Judgment Rakesh Kumar Jain, J. 1. The questions involved in this revision petition are as under:- i) Whether an advocate engaged by a party can authorize another advocate to appear for him if he is prevented by a reasonable cause from appearing and conducting the proceedings at any hearing? ii) Whether an advocate, who appears on behalf of another advocate engaged by a party, can only plead and cannot act on behalf of the said party without a document in writing in his favour? iii) Whether a sub-tenant cannot be ordered to be evicted only on the ground of non-payment of rent? 2. A few facts are required to be noticed in order to find out answer to the aforesaid questions. Bhai Manbir Singh and Bhai Mandeep Singh [hereinafter referred to as "landlords"] filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 [for short "the Act"] seeking eviction of M/s Good Luck Marketing Services Private Limited [hereinafter referred to as "tenant"], Munish Sharda and Aryans International [hereinafter referred to as "sub-tenants"] from the First Floor of SCO Nos.32-35, Sector 8-C, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh [hereinafter referred to as "demised premises"] on the ground of non-payment of rent. On 03.02.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order;- "Present: Sh . Rajbir Singh Guraon , Advocate, Counsel for the petitioners. Petition received by entrustment. It is checked and registered. Notice of the same be issued for 28.03.2009 to the respondents on filing of PF copy etc. Sd /- Sudhir Parmar CJ/RC/03.02.2009." On 28.03.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: Sh . Rajbir Singh Guraon , Advocate, C1 . for the petitioners. Sh . S.P. Chhatwal , CI. for the respondent No.1. Sh . N.S. Bawa , CI. for respondents No.2 & 3. Respondent served through summons. Vakalatnamas filed on behalf of respondents No.l to 3 by counsel named above. On request, to come up on 23.04.2009 for filing reply on behalf of all the respondents. Sd /-Sudhir Parmar CJ/RC/28.03.2009." On 23.04.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: Counsel for the parties. WS on behalf of def. No.l filed. Copy given. WS on behalf of def. No.2 and 3 not filed. At request, adjourned to 12.06.2009 for filing WS on behalf of def. No.2 and 3. Sd/- On 12.06.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: As before.
WS on behalf of def. No.l filed. Copy given. WS on behalf of def. No.2 and 3 not filed. At request, adjourned to 12.06.2009 for filing WS on behalf of def. No.2 and 3. Sd/- On 12.06.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: As before. File put up before me under the orders of Ld. District and Sessions Judge, " Chandigarh, as the concerned PO has relinquished the charge. Now to come up on 18.08.2009 for the purpose already fixed. File be sent back to concerned Court immediately. Sd/- Civil Judge (Jr. Division)-cum-JMIC-Duty On 18.08.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: Counsel for the parties. Written statement by def. No.2 & 3 not filed. A date is requested. Heare Now to come up on 28.08.2009 for filing written statement by def. No.2&" Sd/- Sunil Kumar CJ(JD)/18.08.2009." On 24.08.2009, i.e. 4 days before the date fixed, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: None. File taken up today as I have to avail joining time from 25.08.2009 to 31.08.2009 and 30.08.2009 being Sunday. As such, case is adjourned to 28.10.2009 for me purpose already fixed. Parties/counsel be informed accordingly. Date:24.08.2009. Sd/- Sunil Kumar CJ(JD)/RC/JMIC/Chandigarh" On 28.10.009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present Counsel for the parties. Written statement by def. No.2 & 3 not filed. However, an application for striking off defence of def. no./respondent no.2 & 3 has been moved by counsel for petitioners. Heard. In view of the reason mentioned in the application as well as submissions, the defence of def/respondents No.2 & 3 is hereby struck off. Now to come up on 25.11.2009 for consideration, Sd/- Sunil Kumar CJ(JD)/RC/28.10.2009." On 25.11.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: Counsel for the parties. Heard on the point of provisional assessment of rent to be tendered by the respondent. At this stage only a prima facie case is to be seen for the purpose of provisional assessment of rent. The respondent has not disputed the rate of rent as claimed by the petitioner. Therefore, the provisional rate of rent is assessed at the admitted/claimed rate of Rs.25,920/- for the period 01.04.2008 to 30.06.2008 and @ Rs.27,994/- w.e.f. 01.07.2008 to 31.12.2008 and onwards, with interest @ 6% per annum and cost Rs.1,000/-. Now to come up on 22.12.2009 for tendering rent by the respondent.
