JUDGMENT 1. BHASKAR Bhattacharya, J.: This is an application for review of an order dated 1st July, 2011 passed by this Bench in I.T.A. No.218 of 2001 by which this Bench disposed of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act filed by the assessee against an order dated March 30, 2001 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Income2 tax Appeal bearing IT (SS) A No.69/(Cal) of 1997 for the block-period between April 1, 1985 and February 12, 1996. 2. THE main point involved in the aforesaid appeal was whether the addition of Rs.39,78,315/- and a further sum of Rs.20 lac based on alleged bogus purchase could be made in block assessment notwithstanding the fact that those findings were based on no material recovered from search and seizure. This Court held that the aforesaid findings were not based on any material unearthed on search and seizure and thus, was not liable to be assessed on the block assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Income-tax Act but should be subject to regular assessment. We arrived at the aforesaid findings while answering the first question which is quoted below: "i) Whether sum of Rs.39,78,315/- and Rs.20.00 lakh reflected in the regular books of account relating to the assessment years 1993-94 and 1996-97 could form subject matter of the block assessment." Our aforesaid observation, i.e. "but should be subject to regular assessment", is the subject-matter of the present application for review and according to the assessee, we should not have made such observation when such observation was beyond the scope of the subject-matter of the questions formulated by the Division Bench. According to the assessee, the regular assessment proceedings under Sections 143/147/148 of the Act were already barred by limitation as contained in Section 149(1) of the Act and as such, the aforesaid observation should be deleted. 3. MR. Poddar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the assessee, submitted before us that taking advantage of the aforesaid remark, the Assessing Officer now may start fresh assessment by treating the same as a direction contained in the order. MR. Poddar, therefore, prays for deletion of the aforesaid observation or clarification of the same by making it clear that the said remark will not enable the Assessing Officer to start fresh regular assessment which is already barred. 4. MR. MR. Poddar, therefore, prays for deletion of the aforesaid observation or clarification of the same by making it clear that the said remark will not enable the Assessing Officer to start fresh regular assessment which is already barred. 4. MR. Dutt, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has, on the other hand, opposed the application and has contended that there is no bar in proceeding afresh for regular assessment, if a direction to that effect is given by this Court while disposing of an appeal under Section 260A of the Act notwithstanding the fact that period of limitation for initiating fresh assessment has since become barred by time. MR. Dutt tried to convince us that the provision contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply in such circumstances and thus, taking advantage of such observation, his cient can now initiate fresh proceeding as in the earlier proceeding, the endeavour of the Assessing Officer to treat the transactions under block assessment failed for want of jurisdiction or on similar grounds as specified in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the only question that arises for determination in this application is whether there was an error apparent on the face of record in making the aforesaid remark while disposing of the appeal under Section 260A of the Act. 5. AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we find that the question before us was whether those two transactions could form subject-matter of block assessment when findings in support of those transactions were based on no material recovered from search and seizure and thus, within the narrow scope of Section 260A of the Act, there was no necessity of considering whether the transactions in question could be assessed under regular assessment. 6. OUR aforesaid observation was not meant for giving direction upon the Assessing Officer because there was neither any scope of passing such direction for effective disposal of the dispute nor could we pass any such direction while answering questions formulated by the Division Bench admitting the appeal. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Goombira Tea Co. Ltd vs. Income tax Officer reported in (1980) 125 ITR 260 , the expression "finding" and "direction" contained in Section 153(3) of the Act are limited in meaning. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Goombira Tea Co. Ltd vs. Income tax Officer reported in (1980) 125 ITR 260 , the expression "finding" and "direction" contained in Section 153(3) of the Act are limited in meaning. A finding given in an appeal, revision or reference arising out of an assessment must be a finding necessary for the disposal of that particular case and must also be a direction which the authority or the Court is empowered to pass while deciding the case before it. Similarly, under the Income-tax Act, there is no scope of applying the provisions of the Limitation Act as would appear from the fact that in Section 260A itself, the power of condonation of delay in filing the appeal has been incorporated by the legislature by introducing sub-section 2A with effect from April 1, 2010 only and if the Limitation Act of its own had the application to such an appeal, there was no necessity of incorporation of such a provision in Section 260A and that too, with effect from April 1, 2010 and consequently, Section 14 of the Limitation Act also cannot be availed of by the Assessing Officer, if under the Income tax Act, the regular assessment is barred and even the period of limitation for reopening the regular assessment had expired. 