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2011 DIGILAW 1102 (PNJ)

Ram Niwas v. Central Administrative Tribunal

2011-04-25

M.M.KUMAR, T.P.S.MANN

body2011
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. The instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against order dated 28.4.2010 (P-6), passed by the Chandigarh Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal (for brevity, the Tribunal), dismissing the original application on the ground that it is barred by limitation. It is appropriate to mention that the applicant- petitioner had challenged order dated 4.10.1996 (A- 1), dismissing him from service under Rule 19(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Class, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for brevity, the Rules). The subsequent order dated 21.4.2008 (A-2), passed by the Government of India, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Department of Telecommunications, New Delhi, was also impugned before the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal dismissed the original application by observing that there is delay of 12 years from the date of the order of termination dated 4.10.1996 (A-1). It has further been held that against the order dated 4.10.1996 the revision petition was filed on 18.11.2006 after more than 10 years of dismissal of the petitioner from service. According to the Tribunal such a revision petition was not maintainable because it was filed beyond the statutory period and it would not give cause of action to the petitioner. 2. Having dismissed the original application on the ground of delay and laches, the Tribunal proceeded to uphold the aforesaid orders on merit as well, which is discernible from para 8 and the same reads as under:- "8. The vital ground taken by the applicant against the impugned order of dismissal from service is that the competent authority did not record detailed reasons to dispense with the enquiry proceedings under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, read with Rule 19(ii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. On going through the record produced by the respondents we find that detailed reasons for dispensing with the regular enquiry proceedings against the applicant existed and were duly recorded on the file giving numerous instances which certainly reflect the conduct of the applicant requiring his dismissal from service in short of holding a regular inquiry. Such reasons and satisfaction of the Competent Authority have also been mentioned in nut shell in the impugned order of dismissal of the applicant from services. Annexure-1. Such reasons and satisfaction of the Competent Authority have also been mentioned in nut shell in the impugned order of dismissal of the applicant from services. Annexure-1. Thus on the basis of such reasons recorded in writing once the Disciplinary Authority felt satisfied under provisions of Rule 19(ii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 under powers of judicial review, this Tribunal has no authority and jurisdiction to override the satisfaction of the competent authority to take a different view and to hold that the impugned order suffers any such lacuna. The decision does not appear to have been taken because of some whim or ipse or on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. Such pleas taken on behalf of the applicant are hereby rejected." 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and are of the view that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal with regard to delay in filing the original application does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same is sustainable although on different grounds. In that regard it would be necessary to read Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for brevity, the Act), which is as under :- "20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted.- (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,- (a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial. 21. Limitation.- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and >(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) xxx xxx xxx" 4 A perusal of Section 21((1)(b) of the Act would show that in a case where an aggrieved employee has filed an appeal or representation as per the provisions of clause (b) of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act and a period of six months had expired thereafter without passing any final order then within one year from the date of expiry of such period of six months the original application must be filed. According to the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, if no final order has been made by the Government in respect of the appeal preferred or representation made by an employee and a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation made has expired then a person is to be deemed to have availed all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules with regard to redressal of his grievances. Therefore, the period of limitation of one year would commence on the expiry of six months of the filing of appeal/representation and revision. 5. In the present case it has come on record that the petitioner has challenged order dated 4.10.1996 in a revision petition filed on 18.11.2006 after a period of more than 10 years. Therefore, the cause of action, if any, would have arisen to him within a period of limitation. Had the revision petition been filed within the reasonable period after the passing of order dated 4.10.1996 then on the expiry of six months the cause of action would have arisen and the original application could have been filed within one year from the date of expiry of that period. Accordingly, we find that since the revision petition itself was filed after ten years the order dated 21.4.2008 would not give the petitioner a fresh cause of action. If such a course is allowed then any stale claim could travel to the Courts without any compliance of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal deserves to be confirmed. 6. There is another aspect of the matter. There is doctrine of Acquiescence. In the present case, the revision petition itself was delayed by 10 years. It appears that the petitioner has acquiescist and accepted his order of dismissal. He also appears to have accepted that the regular departmental inquiry has been rightly dispensed with. 7. We are further of the view that the Tribunal has rightly upheld the order of dismissal of the petitioner without holding any inquiry because the petitioner has resorted to murderous assault. He assaulted Shri N.P. Dhamariia, Chief Manager, Haryana Telecom Circle, Ambala, on 18.9.1996, who sent a complaint dated 18.9.1996 to the Incharge, Police Post, Lal Kurti, Ambala Cantt. (A-3). We are further of the view that the Tribunal has rightly upheld the order of dismissal of the petitioner without holding any inquiry because the petitioner has resorted to murderous assault. He assaulted Shri N.P. Dhamariia, Chief Manager, Haryana Telecom Circle, Ambala, on 18.9.1996, who sent a complaint dated 18.9.1996 to the Incharge, Police Post, Lal Kurti, Ambala Cantt. (A-3). The petitioner is alleged to have assaulted the Chief Manager, Telecom, Haryana Circle, Ambala, with hockey stick and injured his left foot knee and also gave 2-3 hockey blows on his back. He alleged that the petitioner had given him injuries only with an intention to kill him. The same version is repeated in Annexure A-4. It is further pertinent to mention that although charge under Section 307 IPC was deleted but the trial was held under Sections 332/353/506 IPC. 8. As a sequel to the above discussion, we find that this petition is wholly without merit and accordingly the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.