JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—These objections have been filed against the draft decree prepared by Registrar of this Court pursuant to judgment dated 30.9.2010 whereby four original suits were decided. The suits were initially filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad wherefrom transferred to this Court pursuant to order dated 10.7.1989 passed on applications made by State of U.P. The matter was heard by a Special Bench consisting of three Judges constituted by Hon’ble the Chief Justice as requested by Division Bench in the order dated 10.7.1989 whereby transfer was allowed. 2. The suits were decided on 30.9.2010. All the three Judges have given their separate decisions. The decree, therefore, has to be prepared in the light of majority decision or unanimous decision, if any, though contained in separate decisions of all the three Judges. 3. For the purpose of preparation of decree the procedure prescribed in the High Court Rules read with Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) has to be observed. 4. The procedure for preparation of decree is contained in Order XX Rules 6, 6-A, 7, 8, 9 and 18 of CPC. In the High Court Rules Chapter VIII Rules 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide procedure for preparation of decree. 5. The Registrar has drawn the decree and put up the same to notice of all the parties as contemplated under Chapter VIII Rule 9 of the High Court Rules. Some of parties have filed their objections which the Registrar has placed for consideration by Court under Chapter VIII Rule 10 of the High Court Rules. 6. We proceed to consider these objections suitwise. OOS No. 1 of 1989 7. In OOS No. 1 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “Suit-1”) two objections have been filed. First is Civil Application No. 16(O) of 2010 filed on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara. It says that in view of totality of judgement and in view of composite delivery of judgment in all connected suits, entire operative part of judgement of one of us (Sudhir Agarwal, J.) should be made part of decree in view of Order XX Rule 6 CPC. The decree should agree with the judgement. It is important fact which should be inserted in decree. The decree should agree with the judgement. It is important fact which should be inserted in decree. The judgement of Justice Agarwal does contain a map, Appendix-7, which should be made part of decree alongwith details contained in roman digit I to VII in the judgment. 8. Another objection is C. M. Application No. 21(O) of 2010, on behalf of defendant No. 1/1, Farooq Ahmad son of Jahoor Ahmad and defendant No. 10, Sunni Central Board of Waqf. It refers to certain corrections in the draft decree. In the description of defendants, name of defendant No. 1/1 is said to have been written as Qk:[k vgen (Farookh Ahmad) in place of Qk:d vgen (Farooq Ahmad). Similarly in respect to defendant No. 9 it says that it should be mentioned completely as Babu Priya Dutt Ram in place of B. Priya Dutt and further since he is no more a remark (now dead) should be given. The next objection is that map Plan 1 prepared by Sri Shiv Shankar, Pleader/Commissioner appointed by Court in Suit-1 as mentioned by S.U. Khan, J. in the operative part of his judgment should be annexed/enclosed with the decree. The date of decree should be changed, as it ought to be the date when the decree is prepared and signed and not the date of judgment. Lastly it says that operative part of the judgment of Sudhir Agarwal, J. as find mentioned in Para 4566 at pages 5079-5081 should be mentioned in its entirety and Appendix-7 referred to in the said judgement i.e. the operative part should be made part of the decree. 9. Sri Hari Shankar Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Hindu Mahasabha though is not a party in Suit-1 but during the course of oral arguments submits that the decree in respect to Suit-1 is not clear and it is not evident whether the suit has been decreed or not. Therefore, the manner in which it has been prepared is not in accordance with Order XX Rule 6 CPC read with Chapter VIII Rule 8 of High Court Rules. 10. We shall first find out, what relief has been granted to plaintiff in Suit-1 and how the suit has been decided by three judges in their separate decisions. Here we may mention one more aspect. 10. We shall first find out, what relief has been granted to plaintiff in Suit-1 and how the suit has been decided by three judges in their separate decisions. Here we may mention one more aspect. Since the judgment of three Judges are running in several volumes consisting of 8666 pages, we would refer from the relevant volume, page number and para number of the judgment of concerned Judge. Further, fortunately this judgment has also been reported in 2010 ADJ page 1 (Special F.B.) and it is in three volumes. For convenience we will also refer page number and para number of the said report. 11. The judgment of S.U. Khan, J. has dealt with certain issues of Suit-1 separately but on page 261 (page 109 Volume 1 of the report) it reads as under: “In respect of findings on other issues (except issues relating to relief) I fully agree with the findings of my brother Sudhir Agarwal, J. subject to any thing contrary stated/found in this judgement of mine.” 12. Issue No. 17, Suit-1 related to relief and has been dealt with by S.U. Khan, J. in his judgement at pages 262 to 276 (pages 109 to 114, Vol. I of the report). 13. However a reading of the aforesaid shows that S.U. Khan, J. has not granted any relief to plaintiff of Suit-1. It is true that specifically nothing has been said on the issue of relief of Suit-1 but we are of the view that a relief if not granted, means it has been rejected. 14. Sudhir Agarwal, J. has dealt with issue No. 17, Suit-1 relating to reliefs in paras 4554 and 4555, pages 5072-5073, Vol. 21 (paras 4554-4555, pages 2867-2868, Vol. III of the report); para 4570, page 5088, Vol. 21 (para 4570, page 2876, Vol. III of the report); and, para 4571, page 5091, Vol. 21 (para 4571, page 2878, Vol. III of the report). It decrees Suit-1 partly. 21 (paras 4554-4555, pages 2867-2868, Vol. III of the report); para 4570, page 5088, Vol. 21 (para 4570, page 2876, Vol. III of the report); and, para 4571, page 5091, Vol. 21 (para 4571, page 2878, Vol. III of the report). It decrees Suit-1 partly. The Judge has made a declaration that plaintiff has right of worship at the site of dispute including the part of land which is held by this Court to be the place of birth of Lord Rama according to the faith and belief of Hindus but this right is subject to such restrictions as may be necessary by authorities concerned in regard to law and order, i.e., safety, security and also for the maintenance of place of worship etc. Rest of the relief has been specifically denied. 