7. OUR attention has been drawn to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT vs. R.K. B. K. Ltd., reported in (2011) 331 ITR 269 where the Division Bench held that by virtue of the provisions of sub-section 7 of Section 260A of the Act, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3A of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable and thus, it necessarily implied that the Limitation Act was applicable. It was further held that by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. 8. WITH great respect to Their Lordships, we are unable to accept the said proposition for the following reasons: Sub-section 7 of Section 260A merely provides that the save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section. In the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions contained in Sections 100-103 are the provisions relating to appeals to High Court and the provisions of Order 41 are the procedural part of Section 96 which is the general provision of appeal. Therefore, the legislature intended that the provisions contained in the Code for Second Appeals should be applicable as far as may be, but not in full, to an appeal under Section 260 A of the Act. Thus, such an appeal must be limited to substantial questions of law and not like an ordinary appeal under Section 96 of the Code. Similarly, the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 3A does not confer the power of condonation of delay. It was incorporated in the Code by the amendment of 1976 to give effect to the decision of the Privy Council which deprecated the practice prevailing in India of admitting an appeal subject to the objection as to the question whether the same was barred by limitation that might be raised at the time of final hearing by the respondent (Vide object and reasons of such enactment) being quite conscious that the Limitation Act applies in full to an appeal under Section 96 of the Code. That the provision of Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code is not the source of power of condonation of delay has been accepted by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Egra Thana Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd vs. Registrar of Co7 operative Society reported in 2003(2) CHN 460 on a Reference consequent to a difference of opinion between two learned Single Judges of this court in the cases of Nowda Thana Agricultural Marketing Society ( AIR 1979 Cal 318 ) and Anupam Maity vs. Vidyasagar Central Cooperative Bank Ltd ( 2001(2) CHN 11 ). It appears that the attention of the Division Bench in the case of CIT vs. R.K. B. K. Ltd. was not drawn to the said decision given on the Reference holding that Order 41 Rule 3A does not confer power of condonation of delay and thus, the said decision is not a valid precedent. It appears that the attention of the Division Bench in the case of CIT vs. R.K. B. K. Ltd. was not drawn to the said decision given on the Reference holding that Order 41 Rule 3A does not confer power of condonation of delay and thus, the said decision is not a valid precedent. It is now a settled law that in case of conflict of opinion between two benches of the equal strength, the former prevails and thus, we propose to accept the view taken in the case of Egra Thana Marketing Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra) on the proposition that Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code does not confer any power of condonation of delay. We are also unable to accept the other finding given in the case of CIT vs. R.K. B. K. Ltd. (supra) that sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to an appeal under Section 260A of the Act in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Ltd., reported in (2009) 315 ITR 449 where the said court laid down the following tests for application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in a given statute: "Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court." (Emphasis supplied by us). 9. IN that case, the Supreme Court was considering whether in respect of the proceedings under the Central Excise Act, those were excluded from the operation of the Limitation Act. 10. SO far as the Income-tax Act is concerned, its scope and the nature has been described by the Supreme Court in the case of Rao Bahadur Ravulu Subba Rao vs. CIT, reported in (1956) 30 ITR 163 thus: "To sum up, the Indian Income tax Act is a self-contained code exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein and its provisions show an intention to depart from the common rule, qui facit per alium facit per se." In view of the aforesaid observations of the Three-Judge-Bench of the Apex Court if we apply the principles laid down in the case of Hongo India Ltd (supra), to the Income tax Act, there is no scope of any argument that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to the Act. We, therefore, are unable to accept the said decision in the case of CIT vs. R.K. B. K. Ltd (supra), as a valid precedent. 11. THUS, there is no basis of the apprehension of Mr. Poddar that taking advantage of our above observations, the Assessing Officer will now reopen the regular assessment by taking aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 11. THUS, there is no basis of the apprehension of Mr. Poddar that taking advantage of our above observations, the Assessing Officer will now reopen the regular assessment by taking aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. We, consequently, dispose of this application by clarifying our above observation that we never intended to direct the Assessing Officer to bring those transactions within regular assessment after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Income tax Act by taking aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act which is not even applicable. 12. IN the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.