Therefore, the provisional rate of rent is assessed at the admitted/claimed rate of Rs.25,920/- for the period 01.04.2008 to 30.06.2008 and @ Rs.27,994/- w.e.f. 01.07.2008 to 31.12.2008 and onwards, with interest @ 6% per annum and cost Rs.1,000/-. Now to come up on 22.12.2009 for tendering rent by the respondent. Sd/-Sunil Kumar RC/25.11.2009."; On 22.12.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: As above. A date is requested. Heard. To come up on 24.12.2009 for tendering of rent Sd/- CJ/RC/22.12.2009." On 24.12.2009, the learned Rent Controller passed the following order:- "Present: Counsel for the parties. A perusal of the title reveals that vide order dated 25.11.2009 provisional rent was assessed and the case was adjourned to 04.12.2009 for tendering of provisional rent However, on the request of respondent, not objected by the petitioner, the case was adjourned for today i.e. 24.12.2009 for tendering the provisional rent. But today the respondent has failed to tender the provisional rent. In Rakesh Wadhawan v. M/s Jagdamba International Corporation, (2002-2)131 P.L.R. 370 (S.C.), it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court that the provisional rent as determined by the Controller shall be liable to be paid or tendered by the tenant on the first date of hearing falling after the date of preliminary/provisional order of controller. On the failure of the tenant to comply, nothing remains to be done and an order of eviction shall follow. Since the tenant/respondent has failed to comply fee same, the law laid down in the judicial authority cited above squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, in view of the law laid down above, the respondent is liable to be ejected from the demised premises. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed with costs. The respondent is directed to vacate the demised premises within 2 months from today. Memo of costs be prepared and file be consigned to the record room after due compliance . Pronounced. Sd /- Sunil Kumar 24.12.2009. Rent Controller, Chandigarh ." 3. The aforesaid order dated 24.12.2009 was challenged by the petitioners by way of statutory appeal in which it was alleged by them that they are tenants in the demised premises under the landlords at a monthly rent of Rs.25,920/-.
Pronounced. Sd /- Sunil Kumar 24.12.2009. Rent Controller, Chandigarh ." 3. The aforesaid order dated 24.12.2009 was challenged by the petitioners by way of statutory appeal in which it was alleged by them that they are tenants in the demised premises under the landlords at a monthly rent of Rs.25,920/-. On receipt of the summons for 28.03.2009, they had engaged Kulwant Singh Bawa, Advocate [for short "K.S.Bawa"] to contest the eviction petition, who told the petitioners that since it was a matter of civil nature, therefore, their presence was not required on each and every date of hearing and he would inform them as and when the need would arise for the purpose of their appearance, as a result of which, the petitioners could not come present on each and every date of hearing and came to know on 30.03.2010 when the landlords threatened to take possession of the demised premises on the ground that an eviction order has already been passed against them. It is alleged that the petitioners rushed to the Court and found that their Advocate K.S.Bawa had already expired on 10.06.2009. Then, they engaged Anil Kumar Bhai, Advocate and had found that the presence of Narinder Singh Bawa, Advocate [for short "N.S.Bawa"] has been marked on each and every date of hearing even after the death of K.S.Bawa on 10.06.2609. It was further alleged that N.S.Bawa was not engaged by the petitioners to appear on their behalf and as such, his appearance before the learned Rent Controller on their behalf was inconsequential. However, the learned Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 05.01.2011. The petitioners has, thus, filed the present revision petition in order to challenge the validity of order dated 28.10.2009 by which their defence was struck off, order dated 24.12.2009 by which they have been ordered to be evicted from the demised premises due to non-tendering of rent and order dated 05.01.2011 by which their appeal has been dismissed by the learned Appellate Authority. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that since N.S.Bawa was never engaged by the petitioners as it is evident from the Power of Attorney available on record, which has been signed only by K.S.Bawa and two other advocates, namely R.K.Sharma and G.S.Sandhu, therefore, he had no authority to appear on behalf of the petitioners before the learned Rent Controller on 28.03.2009 and thereafter.
