ORDER 07.01.2011 — Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Advocate for the State. 2.This writ petition has been filed seeking the prayer for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 17.9.1997 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Kalahandi in L.A. Case No. 2 of 1996 and further for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the opposite party to refer the matter to the concerned reference Court for re-determination of compensation amount of the land in question of the petitioner acquired for construction of Chhoriagarh M.I.P. in L.A. Case No. 2/1996. 3.The case of the petitioner in brief is that the father of the petitioner was the owner in possession of Plot No. 157 corresponding to Khata No. 30 of Mouza Chhuriagarh. The aforesaid land was submersed in the M.I.P., Chhuriagarh for which opposite party acquired the said land under Section 4(1) notification dated 11.4.1996. In this regard a land acquisition proceeding vide L.A. Case No. 2/1996 was started and vide order dated 15.4.1997 notice under Section 9 (i) & (ii) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) was issued inviting objection from the person interested. After receipt of notice the petitioner’s father filed objection. Thereafter the opposite party vide its order dated 7.6.1997 disbursed the awarded amount in favour of the petitioner’s father and other persons which was received by him with objection. Being not satisfied, petitioner’s father filed a petition under Section 18 of the Act along with a petition U/s. 5 of the Limitation Act to refer the matter to the Civil Court for reassessment of the compensation amount. The same has been rejected by the opposite party vide impugned order dated 17.9.1997. Hence this writ petition. 4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no doubt the award has been received by the petitioner’s father, but being not satisfied, father of the petitioner filed Section 18 petition to refer the matter to the reference Court for proper determination of the market value of the acquired land, which was rejected without giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice and in contravention of the law under Section 18 of the Act read with Section 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice and in contravention of the law under Section 18 of the Act read with Section 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act. As the determination of the market value is the statutory rights of the land losers shall get the reasonable compensation, which has not been done in this case. Therefore, the petitioner is before this Court seeking appropriate relief. 5.This Court at the time of admission of this matter on 02.12.2010 heard the learned counsel for the petitioner preliminarily on the question of maintainability of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mohan Vasta Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 115, wherein the Gujarat High Court while dealing with Section 18 of the Act and Section 29 of the Limitation Act, referring the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum, v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 ; and Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335 , at paragraph 3 of its judgment held that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in view of the fact that there is no restriction in the applicability of the Limitation Act. 6.Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of the Gujarat High Court and in view of the facts involved in this case, this Court on 02.12.2010 at the time of admission formulated as many as five issues for its consideration and issued notice to the opposite party. The said issues are as follows: “(1)As to whether the impugned order is passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner ? (2)As to whether the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in entertaining the application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, on the basis of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, particularly having regard to the fact that the applicability of the Limitation is not expressly ousted in the proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is maintainable in law ? (3)As to whether the order is a nullity in the eye of law ? (3)As to whether the order is a nullity in the eye of law ? (4)As to whether the impugned order, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is in violation of Principles of natural justice ? (5)As to whether the writ petition, which has been filed after a lapse of 12 years is not maintainable, against the impugned order which was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.09.1997 in LA. Case No. 2/1996, keeping in view the observation made by the Supreme Court at paragraph 11 in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 , placing reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 ?” 7.Pursuant to the said notice, opposite party has filed the counter affidavit traversing the prayer of the petitioner urging various grounds, namely, that the writ petition is hit by delay and latches as the petitioner has approached this Court after lapse of more than 13 years without proper explanation for this inordinate delay. Further, the order has been passed by the opposite party after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner’s father along with the counsel engaged on his behalf. The father of the petitioner received the compensation on 07.06.1997, however, he filed reference petition U/s. 18 of the Act on 17.09.1997 after a lapse of 14 weeks, which is beyond the stipulated time limit of six weeks. It is stated that there were 10 awardees including the petitioner’s father, therefore, if the petitioner’s father was ill during that period, then any other awardees could have filed the reference petition within the prescribed time limit. Therefore, the reference petition filed by the petitioner’s father U/s. 18 of the Act was rightly rejected as it was beyond the stipulated time. Hence, it is not a fit case for exercising discretionary power at this belated stage. 