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2011 DIGILAW 1066 (KAR)

Byrappa S/o. Shivanna v. Deputy Commissioner

2011-11-03

A.N.VENUGOPALA GOWDA, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2011
Judgment :- A.N. Venugopala Gowda, J. These appeals are directed against an order dated 09.12.2009 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.19299-311/2009 (reported in ILR 2010 KAR 397), by which, an order dated 30.06.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Mandya District, Mandya disqualifying the appellants from being the Councillors of City Municipal Council, Mandya, was upheld. 2. The material facts of the case are as follows: The general election to the City Municipal Council, Mandya (for short ‘the Council), which consists of 35 wards was held on 28.09.2007. Result of the election was declared on 30.09.2007 and was published in the official gazette on 08.10.2007, in terms of which, 21 Councillors were from Janata Dal (Secular) [for short ‘JD(S)’] party, 6 Councillors were from Indian National Congress (I) Party, 2 Councillors were from Bharatiya Janata Party and 6 Councillors, were independents. The appellants were elected as Councillors of ‘the Council’, by being the candidates of JD(S) party. The Councillors in turn elected Smt. K.C. Nagamma, a Councilor who had got elected on JD (S) party election symbol, as the President of the Council. 3. On 27.12.2008, appellants filed an application before Deputy Commissioner, to move no-confidence motion against the President of the Council. On 07.01.2009, appellants submitted a requisition to the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner of City Municipal Council, stating that they have voluntarily left JD(S) political party and formed a front called as ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ and requested for separate seating arrangements in the Council meetings. To consider the said motion of no-confidence, a meeting of the Council was convened by the Commissioner of the Council, to be held on 16.01.2009. 4. In the meanwhile i.e., on 09.01.2009, the State President of JD(S) party issued a direction, popularly called as ‘WHIP’, to the 21 Councillors elected on JD(S) party symbol to vote against the motion of no-confidence, in the meeting scheduled to be held on 16.01.2009. The whip was served on the JD(S) Councillors through the 3rd respondent-D. Ramesh, Mandya District President of JD(S) political party. S. Balaraj – 4th respondent was appointed as the Observer. The appellants having voted on 16.01.2009 in favour of the said motion, the motion was passed against Smt. K.C. Nagamma. 5. The whip was served on the JD(S) Councillors through the 3rd respondent-D. Ramesh, Mandya District President of JD(S) political party. S. Balaraj – 4th respondent was appointed as the Observer. The appellants having voted on 16.01.2009 in favour of the said motion, the motion was passed against Smt. K.C. Nagamma. 5. On 09.02.2009, respondents 3 to 5, filed a complaint under Section 4 of Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 (for short ‘the Act’), against the appellants, before the Deputy Commissioner, seeking disqualification of the appellants under Section 3(1)(a) & (b) of the Act, interalia contending that, the appellants violated ‘the whip’ issued by the State President of JD(S) party and that the appellants have also given up membership of the party by forming ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ and by seeking separate seating arrangements in the Council meetings. The appellants, who were the respondents in the said complaint, filed objections. The appellants admitted the fact that they filed application moving no-confidence motion against the President of the Council and they having formed ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ as their political platform due to a split in the JD(S) political party with 13 Councillors and they having acted in accordance with the decision of political group headed of Mr. K.S. Kumar. However, appellants denied receiving of ‘the whip’. Appellants contended that there is a split among the Councillors of JD(S) political party in the City Municipal Council, Mandya and as such, the disqualification on the ground of defection is not attracted as per Section 3-A of the Act. 6. Before the Deputy Commissioner, to prove the complaint, PW-1 to PW-3 deposed and Exs.P-1 to P-9 were marked. For the respondents in the complaint, RW-1 to RW-10 deposed and Exs.D-1 to D-3 were marked. After considering the rival contentions and the record of the case, Deputy Commissioner raised the following points for consideration: 1. Whether valid directions was issued and served upon the respondents 1 to 13 by the political party to which they belong? 2. Whether they have incurred disqualification under Section 3 of Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987? 3. What order? The Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 30.06.2009, holding that the whip issued was valid and the appellants violated the whip. 2. Whether they have incurred disqualification under Section 3 of Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987? 3. What order? The Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 30.06.2009, holding that the whip issued was valid and the appellants violated the whip. He further held that, there is no split in the JD(S) political party and hence that the appellants are not entitled for exemption under Section 3(A) of the Act. As a result, in exercise of the power under Section 4(1) of the Act, appellants were disqualified to be the members of the Council. 