It is submitted that the learned Rent Controller has committed a serious error of law in permitting a person not duly authorized by them to appear before it and acted upon the request made by him for the purpose of continuing the proceedings in which their defence was ultimately struck off beeause of the non-filing of written statement in time. He also submits that the learned Courts below have further erred in ordering eviction of the petitioners on the ground of non-tendering of rent on the stipulated date although the petitioners have been alleged to be sub-tenants by the landlords in their eviction petition inducted without their consent. He submits that a sub-tenant cannot be ordered to be evicted for non-payment of rent as the tenant would not include a sub-tenant. In this regard, he has relied upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of P.C.Verman (Retd.) It. Col. (Dr.) v. Mohinder Singh and others, (1997-3)137 P.L.R. 857 and a Single Bench judgment of this Court, who has followed the aforesaid Full Bench decision, rendered in the case of Gurdial Singh v. Rajeshwar Dayal, (2008-1)149 P.L.R. 634. 5. In reply, learned counsel for respondent Nos.l and 2 has argued that, admittedly, N.S.Bawa had not accepted the Power of Attorney which is on record of the learned Rent Controller and the same had been accepted by K.S.Bawa, R.K.Sharma and G.S.Sandhu, Advocates and according to the zimni order dated 28.03.2009, N.S.Bawa had appeared for the present petitioners and, thereafter, it is not clear as to whether K.S.Bawa had appeared or N.S.Bawa had appeared and since K.S.Bawa had died on 10.06.2009, therefore, it is presumed that N.S.Bawa had been appearing throughout on behalf of K.S.Bawa. He has also submitted that an Advocate engaged by a party can authorize another Advocate to plead on his behalf for the purpose of seeking dates etc. and for these purposes he is not required to file any Power of Attorney or even memo of appearance in the Court.
He has also submitted that an Advocate engaged by a party can authorize another Advocate to plead on his behalf for the purpose of seeking dates etc. and for these purposes he is not required to file any Power of Attorney or even memo of appearance in the Court. In support of his submission, he has referred to Section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for short "CPC"], Order 3 Rule 4(5) of CPC, Form No.19 provided in Appendix H of CPC, Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961 [for short "Act of 1961"] and Rules 2 & 7, Chapter 6, Part B, Volume 5 of the Rules and Orders of Punjab and Haryana High Court [for short "Rules & Orders"]. Besides referring to the aforesaid provisions of law, he has also relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Jayant Madhav Chitale v. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. and others, A.I.R, 1997 Bombay 126 and decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Berjesh Goyal and another v. Daily Foods (India) 2009 A.I.R. (Delhi) 118. 6. In respect of the second submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, it is submitted by him-that the petitioners cannot claim themselves to be the sub-tenants as provided in Section 2(i) of the Act which does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant without the consent of the landlord. 7. I have heard both learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record with their able assistance. 8. In order to answer the first and second questions, which have been framed in the beginning of the judgment, a few provisions of law, which have been quoted by learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2 are required to be noticed:- Section 119 of CPC. "119. Unauthorized persons not to address Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to authorize any person on behalf of another to address the court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, or to examine witnesses, except where the Court shall have in the exercise of the power conferred by its charter authorized him so to do, or to interfere with the power of the High Court to make rules concerning advocates, vakils and attorneys." Order III Rule 4(5) of CPC.
