ORDER 1. Heard Shri N.S. Ruprah, learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission. 2. This is tenants' second appeal having lost from the both the Courts below. 3. The plaintiff filed suit for eviction that his sons have become major and are sitting idle, therefore, plaintiff required the suit accommodation to start the business of electrical goods for his sons as envisaged under section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 4. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff. 5. During pendency of the first appeal of tenants two applications were filed by them. First, under Order XL1 Rule 27 CPC seeking permission to adduce additional evidence and second under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the written statement. 6. Learned First Appellate Court heard learned counsel for the parties and dismissed the appeal not only on the merit, but the aforesaid applications have also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 7. In this manner this second appeal has been filed by the appellants. 8. Three points have been highlighted and pressed by Shri Ruprah, learned counsel for the appellants. The first contention of his is that earlier eviction proceedings were initiated by the landlord before the Rent Controlling Authority which came to an end on 23.1.1991 in compromise and it was agreed between the parties that no eviction suit shall be filed before the expiry of 30 years and therefore, the present suit which has been filed on 12.5.1999 is not maintainable, and eventually, the learned two Courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing the suit. The contention of learned counsel is that though under section 12 (1) of the Act non obstante clause is very much there, but, it relates to only contract and not a compromise order and because the contract and compromise are two distinct things, therefore, if the parties have compromised that no eviction suit shall be filed within 30 years and accordingly if a compromise decree has been passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, since no eviction suit could be filed within 30 years, therefore, the present suit which has been filed on 12.5.1999 is not maintainable. 9. 9. The second submission of learned counsel is that the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC has been wrongly dismissed by learned First Appellate Court and similarly the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the written-statement has been wrongly dismissed. To substantiate his arguments it has been argued by learned counsel that during the pendency of the first appeal certain properties which includes six shops were purchased by the plaintiff and if in fact the need of plaintiff's sons was bona fide, his sons could have started their business in these shops which plaintiff bought. Hence, the need cannot be said to be bona fide and learned First Appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. 10. So far as the rejection of application to amend the written statement is concerned, learned counsel submits that at the time of consideration of the amendment application, the merit of the amendment cannot be taken into account and if that would be the position, since learned First Appellate Court has taken into account the merit of the amendment application, its approach is contrary to law and therefore, impugned judgment be set aside. 11. The third and last submission which learned counsel has put emphasis is that looking to the pleadings vis-a-vis to the oral and documentary evidence placed on record it is proved that the plaintiff is having several alternative non-residential accommodation of his own in which he could have asked his sons for whom the suit premises is being vacated to start the business. In this context he has invited my attention to para 44 and 46 of the judgment by learned First Appellate Court. 12. On these premised submissions it has been put forth by learned counsel that this appeal be admitted and ultimately it may also be allowed. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 14. 12. On these premised submissions it has been put forth by learned counsel that this appeal be admitted and ultimately it may also be allowed. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 14. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the non obstante clause envisaged under section 12 (1) of the Act is not applicable is concerned, suffice it to say that specifically the legislature has enacted that not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds which are mentioned in clauses (a) to (P) to section 12 (1) of the Act. The contention of learned counsel is that there is distinction between the "contract" and the "compromise" and because on 23.1.1991 before the Rent Controlling Authority a compromise was arrived at between the parties and it was agreed that for 30 years the suit will not be filed and further because a compromise decree has been passed, it should be given effect to. I do not find any substance in this contention for the simple reason that if the explanation to Rule 3 of the Order XXIII CPC is considered in its proper perspective it would reveal that an agreement to compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and if that would be the position, since the agreement arrived at between the parties before the Rent Controlling Authority was ab initio void because the condition so stipulated in the compromise is prohibited under the law in view of section 12 (1) of the Act, therefore, there was no bar to the plaintiff to file present suit even prior to the expiry of 30 years. Indeed, by the said compromise decree the contractual tenancy was extended for a period of 30 years. According to me, there is no bar, rather the non obstante clause in section 12 (l) of the Act authorises a landlord to bring a suit of eviction on any of the grounds envisaged under the said section even when the contractual tenancy has not come to an end. According to me, there is no bar, rather the non obstante clause in section 12 (l) of the Act authorises a landlord to bring a suit of eviction on any of the grounds envisaged under the said section even when the contractual tenancy has not come to an end. Hence, section 12 (1) of the Act would override the condition of fixed term tenancy. 