7. Appellants questioned the said order by filing writ petitions, wherein it was interalia stated that there was serious dispute with regard to certain actions and decisions sought to be imposed by the JD(S) party in total disregard to the interest of the party members, particularly of Mandya District, which led to serious disagreement among the party workers and leaders of JD(S) party from Mandya District on one hand and the JD (S) party State leaders particularly projecting the 3rd respondent as the sole representative of the JD(S) party in the District of Mandya, which led to a split in the JD (S) political party and that the entire party workers and party apparatus particularly of Mandya and surrounding districts forming a break-away group resulting in split in the political party. It was further stated that, with the split in the political party i.e., 13 Councillors elected from JD(S) party ticket out of the 21 Councillors, formed a separate group called as Abhivrudhi Ranga’ and intimated the Commissioner of City Municipal Council, Mandya, to provide separate seating arrangements. Order dated 30.06.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner was questioned. 8. Respondents 3 & 4 filed statement of objections in justification of the order dated 30.06.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner i.e. in allowing the complaint filed by them and disqualifying the appellants from being the Councillors of City Municipal Council, Mandya. 9. Order dated 30.06.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner was questioned. 8. Respondents 3 & 4 filed statement of objections in justification of the order dated 30.06.2009 passed by the Deputy Commissioner i.e. in allowing the complaint filed by them and disqualifying the appellants from being the Councillors of City Municipal Council, Mandya. 9. Learned Single Judge, considering the rival contentions, the record of the case and the object of enacting the Anti-Defection Legislation, following a judgment dated 19.12.2008 passed in W.A.910/2008, in the case of Nijnagouda vs. State Election Commissioner, held that, the whip issued by the State President of JD(S) political party was not valid and consequently the question of disobeying the same by the writ petitioners does not arise and that the writ petitioners are not liable to be disqualified under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. However, by noticing paragraph 2(1)(a) of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and the ratio of law in the decisions of the Apex Court and also the provisions under Sections 3(1)(a), 3A(a)(i) and 2(vi) of the Act, held that, the formation of separate political front will not amount to split of JD(S) political party as specified under Section 3-A of the Act. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioners have filed these appeals. 10. Respondents 3, 4 & 5 have filed cross-objection, questioning the finding of the learned Single Judge with regard to invalidity of the whip issued by the President of JD (S) political party. Registry upon examination has pointed out defects in the cross-objection. The cross-objectors have not so far removed the objections. In the circumstances, cross-objection being not in order and having not been registered, we do not deem it appropriate to consider the same and record any findings with regard to the grounds raised therein. 11. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants, assailing the impugned orders contended that the split in the case of local bodies is confined to concerned local authority i.e., split in the municipal party, as against the finding that there should be a split in the original political party and the same should be reflect in the local body, in view of the definition of the words ‘councilor’ and ‘political party’, as defined under Section 2(i) & 2(vi) of the Act. Learned counsel further contended that, approach of the learned Single Judge to the matter by having reference to Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India is erroneous, since the learned Single Judge has failed to notice that the definition of ‘Legislature Party’ and ‘Original Political Party’, do not appear in ‘the Act’ and therefore the provisions of ‘the Act’ are not ‘in para materia’ with the provisions of the ‘Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India’ and hence the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the decisions of the Apex Court interpreting the provisions of Tenth Schedule to answer the 2nd point raised for consideration against the appellants is erroneous and hence interference with the impugned orders is called for. 12. Sri Prabhuling K. Navadgi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 3 to 5 on the other hand contended that, the case is one of clear admissions, both in the pleadings and evidence of the appellants and that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge with regard to point No.2 raised for consideration being well supported by the materials on record of the case and in view of the ratio of law in catena of decisions of the Apex Court, learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the writ petitions. Learned counsel further submitted that, Deputy Commissioner has recorded the findings upon correct appreciation of the record of the case and that the findings recorded against the appellants in the impugned orders being neither perverse nor illegal, the appeals may be dismissed. 