"(5) No pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating - (a) the names of the parties to the suit, (b) the name of the party for whom he appears, and (c) the name of the person by whom he is authorized to appear. Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of such party." Form No. 19 provided in Appendix H of CPC "No. 19 VAKALATNAMA In the Court of...................... Suit/Miscellaneous Case/Civil Appeal/Execution Case No........... of 20..... fixed for...............Plaintiff/Appellant/Applicant/D.H. Versus .....................Defendant Respondent Opposite Party J.D. Vakalatnama of Plaintiff/ Appellant DH Defendant Respondent Opposite Party J.D. In the case noted above Sri ..................., each of Sarvasri .......... Advocate, is hereby appointed as counsel to appear, plead and act on behalf of the undersigned, in any manner, he thinks it proper, either himself or through any other Advocate, and in particular to do the following, namely, - to receive any process of Court (including any notice from any appellate or reversional Court), to file any applications, petitions or pleadings, to file, produce or receive back any documents, to withdraw or compromise the proceedings, to refer any matter to arbitration, to deposit or withdraw any moneys, to execute any decree or order , to certify payment, and receive any moneys due under such decree or order. The undersigned shall be bound by all whatsoever may be done in the aforesaid case (including any appeal or revision therefrom ) for and on behalf of the undersigned by any of the said counsel. Signature Name in full Date....................................................... Attesting witness Name in full Address Date Accepted/Accepted on the strength of the signatures of the attesting witness." Section 34 ofthe Advocates Act, 1961 . "34. Power of High Courts to make rules.- (1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the Courts subordinate thereto.
"34. Power of High Courts to make rules.- (1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the Courts subordinate thereto. (1A) The High Court shall make rules for fixing and regulating by taxation or otherwise the fees payable as costs by any party in respect of the fees of his adversarys advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the High Court at Calcutta may make rules providing for the holding of the Intermediate and the Final examinations for articled clerks to be passed by the persons referred to in section 58AG for the purpose of being admitted as advocates on the State roll and any other matter connected therewith." Rules 2 & 7, Chapter 6, Part B of Rules & Orders. "PART B - RULES MADE BY THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA UNDER SECTION 34(1) OF THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961. No.G.S.R40/C.A/25/61/S.34(l)/70.- In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Act No.25 of 1961) and all other powers- vested in it by law, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, on the provisions of the aforesaid Section having come into force by virtue of Government of India Notification No.F.41(40)/67-J, dated the 5th April, 1969, makes the following rules laying down the conditions subject to which an Advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the Courts subordinate thereto. 1. In these rules unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context the Word advocate shall include a partnership or a firm or advocates. 2.
1. In these rules unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context the Word advocate shall include a partnership or a firm or advocates. 2. Save as otherwise provided for in any law for the time being in force, no advocate shall be entitled to appear, plead or act for any person in any Court in any proceeding unless the advocate files an appointment in writing signed by such person of his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorised byor under a power of attorney to make such appointment and signed by the Advocate in token of its acceptance or the advocate files a memorandum of appearance in the form prescribed by the High Court : Provided that where an advocate has already filed an appointment in any proceeding, it shall be sufficient for another advocate, who is engaged to appear in the proceedings merely for the purposes of pleading, to file a memorandum of appearance or to declare before the Court that he appears on instructions from the advocate who has already filed his appointment in the proceedings: Provided further that nothing herein contained shall apply to an advocate who has been requested by the Court to assist the Court amicus curie in any case or a proceeding or who has been appointed at the expense of the State to defend an accused person in a criminal proceeding. Explanation.- A separate appointment or a memorandum of appearance shall be filed in each of the several connected proceedings, notwithstanding that the same advocate is retained for the party in all the party connected proceedings". 3. tO 6 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX "7. Where an advocate appointed by a party in any of the proceedings is prevented by Treasonable cause from appearing and conducting the proceedings at any hearing, he may instruct another advocate to appear for him at that hearing." 7; It is an admitted position on record that N.S.Bawa had not accepted the Power of Attorney executed by the petitioners which was only accepted by K.S.Bawa and two other advocates.
