JUDGMENT 1. REJECTION of an application under Order I Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code (hereafter the Code) filed by the petitioners, seeking their impleadment as additional defendants in T.S. No.94 of 2000, by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 8th Court at Alipore is questioned in this application under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. T.S. No.94 of 2000 is a suit for declaration and injunction instituted by the opposite party no.1 against the opposite parties 2 to 13 in respect of a property situate on 37/1 Diamond Harbour Road, Kolkata " 700027 (hereafter the suit property). The antecedent facts leading to filing of the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code may be noted. There has been a long standing dispute between the parties to the suit, the origin whereof relates back to the times of their respective predecessor-in-interest during the fifties of the earlier century. It is unnecessary for a decision on this application to trace as to how right, title and interest in respect of the suit property, if at all, devolved on the opposite parties. Suffice it to note that a suit was instituted by the opposite parties 2 to 13 against the opposite party no.1 in respect of the self-same suit property seeking declaration and injunction, being T.S.No.33 of 1999. The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution by an order dated January 17, 2000 and consequently the rights claimed by the opposite parties 2 to 13 against the opposite party no.1 in respect of the suit property were not declared. After such dismissal, the opposite party no.1 instituted T.S.No.94 of 2000. On an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, an order of status quo was passed by the trial Court in respect of nature, character and possession of/over the suit property. Sometime thereafter, the opposite parties 2 to 13 entered into a development agreement in respect of the suit property with a certain M/s. Chaman Projects Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter Chaman). The terms of the development agreement not having been adhered to by the opposite parties 2 to 13, T.S. No.101 of 2000 was instituted by Chaman against them for specific performance of contract. An order of status quo was passed on an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code filed by Chaman. The terms of the development agreement not having been adhered to by the opposite parties 2 to 13, T.S. No.101 of 2000 was instituted by Chaman against them for specific performance of contract. An order of status quo was passed on an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code filed by Chaman. During pendency of the said suit, Chaman filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code seeking its impleadment as additional defendant in T.S. No.94 of 2000. By order no. 28 dated July 10, 2002, the said application was rejected. 3. WHILE the interim orders of injunction passed in connection with the suits referred to above were subsisting, on September 19, 2005, the opposite parties 2 to 13 entered into an agreement for sale with the petitioners in respect of the suit property. The fact of execution of the agreement for development dated April 5, 2000 in favour of Chaman and that an order of injunction has been passed on February 21, 2002 by the trial Court in T.S. No.101 of 2000 finds place therein. The agreement further proceeds to record that "this Agreement for Sale is strictly subject to the vacating of the status quo order passed by the Learned Court and in case such status quo order is not vacated, the vendor shall not be entitled to transfer or convey the property to the Purchasers herein but in case if the same is vacated, the Vendor shall be entitled to sell and transfer the property at the agreed consideration only to the Purchasers herein and none else and the Purchasers have accepted such contention of the Vendor that the Purchasers would not be bound to purchase the said premises unless and until the Learned Court vacate the status quo order and on the aforesaid basis the parties are desirous to enter into this Agreement". The parties to the agreement agreed that although the obligation to contest and to obtain a favourable adjudication and/or dismissal of T.S. No.94 of 2000 and other pending proceedings is that of the vendor, nevertheless cost and expenditure for contesting the same would be borne by the purchasers. The parties to the agreement agreed that although the obligation to contest and to obtain a favourable adjudication and/or dismissal of T.S. No.94 of 2000 and other pending proceedings is that of the vendor, nevertheless cost and expenditure for contesting the same would be borne by the purchasers. The agreement further proceeds to record that the "Vendor simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement has executed and delivered appropriate Power of Attorney in favour of the Purchasers" nominee authorizing and empowering such nominee to contest the said suit and all other related proceedings and all other legal proceedings". 4. CLAUSE 9 of the agreement provides as follows : "9. The Purchasers have agreed to enter into this agreement for purchase of Third Scheduled property subject to pending litigations as stated above and particularly subject to condition of maintenance or order of status-quo and other interim orders as passed in Title Suit No.94 of 2000 (Padmavati Investment Limited "Versus- Bimala Shaw and Ors.) and Title Suit No.101 of 2000 (Chaman Projects Private Limited "Versus- Shyam Sundar Saha and ors.) and further subject to dismissal or settlement of such litigations as stated herein." Subsequently, however, the vendor revoked the power of attorney granted in favour of the representative of the petitioners and allegedly started negotiating with third parties for sale/transfer of their respective shares in the suit property to destroy the rights of the petitioners. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have instituted three separate suits against the opposite parties 2 to 13 and have obtained interim orders of injunction restraining them from selling or disposing of their respective shares in the suit property. 5. IT is in the aforesaid factual backdrop that the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code saw the light of the day. 6. MR. S.P. Roy Choudhury, learned senior advocate representing the petitioners contended that the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code was filed by the petitioners once it sensed that there was collusion between the plaintiff and the defendants, being the two sets of opposite parties herein to defeat the rights of the petitioners. To substantiate the point of collusion, my attention was drawn to the advertisement published in a local daily purporting to convey that the power of attorney that had been executed in favour of the petitioners had been revoked. To substantiate the point of collusion, my attention was drawn to the advertisement published in a local daily purporting to convey that the power of attorney that had been executed in favour of the petitioners had been revoked. According to him, this aspect of the matter was not given due consideration by the learned trial Judge. The celebrated decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 : Razia Begum v. Sahebjadi Anwar Begum was relied on in support of the contention that if a party has direct interest in a property that is the subject matter of suit as distinguished from only a commercial interest, he ought to be added as party defendant. Next, Mr. Roy Choudhury submitted that the learned trial Judge also failed to consider that the agreement for sale between the opposite parties 2 to 13 and the petitioners still subsists with all the rights and liabilities of the parties and the contingency in the contract is till such time the suit between the parties is decided. If the trial Court decides the suit in favour of the defendants, the contingency would vanish and the second part of Section 40, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would come into play and impose obligation on the defendants/opposite parties 2 to 13 to perform their part of the contract. Referring to Section 54 and Section 40 of the Act, it was contended that though the contract for the sale of immovable property does not by itself create any interest in or charge on such property, the obligation that is annexed to the ownership of the immovable property could be imposed against the transferee and in support of such contention reliance was placed on the decision reported in AIR 1980 SC 1334 : Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govindas and ors.). 7. IT was also contended by Mr. Roy Choudhury that the fate of the petitioners is dependent on the decision of the trial Court in respect of title of the suit property and hence the claim of the petitioners ought to have been recognized by their addition in the suit. Reference in this connection was made to the decisions reported in (1983) 1 SCC 18 : Khemchand Shankar Choudhari and anr. v. Vishnu Hari Patil and ors. and (1990) 2 SCC 524 : Ramesh Hirachand Hindalmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and ors. 8. Reference in this connection was made to the decisions reported in (1983) 1 SCC 18 : Khemchand Shankar Choudhari and anr. v. Vishnu Hari Patil and ors. and (1990) 2 SCC 524 : Ramesh Hirachand Hindalmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and ors. 8. THE learned Judge, it was finally contended, ignored the special facts of this case and erred in appreciating that the petitioners had a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit for which the prayer for addition ought to have been allowed. He, accordingly, prayed for an order to set aside the impugned order and for a direction on the trial Court to proceed with the suit only after impleading the petitioners as additional defendants. Mr. Bhudeb Chatterjee, learned advocate for the plaintiff/opposite party no.1 vehemently opposed the application. First, he took me through the plaint to impress that there is no allegation against the petitioners and that no relief has been claimed against them. According to him, relief having been claimed against the defendants/opposite parties 2 to 13, the petitioners have no right to seek their addition in the suit. It was also urged that the opposite party no.1 is dominus litis and, therefore, at liberty to choose the defendant and the petitioners also having failed to satisfy the trial Court that their presence is essential even as a proper party, the order of the trial Court impugned herein does not warrant interference. 9. IT was further urged by Mr. Chatterjee that the interest of a party seeking its addition in a suit must be substantial and not merely peripheral. My attention was drawn to the contents of the agreement for sale to demonstrate that the petitioners were well and truly aware of the pending suit and the order of injunction passed in connection therewith and that it is evident therefrom that the agreements would take effect after the order of injunction is vacated; therefore, presently, the petitioners have no interest at all. IT was also submitted that a contingent interest is not enforceable and even if the suit is dismissed, the trial Court would not declare the right, title and interest of the opposite parties 2 to 13 in the suit property. The petitioners are not even transferees" pendente lite and cannot therefore claim any right. 10. IT was also submitted that a contingent interest is not enforceable and even if the suit is dismissed, the trial Court would not declare the right, title and interest of the opposite parties 2 to 13 in the suit property. The petitioners are not even transferees" pendente lite and cannot therefore claim any right. 10. IN support of his contention that the petitioners have no right to claim addition in the suit filed by the opposite party no.1, the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 3109 : Mumbai INternational Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and ors., AIR 2004 SC 4377 : Balavant N. Viswamitra and ors. v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (deceased by L.R.s), and AIR 1995 SC 498 : Union of INdia v. Prince Muffakkam Jah were relied on. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials on record. 11. IT appears on bare perusal of the plaint that the opposite party no.1 while claiming to be in possession of the suit property has claimed a decree for declaration that it is the absolute owner and in lawful possession thereof and further that the defendants have no right, title, interest and possession in such property. Permanent injunction has also been claimed by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants, their servants, agents or assigns from entering the suit property and from disturbing/interfering with its right, title, interest and possession and further restraining them from dispossessing it from the suit property and from claiming any right, title, interest and possession thereof. The immediate cause of action for instituting the suit appears to be that the defendants started interfering with peaceful possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property only after their names were erroneously mentioned as owners of the suit property in the computerized consolidated rate bills issued by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. In connection with the suit, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code having been filed, an order of status quo has been directed to be maintained. IT further appears that during subsistence of the interim order of injunction, the agreement for sale was executed. 12. LAW is well settled that it is for the plaintiff to claim whatever relief he is entitled to in law and to choose the defendants against whom the relief would be directed. IT further appears that during subsistence of the interim order of injunction, the agreement for sale was executed. 12. LAW is well settled that it is for the plaintiff to claim whatever relief he is entitled to in law and to choose the defendants against whom the relief would be directed. However, a non-party to the suit may be impleaded in the suit on an application being made by him if he satisfies that he is either a necessary party or a proper party. The Court is also empowered to suo motu add a party who, it considers, is either a necessary party or a proper party. A necessary party is one who should have been joined as a party and without whose presence the Court would be disabled to pass an effective decree; non-joinder of a necessary party may lead to dismissal of a suit. However, a proper party is one whose presence would enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit. Keeping in mind the nature of dispute raised by the opposite party no.1 and the applicable law, it is to be decided as to whether the petitioners were entitled to an order for their addition in the suit as additional defendants or not. 13. MR. Chatterjee is right in his contention that reading of the agreement dated September 19, 2005 would clearly reveal that the obligation of the vendor is yet to come into the picture. The status quo order passed by the trial Court is still in operation and, therefore, whatever rights and privileges the petitioners could claim thereunder is in a state of suspended animation. The petitioners executed the agreement fully aware of the claims of the opposite party no.1 and cannot seek a better right than the opposite parties 2 to 13. The consideration of the trial Court in T.S. No.94 of 2010 would be confined to examining the worth of the claim of the opposite party no.1 that it is the owner of the suit property and in lawful possession thereof. 14. THAT the petitioners are likely to secure a right/interest in the suit property after the suit is decided against the opposite party no.1 would not make the petitioners a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for declaration and injunction filed by the opposite party no.1. 14. THAT the petitioners are likely to secure a right/interest in the suit property after the suit is decided against the opposite party no.1 would not make the petitioners a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for declaration and injunction filed by the opposite party no.1. For the purpose of being entitled to addition, it is essential that the presence of the petitioners is either necessary for passing an effective decree or for complete or effective adjudication of the points in issue in the suit. On facts and in the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioners cannot be said to have any semblance of right in respect of the suit property warranting their addition in the suit. The opposite party no.1 is neither claiming any right or remedy against the petitioners nor is there any privity of contract between them. If at all T.S. No.94 of 2000 is dismissed and the vendor of the agreement dated September 19, 2005 commits a breach thereof, the grievance of the petitioners could only be for breach of the terms of such agreement affording a different cause of action to sue. The petitioners have in fact pursued the remedy available to them in law. On the other hand if the suit out of which the impugned order arises succeeds, a declaration would issue as prayed for by the opposite party no.1 and in such event it is only but obvious that the agreement dated September 19, 2005 would be rendered inoperative and not liable to be acted upon. The mere fact that the opposite parties 2 to 13 may not take sufficient interest to contest the suit and thereby allow a virtual walk over to the opposite party no.1 is not considered just reason to allow the petitioners to intervene, for they entered into the agreement abreast of the pending litigation and, therefore, must abide by the consequences flowing therefrom. 15. IN such view of the matter, the learned Judge was perfectly justified in rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code. The order under challenge is upheld and the revisional application stands dismissed, without order for costs. 16. URGENT photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.