13. Keeping in view the rival contentions and the record, the point for our consideration is: Whether the disqualification of the appellants from being the Councillors of City Municipal Council, Mandya is justified? 14. The provisions of ‘the Act’ which are relevant for decision are reproduced herein below: 2(v) – “Municipal Council” means a City or Town Municipal Council established under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. 2(vi) – “Political Party” in relation to a Councilor or Member means a political party recognized by the Election Commission of India as a National party or a State party in the State of Karnataka under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and to which he belongs for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 3. 2(vi) – “Political Party” in relation to a Councilor or Member means a political party recognized by the Election Commission of India as a National party or a State party in the State of Karnataka under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and to which he belongs for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 3. 3 – Disqualification on the ground of defection – (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 3A, 3B and 4, a councilor or a member, belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified for being such councilor or member, - (a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in, or intentionally remains absent from any meeting of the Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Town Panchayat, Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat, contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such party, person or authority and such voting, abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence. 3-A. Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of split – Where a Councilor or a Member makes a claim that he and any other members of his political party constitute the group representing a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his political party and such group consists of not less than one-third of the members of such political party, - (a) he shall not be disqualified under sub-section (1) of Section 3 on the ground – (i) That he has voluntarily given up his membership of his political party; or (ii) That he has voted or abstained from voting in, or intentionally remained absent from any meeting of the Municipal Corporation. Municipal Council, Town Panchayat, Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authorized by it in this behalf, without obtaining in any case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence; and (b) from the time of such split, such faction shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 3 and to be his political party for the purpose of this section. 4 – Decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection – (1) A complaint that a member of a Councilor has become subject to the disqualification under Section 3 may be made by a member, Councilor or a political party to the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority – (a) in a case falling under clause (a) of sub-section (1), after the member of the Councilor gives up the membership of the political party; (b) in a case falling under clause (b) of sub-section (1), after the expiry of fifteen days specified therein; (c) in a case falling under sub-section (2), after he joins the political party (d) xxx xxxx xxxxx (2) Where a complaint under sub-section (1) is received by the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority, he shall, within twenty-four hours from the receipt of such complaint, refer the same for decision to – (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) in the case of a City or Town Municipal Council or Town Panchayat, to the Deputy Commissioner (iii) xxx xxxx xxxx Who shall decide the question within thirty days after the receipt by him of the reference and his decision shall be final. 15. The object and purpose for which ‘the Act’ was enacted has been stated in the preamble portion, which reads as under: “An act to prohibit defection by the Councillors of Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils, Town Panchayats and members of Zilla Panchayats and Taluk Panchayats from the political parties by which they were set up as candidates and matters connected therewith. The object and purpose for which ‘the Act’ was enacted has been stated in the preamble portion, which reads as under: “An act to prohibit defection by the Councillors of Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils, Town Panchayats and members of Zilla Panchayats and Taluk Panchayats from the political parties by which they were set up as candidates and matters connected therewith. Whereas, it is expedient to prohibit defection by the Councillors of Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils and Taluk Panchayats and members of Zilla Panchayats and Taluk Panchayats from the political parties by which they were set up as candidates and matters connected therewith” The Act has been enacted on the lines of the provisions of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The underlying object and the purpose which the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India sought to achieve has been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu, reported in (1992 (S-2) SCC 651). The material observations made therein is to the following effect: “13. These provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme. A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. The provisions of Paragrapph 2(1)(a) proceed on the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if such a person, after the election, changes his affiliation and leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his membership of the legislature and go back before the electorate”. 