Judgment : 1. This petition is filed by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee challenging the judgment and order dated 17-12-2005 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, in Complaint (ULPN) No.574 of 2002. The Industrial Court, by the impugned judgment and order, has directed the petitioner-Market Committee to pay to the respondent No.2-complainant the subsistence allowance as per the provisions of Clause 25(5-A) of the Model Standing Orders till the suspension of the respondent-complainant is revoked or till the final order is passed after completion of the departmental enquiry, whichever occurs earlier. 2. In the complaint filed under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 invoking Item 9 of Schedule IV of the said Act, it was alleged that the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 [for short, “the Employment (Standing Orders) Act”] were applicable to the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee and as per the provisions of Clause 25(5-A) of the Model Standing Orders framed thereunder, the respondent-complainant was entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% of the basic pay after completion of 90 days from the date of suspension, i.e. 30-3-2002, and at the rate of 100% after completion of 180 days. However, the petitioner-Market Committee was paying subsistence allowance to the respondent-complainant at the rate of 50% of the wages as per the provisions of the Rules framed by the petitioner-Market Committee, during the period of suspension, which, according to the respondent-complainant, was illegal. Hence, the claim was made as per the provisions of the Model Standing Orders, which has been granted. 3. The stand of the petitioner-Market Committee before the Industrial Court was that the petitioner-Market Committee is not covered by the definition of “industrial establishment” under Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and hence the provisions of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act or the Model Standing Orders framed thereunder were not applicable to the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee. The respondent-complainant was, therefore, not entitled to subsistence allowance as per the provisions of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Model Standing Orders. 4. The respondent-complainant was, therefore, not entitled to subsistence allowance as per the provisions of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Model Standing Orders. 4. The Industrial Court, after referring to the definition of “industrial establishment” under Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the definition of “industrial or other establishments” under Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has recorded the finding that the provisions of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act are applicable to the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee for the reason that the word “produce” employed in the definition of “industrial establishment” can be interpreted as to bring forward or to provide for consideration, inspection or sale. The further finding is recorded that the petitioner-Market Committee is bringing forward the notified agricultural produce for sale by public auction through the broker and hence it is covered by the definition of “industrial establishment” given in Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act. 5. In view of the aforesaid pleadings and the decision given by the Industrial Court, the question, which falls for consideration of this Court, is whether the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee is covered by the definition of “industrial establishment” under Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 read with Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act. It is not disputed before this Court that if the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee is covered by the said definition, then the provisions of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Model Standing Orders framed thereunder will be applicable and the respondent-complainant will be entitled to subsistence allowance as per the provisions of Clause 25(5-A) of the Model Standing Orders. It is also not disputed that on the basis of principle of generaliaspecialibus non-derogant, the provisions of the Model Standing Orders shall override the provisions of the Rules framed by the petitioner-Market Committee. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present case, the provisions of Section 2(e) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act are required to be seen. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present case, the provisions of Section 2(e) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act are required to be seen. Hence, the said provisions are reproduced below : “Section 2(e) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 : “2(e) - “industrial establishment” means - (i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, (4 of 1936), or (ii) a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948) or (iii) a railway as defined in clause (iv) of Section 2 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890); (iv) * * *” “Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 : “2(ii) - “industrial or other establishments” means any - (a) tramway service, or motor transport service engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward; (aa) air transport service other than such service belonging to or exclusively employed in the military, naval or air forces of the Union or the Civil Aviation Department of the Government of India; (b) dock, wharf or jetty; (c) inland vessel, mechanically propelled; (d) mine, quarry or oil-field; (e) plantation; (f) workshop or other establishments in which articles are produced, adapted or manufactured, with a view to their use, transport or sale. (g) establishment in which any work relating to the construction, development or maintenance of buildings, roads, bridges or canals, or relating to operations connected with navigation, irrigation or to the supply of water, or relating to the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity or any other form of power is being carried on; (h) any other establishment or class of establishments which the appropriate Government may, having regard to the nature thereof, the need for protection of persons employed therein, and other relevant circumstances, specify, by notification in the Official Gazette. 7. 7. Inviting my attention to the provisions of Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act and Section 2(ii)(f) of the Payment of Wages Act, Shri Dastane, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Market Committee, has urged that the word “workshop” employed in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act is followed by the general word “other establishments” and hence the principle of interpretation covered by the maxims noscitura sociis and ejusdemgeneris needs to be invoked to hold that the word “other establishments” shall take its colour from the word “workshop”. According to him, the word “workshop” represents a class, category or genus and hence the meaning of the term “other establishments” following it will have to be limited to the class, category or genus of “workshop” and its scope cannot be widened. He further submits that clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act refers to the articles, which are produced, adapted or manufactured, with a view to their use, transport or sale. Hence only such “other establishments” where the activities of the kind, similar to the one carried out in the “workshop”, are covered. He, therefore, submits that the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee cannot be termed as the “other establishment”, as