to the original allotteees. There is no dispute that all the petitioners have been in occupation of premises and have been doing business on payment of rent on behalf of original allottees. There is no allegation so far by the authorities that any of the provisions of the Regulations or the terms of rental deed are violated. Similarly, there is no allegation that the petitioners are liable to vacate the premises on the ground that rental deed executed was expired. Petitioners are aware that if the tenants default in payment of rent due from them for four months, it is open for the authorities to take steps to evict them. So far the enhanced rent i.e., enhanced in 2011 after 31-08-2011 cannot be said to be an amount lawfully due from each of the tenants. Petitioners are aware that if the tenants default in payment of rent due from them for four months, it is open for the authorities to take steps to evict them. So far the enhanced rent i.e., enhanced in 2011 after 31-08-2011 cannot be said to be an amount lawfully due from each of the tenants. The demand made in pursuant to such enhancement is bound to be treated as not covered by a lawful demand as such due amount is not fixed or determined in accordance with law. What has been arbitrarily fixed by the authorities in exercise of the deemed power stated to have been conferred upon them under the Act and the Regulations is bound to be treated as arbitrary as no rule or regulation or any other provision of the Act do confer upon the respondent authorities to demand for such payment by calling it as enhanced rent. The whole object of the Act is to see that the weaker sections of the occupants shall not be put to jeopardy on the ground that they cannot afford to compete with other persons who can afford to take the premises for their business by way of payment of heavy amount as rent. It is necessary to notice that the question of fixation of fair rent or enhancement of rent already fixed under any law is bound to be determined by the Rent Control Authorities in accordance with the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 as amended by A.P. Act No.17 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act 1960'). Act 1960 is consolidated and amended the law relating to the regulation of lease of buildings, control of rent thereof and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants there from in the State of Andhra Pradesh. APHB premises cannot be said to be a building belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh or Central Government or Local authority. Therefore, the provisions of Rent Control Act have to be followed and applied. The constitutional concept of permitting the holder of the property to continue to have the right to property and right to eke livelihood by holding such property is the fundamental right or constitutional right. APHB has no power to act contrary to the concept of fair rent contemplated and adumbrated under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The constitutional concept of permitting the holder of the property to continue to have the right to property and right to eke livelihood by holding such property is the fundamental right or constitutional right. APHB has no power to act contrary to the concept of fair rent contemplated and adumbrated under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. It cannot fix the rent arbitrarily and call it as a fair rent. The provisions of Rent Control Act are attracted in respect of fixation of enhancement of rent. In respect of shop No.36, 2nd respondent issued a notice on 08-03-2010 demanding allottee to pay Rs.40,545/- as on March, 2010 towards arrears of monthly rent with interest at 12% p.a. failing which, allotment would be cancelled. The 3rd petitioner has paid the entire amount and the 2nd respondent was informed of the fact about the payment. On 08-11-2010 in respect of shop No.36, another demand notice was issued for Rs.11,355/-. Later the 3rd respondent passed the order on 08-11-2010. Similarly, the 2nd respondent issued a letter, dated 03-01-2011 in which a proposal by the board to increase the existing monthly rent from Rs.765/-to Rs.1148/- w.e.f. 01-04-2011, wherein it is stated that if he is willing to pay the enhanced rent, he was required to execute fresh lease deed, otherwise he has to vacate the premises. In spite of accepting the enhanced rental arrears from each of the petitioners, APHB made a proposal provisionally seeking to enhance the rent. The authorities passed eviction orders in respect of the shops in question by an order, dated 17-05-2011 and the letter dated 03-01-2011 was treated as provisional order. The letter, dated 03-01-2011 was not shown to be a provisional order as it is issued without notice. Thus, both the proceedings, dated 03-01-2011 and 17-05-2011 are without notice and without affording any opportunity to the petitioners so as to propose enhancement. Further the provisional order as well as the eviction order, dated 17-05-2011 are not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, they are to be treated as nonest in the eye of law. By the order, dated 17-05-2011 the Bailiff was asked to take over possession after reporting the action taken by him by 06-06-2011. Further the provisional order as well as the eviction order, dated 17-05-2011 are not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, they are to be treated as nonest in the eye of law. By the order, dated 17-05-2011 the Bailiff was asked to take over possession after reporting the action taken by him by 06-06-2011. The impugned notice, dated 02-09-2011 was issued by the competent authority stating that 3rd petitioner is due to an amount of Rs.4,52,757/-towards arrears of enhanced differential monthly rent and an amount of Rs.5,29,545/-towards penal interest at 12% p.a. for the belated payment totalling to Rs.9,82,302/-. Such a demand is final determination, which was provisionally arrived at by the authorities. No show-cause notice was issued with regard to determination of arrears. The demand notice issued by the 2nd respondent is absolutely illegal and arbitrary. The petitioners are prevented from continuing to be in occupation of the premises by illegal action of the 4th respondent in seizing and locking the premises of the petitioners without notice on 20-08-2011 on the ground that they have been in arrears till August, 2011. The entire action is only with a view to see that the petitioners are evicted for the purpose of notifying the shops as vacant with a view to fetch more rent by way of public auction. 3. The other writ petitions are filed by the petitioners therein seeking to issue writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in preventing them from carrying on business in their respective shops. 