15. Dharam Veer Sharma, J. in his separate judgment in OOS No. 1 of 1989 at page 33 (page 3489, Vol. III of the report) has held that plaintiff is not entitled for the relief claimed and defendants are also not entitled for special costs as initially the plaintiff who filed the suit is no more. It thus ordered that suit is dismissed with easy costs. 16. Now we come to the question as to what ought to be the contents of decree. 17. Order XX Rule 6 CPC provides that the decree shall normally specify the relief granted or other determination of suit. In respect to Suit-1 we find that S.U. Khan, J. has not granted any relief to the plaintiff and D.V. Sharma, J. has held that plaintiff is not entitled for any relief and the suit is dismissed. In our view there is no occasion in Suit-1 while preparing the decree to mention other determination when majority has not granted any relief to plaintiff. It is only in the decision of Sudhir Agarwal, J. where suit has been decreed partly and some relief has been granted but that is in minority so far as this aspect is concerned. 18. Now the question would be whether minority decision should also form part of the decree or not. 19. Lots of arguments have been advanced on this aspect. 18. Now the question would be whether minority decision should also form part of the decree or not. 19. Lots of arguments have been advanced on this aspect. Reference was made to Order XLI Rule 35 CPC which provides where there are more Judges than one and there is difference of opinion among them it shall not be necessary for any Judge dissenting from the judgment of Court to sign the decree. It means that the judgment of minority need not be signed by such Judge. 20. To our mind this provision does not help anyone in preparation of decree hereat inasmuch as this provision is applicable for preparation of decree by Appellate Court. Here we have heard and decided original suits transferred from subordinate Court. The High Court has decided suits in original jurisdiction and not as an Appellate Court. No other provision in CPC throws any light on this aspect of the matter. 21. Chapter XV of High Court Rules makes certain provision in respect to original and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. Rule 22 says trial of suits removed by the Court from any Court subject to superintendence of High Court to be tried and determined by it in exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction and provides that rules contain in Chapter XV shall apply to such suits also. 22. Here also nothing is said about the manner in which decree is to be prepared by this Court particularly when case has been heard by a larger Bench consisting of three Judges and decisions have been given separately by all the Judges constituting the Bench. It is an extraordinary situation. Normally a civil suit when instituted in original course is decided by Presiding Judge of the Court which is obviously a Single Judge. When a suit is transferred from subordinate Court to High Court, then also it is normally decided by a Single Judge. We have not come across of any other illustration where civil suits preferred before the civil judge in subordinate Court have been transferred to this Court and tried, heard and decided by a Special Bench consisting of three Judges, more so when all the three Judges have delivered their separate decision. This is totally a novel situation. Learned counsels for the parties also could not assist this Court by placing any other illustration or precedent of a similar kind. 23. This is totally a novel situation. Learned counsels for the parties also could not assist this Court by placing any other illustration or precedent of a similar kind. 23. Whether minority order of a Bench should make part of decree or not, therefore, has to be considered in the light of what a “decree” is? It is defined in Section 2(2) CPC and reads as under: “2(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include,— (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order; or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” 24. It talks of formal expression of an adjudication, which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines rights of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. 25. The term “decree” has been defined so as to contain “formal expression” of an adjudication. These words have not been used in Section 2(11) which defines judgement. Though in Section 2(16) the word “order” contains the phrase “formal expression” but it is the formal expression of any decision of civil Court and not the formal expression of adjudication. The judgment contains statement given by Judge on the ground of a decree. The decree, therefore, need not contain a statement of reasons given by Judge. Then the question would arise as to what is the meaning of words, “adjudication”, “formal” and “expression”. 26. The judgment contains statement given by Judge on the ground of a decree. The decree, therefore, need not contain a statement of reasons given by Judge. Then the question would arise as to what is the meaning of words, “adjudication”, “formal” and “expression”. 26. In “Legal Thesaurus-Deluxe Edition 1980” by William C. Burton at page 11 the term “adjudication” has been defined as under: “Adjudication-act of judgment, adjudgment, arbitrage, arbitrament, arbitration, authoritative decision, award, conclusion, decision, declaration, decree, deliberate determination, determination, determination of issues, disposition, edict, final determination, final judgment, finding, irrevocable decision, judgment, judgment on facts, judicial decision, opinion, order, order of the Court, proclamation, pronouncement, reasoned judgment, res judicata, resolution, result, ruling, sentence, settled decision, verdict.” 27. In P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s “The Law Lexicon-The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms, Words and Phrases” 2nd Edition Reprint 2007 at page 11 the term “adjudication” has been defined as under: “Adjudication. The act of adjudicating; the process of trying and determining a case judicially. The application of the law to the facts and an authoritative declaration of the result.” 