Judgment :- Challa Venkateswarlu, husband of respondent No.1, father of respondent Nos.2 to 5 and son of respondent No.6, was employed as a Driver with respondent No.7 to work on a lorry bearing No. ADF 7722. On 28.08.1996, he was at Bangalore on the vehicle. He suffered cerebral hemorrhage, while on duty and immediately, he was hospitalized. On the next day, he died. Respondent Nos.1 to 6 (for short ‘the respondents’) filed W.C. Case No.68 of 1997 before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour-I, Guntur (for short ‘the Commissioner’) claiming a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, as compensation. They stated that Venkateswarlu was under serious stress and mental agony, on account of prolonged duty to drive a heavily loaded vehicle and that the same has resulted in cerebral hemorrhage. It was stated that he was being paid a sum of Rs.2,500/- as salary apart from Rs.500/- as D.A. and Rs.25/- per day as allowance and that he was aged 42 years at the time of his death. Respondent No.7 filed a counter in the W.C. Case admitting the fact that the deceased was employed with her and that he was being paid salary of Rs.2,000/- per month. It was also stated that the vehicle was insured and the appellant is liable to pay the compensation. The appellant filed separate counter denying most of the averments in the application. It has disputed the cause of death, age, and wages of the deceased. It further pleaded that the compensation claimed by the respondent is excessive. The Commissioner passed an order, dated 19.01.2001, awarding a sum of Rs.1,69,779/- as compensation. The said order is challenged in this appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ‘the Act’). Sri Kota Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the W.C. Case filed by the respondents was not maintainable, since there was not any accident, much less injuries, and that Section 3 of the Act is not at all attracted. He submits that even if it may be a fact that the deceased died in the course of employment, the liability for the appellant would arise, if only, the death was on account of the injuries, as a result of an accident. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jyothi Ademma Vs. He submits that even if it may be a fact that the deceased died in the course of employment, the liability for the appellant would arise, if only, the death was on account of the injuries, as a result of an accident. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jyothi Ademma Vs. Plant Engineer, Nellore Thermal Station (2006 ACJ 2165) and the judgment rendered by this Court in C.M.A.No.403 of 2003, dated 27.04.2009. Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by Patna High Court in Superintendent of Mines Vs. Lalo Devi (1985 ACJ 850). Sri Suresh Kumar Routhu, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that cerebral hemorrhage is a serious injury and the very fact that it has occurred to the deceased would disclose that it was an accident, though, not in the ordinary parlance. The learned counsel submits that the expressions ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ employed in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act cannot be restricted to the cases where the injury is visible externally or that the accident is a mishap. Learned counsel further submits that anything that occurs otherwise than in usual course is an accident and the resultant suffering of any kind to the body, deserves to be treated as, injury. He submits that support in this regard can be drawn from sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, where the contracting of a disease by an employee shall be deemed to be an injury by the accident. He places reliance upon a judgment in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ajoy Medhi (1996(2) ACJ 727)of Gauhati High Court and that of Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Philo (1996(2) ACJ 849). Before the Commissioner, A.Ws.1 and 2 were examined by the respondents and they filed Exs.A1 to A3, insurance policy, case sheet and driving licence. On behalf of the appellant, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.R1 and R2, insurance policy, and policy terms and conditions, were filed. That the deceased was employed with respondent No.7, and that he died in the course of employment, are not seriously disputed. Respondent No.7, opposite party No.1 in the W.C. case filed a counter admitting those facts. The appellant also does not dispute the finding in this regard. That the deceased was employed with respondent No.7, and that he died in the course of employment, are not seriously disputed. Respondent No.7, opposite party No.1 in the W.C. case filed a counter admitting those facts. The appellant also does not dispute the finding in this regard. The principal ground urged by the appellant is that its liability will arise, if only the death of the workman occurred on account of injuries caused to him in an accident as mentioned under subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act, and that since no such accident has occurred, it is not under obligation to pay the compensation. The Act is a social security measure. Before the Act was enacted, the workmen, who suffered injuries or the dependents of the workmen, who died in the course of employment, were left to the mercy of the employers or were required to pursue the remedies in the civil Courts. With a view to provide social security to the employees, Parliament stepped in and brought about the said legislation. It is a comprehensive enactment. The injuries are classified under the respective parts in Schedule-A and the corresponding percentage of loss of earning capacity is stipulated. A mathematical formula is evolved with the age of the employee, as variables. The mechanism is so perfect that once the nature of injury or death, as the case may be, the wages and age of the employee are known, the compensation which is required to be paid can be ascertained with precision. Hardly, any discretion is left to adjudicating authority. Section 3 of the Act defines the circumstances under which liability on the part of the employer or his insurer would arise. It is a lengthy provision. For