4. It is stated in the affidavits filed in support of the other writ petitions that APHB constructed 50 shops at Bagh Limgapally, Hyderabad during the period 1980 and 1981, each extent ranging from 100,150 and 200 sq. ft. After conducting public auction, the Board allotted those 50 shops to the highest bidders on lease basis on payment of monthly rent and collected five months rent advance, earnest money deposits ranging from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-and enhanced the rents from time to time. The petitioners were allotted their respective shops and they are doing business continuously from 1986 till today. After conducting public auction, the Board allotted those 50 shops to the highest bidders on lease basis on payment of monthly rent and collected five months rent advance, earnest money deposits ranging from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-and enhanced the rents from time to time. The petitioners were allotted their respective shops and they are doing business continuously from 1986 till today. The petitioners were served with a letter, dated 03-01-2011 issued by the Vice-Chairman and Housing Commissioner, wherein it is stated that the Board proposes to increase the existing monthly rent w.e.f. 01-04-2011 and requested to intimate their willingness within a month time and in case of willingness execute a fresh rental deed in Form 4 or vacate and hand over the shop to the Board within a month from the date of receipt of the said notice. Therefore, the petitioners filed W.P.No.1732 of 2011 and this Court vide order, dated 31-01-2011 directed the petitioners to clear the arrears of rents. Accordingly, they cleared the arrears of rent. But unfortunately on 20-08-2011, the respondent No.4 on behalf of 1st respondent came to the shops and forcibly closed the shops and locked the same. The said action of the respondents in closing the shops without following due process of law, without issuing any notice and without conducting any enquiry is utter violation of principles of natural justice. 5. The respondents filed vacate stay petition. Along with the vacate stay petition, they filed counter-affidavit stating that most of the writ petitioners are not original allottees and the tenancy agreement of remaining petitioners had expired long back and they have not been renewed. The evictions undertaken by the APHB are of the unauthorized occupants and these evictions were undertaken lawfully after following due procedure of law. The lease of the shops, which were given on lease in the years 1982 to 1986 had expired by 1987 to 1991 and the second term also expired by 1992 to 1996. Even after expiry of lease period, the petitioners continued to be in unauthorized occupation of their respective premises. Out of 49 shops, only 9 shops were under still the occupation of original allottees while 25 shops are under occupation of unauthorized sub tenants. Even after expiry of lease period, the petitioners continued to be in unauthorized occupation of their respective premises. Out of 49 shops, only 9 shops were under still the occupation of original allottees while 25 shops are under occupation of unauthorized sub tenants. Except 9 shops, the tenants in the other shops are illegally making money at the cost of APHB either by sub letting the shop to third persons and collecting rents from them at current market rates. In para 5 it is stated that how the lease of the shops of the APHB can be given. The APHB has taken a decision not to continue the shops on rental basis and to dispose of the same and the matter was referred to High Power Committee. A proposal for selling the shops is pending with the Government. But there was no agreement on price was reached between the tenants and the APHB despite several meetings. The only alternative left for APHB was to evict the existing tenants and put the said shops for public auction. Notices-cum-Provisional Orders during November, 2010 as required under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act to evict the premises were issued to the occupants. As they failed to comply with the order, final order was passed during December, 2010 as required under Section 52(2) of the Act. Though statutory appeal is provided against the said order under Section 55 of the Act, no appeal has been preferred. Challenging the letters of APHB issued in December, 2010 and 03-01-2011, some of the occupants filed Writ Petition No.1732 of 2011 and batch. This Court by order, dated 31-01-2011 disposed of the Writ Petition directing the petitioners to clear the arrears of rent by the end of March, 2011 and to pay the enhanced rents from 01-04-2011. The eviction order passed in December, 2010 has not been appealed and that order has become final and the same was executed on 20-08-2011 and the possession of shops were taken and the movables were attached for recovery of arrears of rent under cover of panchanama and the shops are now under the lock and possession of APHB. The eviction order, dated 17-05-2011 is only a consequential order in pursuance of the noncompliance of the directions given by this Court in the writ petition. The eviction order, dated 17-05-2011 is only a consequential order in pursuance of the noncompliance of the directions given by this Court in the writ petition. As the petitioners were in unauthorized occupation, the APHB is entitled to damages under Section 52 of the Act. Even the notice, dated 20-09-2011 is set aside it will not give the petitioners any right to continue as tenants as the period of lease has expired. Some of the petitioners were in arrears of rent. APHB are not subject to Rent Control Act in view of exemption under Section 32 of the Act, 1960. Therefore, the respondents pray to dismiss vacate stay petition and the writ petitions. 6. The petitioners filed reply affidavit pointing out the scheme of regulations and how the shops have to be auctioned and the demand notice issued in the month of May were complied with and also specifically stated about the demand of rents in respect of petitioners in respect of certain shops. Therefore, it is not necessary to reiterate what is stated in the reply affidavit. 7. At request of both senior counsel, the main Writ Petition is taken up for hearing. 8. Therefore, it is not necessary to reiterate what is stated in the reply affidavit. 7. At request of both senior counsel, the main Writ Petition is taken up for hearing. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that tenancy of the petitioners has not been terminated under Section 52(1)(3) of the Act, that the action of APHB in evicting the petitioners forcibly from their respective shops is bad in law, that all the persons agreed for enhancement of rent under Regulation 21 (3) of the Regulations, that a month's notice has to be given and cancellation of tenancy can be revoked if arrears paid, that the Provisional Order is not an order in the eye of law, that in case of arrears attachment can be made for realization of arrears and for that a procedure is laid down under the Regulations and the said procedure has not been followed, that no inventory of the movables has been effected, that as the entire arrears have been paid, the respondents ought not to have locked the premises, that with regard to method of ascertaining damages, Rule 32 of A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959 (for short 'the Rules') have not been followed, that with regard to attachment of movables, the same was not effected in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules, that all the petitioners have no knowledge about provisional order, dated 03-01-2011 and the same was not served on none of the petitioners, that there was a total non application of mind by the competent authority in passing the order, that the eviction should be in accordance with law and it should not be a forcible eviction, that the Regulations are not made by the legislature and therefore, Regulations are not law in the eye of law, that in respect of some of the petitioners, eviction orders have been rescinded as they have paid rents and hence, he prays to allow the writ petitions. 9. 9. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents contended that none of the petitioners has a right to continue in the premises after the lapse of 10 years that therefore, there is no subsisting relationship of tenancy and landlord and all the petitioners are in occupation of the premises unauthorizedly, that under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act, notice has been served directing them to vacate the premises and therefore, final orders have been passed in the month of December, 2010, that the petitioners were evicted duly by the Bailiff on 20-08-2011, that the ascertainment of damages is nothing to do with the eviction of the petitioners since APHB Act is a special enactment and the procedure under the Act and the Rules and Regulations framed there under have to be followed, that the Rent Control Act has no application, that after panchanama, the movables were attached and the premises in question were locked and sealed and hence, he prays to dismiss the writ petitions. 10. Basing on the above pleadings, the following points arise for consideration: 1. As to howa tenant of APHB premises can be evicted? 2.Whether the authorities concerned followed procedure prescribed under A. P. Housing Board Act, 1956? 3.Whether the Rent Control Act would be applicable for determination of fair rent? 4.Whether the Writ Petitions are maintainable in view of availability of alternative remedy of filing a statutory appeal? 5.Whether the A.P. Housing Board (Shops) Rental Regulations, 1975 are having a force of law? 11. POINTS: Mandamus is intended to remedy defects of justice, it will issue to see that the justice may be done in all cases where there is no specific legal remedy for enforcing a special legal right. Where it is a question of enforcement of a fundamental right, the remedy is provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No question of alternative remedy arises in such cases. It is well settled that the remedy provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary remedy and the High Court has always discretion to refuse to grant such relief in certain circumstances. Even though legal right might have been infringed, availability of alternative remedy is one of such considerations which the High Court may take into account for refusing to exercise the jurisdiction. Even though legal right might have been infringed, availability of alternative remedy is one of such considerations which the High Court may take into account for refusing to exercise the jurisdiction. In exceptional circumstances, the High Court may grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even if alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party. In a appropriate case in spite of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction in at least three contingencies viz., 1) whether the wit petitioner seeks enforcement of any one of the fundamental rights, 2) whether there is a failure of principles of natural justice and 3) whether order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or is virus of an Act under challenge. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in A.VENKATESWARAN V COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AIR 1961 SC 1506 wherein it was held thus (para 9): “We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. We must, however, point out that the rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law, is not one which bars the jurisdiction of he High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. The law on this matter has been enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is sufficient to refer to two cases : In Union of India v. T. R. Varma, 1958 SCR 499 . Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the Court said : "It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. . It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. . And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art. 226, unless there are good grounds therefor." There is no difference between the above and the formulation by Das, C. J., in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 where he observed : "... It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies." After referring to a few cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy had been held not to bar the issue of a prerogative writ, the learned Chief Justice added : "It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari." In the result this Court held that the existence of their legal remedies was not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the Court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to the other legal remedies available to him.” Similarly in STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH V GUJARAT AMBUJA CEMENTS (2005) 6 SCC 499 it was held thus (paras 15 and 16): “If, as was noted in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana and Ors. the appeal is from "Caeser to Caeser's wife" the e-istence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an e-ercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. Though the High Court did not go into that plea relating to bias in detail, yet it felt that alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the writ petition. Since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the question as to why the statutory remedy available was not efficacious, it would not be proper for this Court to consider the question again. When the High Court had entertained a writ petition notwithstanding e-istence of an alternative remedy this Court while dealing with the matter in an appeal should not permit the question to be raised unless the High Court's reasoning for entertaining the writ petition is found to be palpably unsound and irrational. Similar view was e-pressed by this Court in First Income-Ta- Officer, Salem v. M/s. Short Brothers (P) Ltd. and State of U.P. and Ors. v. M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Similar