28. In “Black’s Law Dictionary” with pronunciations Fifth Edition at page 39 the term “adjudication” has been defined as under: “Adjudication. The formal giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a case; also the judgment given. The entry of a decree by a Court in respect to the parties in a case.” 29. In “Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language” 1989 the meaning of word “formal” at page 557 is: “Formal- . . . . . . . being in accordance with usual requirements . . . . . . being a matter of form only; perfunctory . . . . . pertaining to the form, shape or mode of a thing, specially as distinguished from the substance.” 30. In “Legal Thesaurus-Deluxe Edition 1980” by William C. Burton at page 233 the term “formal” has been defined as under: “Formal-accepted, according to established form, affected, approved, businesslike, ceremonial, ceremonious, confirmed, conventional, customary, decorous, fixed, following established custom, following established form, following established rules, formalis, formalistic, in accordance with conventional requirements, inflexible, mannered, observant of form, official, polite, pompous, prescriptive, prim, proper, reserved, rigid, ritual, ritualistic, set, starched, stiff, stilted, systematic, traditional, unbending, uncompromising.” 31. In “Concise Oxford English Dictionary” 11th Edition at page 558 the term “formal” has been defined as under: “Formal-done in accordance with rules of convention or etiquette . . . having a conventionally recognised form, structure, or set of rules. . . . .” 32. In P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s “The Law Lexicon-The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms, Words and Phrases” 2nd Edition Reprint 2007 at page 750 term “formal” has been defined as under: “Formal. Done in due form, or with selemnity; according to regular method. Of the outward form, shape or appearance, not the matter or substance of a thing; ceremonial; required by convention; observance of form and not of the spirit.” 33. The term “expression” is defined in “Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language” 1989 at page 503: “Expression-. . . . . the manner or form in which the thing is expressed in words; wording; phrases . . . . . . indication of feeling, spirit, character etc. as on the face, in the voice or in artistic execution . . . .” 34. In “Legal Thesaurus-Deluxe Edition 1980” by William C. Burton at page 216 the term “expression” has been defined as under: “Expression-appearance, demonstration, disclosure, display, emergence, evidence, evincement, exhibit, exhibition, exposition, exposure, illustration, indication, instance, mark, presentation, presentment, revealment, revelation, show, showing, sign, token, uncovering.” 35. The term “expression” is defined in “Concise Oxford English Dictionary” 11th Edition at page 503: “Expression-the action of expressing something. A look on someone’s face that conveys a particular emotion. A word or phrase expressing an idea. . . .” 36. The term “expression” in defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s “The Law Lexicon-The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms, Words and Phrases” 2nd Edition Reprint 2007 at page 687: “Expression. A word, phrase or form of speech; the act of manifesting by action or language.” 37. The distinction between the “judgment” and “decree”, therefore, is that the judgment contains reasons as well as the conclusions thereof but the decree contains formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining right of parties with regard to all or any of the matter in controversy in the suit. The distinction between the “judgment” and “decree”, therefore, is that the judgment contains reasons as well as the conclusions thereof but the decree contains formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining right of parties with regard to all or any of the matter in controversy in the suit. The phrase “all matters in controversy in the suit” would cover the ultimate conclusion and adjudication made by the Court which should form part of decree as it is this part which has to be normally put on for execution as provided in Part II of CPC. It talks of execution of “decree” and not of the judgment. It is for this reason Section 33 provides that after the case has been heard, the Court shall pronounce judgment and on such judgment a decree shall follow. It is the conclusive determination, therefore, which must be expressed formally in the decree and not the conclusions on various grounds/ issues considered by the Judge in judgment. In the context we are of the view that adjudication determining conclusively rights of parties by the Court, which obviously being the majority decision would/should contain the part of decree and not just and mere “expression” given by all the Judges. 38. The suggestion that decision of Judge constituting minority, if not made a part of the decree, such Judge may not sign the decree, would not apply where the decree is being prepared by the Court in its original jurisdiction as a trial Court. The decree may be signed by all the Judges constituting the Bench. It is necessary to make the things clear unequivocally to parties concerned. In this case categorical and specific majority opinion on various aspects between Judges has to be gathered since the observations and expressions have been made with reservations, references etc. To our mind, it means when an adjudication is made and it conclusively determines rights of parties, only that part should form the contents of decree. The majority judgment finds that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief or Suit-1 is to be dismissed. 39. The extraordinary situation demands extra ordinary procedure and methods. To our mind, it means when an adjudication is made and it conclusively determines rights of parties, only that part should form the contents of decree. The majority judgment finds that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief or Suit-1 is to be dismissed. 39. The extraordinary situation demands extra ordinary procedure and methods. We initially, therefore, were inclined to hold that decision of Sudhir Agarwal, J. constituting minority opinion may be made part of the decree but we ultimately after due diligence over the matter decided to follow a method so that things may be apparent and clear to all parties. The way in which we intend to proceed is not inconsistent with any specific provision with respect to preparation of decree contained in CPC or High Court Rules. 40. We, therefore, direct that the decree of Suit-1 should express Court’s formal expression of adjudication conclusively determining the rights of parties with regard to all the matters in controversy in suit. In our view, the decree, therefore, in Suit-1 be prepared as under: Order of the Court (Majority Order): S.U. Khan, J.