It is also admitted fact that N.S.Bawa had appeared on 28.03.2009 when the names of the advocates appearing for the parties have been clearly mentioned by the Rent Controller, which is thereafter not mentioned at all except for mentioning "counsel for the parties" or "as above". 8. At the first blush, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners appears to be very attractive that an advocate, who is not engaged by a party, cannot act on his behalf, but the proviso to Order 3 Rule 4(5) of CPC provides that a pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party can ask any other pleader to appear who is not even required to file his memorandum of appearance. Similarly, Section 34 of the Act of 1961 provides the power to the High Court to lay down conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the Courts subordinate thereto. In pursuance of Section 34(1) of the Act of 1961, which has been noticed above, this Court has framed Rules in Part B, Chapter 6, Volume 5 of the Rules & Orders. According to Rule 2, which has been reproduced here-in-above, an advocate, appearing on behalf of the other advocate, can declare before the Court that he appears on instructions from the advocate who has already filed his appointment in the proceedings and according to the Rule 7, if an advocate appointed by a parry in any of the proceedings is prevented by reasonable cause from appearing and conducting the proceedings at any hearing, he may instruct another advocate to appear for him at that hearing. Order 3 Rule 4(5) came to be interpreted by the Bombay High Court in Jayant Madhav Chitale s case (supra), in which it was held as unden- "The proviso to this provision carves out an exception. If a party appoints a pleader to act on his behalf in the Court and such duly appointed pleader engages another pleader to plead on behalf of that party then another pleader is not required to file memo of appearance as contemplated in the main provision of sub-rule (4) of R.5 of the 0.3.
If a party appoints a pleader to act on his behalf in the Court and such duly appointed pleader engages another pleader to plead on behalf of that party then another pleader is not required to file memo of appearance as contemplated in the main provision of sub-rule (4) of R.5 of the 0.3. In other words, whenever a pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of a party engages any other pleader to plead on behalf of such party, such other pleader is not required to file memo of appearance. The Court in such circumstances cannot insist the other pleader to file memo of appearance. An authority given by advocate who is duly appointed by a party to act and plead on his behalf to another advocate to plead on behalf of such party does not need memo of appearance to be filed by another advocate. It was expected of the trial court to have kept the said provision in mind." 9. In Berjesh Goyal and anothers case (supra), the Ddlhi High Court, while interpreting Order 3 Rule 4 and Chapter 5 Rule 1 of the Delhi High Counnt Rules, has relied upon various other authoritative pronouncements and observed as under:- "9. On a perusal of the provisions set out hereinabove as also- the legal position as contained in the authorities of various High Courts, this Court is of the opinion that there is no bar on a Pleader duly authorized by a pasty under a vakalatnama to engage another pleader to plead the case on bis or her behalf. The power to "plead" would include within its scope and ambit, the right to examine witnesses, to conduct admission and denial, to seek adjournments and to addrsssarguments etc., as may be authorized. Such pleaders however, would? pot have the power to compromise a case, withdraw & case or do any other act which may compromise the interest of his or her client. In procedural matters it is not only expedient but also in the interest of speedy delivery of justice that young lawyers who work with pleaders duly authorized by clients are permitted to appear to. matters Thisis nessesary for speedy disposal of cases and also as an encouragement to the younger professionals who are in the initial/formative years of practice." 10.
In procedural matters it is not only expedient but also in the interest of speedy delivery of justice that young lawyers who work with pleaders duly authorized by clients are permitted to appear to. matters Thisis nessesary for speedy disposal of cases and also as an encouragement to the younger professionals who are in the initial/formative years of practice." 10. It is worthwhile to mention here that no judgment to the contrary has been cited by learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard. Thus, the first question, which has been referred to in the beginning of this judgment, is answered to the effect that an advocate, engaged by a party is competent to authorize any other advocate to appear on his behalf if he is prevented by a reasonable cause from appearing and conducting the proceedings at any hearing. In the present case, since K.S.Bawa, who is reported to have been keeping bad health due to various ailments, had instructed his father N.S.Bawa to appear on his behalf for the purpose of taking dates before the learned Rent Controller, therefore, I do not find any error in the appearance of N.S.Bawa before the Rent Controller despite the fact that he was not engaged by the petitioners as their counsel because he did not act on behalf of the petitioners for the purpose of compromising or withdrawing the case. Moreover, in the Power of Attorney (Form No.19/Vakalatnama), as provided in Appendix H of CPC, the word used is "through any other advocate". Similarly, in the Power of Attorney filed by the petitioners in the present case in favour of K.S.Bawa, there is a specific condition that to employ any other Lego! Practitioner authorizing him to exercise the powers and authorities hereby conferred upon the advocate whatever he may think fit to do so" and "I/We hereby agree to ratify whatever the Advocate or his substitute shall do in the case". Thus, the first arguesent raised by learned counsel for the petitioners regarding appearance of N.S.Bawa without authorization is hereby decided against the petitioners. 11. The second question involved in this case is as to whether the advocate instructed by the other advocate, who had been engaged by the party, can plead or can act?