15. Even otherwise, under section 2 (h) of the Indian Contract Act an agreement enforceable by law is a contract and as per section 2 (g) an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void and therefore, in the compromise decree the condition which was made that no eviction suit shall be filed earlier to 30 years, that condition was void since it is not enforceable by law. 16. The decision of Division Bench of this Court Shanti Devi Agarwal (Smt.) and others v. Punjab National Bank, Rajgarh, 1999 (2) JLJ 185 in which similar situation was there and which has also been placed reliance by learned First Appellate Court is fully applicable. The only distinction between the Division Bench decision Shanti Devi (supra) and the present case is that in the case of Shanti Devi (supra) there was an agreement between the parties not to file the suit within a particular period and in the present case there is a compromise decree of the Rent Controlling Authority stipulating the condition of not filing the suit for 30 years. Since the condition embodied in the compromise recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority on 23.1.1991 was void because it was in contravention to section 12 (1) of the Act, I am of the view that there is no distinction in the present case and the case of Shanti Devi (supra). 17. So far as the rejection of application under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC is concerned, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra, AIR 1991 SC 1760 . This application has been dealt by learned First Appellate Court in great details from para-11 onwards. 17. So far as the rejection of application under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC is concerned, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra, AIR 1991 SC 1760 . This application has been dealt by learned First Appellate Court in great details from para-11 onwards. In Para-27 the learned First Appellate Court has categorically held that the property which has been purchased is not in the main market while the disputed property is on the main market and therefore, according to me, learned First Appellate Court has rightly rejected the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. It is well settled in law and there are catena of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court that the bona fide need should be see on the date of the filing of the suit. Learned First Appellants Court has note down the instance that how and in what manner the appellants were successful in prolonging the trial of the suit. In these facts and circumstances, the decisions of Gulabbai (supra) is not applicable in the present case. Hence, I am of the view that the application under Order XLI Rule 27 has been rightly dismissed by learned First Appellate Court. 18. So far as the rejection of application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is concerned, although the merit of amendment application normally should not be taken into account at the time of its consideration but at the same time this fact cannot be marginalised and blinked away since there is overwhelming material on record that the property which the plaintiff has purchased is not in the main market where the suit shop is situated, hence, rightly the said application has been rejected by learned First Appellate Court. 19. So far as the third and last point pressed by learned counsel for the appellants that there is overwhelming material on record that the plaintiff is having several reasonably suitable non-residential vacant accommodation of his own is concerned, on bare perusal of the impugned judgment (para-41) this Court finds that suit shop is in the busiest locality and in that locality mostly the shops are of electrical goods and the suit of plaintiff has been filed that his sons shall start the business of electrical goods. Apart from this, in para-44 of the impugned judgment the alternative accommodation which the appellants-defendants have suggested is firstly eight to nine kilometers far away from the suit shop which is in the main market and secondly it is a rented accommodation in which plaintiff himself is carrying on a flour mill. I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that because there is no material on record that any eviction case has been filed against the plaintiff to vacate the rented premises in which he is carrying on the flour mill, therefore, in that premises the plaintiff can ask his sons to start the business. The law is otherwise under section 12 (1) (t) of the Act, the alleged vacant non-residential accommodation must be of plaintiff's own. Since the alternative accommodation which the defendants-appellants have shown is not owned by the plaintiff and this fact has been pleaded in the plaint itself and further as the plaintiff himself is carrying on the business of flour mill in it, this accommodation cannot be said to be a reasonable suitable non-residential accommodation of plaintiff and therefore rightly the said argument has not been accepted by learned First Appellate Court. 20. So far as another accommodation available on the plaintiff is concerned, in that regard para-46 of the impugned judgment may be seen in which learned First Appellate Court after marshalling the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff and defendants has arrived at a conclusion that the defendant is unable to state that who is the owner of the said accommodation which is being said to be of the plaintiff. Although it has come in her (defendant's) evidence that plaintiff used to store the goods in that accommodation and said accommodation is being utilised as go down and therefore, firstly it is not proved that the said accommodation is owned by plaintiff and secondly it is not vacant since same is being used as go down by the plaintiff, therefore, this accommodation also cannot be said to be an alternative accommodation. The findings arrived at by learned First Appellate Court are pure findings of fact which cannot be interfered in this second appeal unless and until there is some illegality or perversity or misreading of some evidence or some material document is misconstrued while arriving such finding. The findings arrived at by learned First Appellate Court are pure findings of fact which cannot be interfered in this second appeal unless and until there is some illegality or perversity or misreading of some evidence or some material document is misconstrued while arriving such finding. I have gone through the judgment passed by the learned two Courts below and I find that on the basis of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence on record rightly the suit has been decreed. 21. No substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. The same is hereby dismissed summarily. The possession of suit premises has already been obtained by the plaintiff in execution of the decree. N. S. Ruprah for appellants; Shobhitaditya for respondent No.3.