8.Learned Government Advocate, referring to the stand taken in the counter, submitted that the petitioner’s father was represented by his counsel as could be seen from the order sheet, there is nothing indicated in the order that the petitioner counsel has not been heard. Hence, it is not a fit case for exercising discretionary power at this belated stage. 8.Learned Government Advocate, referring to the stand taken in the counter, submitted that the petitioner’s father was represented by his counsel as could be seen from the order sheet, there is nothing indicated in the order that the petitioner counsel has not been heard. Placing reliance upon the order dated 17.9.1997 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, it is further submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer after proper application of mind and considering the petition U/s. 5 of the Limitation Act rightly came to the conclusion that the petitions U/s. 18 of the Act are beyond the stipulated period of six weeks from the date of award passed by the LA Collector as well as of 12(2) notice issued to the awardees. In case of illness of the petitioner’s father, the other co sharers who are the awardees along with the petitioner’s father could have filed the petition u/s. 18 of the Act within the stipulated period. Therefore, the order impugned in this writ petition has rightly been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the same does not call for any interference. It is further submitted that the petitioner is not at all diligent for the reason that he has not only approached the Land Acquisition Officer after a lapse of 14 weeks which is much beyond the stipulated period fixed in the statute, but has also approached this Court after a lapse of near about twelve years from the date of the impugned order. Therefore, this writ petition is also cannot be entertained and is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches. 9.With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions, we have carefully examined the records produced before us and gone through the relevant provisions of the Act. We are required to answer the aforesaid points framed by us. 10.It appears from the records, which have been made available for our perusal, that there is nothing indicated in the order sheet that on the date when the case was taken up either the father of the petitioner or counsel on behalf of him had been notified or he has been heard before passing the impugned order. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order has been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order has been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. Hence the impugned order is a nullity in the eye of law as held by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions. 11.A seven Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 vide paragraphs 57, 58 and 61 of its judgment held that in the absence of statutory provisions, the principles of natural justice will apply. The relevant portion of the observation in the aforesaid paragraphs read as under: “....although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem.... ....Natural justice is a great humanizing principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action.... The enquiry must always be : does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected ?..... .......The law must now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.” 12.Therefore, in view of the above, as we have already held that the order is nullity in the eye of law, question of delay and latches does not come in the way for a party to approach this Court particularly, which is a Constitutional Court upon which powers under Articles 226 & 227 have been vested with it. The contention urged by the learned Government Advocate that it is barred by limitation cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 . The contention urged by the learned Government Advocate that it is barred by limitation cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 . 13.It is no doubt true that land can be acquired by the State Government for public purpose, but at the same time it is also the duty of the State Government to see that the land losers are awarded with proper compensation, which is not only a constitutional right guaranteed to the citizen but also a human right as held by the Apex Court. Therefore, the more onerous responsibilities on the Land Acquisition Officer to determine the market value of the land and give compensation to the land affected persons. If the award is not satisfactory, the land losers have got every right to file a petition U/s. 18 of the Act to make reference to the appropriate Court for proper adjudication and consideration of the matter on the basis of the market value prevalent at the time when the land was acquired. 14.For the reasons stated supra, points Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 are answered in favour of the petitioner accordingly. 15.Further, as could be seen from the order sheet that while considering the application U/s. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in the filing the Section 18 petition, the Land Acquisition Officer has not examined the same keeping in view the provisions under Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court referred to supra is aptly applicable in the instant case, wherein the Gujarat High Court held that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in view of the fact that there is no restriction in the applicability of the Limitation Act in the Land Acquisition Act. In this view of the matter, point No. 2 is also answered accordingly. In this view of the matter, point No. 2 is also answered accordingly. 16.As we have answered all the aforesaid points in favour of the petitioner, the impugned order dated 17.9.1997 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Kalahandi in L.A. Case No. 2 of 1996 is hereby quashed and we remand the matter to the said Land Acquisition Officer for fresh consideration of the petition under Section 18 of the Act filed by the petitioner and direct the Land Acquisition Officer that he shall dispose of the said petition in accordance with law after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. With the aforesaid observation and direction, this writ petition is disposed of. Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application. Petition disposed of.