view was e-pressed by this Court in First Income-Ta- Officer, Salem v. M/s. Short Brothers (P) Ltd. and State of U.P. and Ors. v. M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. That being the position, we do not consider the High Court's judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. There are two well recognized e-ceptions to the doctrine of e-haustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. (16) Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the ta-ing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess it can be the ground on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. Income Ta- Officer, Bareilly that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non e-haustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition” 12. Section 55 of the Act reads that any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sub-section (2) of Section 52 or Section 53 may, within one month time the date of the confirmation of the order under Section 52 or the date of the said service of the notice under Section 53 as the case may be prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. Clause (4) reads that appellate authority shall be Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad if the Board premises in respect of which the appeal is to be preferred are situated in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and if such premises are situated elsewhere, the District Judge within whose jurisdiction such premises are situated. It is not the case of the petitioners that the authority who passed the order has no jurisdiction or that the principles of natural justice have been violated. Similarly, it is not the case where an infringement of fundamental right except stating that Articles 14,19, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India are violated. But as seen from the entire writ petition allegations, it is not given any factual background as to what manner those articles in the constitution have been violated. There must be a factual foundation for violation of any one of the articles to be mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Therefore, in the absence of any violation of legal or statutory right except some procedural irregularity in issuing notices cannot be a ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. Even assuming for a moment that there is infringement of fundamental right or statutory right to the petitioners, now it has to be seen whether the petitioners were duly evicted in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Act. 13. The A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 is an Act to provide for measures to be taken to deal with and satisfy the need of housing accommodation. Departing from evicting a tenant under general law or special statute, Housing Board Act is enacted so as to evict a tenant in summary procedure. It is a special enactment by itself to deal with eictionof authorized or unauthorized occupants. Departing from evicting a tenant under general law or special statute, Housing Board Act is enacted so as to evict a tenant in summary procedure. It is a special enactment by itself to deal with eictionof authorized or unauthorized occupants. ‘Board Premises’ means any premises belonging to or vesting in the Board or taken on lease by the Board or entrusted to the Board under this Act for management and use for the purposes of this Act. ‘Premises’ means any (land or building) or part of a building and includes (i) gardens, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building and (ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Chapter 6 of the Act deals with the powers to evict persons from Board premises. Section 52 of the Act deals with power to evict certain persons from Board premises. For the purpose of present facts, Sections 52 (1)(b) and 52 (2) of the Act are relevant. It is not in dispute before this Court that Section 52 (1)(a) deals with authorized occupants of Board premises. Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act deals with persons in unauthorized occupation. The Act operates in a very limited field even though it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging to the board. The object of Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorized occupants from Board premises by summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the board empowering the board to proceed further. Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act reads that any person is in unauthorized occupation of any Board premises, the competent authority may, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for time being in force, by notice served (i) by post or (ii) by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of such premises, or (iii) in such other manner as may be prescribed, order that such person, as well as any other person, who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice. From the above provision, it is clear that by serving notice by any one of the three modes order unauthorized ocupant or any person who is in the occupation of the premises to vacate premises within one month from the service of notice. If a person is in unauthorized occupation of any Board premises, no more grounds or reasons are necessary for eviction. A simple notice to vacate the premises within one month is sufficient. But in case a person authorized to occupy Board premises, the competent authority satisfies that the case of authorized occupant falls under any one of the grounds under Section 52 (1)(a) of the Act, then it must be specifically depicted on which ground the authorized occupant is liable to be evicted. At the stage of Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act, the question of giving any reasonable opportunity of being heard does not arise. The above section does not contemplate to give any reason to unauthorized occupant when he is liable to be evicted from the Board premises. After serving the notice as required under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act, if any person fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (1), then the competent authority after giving such a person a reasonable opportunity of being heard confirm such order and evict that person from, and take possession of the premises and for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. 14. The language used in sub-section (2) would indicate that the competent authority may after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard confirm the order. The use of word ‘may’ in sub-section 2 indicates that discretion has been given to the competent authority in case a person authorized to occupy the premises is being evicted, he has to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Because such person is entitled to give an explanation that his case does not fall under anyone of the three sub clauses in Section 52 (1)(a) of the Act. In case of Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act, there is no need to give any reason at all in respect of unauthorized occupant. A simple one month’s notice is necessary for eviction. The period of one month prescribed under this proviso is to enable the unauthorized occupant to make suitable alternative arrangement so that his business would not be disturbed. 