—No relief granted. D.V. Sharma, J.—Suit is dismissed with easy costs. 41. So far as other objections are concerned, the corrections mentioned in paras 1 of C.M. Application No. 21(O) of 2010 shall be incorporated since no objection has been raised in this regard. With reference to objections contained in paras 2 and 6 of the application, since the conclusion of Sudhir Agarwal, J. is not to be made part of decree, therefore objection in this regard is rejected. The corrections sought in para 3 of the application is misconceived inasmuch as in the array of parties of Suit-1 defendant No. 9 is Superintendent of Police, Faizabad and not B. Priya Dutt or Babu Priya Dutt Ram, hence this correction sought by applicant is rejected. 42. Now we come to objection taken in para 5 of Application No. 21(O) of 2010. So far as the date of decree is concerned, Order XX Rule 7 CPC reads as under: “7. Date of decree.—The decree shall bear the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree.” 43. So far as the date of decree is concerned, Order XX Rule 7 CPC reads as under: “7. Date of decree.—The decree shall bear the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree.” 43. It is thus evident from Rule 7 that so far as the date of decree is concerned, it would be the same on which judgment was pronounced but signature of the Judge on decree shall be made or can be made subsequently when he is satisfied that decree has been drawn up in accordance with judgement. Therefore, date under the signature of Judges on decree may be different but date of decree cannot be different from that of the judgment. It has to be the same, i.e., the date when the judgement was pronounced. 44. Almost all the High Courts are unanimous with the view that decree comes into existence on the date of judgment even though it is signed later. As soon as the judgment is pronounced, decree is there. In law it comes into existence though it is not formally prepared and signed on the same date. The expression “date of decree” does not mean the date on which it is signed but the date on which the judgment is actually declared. The provision is very clear and admits no doubt. We are fortified in taking the above view from the decisions in Ventataraya v. Mallappa, AIR 1946 Mad 348 ; Sri Ram Chandra Mardaray Deo v. Bhalu Patnaik, AIR 1950 Ori 125 (FB); Dagduba v. Abdul Gafoor, AIR 1954 Hyderabad 104; Lalchand v. Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1961 M.P. 223 ; Rajeshwar Rai v. Shankar Rai, AIR 1962 Pat 398 ; Bai Vasanti v. Suryaprasad, AIR 1969 Guj 152 ; and West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. v. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Ltd., (2000) 1 LRI 606. 45. This is also evident from Order XX Rule 8 which provides that decree can be signed by another Judge where the Judge pronouncing the judgment vacated the office without signing decree or if the Court cease to exist, as the case may be. In this case also D.V. Sharma, J. pronounced the judgment and retired on 01.10.2010. Hence there was/is no occasion for him to sign the decree. In this case also D.V. Sharma, J. pronounced the judgment and retired on 01.10.2010. Hence there was/is no occasion for him to sign the decree. V.K. Dixit, J. has been nominated to the Bench who can sign the decree but obviously he would not mention the date 30.09.2010 under his signatures. The Judge’s signature, therefore, may contain the date when sign the decree but the date of decree would be the date of pronouncement of judgment. The objection, therefore, suggesting that the date of decree must be changed as the date when signed, is hereby rejected. 46. With respect to objection raised in para 4 of C.M. Application No. 21(O) 2010, since S.U. Khan, J. has not granted any relief, the occasion to annex map Plan 1 as part of decree does not arise. 47. So far as Civil Application No. 16(O) of 2010 filed by Nirmohi Akhara is concerned, we find that basically objections raised therein are similar as are contained in C.M. Application No. 21(O) of 2010 filed on behalf of defendants No. 1/1 and 10 in Suit-1, which we have already discussed and, therefore, both these objections are disposed of as discussed above. 48. The office is directed to prepare decree of Suit-1 as directed above. OOS No. 3 of 1989 49. Now coming to OOS No. 3 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “Suit-3”) we find that objections vide Civil Application No. 17(O) of 2010 on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara are in identical terms as Application No. 16(O) of 2010. 50. So far as Suit-3 is concerned, S.U. Khan, J. in his judgment at pages 262 to 276 (pages 109 to 114, Vol. 1 of the report) has not said anything separately but in a composite manner has declared that Nirmohi Akhara is entitled to 1/3 share in the property in dispute. 51. Sudhir Agarwal, J. however in para 4557, page 5073, Vol. 21 (para 4557, page 2868 Vol. III of the report) has held: “4557. In view of our findings in respect of issues No. 2, 3, 4, 9 and 14 the plaintiff, Suit-3, is not entitled to any relief.” 52. Summarizing his findings on various issues, in para 4570, at page 5089, Vol. 21 (para 4570 at page 2877, Vol. III of the report); Sudhir Agarwal, J has said: “4570. . . . . . 9. Summarizing his findings on various issues, in para 4570, at page 5089, Vol. 21 (para 4570 at page 2877, Vol. III of the report); Sudhir Agarwal, J has said: “4570. . . . . . 9. Issue 13 (Suit-3)-The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in view of the findings in respect of issues 2, 3, 4, 14 and 19.” 53. In the ultimate conclusions recorded in para 4571, page 5091, Vol. 21 (para 4571, page 2878, Vol. III of the report) he says that Suit-3 is dismissed and parties shall bear their own costs. It reads as under: “4571. In the result, Suit-1 is partly decreed. Suits 3 and 4 are dismissed. Suit-5 is decreed partly. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.” 54. D.V. Sharma, J. has said in his separate judgement in OOS No. 3 of 1989 at page 18 (page 3496 Vol. III of the report) as under: “The suit is dismissed with easy costs.” 55. In our view the Court’s decision, therefore, in majority is the decision of Sudhir Agarwal and D.V. Sharma, JJ. and, therefore, the decree shall contain the order as under: The Court’s order (by majority of Sudhir Agarwal and D.V. Sharma, JJ.): “Suit is dismissed. Cost made easy.” 56. So far as objections raised in para 1 in Application No. 22(O) of 2010 is concerned, we find that address given for both the defendants No. 6/1 and 6/2 is the same as mentioned in the substitution application, therefore, no change is required. However, we find that word “Bazar” has been printed twice and, therefore, the word “Bazar” at one place shall be deleted. In the description of defendant No. 11 after the word “Singarghat” word “Ayodhya” is already there, hence no correction is required. 