16. Indisputedly, appellants being the members of JD(S) political party, contested the election held on 28.09.2007 on JD(S) party election symbol and got elected as Councillors of City Municipal Council, Mandya. Notification issued and published in the Gazette on 08.10.2007 shows that the appellants were elected to the Council, being the members of JD(S) party. 17. Specific case of the appellants before the Deputy Commissioner in response to the notice issued on 21.02.2009 is that, out of 21 Councillors elected from JD(S) party, 13 Councillors formed a separate group named as “Abhivrudhi Ranga” and selected Mr. 17. Specific case of the appellants before the Deputy Commissioner in response to the notice issued on 21.02.2009 is that, out of 21 Councillors elected from JD(S) party, 13 Councillors formed a separate group named as “Abhivrudhi Ranga” and selected Mr. K.S. Kumar, elected Member from Ward No.28, as the leader of their group and submitted an application to the Commissioner of Mandya City Municipal Council on 07.01.2009, seeking separate seating arrangements in all the Council meetings and programmes to be held by the Council. It was further stated that, in view of they forming ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’, the complaint filed against them may be rejected. In the additional statement of objections dated 06.03.2009 filed before the Deputy Commissioner, appellants admitted that they moved ‘no-confidence motion’ against the then Council President Smt. K.C. Nagamma, for consideration of which, meeting was convened and held on 16.01.2009. Para 10 of the said additional statement of objections filed by the appellants being material, the same is reproduced below: “10. It is true that the respondents 1 to 13 have requested the authorities to suitable seating arrangements as they have formed their own political platform namely ‘Abivrudhi Ranga’ as stated in the complaint. It is actually due to the split in the JD(S) political party this political group has been formed by the 13 elected C.M.C Councillors under the leadership of K.S. Kumar. It is also true that the members of this group have written the letter to D.C. requesting him to consider their representation. It is not correct to submit that there is no legal sanction for the acts of these respondents and their political group provisions of law and in accordance with and democratic norms and principles. But the JD(S) political party did not digested the legitimate acts of these respondents have started to manipulate by throwing all the norms, principles and morality to winds. They have adopted all dubious method in order to see that the action taken by these respondent has to be defeated. But it is in vain. The law recognizes split in the political party, but it requires to be fulfilled by the requisite numbers. These respondents have fulfilled for said requisite of law. And as such these respondents are not liable for any disqualification under the act.” 18. Appellant No.11-Mr. But it is in vain. The law recognizes split in the political party, but it requires to be fulfilled by the requisite numbers. These respondents have fulfilled for said requisite of law. And as such these respondents are not liable for any disqualification under the act.” 18. Appellant No.11-Mr. K.S. Kumar, while deposing before the Deputy Commissioner has reiterated that the appellants formed ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ on 20.12.2008, which was recorded in Ex.D1 and the signatures of all participating Members was obtained (Ex.D (a)). In the cross-examination, he has admitted that there is no party with the name ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’. He has stated that the appellants formed ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ leaving JD(S) party. He has categorically admitted that on 20.12.2008 the appellants left the JD(S) party. 19. From the record, it isclear that the appellants voluntarily separated from JD(S) party, formed separate group ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ on 07.01.2009 and sought separate seating arrangements being made to their group, in the meetings of the Council. Undeniably, the appellants submitted a requisition on 27.12.2008 to move no-confidence motion against Smt. K.C. Nagamma, the President of the Council. Pursuant to the said requisition, a special meeting of the Council was convened by the Commissioner on 16.01.2009 and the appellants voted in favour of no-confidence motion against the President of the Council, who had got elected to the Council on JD (S) party election symbol. Absolutely there is no material placed on record of the case by the appellants showing split in JD(S) political Party. Hence, S.3-A of the Act does not come to the aid of the appellants. S.3-A of the Act can be taken advantage of only where a Councillor makes a claim that he and any other Members of his political party constitute the group representing a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his political party and such group consists of not less than 1/3rd of the members of such party. Political party in relation to a Councillor or Member means the political party as defined under S.2(vi) of the Act and not the one as has been sought to be made out by the appellants. Political party in relation to a Councillor or Member means the political party as defined under S.2(vi) of the Act and not the one as has been sought to be made out by the appellants. From the sequence of events noticed supra, it is clear that the appellants voluntarily gave up their membership of JD(S) party, on whose symbol they had got elected to the Council and as such, incurred the disqualification under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, which, without any qualification or rider provides that a Councilor or a Member, belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. 