15. A simple one month’s notice is necessary for eviction. The period of one month prescribed under this proviso is to enable the unauthorized occupant to make suitable alternative arrangement so that his business would not be disturbed. 15. It is contended that in view of the fact that rents have been paid by all the petitioners, the competent authority is empower to cancel its order made under Section 52 (1) of the Act. Sub clause (3) of Section 52 of the Act has no application to the unauthorized occupants because as seen from this provision, it only applies to a person who has been ordered to vacate any premises under clause (i) or (ii) of sub clause (a) of sub-section (1) within one month from the date of service of notice. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that this provision would be applicable to a person authorized to occupy the Board premises. 16. It is not in dispute before this Court that the leases of shops in respect of some of the petitioners which were given on lease during the years 1982 to 1986 had expired in between 1987 to 1991 and in case of shops where they were extended by one more term, the second term also expired from 1992 to 1996. The lease period of the shops given on lease to some of the petitioners between 1991 to 1995 expired in the year 1996 to 2000. Therefore, the lease period of all the shops of the petitioners had expired in between the years 1992 to 2000. Therefore, it is safely be concluded that all the petitoners are unauthorized occupants. 17. The Regulations came into existence in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 71 of the Act. Regulation 4 provides that as soon as shops are ready or vacant, the Board may subject to the provisions of these regulations, allot them on rent in the manner provided in the regulations. Regulation 5 provides that the Board shall issue a notice inviting applications specifying the localities of the shops available for allotment on rental basis, the monthly rent of the shop, the amount payable as earnest money, the last date for receipt of the applications, the date on which and the place where public auction will be held and such other particulars as the Chairman may consider necessary. Regulation 6 provides that the shop shall be leased out and the right to occupy the shop on rental basis shall be put to public auction. The public auction shall be held on such terms conditions as are specified in Form.1. Regulation 7 provides that the notice shall be published in not more than three daily news papers having wide circulation in the State in the main languages i.e., English, Telugu and Urdu. In additional to the publication in the daily news papers, wide publicity shall be given locally in the manner specified by the Chairman. Regulation 16 provides that the period of lease will be for five years from the date of execution of rental agreement. Regulation 17 provides that the Board may renew the lease for another term not exceeding five years without conducting public auction, if the present lessee agrees to renew the lease in his favour at an amount which shall not be less than 50% over the existing monthly rent in which case a fresh rental agreement in Form.4 shall be executed. For this purpose, the Board shall get the willingness of the occupying tenant within three months before the expiry of the existing lease. If a reply is not received within 15 days from the date of receipt of intimation by the tenant, the Chairman shall take steps for leasing out the same through public auction before the expiry of the existing lease. 18. A combined reading of the above regulations would indicate that the initial period of first lease is for about five years from the date of execution of rental agreement and thereafter the Board may renew the lease for another term not exceeding five years. So all the highest bidders of Board premises in pursuance of public auction can only retain the shop in the first instance for five years and if it is renewed another term of five years. Beyond ten years the Board or any other officials of the Board is not empowered to continue a tenant in the Board premises. A prompt action is necessary for evicting a person from the Board premises. Similarly after completion of five years and in case of renewal of lease after 10 years, there is a total in action on the part of the respondents officials in not initiating any action even after expiry of ten years. 19. A prompt action is necessary for evicting a person from the Board premises. Similarly after completion of five years and in case of renewal of lease after 10 years, there is a total in action on the part of the respondents officials in not initiating any action even after expiry of ten years. 19. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from enabling the Act. It is fundamental that a delegate of whom such a power is conferred has to Act within the limits of the authority conferred by the Act. Section 3 (51) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the rule which shall mean a rule made in exercise of power conferred under any of enactment and shall include a regulation made under any enactment. 20. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that Regulations framed under the Act have no force of law cannot be accepted. The law on this aspect is no longer res integra. In SUKHDEV SINGH V BHAGATRAM SARDAR SINGH RAGHUVAMSI AIR 1975 SC 1331 the question falls for consideration is whether the Regulations framed under ONGC Act, 1955, Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 and Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 have the force of law. In the above decision, it was held thus (paras 17,21,37): “Subordinate legislation has. if validly made, the full force and effect of a statute. That is so whether or not the statute under which it is made provides expressly that it is to have effect as if enacted therein. If an instrument made in the exercise of delegated powers directs or forbids the doing of a particular thing, the result of a breach thereof is, in the absence of provision to the contrary, the same as if the command or prohibition had been contained in the enabling statute itself. Similarly, if such an instrument authorises or requires the doing of any act, the principles to be applied in determining whether a person injured by the act has any right of action in respect of the injury are not different from those applicable whether damage results from an act done under the direct authority of a statute. Re. Langlois and Biden; and Kruse v. Johnson. 