57. With respect to objection in para 2 of Application No. 22(O) of 2010 we find that defendant No. 1 in Suit-3 is not Babu Priya Dutt Ram but it is Sri Jamuna Prasad Singh hence no correction is required. 58. So far as objections contained in paras 3 and 4 of the application are concerned, the same stand rejected for the reasons we have already given while discussing similar objections in respect to Suit-1. 59. The other objections on other aspects of the matter stand rejected in view of our discussion already made above being similar. 58. So far as objections contained in paras 3 and 4 of the application are concerned, the same stand rejected for the reasons we have already given while discussing similar objections in respect to Suit-1. 59. The other objections on other aspects of the matter stand rejected in view of our discussion already made above being similar. OOS No. 4 of 1989 60. Now coming to OOS No. 4 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “Suit-4”) we find that objection vide Civil Application No. 18(O) of 2010 on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara is in identical terms as Application No. 16(O) of 2010. 61. So far as Suit-4 is concerned, S.U. Khan, J. in his judgment at pages 262 to 276 (pages 109 to 114, Vol. 1 of the report) has not said anything separately but in a composite manner has declared that Sunni Central Waqf Board is entitled to 1/3 share in the property in dispute. 62. Sudhir Agarwal, J. in para 4553, page 5072, Vol. 21 (para 4553, page 2867 Vol. III of the report) has held: “4553. In view of our finding on Issue No. 3 since the suit is barred by limitation, the question of entitlement of any relief to the plaintiff does not arise as the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.” 63. Summarizing his findings on various issues, in para 4570, at page 5084, Vol. 21 (para 4570 at page 2874, Vol. III of the report) he (Agarwal, J) said: “4570. . . . . . 21. Issue 16 (Suit-4)-No relief since the suit is liable to be dismissed being barred by limitation.” 64. In the ultimate conclusions recorded in para 4571, page 5091, Vol. 21 (para 4571, page 2878, Vol. III of the report) he (Agarwal, J) says that Suit-4 is dismissed and parties shall bear their own costs. It reads as under: “4571. In the result, . . . . . . . . Suits 3 and 4 are dismissed . . . . . . . . . . . In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.” 65. D.V. Sharma, J. has said in his separate judgement in OOS No. 4 of 1989 at page 219, Vol. IV (page 3474 Vol. III of the report) as under: “The suit is dismissed but the parties shall bear their own costs.” 66. . In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.” 65. D.V. Sharma, J. has said in his separate judgement in OOS No. 4 of 1989 at page 219, Vol. IV (page 3474 Vol. III of the report) as under: “The suit is dismissed but the parties shall bear their own costs.” 66. In our view the Court’s decision is the majority decision consisting of Sudhir Agarwal and D.V. Sharma, JJ. and, therefore, the decree shall contain the order as under: The Court’s order (by majority of Sudhir Agarwal and D.V. Sharma, JJ.): “Suit is dismissed. Cost made easy.” 67. The objections otherwise on this aspect stand rejected in view of our discussion made above. 68. The objections vide para 1 of C.M. Application No. 23(O) of 2010 intends to take note of certain fact which is not borne out from the record. Till the matter was decided or even when the judgment was reserved no such information was placed on record that plaintiff No. 9 (Suit-4) Mahmud Ahmad has expired. No application was also placed on record for bringing his heirs on record. We, therefore, at the stage of preparation of decree cannot direct any such change which requires verification of certain facts. The objection as contained in para 1 of application is hereby rejected. 69. The request made vide para 2 of Application No. 23(O) of 2010 also, we are afraid, cannot be granted. As per order, in the array of parties after the name of Sri Gopal Singh Visharad the word “deleted” is already there. The name of Mahant Suresh Das was impleaded as defendant No. 2/1 and, therefore, it has been mentioned in the same manner. Since there is no order changing the chronology of various defendants and, therefore, at this stage we do not find any justification for changing the chronology of defendants and hence, no correction is required as requested in para 2 of the application. It is accordingly rejected. 70. So far as para 3 of Application No. 23(O) of 2010 is concerned, we find that description of party is the same as contained in original plaint. Hence, no correction can be permitted at this stage. It is accordingly rejected. 70. So far as para 3 of Application No. 23(O) of 2010 is concerned, we find that description of party is the same as contained in original plaint. Hence, no correction can be permitted at this stage. Regarding the death of Priya Dutt Ram, Receiver, it is true that there is no order on record to mention it in the array of parties against defendant No. 9 in Suit-4 but this fact has already been taken note in the judgement of Sudhir Agarwal, J. and, therefore, this fact can be mentioned in array of parties. We direct that in the description of defendant No. 9 in Suit-4 after description of defendant No. 9 following shall be added: “(now dead)”. 71. Coming to the request made in para 4 of Application No. 23(O) of 2010 we find that in the description of defendant No. 21 it is already mentioned that he died on 23.07.1994, therefore, nothing further is required. 72. Rest of the request/objections as made in paras 5 and 6 of Application No. 23(O) of 2010 are concerned, the same are rejected for the reasons we have already given while discussing similar objections in regard to Suit-1. OOS No. 5 of 1989 73. Now we come to OOS No. 5 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “Suit-5”). Three objections have been filed. Civil Application No. 19(O) of 2010 is on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara and it is in identical terms as Application No. 16(O) of 2010. 74. Objection No. 20 of 2010 is on behalf of defendant No. 11, All India Hindu Mahasabha. Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate has submitted that it is not evident from the decree whether it is final decree or preliminary decree. According to him the decree is vague and is not inconformity with Section 2(2) CPC. It should mention the determination of issues on the basis of majority judgment of Court which has not been done. The operative part of the judgment of all the three Judges has been mentioned without indicating as to what adjudication have been made by majority opinion and what rights of parties to suit have been determined. He relied on a decision of Apex Court in S. Satnam Singh and others v. Surendra Kaur and another, 2009(2) SCC 562 . 75. The operative part of the judgment of all the three Judges has been mentioned without indicating as to what adjudication have been made by majority opinion and what rights of parties to suit have been determined. He relied on a decision of Apex Court in S. Satnam Singh and others v. Surendra Kaur and another, 2009(2) SCC 562 . 75. The third application is C.M. Application No. 24(O) of 2010 filed on behalf of defendant No. 4, Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, defendant No. 5, Sri Mohammad Hashim and defendant No. 26, Hafiz Mohd. Siddiqui. 76. We first come to factual objections raised in Application No. 24 (O) of 2010 and then shall discuss other aspects. 77. So far as objection raised in para 1 of Application No. 24 (O) of 2010 is concerned, we find that initially the suit was filed by Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawal impleading himself as plaintiff No. 3 but after his death it was substituted by others and lastly by Sri Triloki Nath Pandey. In the circumstances, we do not find any reason or occasion to make any description of Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawal in the decree particularly considering the fact that description of parties in decree is consistent with what it is in the plaint as it was on the date of judgment. Request, therefore, as made vide para 1 of application is hereby rejected. 78. Similarly with respect to defendant No. 6 the information about his death is not on record and none has sought any substitution. The description of parties in decree is consistent with description as contained in the plaint on the date of judgment, hence we do not find any reason to order any alteration particularly when facts sought to be taken note would require verification. Therefore, the request made in para 2 of the application is also rejected. 79. The request made in para 4 refers to a typing mistake in the name of counsel, Sri Zafaryab Jilani. The same is allowed. In the judgment there is no mistake and it appears that this mistake inadvertently has occurred while drawing the decree by office. Therefore, the correction shall be made and the name of counsel shall be corrected as “Zafaryab Jilani”. 80. The same is allowed. In the judgment there is no mistake and it appears that this mistake inadvertently has occurred while drawing the decree by office. Therefore, the correction shall be made and the name of counsel shall be corrected as “Zafaryab Jilani”. 80. The objection regarding date of decree taken in para 6 of Application No. 24 (O) of 2010 is rejected for the reasons we have already given above while discussing similar objections in respect to Suit-1. 81. Now we shall deal with collectively the objections contained in paras 5, 7 and 8 of Application No. 24 (O) of 2010 and the objections raised by Sri H.S. Jain pressing Application No. 20 of 2010. 82. What ought to be the contents of decree we have already discussed. The judgement cited by learned counsel Sri Jain does not lay down any law contrary to what we have already said. In S. Satnam Singh (supra), in para 15 of the judgment, the Apex Court has said: “15. For determining the question as to whether an order passed by a Court is a decree or not, it must satisfy the following tests: “(i) There must be an adjudication; (ii) Such adjudication must have been given in a suit; (iii) It must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; (iv) Such determination must be of a conclusive nature; and (v) There must be a formal expression of such adjudication.” 83. In the subsequent paragraphs of judgment it has discussed the nature of preliminary decree and final decree, the exposition of law whereof admits no exception. 84. We shall now consider what constitute formal expression of adjudication conclusively determining rights of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in suit, so far as Suit-5 is concerned. 85. Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J. has discussed Issue No. 30, Suit-5 on pages 262 to 276 (pages 109 to 114, Vol. 1 of the report). On pages 275-276 (pages 113/114, Vol. 1 of the report) S.U. Khan, J. has said: “Accordingly, in view of the VIIth finding (Supra) all the three parties (Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara) are entitled to a declaration of joint title and possession to the extent of one third each and a preliminary decree to that effect is to be passed. On pages 275-276 (pages 113/114, Vol. 1 of the report) S.U. Khan, J. has said: “Accordingly, in view of the VIIth finding (Supra) all the three parties (Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara) are entitled to a declaration of joint title and possession to the extent of one third each and a preliminary decree to that effect is to be passed. In the matter of actual partition it is only desirable but not necessary to allot that part of property to a party which was in his exclusive use and occupation. Accordingly, in view of peculiar facts and circumstances it is held that in actual partition, the portion where the idol is presently kept in the makeshift temple will be allotted to the Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted land including Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi as shown in the map, plan I. However, to adjust all the three parties at the time of actual partition slight variation in share of any party may be made to be compensated by allotting the adjoining land acquired by the Central Government.” 86. Then the gist of findings have been given on pages 280-283 (115/116, Vol. 1 of the report) which is the summary of findings based whereon the order has been made by S.U. Khan, J. on pages 284-285 (page 116 of the report) which reads as under: “Accordingly, all the three sets of parties, i.e. Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara are declared joint title holders of the property/ premises in dispute as described by letters A B C D E F in the map Plan-I prepared by Sri Shiv Shanker Lal, Pleader/Commissioner appointed by Court in Suit No. 1 to the extent of one third share each for using and managing the same for worshipping. A preliminary decree to this effect is passed. However, it is further declared that the portion below the central dome where at present the idol is kept in makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree. It is further directed that Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted share including that part which is shown by the words Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi in the said map. However, it is further declared that the portion below the central dome where at present the idol is kept in makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree. It is further directed that Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted share including that part which is shown by the words Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi in the said map. It is further clarified that even though all the three parties are declared to have one third share each, however if while allotting exact portions some minor adjustment in the share is to be made then the same will be made and the adversely affected party may be compensated by allotting some portion of the adjoining land which has been acquired by the Central Government. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition by metes and bounds within three months. List immediately after filing of any suggestion/ application for preparation of final decree after obtaining necessary instructions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Status quo as prevailing till date pursuant to Supreme Court judgment of Ismail Farooqui (1994(6) Sec 360) in all its minutest details shall be maintained for a period of three months unless this order is modified or vacated earlier.” 87. Sudhir Agarwal, J. in his decision has considered Issue No. 30, Suit-5 in paras 4558-4566, pages 5073-5081, Vol. 21 (paras 4558-4566, pages 2868-2872, Vol. III of the report). Having discussed the matter in para 4566 the directions/declarations have been given as under: “4566. In the light of the above and considering overall findings of this Court on various issues, following directions and/or declaration, are given which in our view would meet the ends of justice: (i) It is declared that the area covered by the central dome of the three domed structure, i.e., the disputed structure being the deity of Bhagwan Ram Janamsthan and place of birth of Lord Rama as per faith and belief of the Hindus, belong to plaintiffs (Suit-5) and shall not be obstructed or interfered in any manner by the defendants. This area is shown by letters AA BB CC DD in Appendix 7 to this judgment. This area is shown by letters AA BB CC DD in Appendix 7 to this judgment. (ii) The area within the inner Courtyard denoted by letters B C D L K J H G in Appendix 7 (excluding (i) above) belong to members of both the communities, i.e., Hindus (here plaintiffs, Suit-5) and Muslims since it was being used by both since decades and centuries. It is, however, made clear that for the purpose of share of plaintiffs, Suit-5 under this direction the area which is covered by (i) above shall also be included. (iii) The area covered by the structures, namely, Ram Chabutra, (EE FF GG HH in Appendix 7) Sita Rasoi (MM NN OO PP in Appendix 7) and Bhandar (II JJ KK LL in Appendix 7) in the outer Courtyard is declared in the share of Nirmohi Akhara (defendant No. 3) and they shall be entitled to possession thereof in the absence of any person with better title. (iv) The open area within the outer Courtyard (A G H J K L E F in Appendix 7) (except that covered by (iii) above) shall be shared by Nirmohi Akhara (defendant No. 3) and plaintiffs (Suit-5) since it has been generally used by the Hindu people for worship at both places. (iv-a) It is however made clear that the share of muslim parties shall not be less than one third (1/3) of the total area of the premises and if necessary it may be given some area of outer Courtyard. It is also made clear that while making partition by metes and bounds, if some minor adjustments are to be made with respect to the share of different parties, the affected party may be compensated by allotting the requisite land from the area which is under acquisition of the Government of India. (v) The land which is available with the Government of India acquired under Ayodhya Act 1993 for providing it to the parties who are successful in the suit for better enjoyment of the property shall be made available to the above concerned parties in such manner so that all the three parties may utilise the area to which they are entitled to, by having separate entry for egress and ingress of the people without disturbing each others rights. For this purpose the concerned parties may approach the Government of India who shall act in accordance with the above directions and also as contained in the judgement of Apex Court in Dr. Ismail Farooqi (Supra). (vi) A decree, partly preliminary and partly final, to the effect as said above (i to v) is passed. Suit-5 is decreed in part to the above extent. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition of the property in dispute in the manner as directed above by metes and bounds by submitting an application to this effect to the Officer on Special Duty, Ayodhya Bench at Lucknow or the Registrar, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, as the case may be. (vii) For a period of three months or unless directed otherwise, whichever is earlier, the parties shall maintain status quo as on today in respect of property in dispute.” 88. The summary of findings on different issues is contained in para 4570, page 5091, Vol. 21 (para 4570, at page 2878, Vol. III of the report) and it says: “20. Issue 30 (Suit-5)-The suit is partly decreed in the manner the directions are issued in para 4566.” 89. In para 4571 it concludes by saying that Suit-5 is decreed partly. 90. A wholesome reading of above makes it clear that suit has been partly decreed in the decision of Agarwal, J. in the manner the directions/declarations contained in para 4566 and cost has been made easy on parties vide para 4571. Therefore, in our view, the decree must contain from the decision of Agarwal, J., the directions/declarations contained in para 4566 and part of para 4571 which provides that the parties shall bear their own costs. 91. D.V. Sharma, J. has decreed Suit-5 in its entirety and in his separate judgment in OOS No. 5 of 1989 on page 174 (Page 3586, Vol. III of the report) after dealing Issue No. 30 he has passed following order: “Plaintiffs’ suit is decreed but with easy costs. It is hereby declared that the entire premises of Sri Ram Janm Bhumi at Ayodhya as described and delineated in annexure Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint belong to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, the deities. III of the report) after dealing Issue No. 30 he has passed following order: “Plaintiffs’ suit is decreed but with easy costs. It is hereby declared that the entire premises of Sri Ram Janm Bhumi at Ayodhya as described and delineated in annexure Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint belong to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, the deities. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with, or raising any objection to, or placing any obstruction in the construction of the temple at Ram Janm Bhumi Ayodhya at the site, referred to in the plaint.” 92. The order of the Court, therefore, is the majority order consisting of S.U. Khan and Sudhir Agarwal, JJ. In our view, the decree must contain the order as under: The Court’s order (by majority of S.U. Khan and Sudhir Agarwal, JJ.) S.U. Khan, J. “Accordingly, all the three sets of parties, i.e. Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara are declared joint title holders of the property/ premises in dispute as described by letters A B C D E F in the map Plan-I prepared by Sri Shiv Shanker Lal, Pleader/Commissioner appointed by Court in Suit No. 1 to the extent of one third share each for using and managing the same for worshipping. A preliminary decree to this effect is passed. However, it is further declared that the portion below the central dome where at present the idol is kept in makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree. It is further directed that Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted share including that part which is shown by the words Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi in the said map. It is further clarified that even though all the three parties are declared to have one third share each, however if while allotting exact portions some minor adjustment in the share is to be made then the same will be made and the adversely affected party may be compensated by allotting some portion of the adjoining land which has been acquired by the Central Government. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition by metes and bounds within three months. List immediately after filing of any suggestion/ application for preparation of final decree after obtaining necessary instructions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition by metes and bounds within three months. List immediately after filing of any suggestion/ application for preparation of final decree after obtaining necessary instructions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Status quo as prevailing till date pursuant to Supreme Court judgment of Ismail Farooqui (1994(6) Sec 360) in all its minutest details shall be maintained for a period of three months unless this order is modified or vacated earlier.” Sudhir Agarwal, J. (i) It is declared that the area covered by the central dome of the three domed structure, i.e., the disputed structure being the deity of Bhagwan Ram Janamsthan and place of birth of Lord Rama as per faith and belief of the Hindus, belong to plaintiffs (Suit-5) and shall not be obstructed or interfered in any manner by the defendants. This area is shown by letters AA BB CC DD in Appendix 7 to this judgment. (ii) The area within the inner Courtyard denoted by letters B C D L K J H G in Appendix 7 (excluding (i) above) belong to members of both the communities, i.e., Hindus (here plaintiffs, Suit-5) and Muslims since it was being used by both since decades and centuries. It is, however, made clear that for the purpose of share of plaintiffs, Suit-5 under this direction the area which is covered by (i) above shall also be included. (iii) The area covered by the structures, namely, Ram Chabutra, (EE FF GG HH in Appendix 7) Sita Rasoi (MM NN OO PP in Appendix 7) and Bhandar (II JJ KK LL in Appendix 7) in the outer Courtyard is declared in the share of Nirmohi Akhara (defendant No. 3) and they shall be entitled to possession thereof in the absence of any person with better title. (iv) The open area within the outer Courtyard (A G H J K L E F in Appendix 7) (except that covered by (iii) above) shall be shared by Nirmohi Akhara (defendant No. 3) and plaintiffs (Suit-5) since it has been generally used by the Hindu people for worship at both places. (iv-a) It is however made clear that the share of muslim parties shall not be less than one third (1/3) of the total area of the premises and if necessary it may be given some area of outer Courtyard. (iv-a) It is however made clear that the share of muslim parties shall not be less than one third (1/3) of the total area of the premises and if necessary it may be given some area of outer Courtyard. It is also made clear that while making partition by metes and bounds, if some minor adjustments are to be made with respect to the share of different parties, the affected party may be compensated by allotting the requisite land from the area which is under acquisition of the Government of India. (v) The land which is available with the Government of India acquired under Ayodhya Act 1993 for providing it to the parties who are successful in the suit for better enjoyment of the property shall be made available to the above concerned parties in such manner so that all the three parties may utilise the area to which they are entitled to, by having separate entry for egress and ingress of the people without disturbing each others rights. For this purpose the concerned parties may approach the Government of India who shall act in accordance with the above directions and also as contained in the judgement of Apex Court in Dr. Ismail Farooqi (Supra). (vi) A decree, partly preliminary and partly final, to the effect as said above (i to v) is passed. Suit-5 is decreed in part to the above extent. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition of the property in dispute in the manner as directed above by metes and bounds by submitting an application to this effect to the Officer on Special Duty, Ayodhya Bench at Lucknow or the Registrar, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, as the case may be. (vii) For a period of three months or unless directed otherwise, whichever is earlier, the parties shall maintain status quo as on today in respect of property in dispute. (viii)The parties shall bear there own costs.” 93. The map Plan 1 prepared by Shiv Shankar Lal, Pleader/ Commissioner referred to in the order of S.U. Khan, J. and Appendix-7 referred to in the order of Sudhir Agarwal, J. shall form part of the decree of Suit-5. 94. The Objection No. 20 of 2010, paras 5, 7 and 8 of Application No. 24(O) of 2010 and Application No. 19(O) of 2010 are disposed of accordingly. —————