Thus, the first arguesent raised by learned counsel for the petitioners regarding appearance of N.S.Bawa without authorization is hereby decided against the petitioners. 11. The second question involved in this case is as to whether the advocate instructed by the other advocate, who had been engaged by the party, can plead or can act? In this regard, reference could be made to a decision of the Orlssa High Cowrt in the case of Doki Adinarayana Suhudhi and Brothers v. Doki Surya Prakash Rao, A.I.R, 1980 Orissa 110 in which it was held that an advocate, who appears on behalf of another advocate engaged by a party, can only plead but he has no power to act on behalf of a party without a document in writing in his favour. It is the agency created by a client in favour of his advocate which clothes the latter with the power to act on behalf of the former and it is by virtue of the vakalatnama that a client is bound by the actions of his advocate within the limits of authority. Similarly, in Berjesh Goyal and anothers case (supra), it has been held by the Delhi High Court that the power to "plead" would include within its scope and ambit, the right to examine witnesses, to conduct admission and denial, to seek adjournments and to address arguments etc., as may be authorized, but such pleader, however, would not have the power to compromise a case, withdraw a case or do any other act which may compromise the interest of his or her client. Thus, the second question is also decided to the effect that the advocate, who is instructed by an advocate engaged by the party, can only plead and cannot act. 12. Coming to the last question, admittedly, the eviction petition is filed by the landlords against respondent No.3 claiming it to be tenant who has been in arrears of rent and also claiming the petitioners to be the sub-tenants inducted by respondent No.3 without their permission. On 28.10.2009, defence of the petitioners was struck off for not filing of written statement in time and vide order dated 24.12.2009 eviction order was passed against respondent No.3 alone for not tendering the provisional rent which was assessed on 25.11.2009 and was ordered to be paid on 24.12.2009.
On 28.10.2009, defence of the petitioners was struck off for not filing of written statement in time and vide order dated 24.12.2009 eviction order was passed against respondent No.3 alone for not tendering the provisional rent which was assessed on 25.11.2009 and was ordered to be paid on 24.12.2009. Respondent No.3 had although alleged that the petitioners were inducted as sub-tenants with the oral consent of the landlords, but the landlords have claimed that they have been inducted without their permission. The fact remains that the present petitioners have been sought to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of subletting without permission and not on the ground of non-payment of the arrears of rent. In this regard, I am fortified with the observations in the case of P.C.Verman (Retd.) It. Col. (Dr.) (supra) in which the facts were that the landlords Mohinder Singh and Kulwant Kaur filed a petition for eviction of the tenant and a sub-tenant from 3/8th portion of the first tioor of S.C.O. No.17, Sector 17-E, Chandigarh which was let out to Santa Singh at a monthly rent of Rs.30Q/-. Santa Singh had sublet the said portion to Lt. Col. P.C.Verman against the terms and conditions of the tenancy. The eviction was sought firstly on the ground that Santa Singh had sublet the portion of the demised premises to P.C.Verman without consent, secondly that he had impaired value and utility of the demised premises and thirdly that Santa Singh tenant had not paid the rent of Rs.7,800/- for 26 months i.e. from April 1, 1974 to May 31, 1976. Santa Singh Contested the eviction petition and admitted the relationship. He admitted that he had sublet the demised premises to P.C. Verman, but alleged that it was with the consent of the landlords. P.C.Verman, sub-tenant, filed separate written statement and alleged that the eviction petition is a result of collusion of Santa Singh with the landlords as Santa Singh happens to be their domestic servant. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed including issue No.4 as to whether the respondents have paid the arrears of rent as claimed.