21) The characteristic of law is the manner and procedure adopted in mary forms of subordinate legislation. Re. Langlois and Biden; and Kruse v. Johnson. 21) The characteristic of law is the manner and procedure adopted in mary forms of subordinate legislation. The authority making rules and regulation must specify the source of the rule and regulation making authority. To illustrate, rules are always framed in exercise of the specific power conferred by the statute to make rules. Similarly, regulations are framed in exercise of specific power conferred by the statute to make regulations. The essence of law is that it is made by the lawmakers in exercise of specific authority. The vires of law is capable of being challenged if the power is absent or has been exceeded by the authority making rules or regulations 37) The concurring judgment in the Rajasthan Electricity Board case (supra) said that the Board was invested by statute with extensive powers of control over electricity undertakings. The power of the Board to make rules and regulations and to administer the Act was said to be in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board” The Regulations provide inter alia in the management and use of the building constructed under any housing scheme, principles and procedure to be followed in the allotment of tenements premises. These Regulations are not inconsistent and the only limit is that statutory body cannot use the power to use rules and regulations to enlarge the powers beyond the scope intended by the legislature. Therefore, in view of the above decision, it is clear that the subordinate legislation if validly made have the full force and effect of a statute. There is a procedure prescribed for lease of the premises of the board. Rule 29 of the Rules deals with sale or lease of the occupancy right by public auction in the manner prescribed. Similarly for serving notice as required under Sections 52 and 53 of the Act, it shall be in Forms A,B,C,D specified in Schedule IV. So the impugned notices issued by the Board are in conformity with Form A of Schedule IV of Rules. 21. One of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the Regulations have no force of law and they are only given for internal management of the affairs of the board. Regulations are not merely administrations or department instructions, which have no statutory force. 21. One of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the Regulations have no force of law and they are only given for internal management of the affairs of the board. Regulations are not merely administrations or department instructions, which have no statutory force. But when a Regulation is made in exercise of statutory power, they can be enforceable. In GOBIND V STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AIR 1975 SC 1378 it was held thus (para 6): “In Kharak Singh v. The State of U, P., (1964) 1 SCR 332 = ( AIR 1963 SC 1295 = 1963-2 Cri LJ 329), this Court had occasion to consider the validity of Regulation 236 of the U. P. Police Regulations which is in pari materia with Regulation 856 here. There it was held by, a majority that regulation 236 (b) providing for domiciliary visits was unconstitutional for the reason that it abridged the fundamental right of a person under Article 21 and since Regulation 236 (b) did not have the force of law the regulation was declared bad. The other provisions of the regulation were held to be constitutional. The decision that the regulation in question there was not law was based upon a concession made on behalf of the State of U. P, that the U, P. Police Regulations were not framed under any of the provisions of the Police Act” These Regulations are framed as per Section 71 of the Act, which reads that the Board may from time to time, with the previous sanction of the Government make regulations consistent with this Act and with any rules made under this Act; a) for the management and use of buildings constructed under any housing scheme; b) the principles and procedure to be followed to allotment of tenements and premises and c) for regulating the Board’s procedure and the disposal of its business. So the main enactment gives power to the board that with previous sanction of the Government of A.P. to make regulations consistent with the Act. The Regulations have been made by the Board with the previous sanction of the Government. Therefore, when the regulations made under a provision of a statute, they can be enforceable. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is devoid of merit and wholly untenable. 22. The Regulations have been made by the Board with the previous sanction of the Government. Therefore, when the regulations made under a provision of a statute, they can be enforceable. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is devoid of merit and wholly untenable. 22. Whether there is any infringement of any valid legal or statutory right of the petitioners under the Act. By virtue of notice, dated 08-03-2010 one of the tenants was informed to pay the arrears of monthly rent with interest at 12% p.a. within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice, failing which, allotment shall be cancelled and further action will be taken to recover the dues. In pursuance of that letter, some of the tenants paid the amounts. By virtue of another notice, dated 08-11-2010 some of the petitioners were directed to pay arrears of rent within 30 days and also to vacate the shop within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order and the case is posted before the competent authority on 10-12-2010. By virtue of another notice, dated 03-01-2011, some of the petitioners were requested to intimate their willingness to pay enhanced monthly rent requiring them to execute a fresh rental deed, otherwise they have to vacate the premises. Therefore, in the notice, dated 03-01-2011, the petitioners were informed about increase of the existing rent and asked to express their willingness to continue to pay the enhanced rent on executing fresh rental deed, otherwise they have to vacate and handover the shop to the board within one month. Such a power is not available to the competent authority. The competent authority also has no power to ask the tenants to execute fresh rental deed because by the date of issuance of these proceedings, the maximum period of allottee can retain in pursuance of auction has expired long back. Therefore, these notices can be taken as under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act to enable the petitioners to vacate the premises within 30 days. 23. Therefore, these notices can be taken as under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act to enable the petitioners to vacate the premises within 30 days. 23. It is not in dispute thatnotice-cum-provisional order, dated 18-11-2010 have been served on the petitioners.They have not vacated the premises within one month thereafter.Then eviction orders were passed on a date in December, 2010 