20. The question as to when a member of a House belonging to a political party can be said to have given up his membership of such political party was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India, reported in (1994 (S-2) SCC 641), wherein two MLAs, who had been elected on the ticket of MGP Party, accompanied the leader of Congress (I) Legislative Party, when he met the Governor to show that he had the support of 20 MLAs. On the said conduct, the Speaker held that the two MLAs had given up membership MGP Party and disqualified them from being members of the House. The decision of the Speaker under which he held that the two MLAs shall be disqualified for being members of the House under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was upheld. The scope and amplitude of Paragraph 2(1)(a) of Tenth Schedule, has been stated as follows: “11. …. The said paragraph provides for disqualification of a member of a House belonging to a political party “if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party’. The words ‘voluntarily given up his membership’ are not synonymous with ‘resignation’ and have a wider connotation. A person may voluntarily give up his membership of a political party even though he has not tendered his resignation from the membership of that party. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 21. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 21. In the case of Rajendra Singh Rana & Others vs. Swami Prasad Maurya & Others, reported in ( 2007 (4) SCC 270 ), the act of giving a letter by the 13 BSP MLAs requesting the Governor to call upon the leader of Samajavadi Party to form a Government, whether would amount to an act of voluntarily giving up the membership of the party on whose ticket the said MLAs had got elected having come up for consideration, it has been held as follows: “34. As we see it, the act of disqualification occurs on a member voluntarily giving up his membership of a political party or at the point of defiance of the whip issued to him. Therefore, the act that constitutes disqualification in terms of para 2 of the Tenth Schedule is the act of giving up or defiance of the whip. The fact that a decision in that regard may be taken in the case of voluntary giving up, by the Speaker at a subsequent point of time cannot and does not postpone the incurring of disqualification by the act of the legislator. Similarly, the fact that the party could condone the defiance of a whip within 15 days or that the Speaker takes the decision only thereafter in those cases, cannot also pitch the time of disqualification as anything other than the point at which the whip is defied. Therefore in the background of the object sought to be achieved by the Fifty-second Amendment of the Constitution and on a true understanding of para 2 of the Tenth Schedule, with reference to the other paragraphs of the Tenth Schedule, the position that emerges is that the Speaker has to decide the question of disqualification with reference to the date on which the member voluntarily gives up his membership or defies the whip. It is really a decision ex post facto. It is really a decision ex post facto. The fact that in terms of para 6 a decision on the question has to be taken by the Speaker or the Chairman, cannot lead to a conclusion that the question has to be determined only with reference to the date of the decision of the Speaker. An interpretation of that nature would leave the disqualification to an indeterminate point of time and to the whims of the decision-making authority. The same would defeat the very object of enacting the law. Such an interpretation should be avoided to the extent possible. We are, therefore, of the view that the contention that (sic it is) only on a decision of the Speaker that the disqualification is incurred, cannot be accepted. This would mean that what the learned Chief Justice has called the snowballing effect, will also have to be ignored and the question will have to be decided with reference to the date on which the membership of the legislature party is alleged to have been voluntarily given up. 35. In the case on hand, the question would, therefore be whether on 27-3-2003 the 13 members who met the Governor with the request to invite the leader of the Samajwadi Party to form the Government had defected on 27-8-2003 and whether they have established their claim that on 26-8-2003 there had been a split in the Bahujan Samaj Party and one-third of the members of the legislature of that party had come out of that party. It may be noted that the clear and repeated plea in the counter-affidavit to the writ petition is that a split had occurred on 26-8-2003. This was also the stand of the petitioner before the Speaker for recognition of a split. The position as on 6-9-2003 when the 37 MLAs presented themselves before the Speaker would not have relevance on the question of disqualification which had allegedly been incurred on 27-8-2003. 