the purpose of this case, sub-section (1) excluding the proviso and sub-section (2) together with its provision are relevant. They read as under: “3. Hardly, any discretion is left to adjudicating authority. Section 3 of the Act defines the circumstances under which liability on the part of the employer or his insurer would arise. It is a lengthy provision. For the purpose of this case, sub-section (1) excluding the proviso and sub-section (2) together with its provision are relevant. They read as under: “3. Employer’s liability for compensation:- (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: (2) If a workman employed in any employment specified in Part A of Schedule III contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, or if a workman, whilst in the service of an employer in whose service he has been employed for a continuous period of not less than six month (which period shall not include a period of service under any other employer in the same kind of employment) in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, or if a workman whilst in the service of one of more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III for such continuous period as the Central Government may specify in respect of each such employment, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this Section and, unless the contrary is proved, the accident shall be deemed to have arisen out of, and in the course of, the employment: Provided that if it is proved- (a) that a workman whilst in the service of one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III has contracted a disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment during a continuous period which is less than the period specified under this sub-section for that employment, and (b) that the disease has arisen out of and in the course of the employment; the contracting of such disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this Section: Provided further that if it is proved that a workman who having served under any employer in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III or who having served under one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of that Schedule, for a continuous period specified under this sub-section for that employment and he has after the cessation of such service contracted any disease specified in the said Part B or the said Part C, as the case may be, as an occupational disease peculiar to the employment and that such disease arose out of the employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this Section”. A perusal of sub-section (1) gives an indication that the obligation for an employer to pay compensation would arise, if only (a) an accident occurred in the course of employment of his workman and (b) the workman received personal injuries in such accident. In many judgments, attempts were made to explain the words ‘accident’ and ‘injury’. For example, the Bombay High Court held that the words ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ imply the existence of some extraordinary factor to cause death or injury apart from internal ailment of the body. If the Parliament were to have left the matter with sub-section (1), there would have been some force in the contention of the appellant that the accident must be a phenomenon where ordinary course of things is disturbed and injury is the one that is manifest on the body of the workman. The Act has taken in its fold, instances of sufferings of employees otherwise than through accident and injury. Sub-section (2) deals with such instances. If an individual was in employment for not less than six months of service in an employment specified in Schedule ‘B’ and has contracted a disease specified therein, which is peculiar to the employment, it shall be presumed that the contracting of such disease is, by itself, an injury by accident contemplated under sub-section (1) of the Act. Therefore, the contention that an employee or his dependents would be entitled to compensation if only an accident in the ordinary parlance or injury, which is visible externally, takes place cannot be accepted. Even if a different view is possible in this regard, the same needs to be rejected, since the Act is a welfare legislation. It is too well known that a welfare legislation must be interpreted liberally and if two interpretations are possible, the one that sub-serves the cause of persons for whose benefit the legislation was made, must be adopted. In the instant case, the driver suffered cerebral hemorrhage right, when he was on driving seat. While in most of the injuries, oozing of blood is visible externally, in case of hemorrhage, it takes place internally within the brain. Though it is not visible externally, in terms of seriousness, it is more serious and dangerous than the one which is externally visible. A.W.2 in his evidence stated that cerebral hemorrhage is a phenomenon where blood vessels burst and on account of the same, patient dies. Though it is not visible externally, in terms of seriousness, it is more serious and dangerous than the one which is externally visible. A.W.2 in his evidence stated that cerebral hemorrhage is a phenomenon where blood vessels burst and on account of the same, patient dies. From this, it is clear that whether the blood comes out of the body on account of bursting of vessels or it flows inside the body itself in a dangerous manner, there does not exist any difference, so far as its effects thereof are concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 3 of the Act is not attracted to the facts of the case. In Philo’s case, a Division Bench of Kerala High Court held that even where a driver of a vehicle is murdered by some unidentified persons, the liability to pay compensation under Section 3 of the Act would arise. Similarly, in Ajoy Medhi’s case, Gauhati High Court took the view that when a driver suffered injury in the process of being dragged by the police personnel, he is entitled to be paid compensation, though it cannot be said that an accident, in the ordinary parlance, has occurred. The Commissioner has taken the correct view and awarded the compensation. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.