authorizing the Bailiff to take possession of the shop and report compliance and also authorized the Bailiff to break open the locks and conduct panchanama and the defaulter fails to comply the order and fails to vacate the shop, the Bailiff should attach movable propertyof the shop to the extent of amount due.At that stage, some of the petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P.No.1732 of 2011 and batch. This Court at the stage of admission, disposed of the writ petitions directing that the petitioners shall be under obligation to clear the arrears of rent by the end of March, 2011 and to pay the enhanced rents w.e.f. 1-04-2011. If the petitioners commit default in payment of rents, it shall be open to the respondents to evict the petitioners without initiating any further proceedings.Thereafter, the respondents issued another order on 17-05-2011 authorizing the Bailiff to take possession and also authorized him to conduct auction of the movable property in case of any amount due.It is only a consequential order because after passing a similar order in the month of January, petitioner approached this Court.Therefore, another order was issued by the competent authority to take possession of the shops.In pursuance thereof, shops were taken possession by APHB by duly locking and sealing the premises.It is not stated by the petitioners in the entire writ affidavit or in the reply affidavit that the respondents violated any one of the provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations made there under. 24. The scheme of the Act is meant to ensure that all theeligible persons should able to participate in the public auction and the board is able to get maximum price. That is the reason why, necessary safe-guards were inbuilt in statute and also in the Rules and Regulations with regard to allotment and eviction. As to how a tenant can be inducted in the board premises and the maximum period of lease have been incorporated in Regulations. That is the reason why, necessary safe-guards were inbuilt in statute and also in the Rules and Regulations with regard to allotment and eviction. As to how a tenant can be inducted in the board premises and the maximum period of lease have been incorporated in Regulations. This procedure is contemplated so as to avoid favoritism and nepotism or arbitrary action on the part of the competent authority. Mere fact that competent authority of the board did not take action for evicting a person who is in unauthorized occupation of the Board premises for several years or when the officials of the board accepted the amount towards rent cannot endure the petitioners advantage and justify issuance of writ of mandamus by this Court to protect his illegal or unauthorized occupation of shop. A month’s time is given as required under Section 52 (1)(b) of the Act. That order has been confirmed. Therefore, absolutely there is no deviation or violation of procedure in evicting a person from the Board premises. 25. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that in determining the fair rent, the provisions of Act, 1960 would apply cannot be the correct proposition of law. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in AKBAR ALI V A.P.HOUSING BOARD 1996 (2) ALD 794 wherein the question falls for consideration is whether the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 are applicable to the leases granted under APHB in respect of buildings, shops or premises under the control of the APHB and accordingly, it was held thus (para 7): “In this context, it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions. Section 22(1) of the Housing Board Act deals with sale (including on hire purchase system) of any property comprised in the scheme. Rule 29 of the A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959 deals with sale or lease of the occupancy rights by public auction. Regulations 6,11 and 17 of the Regulations deal with leasing out of the occupancy rights by public auction, deposit of 50% of the bid amount by the highest bidder and renewal of the licence for a further term of five years without conducting public auction respectively. Regulations 6,11 and 17 of the Regulations deal with leasing out of the occupancy rights by public auction, deposit of 50% of the bid amount by the highest bidder and renewal of the licence for a further term of five years without conducting public auction respectively. Sections 52, 53 and 55 of the Housing Board Act deal with power to evict persons from the premises for non-payment of rent etc., and eviction of the persons who are in unauthorised occupation of the Board premises and the procedure thereof. Against the orders passed under Secs. 52 and 53 of the Act, appeal is provided under Sec. 55 of the Act to the Chief Judge of City Civil Court, Hyderabad if the Board premises are situated in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and if such premises are situated elsewhere, the District Judge within whose jurisdiction such premises are situated. By reading the above provisions, it is manifest that the entire machinery for granting leases by public auction to the bidders, to enhance the rents and to extend the period of lease, and for evicting the tenants who violate the terms and conditions of the lease or who are in unauthorised occupation of the premises, is provided under the Act. Thus, the provisions of the Act, Rules and Reguiations are self-contained for entering into lease, enhancement of rent, eviction of the tenant, extension of the lease period, recovery of rent etc., It is a fact that A.P. Rent Control Act came into force in the year 1960 and it was made applicable to all buildings in the State. Further by amendment, to Sec. 3(3) of the Housing Board Act, the Housing Board has been treated as a local authority for the purpose of Land Acquisition Act and Rent Control Act. But the question is, when the special enactment provides for the entire machinery governing granting of lease, recovery of rents, enhancement of rent, extending the period of lease etc., whether the Rent Control Act applies or not. It is well settled principle of law that when the Special enactment provides for the entire machinery, the latter general enactment will not apply to the buildings. which are governed by the special enactment under the principle of interpretation of the statute. It is also true that Secs. 26 and 32 of the Rent Control Act provide for exemption to certain buildings. which are governed by the special enactment under the principle of interpretation of the statute. It is also true that Secs. 26 and 32 of the Rent Control Act provide for exemption to certain buildings. The Government has also issued G.O.Ms.No. 480 GAD dated 26-8-1989 exempting the buildings, shops, etc., of the A.P. Housing Board from the operation of the Rent Control Act. It has to be noticed that when a special enactment enables the entire, machinery for granting leases, enhancement of rents, recovery