36. The question whether for satisfying the requirements of para 3, it was enough to make a claim of split in the original political party or it was necessary to at least prima facie establish it, fell to be considered in the decision in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana – ( 2006 (11) SCC 1 ) rendered by a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, (Balasubramanyan, J.) was a party. Dealing with an argument that a claim of split in the original political party alone is sufficient in addition to showing that one-third of the Members of the legislature party had formed a separate group, the learned Chief Justice has explained the position as follows: “67. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relies upon para 37 in Ravi S. Naik case – 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 in support of the submission that only a claim as to split has to be made and it is not necessary to prove the split. The said observations are: ’37. In the present case the first requirement was satisfied because Naik has made such a claim. The only question is whether the second requirement was fulfilled.’ 68. The observations relied upon are required to be appreciated in the light of what is stated in the next paragraph i.e. para 38, namely: ‘As to whether there was a split or not has to be determined by the Speaker on the basis of the material placed before him.’ 69. Apart from the above, the acceptance of the contention that only a claim is to be made to satisfy the requirements of para 3 can lead to absurd consequences besides the elementary principle that whoever makes a claim has to establish it. It will also mean that when a claim as to split is made by a Member before the Speaker so as to take benefit of para 3, the Speaker, without being satisfied even prima facie about the genuineness and bona fides of the claim, has to accept it. It will also mean that even by raising a frivolous claim of split of original political party, a Member can be said to have satisfied this stipulation of para 3. The acceptance of such a broad proposition would defeat the object of defection law, namely, to deal with the evil of political defection sternly. We are of the view that for the purposes of para 3, mere making of claim is not sufficient. The prima facie proof of such a split is necessary to be produced before the Speaker so as to satisfy him that such a split has taken place.” 37. We are of the view that for the purposes of para 3, mere making of claim is not sufficient. The prima facie proof of such a split is necessary to be produced before the Speaker so as to satisfy him that such a split has taken place.” 37. Thus, in the above decision, it has been clarified that it is not enough that a claim is made of a split in the original party, in addition to showing that one-third of the members of the legislature party have come out of the party, but it is necessary to prove it at least prima facie. Those who have left the party, will have, prima facie, to show by relevant materials that there has been a split in the original party. The argument, therefore, that all that the 37 MLAs were required to do was to make a claim before the Speaker that there has been a split in the original party and to show that one-third of the members of the legislature party have come out and that they need not produce any material in support of the split in the original political party, cannot be accepted. The argument that the ratio of the decision in Jagit Singh requires to be reconsidered does not appeal to us. Even going by Ravi S. Naik it could not be said that the learned Judges have held that a mere claim in that behalf is enough. As pointed out in Jagjit Singh the sentence in para 37 in Ravi S. Naik case cannot be read in isolation and it has to be read along with the relevant sentence in para 38 of SCC quoted in Jagjit Singh. 38. Acceptance of the argument that the legislators are wearing two hats, one as members of the original political party and the other as members of the legislature and it would be sufficient to show that one-third of the legislators have formed a separate group to infer a split or to postulate a split in the original party, would militate against the specific terms of para 3. That paragraph speaks of two requirements, one, a split in the original party and two, a group comprising of one-third of the legislators separating from the legislature party. By acceding to the two that theory one of the limbs of para 3 would be made redundant or otiose. That paragraph speaks of two requirements, one, a split in the original party and two, a group comprising of one-third of the legislators separating from the legislature party. By acceding to the two that theory one of the limbs of para 3 would be made redundant or otiose. An interpretation of that nature has to be avoided to the extent possible. Such an interpretation is not warranted by the context. It is also not permissible to assume that Parliament has used words that are redundant or meaningless. We, therefore, overrule the plea that a split in the original political party need not separately be established if a split in the legislature party is shown.