stipulated in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, as the activities of production, adaptation or manufacturing are not undertaken by the petitioner-Market Committee. He further submits that the word “produce” employed in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, reproduced above, means “to create”, as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary and the petitioner-Market Committee is not creating any product nor is engaged in the activities of creating agricultural produce. Hence, according to him, the petitioner- Market Committee is not an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act. 8. The rule of construction of noscitura sociis means the meaning of a word is to be judged by company it keeps and when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified, the rule is known as ejusdemgeneris. The noscitura sociis is wider than the rule of ejusdemgeneris and the latter is only an application of the former. The noscitura sociis is wider than the rule of ejusdemgeneris and the latter is only an application of the former. The rule of ejusdemgeneric attempts to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words. It applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words, (ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category, (iii) the class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration, (iv) the general terms follow the enumeration, and (v) there is no indication of different legislative intent. However, if the subjects of enumeration belong to a broad-based genus as also to a narrower genus, there is no principle that the general words should be confined to the narrower genus. If upon consideration of the context and the object sought to be attained and of the act as a whole it adequately appears that the general words were not used in the restricted sense suggested by the rule, the effect must be given to the conclusion afforded by the wider view in order that the will of the Legislature shall not fail. These are all the principles of law laid down in a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of MaharashtraUniversity of Health Sciences and others v. SatchikistsaPrasarak Mandal and others, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 786 . 9. The definition of “industrial establishment” under Section 2(e)(i) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act includes the industrial establishments, as defined in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, and it includes the factories, railways and the establishments of the contractors. The definition of “industrial or other establishments” under Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act is still wider and includes the establishments of tramway service, motor transport service engaged in carrying passengers or goods, dock, wharf or jetty, inland vessel, mine, quarry or oil-field, plantation and also the activities of construction, development or maintenance of buildings, roads, bridges or canals, the activities of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, etc. There are various kinds of activities of industrial or other establishments, which are included within the definitions under both the enactments. The activities include the production, manufacture, trading, construction, transmission, distribution, rendering services, transportation, mining, plantation, etc. Almost all the kinds of the activities of industrial, commercial, trading, rendering of different kinds of services are included. There are various kinds of activities of industrial or other establishments, which are included within the definitions under both the enactments. The activities include the production, manufacture, trading, construction, transmission, distribution, rendering services, transportation, mining, plantation, etc. Almost all the kinds of the activities of industrial, commercial, trading, rendering of different kinds of services are included. The clauses of the definition in both these enactments are of very wide amplitude and will have to be read as a whole. If read as a whole indicates enumeration of different classes or categories of industrial establishments. Hence, there is no reason to put a narrow construction upon the word “other establishments” occurring under clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act. The subjects of enumeration in various clauses of the definition belong to a broad-based genus and also to a narrower genus. Hence, the applicability of the interpretation under the aforesaid two maxims is excluded. 10. Clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act deals with “workshop” or “other establishments” in which articles are produced, adapted or manufactured with a view to their use, transport or sale. “Workshop” means a place of a factory, plant, or garage wherein any industrial process is carried on. Such process may include the process of manufacturing or repairing. It thus carries a restricted meaning. On the other hand, the term “other establishments” is of a wider amplitude and it may include several other activities of industrial, commercial, trading, rendering of services, etc. It is not used as synonym of “workshop” and it includes the activities other than those carried on in “workshop” and hence its meaning cannot be restricted to a class or category of “workshop”. 11. The word “produce”, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, is to bring into existence, or to create. Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines “produce” to mean to make, to manufacture, or to create. Advanced Law Lexicon by Justice Y.V. Chandrachud defines “produce” to include “manufacture”. Black's Law Dictionary defines “manufacture” to mean a thing that is made or built by a human-being, as distinguished from something that is a product of nature. Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines “manufacture” to mean to make (something) on the large scale using machinery. Advanced Law Lexicon by Justice Y.V. Chandrachud defines “produce” to include “manufacture”. Black's Law Dictionary defines “manufacture” to mean a thing that is made or built by a human-being, as distinguished from something that is a product of nature. Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines “manufacture” to mean to make (something) on the large scale using machinery. Advanced Law Lexicon defines “manufacture” to mean to bring into existence a new substance and does not mean merely to produce some change in a substance. It further defines “manufacture” to mean the transformation of the goods into a new commodity commercially known as a distinct and separate commodity having its own character, use and name, whether it be the result of one process or the several processes. It states that “manufacture” includes any art, process or manner of producing, preparing or making an article, and also any article prepared or produced by manufacture. “Manufacturing” and “producing” are also defined in Advanced Law Lexicon. It states that “manufacturing” and “producing” are synonymous and to manufacture is to produce something new out of the existing materials. It further states that “manufacture” and the adjective “manufacturing” are synonymous and inter-changeable with produce and producing. It defines “produce” to mean to make, to manufacture. It states that “manufacture” or “produce” thus implied the change in the sense of transformation into new and different articles having a distinct name, character and use. Thus, both the terms “produce” and “manufacture” are synonymous and can be used to define one and the same process of creation. 12. Clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act deals with “workshop” or “other establishments”. Once it is held that the word “other establishments” is not synonym of “workshop”, then the word “produced” used in the said clause, cannot be construed as synonym of “manufactured”. Both these terms will have to be given a separate meaning. Otherwise, either of them would be rendered otiose or redundant. If the word “produced” is considered as synonym of “manufacture”, then there was no reason to use the term “workshop” or “other establishments” separately, rendering either of them as otiose or redundant. Hence, in the light of the activities carried on by the petitioner-Market Committee, the word “produced” will have to be construed and attributed a meaning, other than that of the word “manufactured”. Hence, in the light of the activities carried on by the petitioner-Market Committee, the word “produced” will have to be construed and attributed a meaning, other than that of the word “manufactured”. What other meaning can be attributed to the word “produced” is now required to be considered. 13. The object of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 (for short, “the APMC Act”), as it appears from the preamble, is to develop and regulate marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas and markets including private markets and farmer-consumer markets to be established therefor in the State of Maharashtra. “Agricultural produce” is defined under Section 2(1)(a) of the APMC Act to mean all produce (whether processed or not) of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, apiculture, pisciculture, fisheries and forest specified in the Schedule. The agricultural products are transported and brought in the market yard of the petitioner-Market Committee for the purposes of their store, sale and thereafter to be transported and taken outside the market yard. The main function of the petitioner-Market Committee is to regulate marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas to be established for that purpose. The agricultural products are transported and brought in the market yard of the petitioner-Market Committee for the purposes of their store, sale and thereafter to be transported and taken outside the market yard. The main function of the petitioner-Market Committee is to regulate marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas to be established for that purpose. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the APMC Act deals with the functions of the Market Committee and the relevant of it, are reproduced below : “(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, a Market Committee may - (i) regulate the entry of persons and of vehicular traffic into the market; (ii) Supervise the behavior of those who enter the market for transacting business; (iii) grant, renew, refuse, suspend or cancel licence; (iv) maintain and manage the market including admissions to, and conditions for use of, markets within the market area; (v) provide for necessary facilities for the marketing of agriculture produce within the market in the market area; (vi) regulate and supervise the auctions of notified agricultural produce in accordance with the provisions and procedure laid down under the rules made under this Act or the bye-laws of the Market Committee; (vii) regulate the making, carrying out and enforcement or cancellation of sales, weighment, delivery, payment to be made in respect thereof and all other matters relating to the marketing of notified agriculture produce in the prescribed manner; (viii) take all possible steps to prevent adulteration and to promote and organise grading and standardization of the agricultural produce; (ix) take measures for the prevention of purchases and sales below the minimum support prices as fixed by the Government from time to time. ... ... ...” The facilities of marketing of agricultural produce, regulating auctions and carrying out and enforcement or cancellation of sales, weighment, delivery, and payments, are also carried on in the market area. The facilities of storage of produce, its grading and standardization are also provided. These are all continuous activities, having character of commerciality involved in it. In order to carry out several activities, the workmen are employed and there subsists a relationship of “employer and employee”. The Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Payment of Wages Act are the labour and social welfare legislations providing protection and benefits to the workmen. These are all continuous activities, having character of commerciality involved in it. In order to carry out several activities, the workmen are employed and there subsists a relationship of “employer and employee”. The Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Payment of Wages Act are the labour and social welfare legislations providing protection and benefits to the workmen. It is for the purposes of promoting the aims and objects of these enactments, that the meaning will have to be attributed to the word “produced” employed in the said definition. 14. The object of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act is to provide for defining with sufficient precision certain conditions of employment in the industrial establishments in the State of Bombay and for certain other matters. The object of the Payment of Wages Act is to regulate the payment of wages to certain class of employed persons. Both these enactments deal with the persons, who are the “workman”, as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Keeping in view the objects of aforesaid enactments and the aforesaid activities of the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee, the term “produce” will have to be construed. Concise Oxford English Dictionary describes the word “produce” to mean to provide for consideration, inspection or sale. Advanced Law Lexicon also defines the word “produce” to mean to show it or to bring into view or notice. Black's Law Dictionary defines “produce” to mean to provide. Thus, the word “produced” employed in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act will have to be given meaning of bringing forward, or to provide for consideration, inspection, storage, grading standardizing, weighment, price fixation, payment, delivery, etc. of the agricultural produce with a view to use, transport or sale. It is not necessary to attribute the same meaning to the word “produced”, which is attributable to the word “manufactured”. It is not disputed that the activities of use, transport or sale of the agricultural produce are carried on in the market area, with the help of “workman”, as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, the term “other establishments” employed in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act would include the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee, and consequently it would be an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 2(e) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act. Hence, the term “other establishments” employed in clause (f) of Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act would include the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee, and consequently it would be an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 2(e) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act. Hence, the view taken by the Industrial Court that the establishment of the petitioner- Market Committee is covered by the definition of “industrial establishment” under Section 2(e) of the Employment (Standing Orders) Act, cannot be faulted with. 15. Once it is held that the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are applicable to the employees working in the establishment of the petitioner-Market Committee, then obviously the payment of subsistence allowance will have to be in terms of clause 25(5-A) of the Model Standing Orders framed under the said Act. Hence, there is no substance in this petition. 16. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.