P.C.Verman, sub-tenant, filed separate written statement and alleged that the eviction petition is a result of collusion of Santa Singh with the landlords as Santa Singh happens to be their domestic servant. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed including issue No.4 as to whether the respondents have paid the arrears of rent as claimed. The ejectment order was passed and ultimately the following question was put up before the Full Bench of this Court:- "The question which needs the determination in the present case is as to whether sub-tenant can be ordered to be ejected for non-payment of arrears of rent when he claims himself to be a direct tenant under the landlord. (Though held by the Court as sub-tenant being a sub-letee from the tenant with permission of the landlord) when the landlord has not sought his ejectment on that ground; and as to whether the sub-tenant in the absence of a definite allegation of non-payment of rent by the landlords is under an obligation to pay or tender the rent in terms of Section 13(2)(i) of the Act." 13. It was decided by the Full Bench of this Court that "it is clearly borne out from the record of this case and from the ejectment application itself that the landlords-respondents have not taken up any of the grounds for ejectment much less the ground for non-payment of rent as provided under Section 13(2)(i) against the sub-tenant who is the petitioner before us. When no demand of rent under Section 13(2)(i) is made: against the sub-tenant and no application as provided under Section 13(2) for demand of rent is made before the Controller specifically against the sub-tenant, the sub-tenant is not liable to ejectment for non-payment of rent. Obviously, when no demand of rent has been made from the sub-tenant (petitioner) then to eject him for non-payment of rent certainly has caused a serious prejudice to him as he has not been given an opportunity of being heard by the Controller as specifically provided under Section 13 of the Act and particularly so when the landlords having failed to claim and demand the rent from the sub-tenant who pleaded himself to be a direct tenant under the landlords.
Ultimately, it was held that "in the case in hand, it has been made clear above that the landlords never acknowledged the petitioner as their tenant at any point of time and that is why they did not demand the rent from the petitioner. The petitioner, thus, could not be ordered to be ejected for non-payment of arrears of rent when he claimed himself to be direct tenant under the landlords and even when the landlords have not sought his ejectment on that ground". 14. In the present case, the petitioners have challenged the orders dated 28.10.2009, 24.12.2009 and 05.01.2011. Insofar as the order dated 28.10.2009 with respect to striking of defence of the petitioners is concerned, the written statement could not have been filed because counsel engaged by the petitioners, namely, K.S.Bawa, had expired on 10.06.2009 as a result of which the petitioners remained in dark about the proceedings being carried out before the Rent Controller. In view thereof, I set aside the order dated 28.10.2009 and grant an opportunity to the petitioners to file written statement. 15. Insofar as the order dated 24.12.2009 is concerned, it pertains to respondent No.3/tenant, who did not tender the rent despite opportunity and no order has been passed by the Rent Controller that the present petitioners had also been ordered to be evicted as the word used is "respondent has failed", i.e. in singular sense, therefore, the order of non-payment of rent would not affect the rights of the petitioners. 16. Insofar as the order dated 05.01.2011 of the Appellate Authority is concerned, it did not decide the issue that the sub-tenant would be liable to be evicted in case of nonpayment of rent by the tenant as assessed provisionally by the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority has basically dealt with the issue of appearance of N.S.Bawa instead of K.S.Bawa and has observed that once N.S.Bawa had appeared on 28.03.2009, therefore, the death of K.S.Bawa would not have any effect on the instant case. All that has been decided is that once the tenant has failed to tender the provisionally assessed rent, the order of eviction has to follow. 17.
All that has been decided is that once the tenant has failed to tender the provisionally assessed rent, the order of eviction has to follow. 17. Hence, it is observed that the petitioners being the sub-tenants, as alleged by the landlords, were not liable to pay arrears of rent and were not liable to be evicted for the fault of the tenant for not tendering the rent on the date fixed as held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of P.C.Verman (Retd.) Lt. Col. (Dr.) (supra). 18. In view of the above discussion, the third point is decided in favour ef the petitioners and it is ordered that theycannot be ordered to be evicted for the fault of the tenant in not tendering the arrears of rent. Hence, the revision petition is hereby allowed to that extent and the impugned order qua the petitioners is hereby set asids. 19. The parties, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of fee case, are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.