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 22. In the case of Kedar Shashikant Deshpande & Others vs. Bhor Municipal Council & Others, reported in ( 2011 (2) SCC 654 ), the pleadings of the appellants before the Additional Collector and the High Court, suggested a split of the appellants from their original political party i.e., NCP. The appellants had contended that they had voluntarily separated from NCP and formed a separate group/aghadi/front. There was no mention of split in NCP or the appellants joining Congress (I) Party. Noticing that the original party of the appellants was NCP and it was not their case that their original party NCP had merged with Congress (I) party at any point of time and the admission of the appellants that they had separated from their original political party and had formed a separate group known as Bhor Shahar Vikas Swabhimani Sanghathana Party, while ascertaining whether the appellants have incurred disqualification in terms of Section 3 (1)(a) of the Maharashtra Local Authority Members’ Disqualification Act, 1986, it has been held as follows: “42. As mentioned above Section 3(1)(a) without any qualification or rider provides that a Councillor or a member belonging to any political party or aghadi or front shall be disqualified, if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or aghadi or front. The provisions are absolute in terms and are mandatory. xxx xxxx xxxx 61. The contention that it is well settled that the Court should not interfere with the election of the democratically elected candidate and, therefore, the appeals should be accepted is difficult to accept. The provisions are absolute in terms and are mandatory. xxx xxxx xxxx 61. The contention that it is well settled that the Court should not interfere with the election of the democratically elected candidate and, therefore, the appeals should be accepted is difficult to accept. It is true that it is laid down in a series of reported decisions of this Court that the Court normally should not lightly interfere with the election of a dramatically elected candidates. However, here in this case the Court finds that the appellants had incurred disqualification under the Act. The question of disqualification of the appellants was raised by respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, not only the competent authority under the Act was required to decide the said question, but this Court also has to determine the question whether the disqualification is incurred by the appellants. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the appellants had incurred the disqualification in terms of the provisions of the Act then the Court has no alternative but to interfere with the election of the appellants even though they have been dramatically elected candidates. However, merely because they are dramatically elected candidates, it would be wrong to contend that they can never be disqualified. If such an interpretation as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants is accepted, it will defeat the object of the Act, which cannot be countenanced.” 23. There being no dispute that the appellants contested and won the election as Councillors of Mandya City Municipal Council as candidates of JD(S) party and thereafter voluntarily left JD()S party and formed ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ on 07.01.2009, Section 3(1)(a) of the Act having been attracted, the appellants incurred disqualification from continuing to be the Councillors of Mandya City Municipal Council. The contentions advanced by Sri Jayakumar S. Patil with regard to the Act not having the definition of ‘Legislature Party’ and ‘Original Political Party’ and that the approach of the learned Single Judge to the matter as erroneous, is without any merit, in view of the clear and unambiguous meaning of the ‘political party’ under Section 2(vi) of ‘the Act’. 24. 24. Keeping in view the scope and ambit of the Act, the para material provisions in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India and the rigorous interpretation of the provisions of Tenth Schedule by the Apex Court in catena of decisions, merely because the Act does not contain the definition of ‘legislature party’, it cannot be said that, learned Single Judge erred in placing reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court interpreting the provisions of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. In our considered opinion, the object and purpose of the Act being the same as that of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the decisions of the Apex Court interpreting the provisions of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution have equal application in the matter of interpretation of the provisions of the Act. 25. Learned Single Judge having considered the rival contentions and upon examining the record of the case and finding that no case was made out by the appellants that there was a split in the JD(S) political party and the split even according to the appellants being only in the JD(S) Councillors of Mandya City Municipal Council and the group formed by the appellants under the banner ‘Abhivrudhi Ranga’ being not a political party, the appellants having voluntarily given up their membership of JD(S) party under whose symbol they had got elected as Councillors to the Council, is justified in holding that the appellants incurred the disqualification and consequently, upholding the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner disqualifying the appellants herein from the membership of the City Municipal Council, Mandya. 26. On the admitted facts of the present case, we have no doubt that the appellants voluntarily gave up their membership of JD(S) party and that there was no split in the JD (S) political party. In the circumstances, no exception, therefore can be taken to the order of disqualification passed against the appellants by the Deputy Commissioner and upheld by the learned Single Judge. In the result, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are hereby dismissed with costs. Advocates’ fees stands quantified at Rs.10,000/-.