of rents, extending the period of lease etc., having ail the provisions in pari-rnateria with the provisions of the Rent Control Act, it cannot be said that merely because the buildings are not exempted under the Rent Control Act, the Rent Control Act applies. The above mentioned GO is only a clarificatory GO and hence it cannot be said that earlier to the said GO, the Rent Control Act applies” From the above decision, it is clear that the provisions of Rent Control Act would not apply as the special enactment provides for entering into lease, enhancement of rent and extension of tenancy etc., 26. For recovery of rent or damages, Section 53 (1) (2)of the Act would apply, which reads that 1) subject to any rules made by the Government in this behalf and without prejudice to the provisions of Section 52 where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any Board premises, the competent authority may, by notice served (i) by post or (ii) by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of such premises or (iii) in such other manner as may be prescribed order that person to pay same together with such other amounts as may be due by him under the contract, agreement, lease, indemnity bond, damages or otherwise within such time not less than thirty days as may be specified in the notice. 2) where any person is in unauthorized occupation of any Board premises, the competent authority may, in the prescribed manner, assess such damages on account of the use and occupation of the premises as it may deem fit, and may by notice served (i) by post or (ii) by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of such premises or (iii) in such other manner as may be prescribed order that person to pay the damages within such time as may be specified in the notice. The above provision makes it clear that by following prescribed manner, assess the damages. For assessment of damages, Rule 32 of the Rules provides as to how assessment has to be made, which reads that in assessing the damages on account of the unauthorized occupation of the premises, the competent authority shall take into consideration the following matters; (i) the purpose and the period for which the Board premises were in unauthorized occupation, (ii) the nature, size and the standard of accommodation available in such premises; (iii) the minimum rent of the premises for the period of unauthorized occupation, such rent being calculated in accordance with the formula that may be decided by the Government from time to time and (iv) any other matter, which in the opinion of the competent authority is relevant for the purpose of assessing the damages. In this case the assessment has not been adjudicated in the manner provided under Rule 32 of the Rules. Without assessing damages for use and occupation, the question of issuance of notice under Section 53 (2) of the Act does not arise. So the notice issued for claiming damages for use and occupation of the premises is not assessed in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the notices, dated 02-09-2011 are liable to be set aside giving liberty to APHB to assess the damages in terms of the Rules and Regulations made under the Act and thereafter APHB is entitled to issue notice under Section 53 (2) of the Act. Therefore, the notices, dated 02-09-2011 are liable to be set aside giving liberty to APHB to assess the damages in terms of the Rules and Regulations made under the Act and thereafter APHB is entitled to issue notice under Section 53 (2) of the Act. In this case property was attached by virtue of the impugned proceedings, dated 08-11-2010 not only giving authorization to the Bailiff to take possession of the shops but also authorizing the Bailiff to call upon to demand the occupier to pay the rent and in case defaulter fails to comply with the order, the Bailiff should attach the movable property in the shop to the extent. Similarly, notices dated 17-05-2011 are liable to be set aside as they are not in accordance with the Act and the Rules. 27. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, it has to be held that the notice-cum-provisional order, dated 08-11-2010 and the confirmation order, dated nil-12-2010 require no interference by this Court. It is not in dispute that the provisional orders have been served on all the petitioners on 19-11-2010. Therefore, after receipt of notice, the unauthorized occupants have to vacate the premises within one month by securing alternative suitable accommodation i.e., on or before 18-12-2010. As the petitioners fail to vacate the premises, confirmation order was passed authorizing the Bailiff to take possession and recover the damages due. Since the petitioners are in occupation of their respective shops after 2000, they can be treated as unauthorized occupants. Therefore, question of payment of rents by them does not arise. Hence, the petitioners are liable to pay damages for use and occupation of the premises on or after 2000 as the maximum term of 10 years of lease of all the petitioners expired as per the Regulations 16 and 17. As procedure is contemplated in assessment of damages and the same has not been followed, the order of the competent authority insofar as directing the Bailiff to attach the movables cannot be sustained. 28. In pursuance of the confirmation order under Section 52 (2) of the Act, possession was taken by the Board by locking the premises along with the movables under a panchanama. The movables cannot be attached as the damages are yet to be ascertained. 28. In pursuance of the confirmation order under Section 52 (2) of the Act, possession was taken by the Board by locking the premises along with the movables under a panchanama. The movables cannot be attached as the damages are yet to be ascertained. Hence, all the petitioners are permitted to take the movables in the presence of APHB officials and after removing the movables by the petitioners, APHB shall conduct open auction after following due procedure as prescribed under the Act along with the Rules and Regulations made there under. 29. Accordingly, W.P. No.25953 of 2011 is allowed setting aside the demand notices made by APHB officials on 02-09-2011 and on 17-05-2011 and dismissed the Writ Petition insofar as taking possession of the premises in question by APHB officials. However, this order will not preclude the respondents in ascertaining damages after following the due procedure and issuance of notice under Section 53 (2) of the Act. 30. Insofar as other Writ Petitions i.e.,25962, 25964, 26262, 26428 and 27337 of 2011 are concerned, as the respondents have already taken possession of the property after giving a notice as contemplated under the Act, the relief sought for in the writ petitions cannot be issued and accordingly, the Writ Petitions are dismissed. But, however, the petitioners are entitled to take back their movables in the premises in question in the presence of APHB officials. No order as to costs.